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JURGEN HABERMAS AND MARX:
CRITIQUE OF AN INCIPIENT PUBLIC SPHERE
by
Russell L. Rockwell 
Adviser: Professor Stanley Aronowitz
This study examines the relationship of Jurgen Habermas's ideas to 
those of Marx. A close reading of Habermas's major works, in conjunction with 
a close reading as well of the Marx texts he analyzes, comprises the 
thematically first part. The Habermas texts include the following, with original 
German publication dates: "Between Philosophy and Science: Marxism as 
Critique" (1960); Structural Transformation of the Public Sphere (1962); 
Knowledge and Human Interests (1968); Legitimation Crisis (1973); 
"Reconstruction of Historical Materialism" (1975); and, The Theory of 
Communicative Action (1981). These texts are shown to contain a two decade- 
long argument that, a) the relevance of Marx’s theories is severely restricted to 
the period in which he lived; b) the original Frankfurt School Critical Theory (of
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Adorno, Horkheimer, Marcuse and others) tacitly retained a Marxist orthodoxy 
none the less; and, c) Habermas’s theory of communicative action and reason 
first faces up to and successfully overcomes the problems associated with a) 
and b).
The thematically second part identifies, delineates and examines a 
public sphere—describing its motivation and content-concerning the practical 
implications of Habermas's critique of Marx, while arguing that it was 
deliberately shaped by Habermas, along with supporters. It is concluded that 
this public sphere, Habermas's mode of critique of Marx's theories and of the 
original Frankfurt School of Critical Theory, drew more attention and support 
before the collapse of Communism than that part of it which continued in its 
1990s aftermath. This can be partly explained with close attention to yet a 
newer critique of Critical Theory, also from within that tradition-Moishe 
Postone's Time, Labor and Social Domination: A Reinterpretation of Marx's 
Critical Theory (1993). The latter both explains socially Habermas's theory, 
and offers a better critical approach to post-Communism on the basis of a 
reinterpretation of Marx's Grundrisse and Capital. However, important areas of 
agreement with Habermas's critique of Mane, especially an assessment of the 
lack of a contemporary relevance of Marx's 1844 Economic-Philosophic 
Manuscripts, stands in the way of this new approach's break from Critical 
Theory and improved prospects for the practical potential of Marx's humanism.
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INTRODUCTION
How Jurgen Habermas’s theory is related to that of Critical Theory's 
founders, particularly Horkheimer, Adomo and Marcuse (as well as others) has 
by now been widely discussed. In so far as a Critical Theory tradition retains 
vitality today, there is little question concerning Habermas’s leading role during 
the last three decades at least. Beginning only slowly in the 1960s and 1970s, 
but accelerating in the 1980s, Habermas developed a sharp critique of his 
predecessors. He increasingly delineated (in respect to the founders) his own 
social theory. Preoccupation with the issue of the continuity or discontinuity of 
the Critical Theory tradition has perhaps been at the expense of critical attention 
to Habermas's direct confrontation with Marx’s ideas, ostensibly the inspiration 
for what is afterall most often understood as a "neo-Marxist" strand of thought. 
However, "neo-Marxist" Critical Theory perhaps too much assumes, and 
attempts to ovecome deficiences of, the original. Considering the various types 
of studies on Habermas's theory during the last couple of decades (which 
include, besides comparison of the old and the newer Critical Theory, more 
specialized studies on communicative ethics, law, etc) an inference must be 
drawn that, in fact, there is a prevailing misperception which underestimates (or 
undervalues) the large amount of attention Habermas paid to Marx’s theory 
proper, its still controversial conclusions, and the relative importance that his 
focus on Marx assumed in his own fully developed theory, all the way into the 
1990s. But now a wide-ranging transformation has occurred in recent times.
The collapse of Communist states, the legitimacy for which was argued in terms 
of Marxist ideology, is the type of epochal world transformation which can open
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up the potential for another look at ideas long thought to already be known, at 
least in their essential features. For example, many of the world economies' 
links to their respective states, and responsibility for social welfare on the part of 
the state, have approached a point of dissolution. A significant part of the 
attraction (and perhaps key presuppositions) of Habermas's theory followed 
from existence of a Communist status-quo, and an apparently long-term, if not 
permanent, “welfare state compromise" in the most capitalistically developed 
countries.
If in the late 1970s and 1980s, coinciding with Habermas’s own attention 
to the issue, several important studies analyzed his criticism (implied or overt) of 
the older Critical Theory, much less attention has been paid to the even more 
recent critique, which also comes from within the Critical Theory tradition itself. 
This new level of critique, found in the Frankfurt-trained Sociologist Moishe 
Postone's Time, Labor, and Social Domination has by no means achieved the 
status of a tendency (as Habermas has purposely cultivated in respect to his 
own theory, and which I bring to the fore in the following chapters).
Postone’s "remarkable study" (Jay 1993) builds a strong case for the idea 
that Marx's "mature critical theory" (primarily the Grundrisse and Capital), 
contain critical categories the development of which potentially explain today's 
powerful social forces, which are, "far removed from personal experience" 
(Postone 1993), and are more abstract than the traditional Marxist categories of 
the market, property relations and labor. Labor, especially, has been 
misunderstood as “transhistorical" (in both Habermas and the Critical Theory 
tradition generally), with important consequences for both theory and practice. 
Moreover, Postone argues convincingly that a reinterpretation of Marx's texts 
can explain socially the original Critical Theory (and its limitations), as well as
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Habermas's revised version, which attempted to escape its pessimism and lack 
of social relevance.
In light of Postone's radical suggestion (that the Critical Theory tendency 
over a long period of time, and in the face of major economic, political and 
social transformations has seriously misunderstood some of the concepts 
crucial to an understanding of Marx’s theory), I closely examine Habermas's 
investigations of Marx's texts, with some unexpected results. For example, I 
argue that Habermas's second (though often thought of as his first) major work, 
Structural Transformation of the Public Sphere, initially published in German in 
1962, issued the outline of a textually-based systematic critique of Marx's ideas, 
an assessment which clashes with the more typical view that it was a work 
written when Habermas was "still a Marxist", or with even Habermas's own view 
(Habermas 1990b), that "Between Philosophy and Science: Marxism as 
Critique", written in 1960 (Jay 1984, 469), represented this sort of approach. I 
argue that "Marxism as Critique" essentially suggested a “revision" of Marx's 
theory of value, while (perhaps more importantly) introducing (earlier than 
previously noted) the concept of the lifeworld. The concept of the lifeworid 
remained dormant in the several years following, yet it was already clear in 
1960 that it would assume importance in any fundamental critique of Marx's 
theory, especially in metatheoretical terms, as it eventually did in the often-cited 
"paradigm shift" from a philosophy of consciousness to a theory informed by a 
social analysis of language. I point out as an important cue that already in the 
1960 “Marxism as Critique" Habermas highlighted passages in the Grundrisse 
while sharply separating analysis of them from Marx's 1844 Economic 
Manuscripts. Habermas interpreted the Grundrisse passages (in a revelatory 
sense) as a possible basis of an immanent critique of Marx's theory. According 
to Habermas, these passages provide evidence (which Marx later submerged)
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that Marx himself questioned the centrality of labor for a description of modem 
society, and the possibility of its critique. Nearly a decade later, in the 1968 
(German) publication of Knowledge and Human Interests, Habermas returns to 
the same Grundrisse passages, expanding and elaborating his prior argument, 
but this time (with the crucial difference) on the basis of an analysis (in his 
Chapter, "Marx’s Metacritique of Hegel: Synthsis Through Social Labor") of the 
most important essay in the 1844 Economic-Philosophic Manuscripts, "Critique 
of Hegelian Dialectic and Philosophy in General". This then represents a 
second, though conceptually more sophisticated, attempt at a comprehensive 
critique of Marx, but still does not bring back in to focus a concept of the 
lifeworid for the potential of a critical social theory more adequate than Marx's 
(too dependent on labor) in view of modem society.
I attempt to demonstrate that Habermas's Knowledge and Human 
Interests implicitly conceded that earlier works ("Between Philosophy and 
Science: Marxism as Critique" and Structural Transformation of the Public 
Sphere), in underestimating the depth of Marx's concept of labor, compelled a 
return to analysis of Marx's theory, perhaps contrary to his initial expectations. 
Habermas's continuous returns to consideration of Marx’s theories seemed to 
take on a life of their own, that is, despite what appeared to be Habermas's 
early intent to meet what he believed was the need for an alternative theory.
Due to this internal dynamic, my analyses necessarily proceeds along 
the route of closely following Habermas’s attention (which gradually diminishes) 
to Marx’s texts, as well as a comparison of these texts with Habermas's 
presentation and interpretation of them. This is especially warranted, and 
therefore is presented in greatest detail, in consideration of Habermas's two 
chapters on Marx in Knowledge and Human Interests, and in respect to 
Habermas's 1990 summary article on the status of Marx's theory in the midst of
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the collapse of Communism in Eastern Europe, the Balkans and the Soviet 
Union itself.
Against the background of a close reading of a variety of Habermas's 
approaches to Marx's theory, including his systematic, textual critique, I analyze 
how Habermas, at the very time of the initial publication of his Theory of 
Communicative Action (1981) substantially contributed to the re-founding of the 
Marxist Humanist, semi-underground dissident journal, Praxis. The latter 
originated in the former Yugoslavia in the early 1960s, was eventually closed 
down by the Tito government in the 1970s, and finally re-surfaced in 1981 (with 
Habermas's active assistance) as Praxis International, published in London.
On one level, I look at Habermas's relationship to this journal in order to explore 
the practical potential of Habermas’s theory from the vantage point of the late 
1980s and early 1990s collapse of Communism and its aftermath, as well as the 
disintegrating social welfare states, including in the United States, Europe and 
elsewhere. On another level, I view Habermas's role in Praxis International as 
constituting a critique of a certain sort of non-Communist, philosophically 
dissident Marxism, apparently unimplicated in the previously ruling statist forms. 
My intention is to bring into focus another type of Habermas's critique of Marx, 
that is adequate to the standard of rationality developed in Habermas's now 
mature theory, in a public sphere constituted on dialogical premises, open to 
thinkers composing a variety of theoretical and political backgrounds-including 
both "state socialist" and Westem-style social welfare states. Examination of 
this historical moment is potentially productive in terms of analyzing the status of 
Habermas's mature theory including (but not limited to) his self-understanding.
Generally, I analyze the trajectory of Habermas's theory construction in 
respect to his critique of Marx, while simultaneously attempting to bring out the 
full significance of the critique of Habermas's theory from within the Critical
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Theory tradition (Postone). I argue that Postone's critique, in contrast to what he 
himself suggests, implies not simply a more critical Critical Theory, but a need 
for a break from the Critical Theory tradition, if the socially useful aspect of this 
type of theory is understood to be in its potential contribution to an overcoming 
of capitalism.
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CHAPTER ONE
THE SEARCH FOR HABERMAS’S MARXISM AND HABERMAS’S PURSUIT
OF MARX
The first comprehensive study of Jurgen Habermas's thought to appear 
in English had as its implicit standard Marx’s critique of capitalist society. 
Thomas McCarthy's, The Critical Theory of Jurgen Habermas (1978), 
concluded that Habermas's work assumed a Marxist form of critique. Yet, 
McCarthy's book contained only a sketchy and unsustained argument about the 
nature of Marx's theory.
Although it was not readily perceived, by the time of publication of 
McCarthy's book Habermas had finally rejected Mane's theory, or more 
precisely, what he had come to understand Marx’s theory to be. With Habermas 
(more so than with the early Critical Theorists Horkheimer and Adorno) it is 
possible to draw out his analyses of specific texts and periods of Marx's 
theoretical position. These can serve as the starting point for conceptualizing 
the relationship between the two thinkers separated by an entire century.
McCarthy's book was published at a time when Habermas's theory was 
at best half-way elaborated and still undigested; still it achieved a wide impact 
in assigning a contemporary status to Habermas's (and indirectly) Marx’s 
thought in the 1970s and 1980s. That status might be briefly described as 
reflecting Habermas's notion that Marx's work contains, in the classical sense, 
certain durable qualities capable of guiding critically oriented thought; but 
Marx's theories (it is generally assumed even by those sympathetic to them) are 
essentially so far removed from contemporary concerns and conditions that at
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best they are in need of, in addition to continued clarification, at the very least 
radical reorganization and/or supplementation (Lohmann 1986).
McCarthy, while not offering much in the way of presenting Marx’s ideas, 
concluded his work by arguing that Legitimation Crisis (Habermas’s work just 
translated by McCarthy at the time) assumed a "Marxist form of critique". A 
possible interpretation of this is that McCarthy believed that contemporary 
critical theory (Habermas its principal representative) had fulfilled an intention to 
update Marx's original theory, thus opening up new prospects for Critical 
Theory generally. Chapters Two, Three and Four of this dissertation take up 
Habermas's various approaches to Marx, inquiring whether any of them 
suceeded in grasping the fundamental concepts relevant for a contemporary 
critical theory of capitalism.
Martin Jay’s Marxism and Totality (1984) placed Habermas squarely in 
the arena of Western Marxism; he argued that Habermas's theory, a potentially 
viable form of Marxism, might represent the only sustainable development from 
that tradition (Jay 1984). Still, the chapter on Habermas, concluding his 
volume, which takes up the whole range of Western Marxism in this century, 
offers limited explicit assessment of Marx's ideas as he developed them, 
compared with those who interpreted them. The remarkable point to note here 
is that as late as 1984 Jay's major work could still suggest that recreation of a 
"Marxist" critical theory of society was Habermas's intent, and that his actual 
attempt was more plausible than any other.
A major shift in perspective began in the mid-1980s--among Habermas's 
most active (or vocal) supporters. Seyla Benhabib's, Norm, Critique and Utopia 
(1986), again following Habermas's own thematization of the significance of his 
work vis a vis Marx, 1) examined specific texts and periods of Marx's theoretical 
development; 2) offered tightly argued perspectives on the origin and
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development of the modem concept of critique, in important ways shaped by 
Marx and; 3) recognized and addressed Habermas's own self-understanding 
that his theory, adequate to contemporary society in a way Marx's was not, 
should "replace" the latter. Benhabib's work was the first since the full scope of 
Habermas's writings became widely accessible in the United States to begin to 
fully come to terms with the idea that Habermas had begun to argue, if only 
implicitly, that a contemporary critical theory, without Marx, was possible and, in 
fact, that his own might be seen as just such a theory.
In this respect, her study represented a radical break with McCarthy's 
less than a decade earlier. But the similarity of the two consisted in their 
following Habermas's rapidly evolving self-understanding of his own theory. 
McCarthy's study was written in the wake of Habermas's presentation of himself 
as engaged in the perhaps still conceivable "reconstruction of historical 
materialism". Benhabib's book appeared at the moment Habermas was 
focused on counter-posing the recent results of his work to the ideas of Marx, as 
well as to contemporary Marxists (particularly the "praxis" philosophers with a 
history of philosophical dissidence inside the East European Communist 
countries). This effort to distinguish his ideas from Marx's "praxis philosophy" 
included both theoretical and practical dimensions. While, in respect to 
Habermas, no one would have difficulty recognizing the former dimension, the 
latter is more subtle, and its peculiarity not well understood. Due to the role a 
critique of Marxist Humanism (or "praxis philosophy") played in the crucial shift 
in Habermas's understanding of his own theory, I will take this up in some detail 
in Chapter Five where I analyze a year-long symposium in the journal Praxis 
International.
In fact, McCarthy, Jay, Benhabib, and Axel Honneth (who will be 
discussed shortly) were all key figures in exploring, along with Habermas, the
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prospects of a new Critical Theory minus a reliance upon Marx in the period 
leading up to the epochal series of events culminating in the collapse of 
Communism in East Europe and Russia. To be sure, such a radical 
transformation of the political landscape was not anticipated at the time when ail 
of the above authors focused on clarifying Habermas's 1980s theory in the 
journal Praxis International (PI) (among others) which originated as a political- 
philosophical dissident Marxist humanist journal in Yugoslavia. The journal, 
closed down by the state in the late 1970s, re-emerged in 1981 as an 
international journal published in Britain. It did not survive long into the post- 
Communist period of the 1990s. (The new journal, Constellations, based at 
Harvard and the New School for Social Research, continues with many of the 
issues and concerns associated with the last several years of publication of PIJ.
Richard Bernstein's Habermas and Modernity (1985) documents the 
theoretical and practical intent of Pi's focus on Habermas's social theory. 
However, Bernstein's own introduction to the collection, on the eve of 
Communism's and this Marxist Humanist tendency's collapse, failed to 
anticipate Habermas’s decisive political/practical distancing himself from the 
Marxist Humanist tendency (only subsequently theoretically justified in 
Philosophical Discourse of Modernity). Bernstein, in fact, stressed Habermas's 
affinity with the "praxis philosophy" of the Marxist Humanists, which was far from 
non-controversial (Lichtheim 1971; Jay 1972; Dallmayr 1984; Wellmer, 1993).
Axel Honneth, one of Habermas's younger followers in Germany, 
contributed considerably to the dissemination of Habermas's ideas, including 
especially outside Germany. His participation was key in shaping the kind of 
forum for Habemas's ideas consonant with Habermas's implict notion of 
practical intervention in a world in which confidence in even "critical" Marxism 
was fading. For Habermas, the latter represented a new situation, uncharted,
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perhaps even dangerous. Honneth's Critique of Power, while published in the 
German in the mid-1980s, did not appear in English until 1991. By then his 
several articles in Telos, New German Critique, and PI had already raised the 
level of discussion of Habermas, particularly of Habermas's self-understanding 
of the status of his own theory in relationship to that of Marx's, and as 
differentiated from the older generation of Critical Theorists. In addition, 
Critique of Power, divided between discussion of Foucault and Habermas, 
helped respond to various calls, from the late 1970s onward, for Habermas to 
engage more directly in dialogue with post-structuralist and post-modem 
theories. The more than four hundred-page book has scarcely a reference to 
Marx (though there is one calling "crude'' Marx's 1844 Economic-Philosophic 
Manuscripts) seeming to imply by omission agreement with Benhabib's 
conclusions, if not her method, following Habermas’s own self-understanding, 
that Critical Theory now can, and should, develop without Marx. Honneth's 
Struggle for Recognition (1996) contains an essay which argues for the 
uselessness of Marx's theories for today.
To be sure, the more specific issue of whether Habermas's efforts could 
even be seen to have aimed at achieving a critical theory of modem society 
without Marx was by no means percieved to be a major one. There has been 
considerably more discussion on whether Habermas had succeeded in making 
a philosophic-historic break with the German idealist tradition (from which Marx 
himself did not break completely, according to Habermas), a tradition seen as 
integral to a discredited “philosophy of consciousness". Habermas 
characterizes the "overcoming" of the latter as an “achievement of the age" 
(Outh waite 1994).
David Ingram's Habermas and the Dialectic of Reason (1987) even 
argued that The Theory of Communicative Action represented a “return" to
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Marx. He identifies this in terms of Habermas's rethinking of the concept of 
reification. In Ingram's reading, Habermas suggests the possibility of a "holistic" 
overcoming of disorienting social phenomenon. The way for this might be 
cleared through Habermas's concept of reification which was elaborated and 
expanded, and at the same time refined, allowing for a distinction between 
social shifts appearing in connection with an increasing rationalization of the 
lifeworid, and those which are pathological expressions of the the type of 
alienation described, but too narrowly, by Marx and some of his followers. 
Ingram sees this theoretical direction primarily in terms of Habermas's new 
reflections on “aesthetic reason".
The appendix to Fred Dallmayr*s earlier Polis and Praxis (1984), which 
is one of the earlier reviews of the TCA (after the first volume's English 
translation) had argued that Habermas, despite his intentions, remained bound 
to the traditional oppositions endemic to Western metaphysics (Dallmayr 1984). 
Indeed, it is precisely that continued connection (which Dallmayr also 
associates with Habermas's current reflections on aesthetic reason), which has 
finally turned Habermas away from his earlier committment to politics, or 
political praxis, and toward a theory of the "social domain". (According to 
Dallmayr, politics in TCA is conceived as a subsystem submerged in 
bureaucratic controls, while having no clear place within the lifeworid either).
Yet, it is only from the late 1980s that at least two distinctive attitudes 
crystalize around the critical discussion of Habermas's theory. The two 
volumes, Philosophical Interventions in the Unfinished Project of 
Enlightenment, and Cultural-Political Interventions in the Unfinished Project of 
Enlightenment (1992), are edited by Honneth, McCarthy, Claus Offe and 
Albrecht Wellmer. These latter might be fairly described as a significant part of 
a tendency of critical support of Habermas's general direction, while
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disagreeing on particular issues. As is clear from the title to the two volumes 
(and their dedication to Habermas on his sixty-fifth birthday) a sort of loose 
Habermasian tendency had developed—apparently motivated by the idea that 
what was needed was an increasingly active relationship to Habermas's ideas 
(or at least those inspired by the latter).
Stanley Aronowitz's Science as Power (1988), Istvan Meszaros's Power 
of Ideology (1989), Tom Rockmore's, Habermas and Historical Materialism 
(1989) and Moishe Postone's, Time, Labor and Social Domination: A Re­
examination of Marx's Crtical Theory (1993) represent later, more independent, 
works which make strong cases (though to some extent implicit) for the 
weaknesses of the first tendency's assumptions of a lack of contemporary 
import and relevance of at least some of Marx's ideas for the possibility of a 
genuine critical theory of society. Upon this basis, they tend to raise questions 
concerning the general social relevance, and therefore the solidity, not merely 
of Habermas's theory proper, but especially its "programmatic" quality.
Stanley Aronowitz's Science as Power (1988) is unlike McCarthy’s and 
Jay's work in that it is not a systematic analysis of Habermas's theory. It 
contrasts with the earlier studies in that it combined an explicit reading of Marx's 
work (German Ideology, Grundrise, Capital) with discussion of Habermas's 
theory. The latter is found to be regressive in comparison. In the broader 
context of Aronowitz's study of science, in which Habermas's "post-Marxism" is 
found to be inadequate, the problem of Habermas and Marxism is not meant to 
be amplified, but rather dissipated. Still, the doubt cast on Habermas's 
understanding of Marx's major theoretical work must have given pause to many 
who might have too easily accepted the theoretical conclusions of McCarthy or 
Jay.
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One of the aims of this study is to highlight the "project" (or 
"programmatic") quality of Habermas’s theory. Inseparable from evaluation of 
the content of varying theoretical positions in this, or at least one might deduce 
from Habermas's own views, is the working out of a concept of the public 
sphere and its relationship to Habermas's notion of a practical discourse.
From the perspective of the evolving status of Marx's ideas in 
Habermas's theory construction, and the divergent opinions on this question, 
the concepts of the public sphere and practical discourse begin to appear in a 
new light. Consideration of the belated translation into English of the Structural 
Transformation of the Public Sphere (1989), nearly three decades after its 
German publication is relevant here. It was followed five years later by 
Habermas and the Public Sphere (1992), a published symposium, edited by 
Craig Calhoun.
In the long run, Habermas's approach to Marx’s theory is related to the 
concepts of the public sphere and practical discourse which, in turn, are related 
to the methodological questions of immanent and transcendent critique. The 
public sphere and practical discourse, when Habermas links them to the 
developing concepts of lifeworld and system, represent the diagnosis of 
contemporary society, its increasing "rationalization." Hence, applying 
Habermas's diagnosis of the times to his own theory formation, the changing 
nature of society, and its conceptualization, might be illustrated by comparison 
of what the "public sphere" represented in Structural Transformation of the 
Public Sphere-historically, a spontaneous cultural phenomenon with strong 
political implications-to what it reflectively refers to by the 1990s: highly 
specialized discussion of the concept itself, theoretical self-reflection seen as 
essential for a ressurection of the distinguishing (progressive) feature of 
modernity, though now on a higher level of abstraction.
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McCarthy's work focused on Habermas's own confrontations with 
competing methodologies, and diverse disciplines, on his way to a 
distinguishable theory in its own right. McCarthy (though clearly aware of its 
significance) scarcely elaborated Habermas's concept of a public sphere. Even 
with the widely-recognized complexities of Habermas's theories, that concept is 
still usually understood to be the animating one of his entire body of work. Yet, 
Habermas recently remarked that-in respect to his early study of the public 
sphere—he had "turned to other concerns" (Habermas 1992b, 421). McCarthy 
did not particularly focus on the concept of the public sphere perhaps because 
Habermas had not yet done so either. When Habermas returned to it (first in a 
practical, then in a theoretical, sense) an important effect (if not intent) was to 
mold the reception (including in the U.S) of his proposed replacement of Marx's 
theory with his own.
One interesting perspective on this process can be developed through 
examination of originally Marxist-oriented journals with a substantial following 
among critical-theory oriented intellectuals. (I examine one of them in Chapter 
Five). Through these journals Habermas and various supporters initiated a 
process leading to a dissolution of a notion of the practical potential of Marx's 
theory, the notable feature being the presentation as well of something to put in 
its "place"~Habermas's by now mature critical social theory
It is important to see that this was not yet the situation when McCarthy 
wrote and published his book. Moreover, it was probably the case that it was 
McCarthy's (and other's) sort of mistaken conflation of Habermas's theory with 
Marx's which probably spurred Habermas, over the course of the following 
decade, in order to counter the impression that his theory was simply a variant 
of Marxism, to focus on intervention in these "neo-Marxist" journals.
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The point of this intervention then was certainly not to argue for the 
continuity of Habermasian Critical Theory with Marx's theory of capitalism.
Quite the opposite, the intervention was gauged to emphatically contrast 
Habermas's theory with both "traditional" and (later) "critical" Marxism; 
Habermas (with both philosophic and political intent) applied the concepts (and 
distinction) of theoretical and practical discourse as a means of differentiating 
his own theory.
Yet, as Moishe Postone (who will be discussed below) has recently 
shown, Habermas himself retained basic assumptions of "traditional Marxism" 
and thereby helped perpetuate them by failing to distinguish them (which would 
have required a fundamental re-interpretation) from Marx's actual theory; due to 
this, Habermas's work contains one of today's most relied upon articulations of 
these traditional Marxist views.
In retrospect, McCarthy's questionable interpretation of the "Marxism" of 
Legitimation Crisis generally miscalculated the book's long-term significance 
when he seemed to argue that it represented an adequate justification of 
Habermas's supplementation or "updating" of Marx’s social analysis. It was not 
easy in the mid-to-late 1970s to anticipate the scope of Habermas's intentions 
in respect to Marx and Marxism. At the time, Legitimation Crisis seemed to 
represent a credible political diagnosis demanded by Habermas's long trek 
through theoretical confrontation with competing methodologies. LC is indeed 
a link in Habermas's diagnosis of contemporary society. It did not, it turns out, 
encompass the full intent of the concept of practical discourse, a concept of 
Habermas's that McCarthy, it should be noted must be credited with having 
ushered into wider discussion (Held 1980).
What is not fully appreciated among most commentators, an essential 
element of Habermas's theory development was his direct participation in
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molding the reception of his thought, including outside Germany. From the 
moment (beginning in the mid-1970s) he began to assert and defend his own 
(post- Marx) theory, a theory which he began to suggest was in need of 
development as a contemporary (and vital) form of practice, Habermas, to a far 
greater extent than his predecessors in the Critical Theory tradition, assumed 
an active role in the debate about how his own ideas should be understood and 
practically employed. This process peaked by the mid-1980s while important 
theses in Legitimation Crisis seemed to become obsolete (White 1988).
Perhaps the most striking contrast in the literature is found in works 
separated precisely by the decade of the 1980s. While McCarthy did little to 
discourage the idea of some level of compatibility of Habermas's theory with 
that of Marx's, Tom Rockmore convincingly demonstrated Habermas's explicit, 
systematic, even even step-by-step, “replacement" of Marx's theory. He does 
this with a close reading of Habermas's major theoretical works, excavating 
those portions which refer directly to Habermas's method and decisions on the 
way to "replacement" of Marx's “historical materialism (Rockmore 1989, 169).
Rockmore did not, however, notice a striking illustration of Habermas's 
assessment of his fully developed theory's relationship to Marx's; Habermas 
singles out a passage in the Grundrisse where Marx speculates on a maturing 
capitalism (Habermas 1987, 402). Marx has already substantially worked out 
his value theory and a concept of labor's specificity in capitalist society. He has 
broken in two the classical political economic concept of labor. Marx now views 
labor dialectically, a relation of abstract and concrete. Focusing on the labor 
process itself, Marx describes capitalist labor and production of the value form 
of wealth. In the capitalist production process labor in molded into an 
increasingly standardized and relatively undifferentiated series of motions 
dictated by the socially necessary labor time for the production of commodities.
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Marx notices that the United States exemplifies this stage of capitalism. 
Due to the value integument of the capitalist mode of production, labor has, 
"become a matter of chance and hence of indifference". As Habermas 
describes the passage, Marx conceived this to be a “problem" for the workers. 
With this perception, Marx constructed a theory adequate to the society he lived 
in, and of the possibility of social transformation, because the crisis potential 
specific to it, becoming problematic, could then be thematized.
The implication, following from the prior analyses in TCA , is that (more 
than a century later) "interaction", or communicative action oriented to 
understanding, faces a threat similar to what Marx identified in regard to labor 
(seen as the relation of man to nature) and social meaning in the nineteenth 
century. Habermas characterizes the contemporary problem, more abstract 
than Marx's diagnosis, specific to contemporaneity, as a "colonization of the 
lifeworld" (Habermas 1987, 355). He in fact argues that Marx had subsumed 
the general (social life) under the specific (labor) (Habermas 1987, 342).
Turning to systems theory, Habermas analyzes this as an intrusion of systemic 
imperatives, the strategic logic of the “steering" mechanisms represented 
through the medias of money and power, into social, or necessarily symbolically 
constituted, domains.
An implication of this is that Habermas's social theory (if not Critical 
Theory generally) is oriented toward and, in fact, follows social practice 
(perhaps in contrast to dogmatic Marxism). The colonization of the lifeworld- 
analogous to what he takes to be the systematization of labor in Marx’s day— 
affords philosophy (re-worked in his version of Critical Theory) access to 
previously unconceptualized phenomenon in the social world; a diagnosis of 
the times discloses a cultural process of increasing abstraction. This is seen in 
terms of an evolution of forms of human activity which achieved centrality in the
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developmental stages of modernization. The movement is from industrial labor 
in incipient capitalism to communicative action in late capitalism.
Habermas traced an implication of this problematic to its incipient stage 
in the writings of the early Hegel (Habermas 1973), who perceived the 
bifurcation of labor and interaction, which he held distinguished the modem 
world. An original unity thus broken apart could only be restored on the basis of 
an intersubjectively achieved consensus. But Hegel then abandoned this 
insight when he turned to a "monologic" conception, culminating in a 
philosophy of history unfolding from Absolute Spirit. Marx, without awareness 
of this early Hegel, independently recovered the dualism inherent in the specific 
way of life defined as modernity, but in the end failed to separate himself from 
Hegel's (later) logic, instead recasting the latter as a “synthesis through social 
labor" (Habermas 1972).
Labor, progressively (and permanently) shorn of its variety of socially 
integrating features-contrary to Mane's "romantic" notion of a future de­
differentiation of society based on class consciousness—is instead pared down 
into a solely instrumental activity. Labor's social prominence is dissolved, or is 
now seen as a special case of a more general process. Modernity is 
characterized by a decentered form of life in which the problem of meaning 
shifts from the social repercussions of a new world, arising out of the metabolic 
relation between the species and nature, to the more abstract processes 
associated with the differentiation of the spheres of culture, society and 
personality constitutive of a complex lifeworid which uncouples from the 
subsystems of economy and state. "Labor", in short, is hardly a theoretical or a 
practical problem in contemporary society. It has fallen in a process of 
increasing "real" abstraction (Habermas 1987, 402).
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Just as Marx arrived (in a theoretical sense) at the United States when he 
saw it as the harbinger of a new level of "real abstraction", Habermas, around 
the time of the completion of TCA, turned considerable attention (including 
outside Germany and perhaps especially to the U.S.) to molding a public 
sphere in which the relation of philosophy and social theory was prominently 
thematized. This process can be viewed as an attempt to apply the concepts of 
theoretical and practical discourse to Marxism itself. This is rooted in 
Habermas's diagnosis of the objectivity of interaction as the principal and 
necessary (though endangered) ingredient for the continuation of "modem" life. 
Modem society, while due to its complexity was not threatened by political or 
social revolution (Habermas 1992a, 469), was vulnerable to collapse, an 
alternative which Habermas left notoriously under-specified.
Moishe Postone's, Time, Labor and Social Domination: A 
Reinterpretation of Marx's Critical Theory (1993) identifies a Marxism sharing 
certain traditional misunderstandings of some of Marx's basic categories, 
spanning practically the entire twentieth century. In one chapter, Critical Theory 
is examined in the 1930s and 1940s work of Horkheimer and Pollock. Later, 
the analysis is carried through by inclusion of a chapter devoted to Habermas, 
the only contemporary theorist whose work he takes up extensively.
Postone writes on Habermas's critique of Marx, constitutive of 
Habermas's effort to revitalize Critical Theory while uncoupling it from the 
pervasive pessimism of the founders of the Frankfurt School. While a large 
number of Marxist theorists in this century are critically cited in the footnotes, the 
fuller attention to Habermas’s critique of Marx is due to the fact that Postone 
shares a grounding in the Critical Theory tradition, and to his judgement that 
Habermas's theory depends in the most crucial respects on a critique of 
traditional Marxism, thus amounting to a strawman argument, and shields from
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deeper probing the issue of the relevance of Marx’s theory for a new, 
contemporary stage of capitalism.
Furthermore, Habermas's reading of Marx is constitutive of his own 
theory. An inadequate interpretation of Marx shapes the theory which is 
intended to replace it. In comparison, the reinterpretation of Marx Postone 
proposes, specifically Marx's "mature critical theory", might, in its own right, be 
shown to be more adequate to late twentieth century capitalism than 
Habermas's theory. The latter both retains, intrinsic to it, questionable positive 
features meant to negate elements falsely attributed to Marx's theory, and lacks 
crucial conceptual insights found in Marx's theory.
Habermas defended his theory against theoretical positions he attributed 
at various times to Marx (Habermas 1975), at others to "Marxists" (Habermas 
1979), and still others to Marx and the Marxists (Habermas 1992a), fundamental 
distinctions between the two at times implied (Habermas 1972), and at other 
times apparently judged not to have major significance (Habermas 1973). As 
Rockmore had noted, however, Habermas's later work tended to categorize 
Marx's theory alone as representing a materialist theory in need of replacement 
(Rockmore 1989).
The tension in this is exemplified in Habermas's later works which, 
though quite different in form, single out for special attention a certain tendency 
of Marxism, ie; “praxis philosophy", or what Rockmore (for example) deduces as 
referring especially to the Marxist Humanism represented by "a group of 
Yugoslav thinkers clustered around the journal Praxisf (Rockmore 1989, 107), 
which drew inspiration from the 1844 Economic-Philosophic Manuscripts. (This 
is especially interesting in light of a "post-Communist" dialogue between 
Habermas and Adam Michnik in New Left Review, where the latter suggests 
Habermas's history of a lack of critical attention to Communist regimes, and lack
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of support for the Solidarity movement in the early 1980s) (Michnik and 
Habermas 1994, 29). I will develop this further in Chapter Six, the concluding 
chapter.
There are critical references to Habermas's theory scattered throughout 
Postone's work, but here (in concluding this introduction) I will briefly review the 
chapter devoted entirely to him. The fact that his critical approach to 
Habermas's understanding of Marx's theory comes from within the Critical 
Theory tradition at a time when the latter is dominated by Habermas's work 
makes Postone's work especially important in the following chapters.
Postone's Time, Labor, and Social Domination is not a detailed, 
systematic appraisal of Habermas's theories. Yet, the critique achieves a 
certain comprehensiveness. There is an astute selection of both Habermas's 
texts and Marx's critical concepts traditionally misunderstood by even his 
ostensibly most sympathetic readers. The concepts in question, already 
discussed in Postone's earlier chapters, are then unfolded. A 
misunderstanding of them is shown to be the principal influence in the trajectory 
of both Critical Theory in general and, in specified ways, Habermas's theory-a 
theory which attempted to encompass social developments in the post-World 
War II period. Postone begins with "Marx’s Metacritique of Hegel: Synthesis 
Through Social Labor" (Habermas 1972, 25-42), one of Habermas's most 
difficult texts. In that work, Postone traces Habermas's understanding of the 
concept of labor.
Habermas's first several pages ostensibly consist of a close reading of 
the third and final part of Mane's 1844 Economic-Philosophic Manuscripts, 
which has the title, "Critique of Hegelian Dialectic and Philosophy in General" 
(Marx 1967b, 314-337). Marx's essay, in turn, represents his most explicit and 
extensive attention to Hegel, primarily the latters's Phenomenology of Mind, but
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including as well the Science of Logic, and the Encyclopedia of the Philosopical 
Sciences generally. At this stage Habermas believes Marx's theory is an 
advance, in one sense at least, over Hegel's: Marx's rejection of a "philosophy 
of identity" (Habermas 1972, 25). Marx assumed the externality of nature. In 
doing so, Marx was in a position to develop a radical critique of knowledge 
which could have prevented the atrophy of epistemology, and the subsequent 
predominance of Positivism. Habermas holds that Marx viewed labor as 
regulating the material exchange with nature, and as constituting a world 
around us~an objective nature for us. Thus, Marx viewed labor as synthesis. In 
doing so, however, the "substratum" in which synthesis (of objectivity and 
subjectivity) is expressed is a system of social labor, and not a connection of 
symbols (Habermas 1972, 31). Symbolic interaction, in Marx's theory, is 
ultimately subsumed, in a positive sense, in a system of labor.
Postone's critique of Habermas centers around an unfoldment of Marx's 
analysis of concrete and abstract labor. Habermas, to begin with, fails to 
distinguish these concepts. Habermas shares with traditional Marxism an 
understanding of labor which is transhistorica! (the metabolical relationship 
between people and nature) rather than catching the crucial dual nature it 
assumes specifically in capitalism. Habermas fails to grasp the way in which 
abstract labor molds interaction within capitalism-the way labor, in mediating 
itself, constitutes a quasi-independent set of structures which exert an abstract 
form of social compulsion (Postone 1993, 240). Marx, far from claiming a stake 
in the instrumental type of action signified by a technical relation to nature as 
Habermas appears to assume, instead demonstrates how this relationship is 
connected to labor's peculiar form of mediation of social interaction as well, 
specifically in capitalism.
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Habermas holds that due to Marx's commitment to the idea of labor as 
synthesis-which took the place of a logic in Hegel-the distinction he 
recognized in his material investigations (between the forces and relations of 
production, for example) was not secured at the categorical level. Marx's 
collapse of interaction into labor resulted in his theory lacking a sufficiently self­
reflexive dimension, opening the way for further development of Positivism. 
(The 'self-reflexive dimension" in question here refers to the problem of the role 
of theory in social constitution. Habermas's much later critique of the Frankfurt 
School (Habermas 1983; 1987) also identified aporias and the lack of a 
standard by which to criticize a percieved gap between the ideal and the real.)
His placement of this presentation of Habermas's most philosophically 
explicit consideration of Marx’s "metacritique" of Hegel is crucial to the 
argument of Postone's entire study. It serves to reinforce the cogency of Part 
Two of Postone's work. This Part reconstructs Mane's critique of the commodity 
form of production. The unfoldment of this analysis in Marx's Capital is the 
basis upon which to understand the specificity of labor (opposite of any 
synthesis whether technical or dialogic) in this social formation—the function it 
performs in mediating both itself and-as a "quasi-independent" set of 
structures-social relations generally. Marx's concept of labor—the social 
mediation specific to capitalism—discloses a specific kind of abstract social 
domination which does not appear social at all.
Postone notes that Habermas takes over from Pollock and Horkheimer 
the idea of labor as instrumental activity. Habermas focuses on a consequent 
need to supplement this dimension with an understanding of interaction, which 
escapes the technical (though synthetic) role of labor; this approach stems from 
Habermas's failure to grasp the double nature of labor in capitalism as 
expressed in the commodity—the value form of production and wealth.
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
25
Value understood as the specific form of wealth intrinsic to capitalism is 
the second concept-following labor-Postone shows the early Habermas failed 
to comprehend. Rather than perceiving the internal opposition between value 
and wealth increasingly manifested in technologically advanced capitalism, 
Habermas equates value and wealth. Postone demonstrates Habermas's 
misunderstanding of this relation specific to capitalism most clearly by reference 
to the latteris early article, "Between Philosophy and Science: Marxism as 
Critique" (Habermas 1973, 195-252). Here Postone shows that Habermas 
misinterprets the Grundrisse in a way consequential (in a negative sense) for 
the development of his own theory proper. (It is interesting to note here that, 
despite the order of Postone's presentation, Habermas's misunderstanding of 
Marx's concept of labor follows his failure to grasp the distinction between the 
material and value forms of wealth).
The value-fonm of wealth Marx develops in the Grundrisse and Capital is 
a function of direct labor time, as wealth in general was for classical political 
economy. Mane, however, already suggested in the Grundrisse that the rapidly 
expanding productivity in industrial capitalism increasingly becomes a function 
instead of science and its application to production, rather than the labor time 
and, hence, direct human labor employed. The material wealth-creating 
potential of industrial capitalism enters into a deepening contradiction with the 
value form of wealth. The value-form, dependent on the amount of labor time 
and hence the expenditure of direct human labor, is socially determinant in 
capitalism; however it becomes increasingly anachronistic when it does not 
lead to a reduction of labor time, or a positive transformation of fragmented, 
alienated labor.
Postone, after reviewing this contradiction of the value form and material 
wealth Marx had uncovered in the Grundrisse, quotes a relevant passage from
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that work, a passage upon which Habermas based his criticism of Marx's value 
theory:
But to the degree that large industry develops, the creation of real wealth 
comes to depend less on labor time and on the amount of labor 
employed than on the power of agencies set in motion during labor time 
(Postone 1993, 233).
In Habermas’s treatment of this passage Marx early on achieved this insight, 
which logically demanded a reformulation of the labor theory of value. The 
advance in technical knowledge needed to be incorporated into the concept of 
constant capital. The implication of this is that theoretical knowledge already 
available to Marx negated his notion of a salient contradiction between "dead" 
labor and "living" labor; constant capital might now be seen as "socialized"-or 
actualized, as stored up technical knowledge, dependent upon a type of social 
interaction, and accessible to "social planning" of a rational distribution of 
surplus value.
According to Habermas, Marx did not incorporate this early insight into 
his final theory (Habermas 1973, 227). The assumption upon which 
Habermas's criticism of Marx rests is that science and technology represent a 
new basis of value (Habermas 1973, 226). Postone demonstrates that the 
implication of this assumption is that Habermas conflates what Marx was 
distinguishing—that in capitalism, a specific form of society, the potential of 
material wealth creation is locked within the specific value form of wealth, a 
function of direct labor time.
Postone acknowledges that Habermas's intention was to overcome the 
limitations of traditional Marxism which tended to consider labor a 
"transhistorical" source of wealth. Yet, in place of labor as the transhistorical 
source of wealth, Habermas substitutes an evolutionary transformation of the
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basis of value itself. This indicates a failure to grasp the specific concept of the 
centrality of the dual nature of labor, the basis for the commodity-form of value 
production in capitalism. The value form of wealth develops in opposition to a 
material form of wealth. Neither forms of wealth are "transhistoricar. The 
increasing tension between the two forms within capitalism characterize the 
latte^s historical specificity, serving as the basis for its immanent critique at 
Marx's categorical level.
According to Postone, the basis of Habermas's mistaken interpretation of 
the law of value is related to his having incorporated important assumptions 
from traditional political economy, mistakenly atrtibuting them to Marx as well. 
Marx was critical of labor; he develops a critical concept of it as the social 
mediation specific to captialism. Crucially, Marx took great pains to criticize an 
idea of "labor" as a transhistorical, a) source of wealth; and, b) relation of man to 
nature. In capitalism (where things are reversed compared to previous history), 
it was primarily neither.
Moreover, Habermas implies that Marx "witheld" evidence that would 
have called into question elements of his final theory. Habermas suggests that 
insights developed in the Grundrisse (which was not published in his lifetime) 
most relevant for developed capitalism have gone largely unrecognized, partly 
because Marx was aware that they were at variance with his own historically- 
determined theoretical and political agenda.
Yet, even within the valid (but covered up) theoretical insights he detects 
in the Grundrisse (which Marx is said not to have incorporated into Capital) 
Habermas levels what he regards as a salient critique: together with what 
Habermas understands to be Marx's notion of the decreasing relevance of 
direct labor in production, Habermas suggests that Mane "unofficially" (a term I 
will explain later) believed that the transformation of science into machinery
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must lead to the liberation of a self-conscious general Subject. This 
interpretation imputes to Marx an idea of emancipation as the result of a linear, 
automatic development of material production, a materialist version of the 
notion of the realization of Geist in Hegel's Phenomenology. Within the 
Grundrisse, according to Habermas, Marx can be seen to have recoiled from 
this conclusion; he then expressed another position, which recognized the 
difference between the self-conscious control of social life and the, "automatic 
regulation of the process of production that has become independent of the 
producers" (Habermas 1972). Here, according to Habermas, is hardly 
disputable evidence that Marx himself already questioned the analytic centrality 
(for a social theory) he had accorded to labor. Postone, in response to this, 
writes,
social constitution by labor in Marx's analysis...is not transhistorical but, 
rather, a historically specific mode that underlies the automatic regulation 
of social life in capitalism. This form of social constitution is the object, 
not the standpoint, of his critique...(Postone 1993, 236).
While pointing to some shifts in emphasis in TCA, Postone regards the 
work as basically continuous with themes and concerns evident in Habermas's 
earlier work. Habermas’s reading of Marx, as in those earlier works, is 
constitutive of his approach. While TCA, then, is importantly shaped by 
Habermas's understanding of Marx, Postone recognizes a two-pronged critical 
thrust, one aimed at social scientific theory, the other at Marx and Marxism. In 
fact, Marx is hardly taken up directly in TCA; rather, as Habermas states clearly 
in the beginning of the work, his is a "second attempt" from within the Western 
Marxist tradition to appropriate Max Weber's theory of societal rationalization, 
which Weber viewed as flowing from a world historical cultural shift. The first 
attempt was Lukacs's History and Class Consciousness, basic insights from
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which the Critical Theory of Horkheimer and Adomo developed. Postone's 
book is structured around an immanent critique of Western Marxism. He had 
already provided concise criticisms of Horkheimer, Lukacs and, to a lessor 
extent, Adomo. These criticisms are grounded in a close reading and re­
interpretation of what he calls Marx's mature critical theory, principally the 
Grundrisse and Capital. None of the three men, he holds, completely escaped 
what they thought was Marx's concept of labor. This they understood as the 
relationship between man and nature, while it was actually the case, according 
to Postone, that Marx's mature critical theory developed the concept of labor as 
the general form of social mediation specific to capitalism. In place of a 
transhistorical view of labor as productive activity, Marx over time sharpened a 
two-fold concept of labor, concrete and abstract, which captured the ground of 
the commodity--the basic element of the social life of capitalism.
The key point Postone notes here has to do with Habermas's approach 
to Lukacs's reformulation of the conceptual relationship of Marx and Weber. 
While in Weber the modem world view results in the instrumentalization of 
reason and the concurrent loss of freedom and meaning, Lukacs grounds this 
process in the historical, and hence transitory, form of the commodity when, in 
becoming the characteristic feature of the economic life of society, it structures a 
totality. Significantly, Postone points out that Habermas doesn“t attempt to 
refute Lukacs's argument against Weber. Rather, Habermas takes strong 
exception to Lukacs's solution to the problem. The early Lukacs, as is well 
known, posits the proletariat as the identical subject-object of the historical 
process. By virtue of the proletariat's position in society, a standpoint exists 
from which to criticize reification, a type of social domination which, while 
abstract, can be overcome. The coming into its own of a specific, but
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intrinsically universal, class re-integrates a totality, bringing it back within the 
horizon of social action.
Lukacs's approach was overly "romantic" and relied on a concretist class 
standpoint, leading to a Hegelian 'solution" to a problem Habermas says was 
equally recognized by Marx and Weber. The respective critical theories of 
Adomo and Horkheimer, who both explicitly rejected the Lukacsian Hegelian 
logic of identity, focused on culture and supplementation of Marxism's orthodox 
attention to the "economic base". Habermas attempted to shift social theory 
from exclusive attention to instrumental reason, its causes and consequences, 
to his notions of communicative action and reason.
According to Habermas (Habermas 1984, 180), Weber's concept of 
rationalization, underlying modem society, was selective. It isolated 
instrumental reason when the resources for another type of rationalization also 
existed, based in social interaction. The symbolic reproduction of the latter type 
of rationalization was not only necessary for modem society, but in fact provided 
the basis for the rationalization Weber described. Habermas grounds 
communicative reason (or rationality) in the movement from tradtional society to 
modem society, from social integration based on normatively ascribed 
agreement, to that based on communicatively acheived agreement (Habermas 
1984, 70). This shift is based on the position that previous attempts—from within 
Western Marxism-to conceptualize modem society were based on a 
philosophy of consciousness (Habermas 1987, 390) which must fail to grasp 
two levels of society-system and lifeworid-and their interaction.
In the context of the literature on Habermas as a whole, Postone 
manages a rare breakthrough in respect to this issue. First, he demonstrates 
that his own position shares certain ground with Habermas, mainly concerning
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a critique of the philosophy of consciousness, which Postone holds is related to 
the traditional concept of labor (Postone 1993, 247).
Second, and most impressively, he begins to offer his own alternative, 
based on a different reading of the late Marx. Postone identifies weaknesses in 
Habermas’s theory. But--against the backdrop of the relationship of 
Habermas’s theory and the traditional Marxism it assumes-Postone explains 
both with reference to the contradictory nature of capitalism itself.
Habermas is critical of a philosophy of consciousness which Postone 
then ties to the traditional concept of labor, that is, conceived as the relationship 
between man and nature. Habermas holds that this philosophy, which he 
rejects as exhausted, is retained in the older Critical Theory. Yet, Postone 
maintains, Habermas himself fails to escape the old Frankfurt School thesis of 
the one-dimensionality attributed to late capitalism. Habermas is obliged to turn 
to a "quasi-ontological" separation of communicative action and labor, the 
former a domain of social reality outside capitalism (Postone 1993, 252). 
Habermas centers his theoretical attention here. Traditional Marxism tended to 
rely on a future development of labor, or the coming into its own of the 
proletariat based in modem industry. Habermas, in turn, trusted in a sphere of 
interaction which would come into its own or "realize" itself.
Postone writes that Marx's “historically determinate approach", which is 
found neither in the older Frankfurt School, nor Habermas nor, for that matter, in 
any of the myriad strands of Marxism Postone includes under the category of 
"traditional Marxism",
provides a framework within which the underspecified notions of system 
and lifeworld can also be analyzed...Marx argues that capitalism's social 
relations are unique in that they do not appear social at all. The structure 
of relations constituted by commodity-determined labor undermines 
earlier systems of overt social ties without, however, replacing them with 
a similar system. Instead, what emerges is a social universe that Marx
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describes as one of personal independence in a context of objective 
dependence. Both the abstract, quasi-objective structure of necessity 
and, on the immediate level, the much greater latitude of interaction in 
capitalist society than in a traditional society, are moments of the form of 
mediation that characterizes capitalism. In a sense, the opposition of 
system and lifeworld—like the earlier one of labor and interaction— 
expresses a hypostatization of these two moments in a way that 
dissolves capitalist relations into "material" and "symbolic" spheres. The 
characteristics of the value dimension of the alienated social relations 
are attributed to the systemic dimension. This conceptual objectification 
leaves an apparently indeterminate sphere of communication which no 
longer is seen as structured by a form of social mediation (inasmuch as 
that form is not overtly social); rather, it is seen as self-structuring and 
"naturally social." Within the framework of this approach, then, the 
underspecification of lifeworld as well as system expresses a theoretical 
point of departure that has retained the notion of "labor" (Postone 1993, 
259-260).
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CHAPTER TWO
MARX AS INSIDER? "BETWEEN PHILOSOPHY AND SCIENCE: MARXISM AS 
CRITIQUE" AND STRUCTURAL TRANSFORMATION OF THE PUBLIC
SPHERE
What is at Stake in the Habermas/Mam Relationship
Often the discussions of Habermas's theory formation, in so far as they 
concern his assimilation of Marx and Marxism, begin from the premises that 
Habermas conserved about all that was possible to conserve in what was 
traditionally understood as Marx's thought; and that he, moreover, creatively 
infused the tradition by supplementing it with recent achievements in the human 
or social sciences (McCarthy 1979; Held 1980; Bernstein 1985). Some, but 
less, attention is directed to his specific revisions of Marx's concepts in the light 
of his interpretation of historical or empirical evidence, with the aim of of 
suggesting new syntheses (Rockmore 1989; Ingram 1990).
While both of the above premises are to some extent sound, they do not 
exhaust the possible approaches to the problem of Habermas, Marx and 
contemporaneity. And, in so far as Habermas developed a theory distinct from 
Marx's, an obvious question is whether his theory is compatible with Marx's 
(Rockmore 1989). Postone (1993), for example, has shown how a
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"reinterpretation of Marx's critical theory", rather than following from Habermas's 
theory situated later in time, can account for many of the tetter's original features 
by demonstrating their dependence upon Habermas's inadequate presentation 
of some of Marx's basic concepts. Such a reinterpretation points to a possible 
revitalization of Marx's theory in the sense of its adequacy for a critical approach 
to contemporary society. Postone's retinterpretation of Marx's "mature critical 
theory" includes, but is not limited to, a discovery of the means to uncover 
abstract forms of social domination which explain phenomenon of late 
capitalism at a level deeper than that of the market and property ownership. 
Thus, Postone opens to question Habermas's sense of modernity’s 
configuration of labor, economy, lifeworld, the (social welfare) state, and critical 
social theory itself.
Within Habermas's writings there is a pattern of attempts to both revise 
and re-interpret various concepts, sometimes offering a description of how they 
were developed in Marx's own texts (Habermas 1972), but more often as they 
had become conventionally understood (Habermas 1975; Habermas 1990b). 
What has become increasingly clear is that, in trying to understand Habermas’s 
thought, distinctions should be drawn between his proposals for revisions of 
Marxism (that is, the convential understanding of Marx's theory) and his own 
attempts at re-interpretation, properly speaking. These distinctions are useful 
for describing and assessing the meaning of Habermas's series of varied 
approaches to Marx's theory, ranging through the decades of the 1960s-1990s.
An immanent critique of Habermas's theory demands focused analysis of 
his confrontation with Marx constitutive of his own theory. The superiority of 
Postone's approach implicitly relies on a distinction between the given 
interpretation for which revision is proposed and re-interpretation. Postone's 
mode of critique of competing interpretations (such as Habermas's) is an
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approach to Marx which seeks to demonstrate the intrinsic weaknesses of these 
interpretations while convincingly explaining their social currency, even among 
those wishing to develop a thorough-going critique of contemporary capitalism. 
He thus incorporates into his own analysis an explanation for the plausibility of 
what he nonetheless goes beyond. This is not a matter of "exposing" as mere 
ideology those ideas which depart from what is held to be original, unique, and 
true in Marx. To the contrary, the two-fold nature of Postone's type of critique 
conserves the integrity, and individual quality, of a competing idea or theory 
and, by also explaining it socially, grasps another dimension indispensible for a 
conceptual advance pregnant with practical implications.
In the case of his treatment of Habermas, this other dimension is arrived 
at with Postone's identification of the particular nature and import of abstraction 
in our time. Theory as itself a form of abstraction is related to the letter's quality 
involved in social mediation. In a word, one might argue that Habermas's 
interpretation of Marx fails. Postone's critical breakthrough, however, consists 
in a creative re-conceptualization of the incompatibility between the force of 
abstraction immanent in labor as social mediation within capitalism and 
Habermas's transhistorical theory of social evolution (or any theory in which the 
role of abstraction itself remains underspecified). Postone clarifies an abstract 
domination characteristic of capitalist society, specifically how it was conceived 
by Marx, but never really digested by post-Marx Marxists. Postone's re- 
interpretation-in identiying a basic misconception common to a large part of the 
tradition-points to the possibility of a revitalization of Marx's theory.
Postone restricts his study to several of Marx's basic concepts. These 
concepts are shown not to have been fully grasped even within the tradition 
which developed, if not always in Marx's name, at least in his spirit. Such a 
situation leads to the question whether there remain yet other concepts, themes,
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or features of Marx’s thought which might prove fruitful through reinterpretation 
along the lines opened by Postone. Postone’s placement of Habermas's theory 
so centrally in his discernment and demonstration of the continuing cogency of 
Marx's theory, warrants a close examination of Habermas's various approaches 
to Marx (Chapters Two-Four), for it might disclose other concepts within Marx's 
thought (other than those elaborated in detail by Postone) which remain 
undigested but potentially fruitful for working out today's social problems and 
concerns. Among these, at least touched upon at various stages in Habermas's 
work, are the relationships of, a) normative and revolutionary concepts of social 
organization; b) philosophy to social theory, and c) critical thought and social 
change.
Such an examination will inform my study of an incipient public sphere in 
which Habermas played an important role. Chapter Five, which seeks to show 
the action dimension of Habermas's theory, will round-out my presentation of 
Haberma's theory as the intended replacement for Marxist (or Marx's) theory. 
The final Chapter Six will examine Habermas's own retrospective look at the 
development of his theory, and its present and future relationship to Marx's 
ideas in the context of a ''post-Communist" world.
Habermas's periodic “returns" to Marx were essentially driven by the 
inadequacy of his comprehension of Marx's basic concepts on the one hand 
and, on the other hand, a rapidly changing world which none the less 
consistently drew new attention to various facets of Marx's thought. Whether or 
not these returns have now come to an end, the question remains, in one form 
or another, what relationship of social practice to theory has structured (or now 
structures) Habermas's thought. On one level, while Habermas understood that 
it was not impossible that "new” concepts, needed to develop a more adequate 
relationship of theory to practice, might be found among the “forgotten"
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elements of Marx's thought (as well as in the thought of other classical 
thinkers), his various approaches to Marx, through the 1960s-90s, contributed at 
least as much to obscuring or confusing those elements as to providing access 
to them.
Moreover, one of Habermas's central concerns, even as he approached 
in various instances an immanent critique of Marx's theory, was to inquire at the 
same time whether immanent critique of either contemporary society, or of 
Marx's theory, was possible or potentially of much value. Thus, in so far as the 
present chapter seeks to proceed through immanent critique of Habermas's 
approaches to Marx, it would have to demonstrate not only Habermas's 
misconceptions of Marx's ideas, but that those particular misconceptions played 
an important, if not central, role in the constitution of his theory and its practical 
implications, primarily as he understood them, but including as well his attempt 
to draw others into his project. It is Habermas's belief that only his theory 
remedied deficiencies in Marx, and was alone really capable of uncovering 
them.
As Postone as shown, from a standpoint within the Critical Theory 
tradition, Habermas's theory has reached a level of sophistication, and gained a 
sufficient amount of credibility, such that development of a re-interpretation of 
Marx's theory must have intrinsic to it the capability of explaining (socially) the 
plausibility of Habermas's theory, while demonstrating that it is not adequate to 
its object. While this chapter, then, remains for the most part at the level of 
immanent critique of Habermas's theory, it also begins to suggest relationships 
between contemporary developments and Marx's concepts which escape the 
bounds of Habermas's positions. Among these are the disintegration of social 
welfare states, the eclipse of Communism, the turn to unfettered market
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economies, and even the re-emergence of the question not only of global 
capitalism, but of its potential collapse.
As his own theory developed, Habermas increasingly reacted against 
"monologic" approaches to theory formation (Habermas 1989b). "Monologic" 
refers back to a "philosophy of consciousness", as well as to the positivistic or 
deterministic substance of various theories; on another level, it also points to the 
limitations of social theory when it is not worked out and clarified through a 
deliberately stylized mode of interaction, that is, dialogically. Far more than any 
of the older generation of the Frankfurt School, Habermas actively sought out, 
actively participated in, and actually attempted to shape discussions, or 
dialogues, with the aim of clarifying not only the nature and role of social theory 
generally, but his own theory particularly. Crucially, he saw this very process as 
constitutive of an important part of the originality of his social theoretic 
contribution, and perhaps even necessary for the type of social integration 
demanded by the particular requirements of modem society.
A second important difference, connected to the latter, is Habermas's 
very apparent concern with the reception of his theory (as a "critical theory") 
particularly in the U.S., or the English-speaking world generally. This will be 
examined in detail in Chapter Five, where I describe Habermas's intervention in 
the journal Praxis International, published in English and drawing an 
international readership. In order to explore the significance of this intervention, 
it will be helpful to begin the examination of the variety of Habermas's 
approaches to Marx and Marxism, what compelled them, and what resulted 
from them, by comparing and contrasting two early theoretical pieces.
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The Relationship of "Between Philosophy and Science: Marxism as Critique" 
and Structural Transformation of the Public Sphere
At first glance, it might appear peculiar that by now, with the considerable 
body of work accumulated on Habermas's thought, that the relationship 
between two early works—"Between Philosophy and Science: Marxism as 
Critique" (BPSMC) and Structural Transformation of the Public Sphere (STPS) 
—has been so little analyzed. Neither Rockmore nor Postone—two writers with 
different sorts of comprehensive critiques of Habermas—took up STPS at all. 
Postone (who strongly criticizes Habermas's interpretation of Marx's theory) 
participated in a symposium on STPS soon after it was published in English in 
1989; yet, his comments, rather than focusing directly on early Habermas's view 
of Marx's concepts, are aimed at defense of the intention of the study, which 
Habermas later concluded was, “still at the level of ideology critique" (Calhoun 
1992), and concludes with a somewhat oblique challenge to Habermas's 
apparent long-standing assumption that the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe 
represented some type of socialism connected to the inherent limitations of 
Marx's ideas. Furthermore, he takes sharp issue with any suggestion that 
Marx's critique of capitalism had lost relevance in regard to the most 
technologically developed Western societies.
While I believe Postone makes a convincing case, in that he implicitly 
rejects any notion that STPS has suddenly become more "relevant" because of 
the way it counter-poses an idea of radical democracy against Marx's concepts, 
my task here is more basic. In analyzing the works from a contemporary 
perspective, one can see clearly the initial dualism, or contradictoriness, which 
became endemic to Habermas's continuous returns to Marx. On more than one 
occasion, Habermas seemed to indicate that he was finished with Marx, only to
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return again in response to new theoretical or practical issues. STPS 
attempted to view Marx's ideas from within the perspective of radical democratic 
theory. BPSMC (first written two years earlier), had sought to view democratic 
theory (or a theory of democracy) from within the Marxist perspective. 
(Habermas’s notions of "reciprocity" and dialogue can be developed in this 
context.)
However, the dualism at issue here is not ultimately at the level of 
Habermas's early "critical theoretic" approach to Marx and contemporary 
society. More importantly, this dualism can be shown to be rooted in the 
problems identified by Postone related to the social constitution of capitalist 
society itself. Postone develops a concept of social mediation peculiar to 
capitalist society, no easier to identify today than it was when Marx wrote. The 
effects of this peculiar type of social mediation have not only become 
increasingly problematic in a practical sense under the rapidly expanding 
technological changes of recent decades. A conceptual grasp of this social 
mediation tends to undermine interpretations of Marx's theory which concern 
themselves primarily with the market and property relations. The 
"concreteness" of Marx's theory lies in its identification of forms of social 
constraint which are even more abstract than those typically traced to the 
market or property relations. Viewing as economic opposites existing 
Communism and advanced capitalist welfare states (as Habermas tended to) 
discloses a conceptual inadequacy in the reliance on these terms.
Habermas's early approach to Marx in BPSMC followed by STPS can be 
seen as preparatory for replacement of Marx’s theory (heretofore the presumed 
foundation of contemporary critical theory) by another theory. STPS confirms 
an interpretation of Mane's political theory, or better, Mane's theory of the 
political, as exclusively merely a different (or more radical) theory of political
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economy. At the same time, it argues that certain debilitating limitations of 
Marx’s theory are related to the horizon of theoretic critique. BPSMC, through a 
proposed revision of a deterministic economic theory attributed to Marx, had first 
attempted to expand conceptually the spheres of society (especially distribution 
and consumption of commodities) amendable to public deliberation. Following 
from this, on the one hand Marxism might be retained as a radicalization of, 
though in essential continuity with, political economy; on the other hand, such 
an approach also left open the option of rejecting both political economy and its 
critique as insufficient or inadequate in respect to a social formation grown 
increasingly complex.
In fact, the starting point of Habermas's argument, initially developed 
explicitly in BPSMC, is that Marxists—no matter how "humanist", "dissident" or 
"Westem"-cannot escape the fundamentally materialist nature of Marx's theory 
(Habermas 1973). At the same time, he suggests in his opening paragraphs in 
connection with this, that if both world power blocs have not completely 
overcome strictly economic problems (or material scarcity) such an eventuality 
is certainly not out of the question in the forseeable future. In this way he seems 
to want to move the critical impulse—in so far as he believes it persists more or 
less openly in "late capitalism", and perhaps underground in the Soviet bloc- 
away from existing forms of Marxism and toward a different theory which, 
however, he has yet to articulate.
His later analysis of Marx in STPS amplified Habermas's earlier 
intimation that Marx understood his own theory nearly exclusively as an 
economic theory with clear deterministic features. In the earlier BPSMC 
Habermas describes how a variety of intellectual responses to history, and 
empirical observation, included attempts to retain Marx under different but 
untenable guises (Habermas 1973, 203). However, now was time, with the aid
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of modem social scientific concepts, to confront head-on the materialistic core of 
Marx’s theory, not in order to totally obliterate the latter, but to salvage its 
rational element for a different, perhaps even more critical, theory of a society 
seen as grown far more "complex” than when Marx described it.
A key feature of BPSMC is that Marx’s labor theory of value—in its original 
conception—is ultimately not viable. Both empirical reality, and perhaps equally 
convincingly (and more tellingly) Marx's own, albeit unpublished, research 
support this position (Habermas 1973, 229). Habermas also indicates that such 
a sober look at the facts alone leaves, irresponsibly, a yawning critical- 
theoretical void. Marx's theory, while not tenable in its classical form, did 
problematize aspects of social life unseen by theorists he successfully 
discredited. Critical examination of Marx's labor theory of value, rather than just 
concerning itself with his critique of political economy generally, leads to the 
question of how to extend democracy to all areas of social life.
Habermas proposes that Marx's critique was basically an attempt to 
resolve crisis. Against the background of the competition between two 
nuclearly-armed superpowers, where the “class-struggle" is said to have been 
displaced (Habermas 1973, 197), social democracy, the welfare state, should 
be seen as the locus for attempts to bring under social control those aspects of 
social life, especially the economy, theorized by conventional Marxism to 
operate on the basis of a natural law conceived within a philosophy of history.
In the section titled, “Critique of Ideology and the Critical Appropriation of 
Traditional Ideas", which directly follows Habermas's suggested revision of a 
labor theory of value he criticized and attributed to Marx, Habermas describes a 
general conception of Marx's theory:
the prejudgement of Historical Materialism, which grants priority to the 
base over the superstructure..., Private property is considered to be the
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dark focal point at which the eclipsing of the world is concentrated, the 
knots in which all the threads of compulsive social relationships are 
drawn together and fastened (Habermas 1973, 236).
This depicts a theory of the transhistorical determination of society’s laws 
and its ideological superstructure, attributable to Marx. Such a theory is rooted 
in Marx's misunderstanding of his own thought as a "positive science". This 
conception is clearly articulated by Engels without correction by a more 
sophisticated Marx, who failed to reflect on “critique as such" (Habermas 1973, 
238). The outcome was that all "spirit", including socialism, came to be 
considered to be ideology, the correct distinguished from the false, "soley 
according to the criteria of a realistic theory of knowledge" (Habermas 1973, 
238).
Habermas continues his discussion with the claim that, with this, Marx 
moved outside the object of his critique (society itself), issuing a standard 
external to society. With this, theory lost its practical thrust. Habermas then 
quotes the fourth of Marx's Theses on Feuerbach:
Feuerbach proceeds from the fact of religious self-alienation, the 
duplication of the world in a religious and a worldly one. His work 
consists in resolving the religious world back into its worldly basis. But 
that this worldly basis elevates itself above itself and establishes itself as 
an independent realm in the clouds can be explained only as a result of 
the internal rupture and self-contradiction of this worldly basis. The latter 
must thus be both understood in its contradictions and revolutionized 
practically (Habermas 1973, 239).
In quoting this thesis, Habermas's purpose is two-fold: to illustrate Marx's 
“ideology critique", and to subsequently propose, against this, a more effective 
practical force of ideas.
In presenting Marx's fourth thesis on Feuerbach, Habermas suggests the 
view that it is more (but not much more) than Feuerbach's own understanding of
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Hegel’s "negation of the negative", or religious consciousness (which, 
Habermas adds, as though arguing with Marx) is “not nothing" (Habermas 
1973, 239). The implication (following from the earlier references to Marx's 
economic theory) is that theoretically Marx (even as late as Capital) did not 
move significantly from Feuerbachian materialism, especially in a practical 
sense. (I will return to this issue when I take up the chapter in Knowledge and 
Human Interests which deals most extensively with Marx's 1844 Economic- 
Philosophic Manuscripts).
Here Habermas tries to show through a partly appreciative, partly critical 
reading of Ernst Bloch, how the "false consciousness of a false world includes 
utopian elements which contain energies that at the same time, once instructed 
about themselves, become critical impulses" (Habermas 1973, 239). Habermas 
is trying to delineate a social sphere outside the instrumentalized social 
relations he believes Marx captured but did not successfully point beyond.
In Bloch, Habermas finds a remarkable attempt to, "preserve within the 
critique of ideology the tradition that is criticized" (Habermas 1973, 240). Ideas, 
with a utopian excess that go beyond ideology, are said to, "lose their power of 
transcendence to their degree of their instrumentalization" (Habermas 1973, 
240). The only “utopian excess" remaining after the maturing of the bourgeois 
form of society is that expressed in the "false consciousness of absoluteness, of 
a divorce from practice" (Habermas 1973, 240), an apparent reference to Hegel, 
as well as Marx's critique of the latter. Habermas writes,
On the lowest rungs of the ideological ladder, as in the case of the 
fetishism of commodities, the estrangement of the theoretical elements 
from the practical marks...only the "estrangement" of praxis from 
itself...here ideology itself becomes practical, while its ideal claims, 
contained in the idea of an exchange of equivalents, have departed 
almost entirely (Habermas 1973, 240).
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Hence Bloch confined himself to the cultural tradition-myth, religion, 
literature and music—with the understanding the more indirect the mediation 
that relates them to social conflict the more readily ideas will reveal their 
“utopian excess" (Habermas 1973, 240).
Habermas's discussion of Bloch repesents an introduction to a concept 
of lifeworld, referring to social relations he conceives to be outside the "false 
consciousness of absoluteness", theory's divorce from practice, thought's 
instrumentalization. According to Habermas, Bloc's insight is derived from 
Marx's concept of the "fetishism of the commodity", but takes it further. 
Habermas elaborates this idea with an interpretation placing Marx's "fetishism 
of the commodity" on "the lowest rung of the ideological ladder", because it is 
said to merely describe how, "ideology itself becomes practical", but the 
idealism previously intrinsic to it fades.
Habermas's brief discussion of Bloch (as well as a critical allusion to 
Adorno's placing of art on a par with with Critical Theory) serve to suggest the 
possibility of a Critical Theory (with incorporation of an understanding of the 
lifeworld) making a new beginning from Hegel's Absolute Spirit. The latter, 
conceived as the subsumption of practice by theory-or what is seen in Marx's 
"translation" of Hegel-labor by capital. Habermas argues that a new beginning 
was necessary for Critical Theory because though Marx's critique of political 
economy amounted to a successful immanent critique of early bourgeois 
society, crucial theoretical and practical changes, related to science and 
technology, define modem society in contrast to the historical period with which 
Marx's theory was intertwined.
Marx's critique is said to have demonstrated the separation of practical 
life from the ideals constitutive of the theoretical sphere. The implication is that 
theory (even if now reduced to "ideology"), is already literally "productive" of
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practical life, can be conceived as a "force of production", might contain 
resources potentially constitutive of fundamental social change as well.
Habermas suggests (with some irony) that this potential might be 
conceived as a realization of the Hegelian Absolute, or the unfolding of nature 
from spirit. (In the next section, I will show that in constrast in the later 
STPSHabermas conceives Marx’s original theory as suggesting a nearly 
"automatic", materialistic realization of freedom with the abolition of private 
property relations and planning of the economy according to the, "laws 
discovered once and for all of political economy without extended 
controversies" (Habermas 1989a, 140).
Marx's concept of "fetishism of commodities" (according to Habermas 
representing the "lowest rung on the ideological ladder”) makes implausible 
Habermas's notion that Marx's critique of capitalism was ultimately "positive", 
and that the commodity form of production, as it unfolded, brought along with it, 
but outside it, a non-instrumentalized sphere, potentially infused with the type 
of social interaction constitutive of freedom. Marx did not take as his own an 
analysis of the laws of political economy which put forward as the ground for 
resolution of crisis recognition of a universal potential inherent in them in 
dialectical opposition to the particularism of class interest. Neither did the 
"fetishism" of the commodity signal a critique of the alienation of bourgeois 
idealism in materialist interest. Marx's critique, did not simply counter-pose an 
idea (“bourgeois" or "socialist") to a reality (an unequal distribution of social 
wealth.)
Political economy itself, Marx concluded, was "true", not false. The 
"material relations between persons, and social relations between things" (Marx 
1977, 166) both constituted political economy and were constituted by it. Marx's 
analysis of the "fetishism of the commodity", in Habermas's description, "the
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lowest rung on the ideological ladder", represents the "secret" of the capitalist 
form not in terms of an opposite existent outside it, but a potential 
transcendence dependent on a different relation of theory to practice within it. 
Marx writes that only “freely associated" human relations, conceivable 
exclusively on the basis of a new relationship of theory to practice, strips the 
fetish from the commodity (Marx 1977, 173).
In this sense, there is an affinity with Hegel's Absolute in that, for 
example, in Marx's most detailed treatment of Hegel—the 1844 "Critique of 
Hegelian Dialectic"-Marx identified not only Hegel’s conceptualization of the 
movements of an alienated totality, but as well the “other moment" (Marx 1967b, 
323). This “other moment" involved the "inwardization" of these externalized, 
alienated forms, what the young Marx believed to be most important in Hegel's 
dialectical philosophy-transcendence as objective (Marx 1967b, 321). Hence, 
Volume I of Capital, in showing the non-viability of a form of social relations 
constituted as a dehumanized totality, presents the “Absolute" as a “collapse" as 
well as prospective new beginning (Marx 1977, 929). Capital re-creates 
humanist concepts introduced in 1844, especially “negation of negation", 
Hegel's concept which had a potential greater than that understood in, eg; 
Feuerbach's type of critique. (I will develop this further in Chapter Three).
Of fundamental concern here is what Habermas's remarks on the 
"fetishism of commodities" can already indicate about his interpretation of 
Marx's theory generally. Since, overall, Habermas attributes about equal 
stature to the Grundrisse, and to Critique of Political Economy, compared to 
Marx's fully worked-out Capital, it is noteworthy that the "fetishism of 
commodity" had not been presented in the former works. The concept was fully 
developed only after all the volumes (including Volume One, which was actually 
written last) known as Capital were already written.
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In the section on Habermas’s Structural Transformation of the Public 
Sphere, I will analyze how he—in a clear departure from most of the Critical 
Theory of the older generation—referred to Marx's texts directly and extensively. 
All periods of Marx's intellectual legacy were represented, at least in outline. I 
will argue that STPS, then, first suggested a detailed thesis concerning a 
theoretical unity implicit in Marx’s work viewed in its entirety. Yet, Habermas’s 
tendency was to merge, rather than distinguish, the ideas of Marx, unarguably a 
highly original and creative thinker, with those of Engels. This alone might 
have alerted readers, especially those who would have been aware of the 
paucity of systematic interpretations of Marx's writings among Critical Theorists, 
to the possibility that Habermas was as much concerned with identifying and 
integrating within his own theory a "sealed" intellectual tradition than in re­
interpreting, in Postone's sense, Marx’s theory.
I will also consider the striking omission-the Economic-Philosophic 
Manuscripts--w\\hin Habermas's presentation in STPS of an essential continuity 
in Marx's thought. One could approach an analysis of this omission by inquiring 
into the nature of his subject matter, what about it justified precluding discussion 
of an element of Marx's work already recognized for several decades in Europe, 
importantly through the work of Marcuse, as central to his early thought, if not 
his entire corpus.
In the opening pages of "Marxism as Critique" (Habermas 1973, 200- 
202), written two years prior the publication of STPS, Habermas presents 
several interpretations of the 1844 Economic-Philosophic Manuscripts, rejecting 
each one in turn, before proceeding to a direct approach to Marx’s economic 
theory via an examination of the farter's "labor theory of value." Already the 
implication might be seen to have been that while there might be elements in 
Marx's theory still relevant to consider for the construction of a contemporary
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theory of society, Marx’s "humanism" was not among them. In addition, Marx’s 
1844 Economic-Philosophic Manuscripts, not published in Marx’s lifetime, might 
have seemed to Habermas to be expendable for the task of situating Marx's 
ideas so that they were conceivable as constitutive of modem society despite 
Marx's intentions.
But, whatever the possible reasons, the early Marx, and in fact the whole 
of Marx's work, as presented in BPSMC, and more so later in STPS, appear 
(from Habermas's contemporary perspective) as strikingly "non", if not "anti" 
philosophical, non-revolutionary and, perhaps even in principle, unconcerned 
about problems of social organization.
Stmctural Transformation of the Public Sphere
Turning to STPS, the most striking features in Habermas's approach to 
Marx are his range of citation of the original texts, and the implicit case he 
makes for the stature of Friedrich Engels in relationship to Marx.
In regard to the first, Habermas cites the 1843 texts, "On the Jewish 
Question", and "Critique of Hegel's Philosophy of Right"; the Communist 
Manifesto (CM) (1848); The Eighteenth Brumaire of Louis Bonaparte (1852); 
Capital, Volume Three (1894); The Civil War in France (1872); and Critique of 
the Gotha Programme (1875). Here, then, is the primary text in Habermas's 
attempt to formulate a systematic critique and/or appropriation of Marx's theory. 
This early, Habermas appears not to have finally decided whether Marx is 
"inside" or "outside" an adequate contemporary critical theory of society. Except 
for perhaps Herbert Marcuse, in Reason and Revolution (Marcuse 1960) none 
among the original Frankfurt School had supported his arguments so directly or 
extensively with such systematic citation of Marx's texts. Habermas's originality
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in this is clear. Yet, given the range of citations, again it is important to notice 
that he excludes any references at all to the 1844 Economic-Philosophic 
Manuscripts. (I will return to this issue after describing, in regard to STPS, the 
relationship between Habermas's approach to Marx, and the presentation of his 
own argument).
Habermas's analysis of Marx's earlier texts proceeds from 1843 directly 
to 1852 (though he later moves back to the 1848 Communist Manifesto).
Overall, Habermas attempts to periodize Marx as a means of explicating his 
own concept of a public sphere; but, his range of selection of Mane's texts can 
also create the impression of an exhaustive inventory of Marx's concepts, 
shown as bound to an early stage of free market capitalism.
This can be seen in the opening paragraphs of his discussion of Marx in 
STPS. First he presents an argument that Marx retained a crucial element in 
Hegel's political philosophy. Hegel had already criticized the notion of public 
opinion. For Hegel, public opinion represented only an appearance of 
knowledge. Therefore, public opinion stood opposed to science (Habermas 
1989a, 118). Marx, with Hegel, was critical of public opinion. Yet, he 
developed a different sort of critique, which turned against Hegel's solution to 
the tension inherent in the difference between public opinion and science. 
According to Marx, Hegel advocated the politically forced integration of civil 
society and the state. Pre-bourgeois estates would function as the link between 
them. Young Marx "saw through this". Political estates of pre-revolutionary 
society had "disslolved into merely social classes" (Habermas 1989a, 122).
Thus Hegel's solution amounted to an attempt at recision by "reminiscence" 
(Habermas 1989a, 123) of the already factual separation of state and society.
(In Chapter Six, I will show that Habermas in a later critique tries to turn this 
against Marx—Marx's 1844 writings were "romantic" because they looked
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backward to restoration of a lost totality; yet, according to Habermas, Marx's 
critique, even in his own understanding, was specific to free market, private 
capitalism).
At this earlier stage, Habermas quotes a long passage from Marx's, "On 
the Jewish Question" (Habermas 1989a, 123). The passage contains a 
description of a "political revolution" in which the "directly political" character of 
civil life in feudalism was transformed by the separation of state and society.
The "general concern" of the people became, "in principle independent 
from...particular elements of civil life" (Habermas 1989a, 123). Next, Habermas 
focuses on the phrase, "in principle". He does so in order to identify Marx's 
"ironic" intention. Marx's point, according to Habermas, was that the "political 
revolution" which "shattered everything" (Habermas 1989a, 123), abolished the 
political character of civil society, and replaced forms of direct social domination 
with a more indirect, or abstract, form. Marx's "solution" to this development was 
to confront the incipient form as in a mirror with the, "social conditions for the 
possibility of its utterly unbourgeois realization" (Habermas 1989a, 124). This 
implied a movement of the formal to the substantive, or the abstract to the 
concrete. Further, in context, Habermas can be read to mean that Marx’s entire 
program, from the 1843 "On the Jewish Question" through Capital, had as a 
presupposition about which Marx was not fully aware, abstraction's 
inadmissibility in the socialism that would follow capitalism, as well as its only 
self-dissolving role on a theoretical level. Finally, the implication is that Marx 
saw in the movement of modem society a universal (in a transhistorical sense) 
potential, only presently distorted by particularistic interests.
in its emergence from feudalism, the self-understanding of bourgeois 
society included a notion of its own basis being rational-critical debate, with the 
result a society based upon reason, not power. However, this was actually
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among “property-owning" private people who viewed themselves, and others 
like themselves, as nothing but autonomous human beings, the basis for a 
"false consciousness" Habermas believes was Marx's primary object of criticism 
all the way through to his completion of Capital.
Here, Habermas's presentation of Marx relies upon, on the one hand, his 
view that Marx, with his critical attitude toward public opinion, was in accord with 
Hegel and, on the other hand, radically departed from Hegel's position that 
ideals of the "bourgeois" constitutional state were immanently realizable within 
the existing "republic". This implies an essentially "political" difference-one that 
might be explained in the movement from the monarchy to parliamentary 
democracy in the eighteenth and ninteenth centuries.
In a shift with an important nuance which he does not explicitly note, 
Habermas further characterizes Marx's attitude toward public opinion, drawing 
a sharper distinction with Hegel, here not alone in connection with the tetter's 
solution to the perceived "separation" of civil society and the state, but in regard 
to the phenomenon of public opinion itself. Habermas writes that Marx 
“denounced" public opinion, terming it "false consciousness" (Habermas 1989a, 
124).
Hegel's view of civil society and the state is grounded in his analysis of 
'science1' and "public opinion." In these, Hegel analyzed a concrete universal, 
the historical realization of a unity of the particular and the universal. Public 
opinion was adequate to the practical idea, science to the theoretical idea. 
Habermas does not see that in Marx's view, these very types of oppositions 
(whose tendency was toward increasing antagonism despite Hegel's forced 
integration of them) were historically specific; eventually, Marx showed, they 
drove the capitalist form of social development. Hegel believed historical 
contradictions might be resolved within the modem form of society. With Marx,
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science and public opinion were each necessary moments in the social 
mediation of capitalism-a situation of "personal independence in a context of 
objective dependence" (Marx 1973, 158). Thus Hegel's dialectic-historical as 
was Marx’s-did not successfully specify the particular and universal and, in fact, 
could not, absent an understanding of the peculiar role of labor in capitalism.
After his reference to, "On the Jewish Question", and a paragraph 
explaining its implications for the overall theme of his study, Habermas moves 
quickly to a discussion of "critique of political economy" in Marx’s Capital. This 
initial discussion of Marx's critique of political economy proceeds with no textual 
references. One reason for this is that it is inserted into Habermas's broader 
discussion of Marx's early ideas relevant to understanding the bourgeios public 
sphere in the context of Kant and Hegel. The long paragraph characterizing 
Marx's "critique of political economy", with no textual references to it, is in fact 
bounded by three references to, "On the Jewish Question" (Habermas 1989a, 
123-125).
Before I analyze in more detail Habermas's procedure here, I shall first 
present, and criticize, the substance of his remarks. As noted, he begins by 
holding that Marx "denounced public opinion as false consciousness". Public 
opinion "hid before itself" that it masked bourgeois class interests. Habermas 
believes that this initial self-deception had far-ranging consequences because 
the main thrust of the critique of political economy aimed to show that the 
bourgeois society could not without crises reproduce itself as a "natural order" 
(Habermas 1989a, 124). In short, the ideas of private property and the free 
market (natural rights of "man") masked a class-divided society dependent on 
the exploitation of the many, whose only commodity was their labor power. An 
intrusion of political power-possible on the basis of this class-divided society- 
led to development of oligopoly, vitiating a supposed situation of an
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Independent formation of prices based on civil freedom of contract (Habermas 
1989a, 124). Habermas summarizes, "This critique demolished all fictions to 
which the idea of the public sphere of civil society appealed" (Habermas 1989a, 
124). The fictions to which Habermas refers are "equality of opportunity", 
individual freedom, and reason (Habermas 1989a, 124-125). He roots Marx’s 
“demolition" of these bourgeois "fictions" in Marx's criticism of private property 
and analysis of social class conflict, that is, the domination one class achieved 
and maintained over others.
Following this, Habermas focuses attention on the historical struggle, "for 
the realization of the bourgeois constitutional state", with an idea of the public 
sphere-private individuals engaged in a public use of reason-as the central 
principle of its organization. The public sphere is twice characterized with the 
term dialectic; in the one case, the latter is "inherent" (Habermas 1989a, 127), 
and in the other it is "immanent" (Habermas 1989a, 128).
Habermas refers to historical markers-electoral reform movements of the 
1830s, and the 1848, "June uprising of the Paris workers". In juxtaposing these 
historical phenomenon, Habermas makes a case for the continuity of Marx’s 
early thought. Electoral reform, as a step in the bourgeois constitutional state's 
struggle for realization, is related to a quotation taken from Marx's, "Critique of 
Hegel's Philosophy of Right":
By really establishing its political existence as its authentic existence, 
civil society ensures that its civil existence, in so far as it is distinct from its 
political existence, is inessential. And with the demise of the one, the 
other, its opposite, collapses also. Therefore, electoral reform in the 
abstract political state is equivalent to a demand for its dissolution and 
this in turn implies the dissolution of civil society (Habermas 1989a,
126).
The sense of Habermas's placement of the quotation involves a 
suggestion that Marx saw electoral reform to be essentially a natural movement
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toward the re-integration of sundered, original totality. The demand for 
expansion of the franchise, an apparent movement of "real" civil society into the 
"fictitious” civil society of the legislature, was at bottom simply the striving of civil 
society to “create a political existence for itself”, a qualitative feature of social 
existence which had been lost in what Marx at this time called the "in principle 
independent" status of the state. (Alternatively, negation of negation is the 
movement of transcendence of a mediation constitutive of an antagonistic 
totality, which results in a new beginning, not a search backwards for a lost, 
original wholeness). Habermas then writes,
Before 1848 the young Marx gave a radical-democratic interpretation to 
the tendency toward the expansion of the franchise; he anticipated a shift 
in the function of the bourgeois public sphere which, after the June 
uprising of the Paris workers, he would diagnose far more clearly... 
(Habermas 1989a, 126).
According to Habermas, then, both the electoral reform movements of the 
1830s and the 1848 "June uprising of the Paris workers", while arguably very 
different types of social movements, served Marx mainly to progressively 
confirm certain of his already held theoretical assumptions. (In Chapter Three, I 
will argue that 1844 represented Marx's "break" with "bourgeois" society. This 
makes unlikely that, if even "far more clearly", Marx saw the 1848 revolutions in 
essential continuity with his pre-1844 view of the 1830 events).
The bourgeois constitutional state, with its underlying principle of a public 
sphere (which actually consisted of autonomous private property-holding 
individuals) was a self-contradictory, unsustainable historical "moment". Out of 
this, Marx saw a possibility for an emergence of a social formation qualitatively 
differering from feudalism or the capitalism of an incipient bourgeois society. 
Habermas, however, suggests something quite different when he writes, in the
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sentences quoted above, that Marx's theory relied upon and, "anticipated a shift 
in the function of the bourgeois public sphere." In Habermas's view, the main 
critical thrust underlying Marx's attitude to these different political phenomenon 
was that the distinction between civil society and the state existing in the form of 
of a depoliticized and concrete civil society of particulars and an abstract 
universal represented by the state, was not a “natural" form.
What then would the "shift in the function" of the bourgeois public sphere 
which Marx anticipated in 1843, and "diagnosed far more clearly" in 1852, 
entail? If before the 1848 "June Uprising" an idea of the bourgeois public 
sphere functioned as the, "central principle of the bourgeois constitutional 
state's organization", after that event it was clear that the pressure of external 
contingencies (the exploitation of it by non-bourgeois strata) could result in it's 
self-abolition. The abstraction which became internal to realization of the 
bourgeois constitutional state could be made to function as a weapon against 
the latter. Habermas's essential critical point is that Marx’s basically misguided 
theoretical presuppositions (which retained a kind of naturalism) led him to view 
favorably a prospect of constitutional democracy functioning as a weapon 
against itself.
Habermas follows out Marx's thought in "Critique of Hegel's Philosophy 
of Right". Marx interprets the repoliticalization of civil society as disclosing the 
inessentiality of its "civil" existence. With the demise of an inessential civil 
existence, a particular kind of political existence (the state) which had 
depended on it, also collapses. The "abstract political state" is founded on the 
contradiction between the private and the public constituting capitalist society; 
the internal transformation of the one side (civil society's demand for electoral 
reform) suggests the transcendence of the internal tension constitutive of the
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whole. With the dissolution of the one side, its opposite dependent upon it, also 
collapses.
It seems that two theoretical questions arise concerning this 
transformaton: where to locate its origin and principle, in so far as it is other than 
arbitrary and contingent; and, what then follows, what comes after, this kind of 
dissolution? After the break-down of the constitutive forces of the market and 
privatate property relations, theory itself must penetrate deeper. Habermas 
approaches these questions solely through the application of the concept he is 
in the midst of developing. The "public sphere" (where public opinion 
developed), not a central theme in the young Marx’s writings Habermas 
considers, is made to appear from Habermas's later theoretical perspective to 
be the underlying crucial one—even if not understood as such by Marx himself. 
This can be clearly seen in the analysis Habermas proposes after he quotes 
Marx on the "dissolution" of the "abstract political state", which implies the 
simultaneous collapse of civil society. There appears to be nothing remaining. 
Habermas does not argue that Marx put forth something positive in connection 
with this. Instead, Habermas proposes, "the democratically revolutionized 
public sphere" (Habermas 1989a, 127) as the actual force which, in the words 
of Marx he now quotes for the second time, "wishes to substitute" the real civil 
society for “the fictitious civil society of the legislature".
But, Marx posed a negation-that of the "abstract" political state by the 
politicized civil society-and a negation of that negation: negation of civil society 
as civil society, which depended on the existence of the state. Nothing 
"positive" appears here. Still, Habermas conceptualizes Marx's appropriation of 
Hegel's negation of negation to be the basis for a "structural transformation of 
the public sphere". In this, Marx's appropriation of Hegelian dialectic represents 
a determinate link in the life of an idea co-extensive with the modem form of
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society generally. Marx-intending to expose the potential impotence of 
abstraction in theory and its relationship to practice—instead (according to 
Habermas) contributes to a restructuring of the social order in which abstraction 
as such (public reason in the place of power) is a necessary part of its identity. 
Abstraction as such functions to ground and perpetuate (at another level) a 
differentiation of public opinion and science, society and state; the latter 
differentiation (society and state)-in its conception and the permanence 
attributed to it-becomes possible, and later develops even with a re-politicized 
economy following classical free-market capitalism, the latter however already 
exposed by Marx as actually determined by "power" instead of “reason" 
anyway.
Habermas presents the idea that the "wish", idealistic and revolutionary 
in a romantic sense, of civil society to substitute itself for the fictitious civil 
society, expresses a dialectic of a public sphere as, eg; a quantitative 
expansion leading to a qualitative transformation. More plausibly, Marx's intent 
is to point to mystifications in Hegel's philosophy, and the non-viability of a 
social formation to which it accomodated, while working out how the latter is 
intrinsically related to the former.
Habermas argues that the "enlarged public" Marx attributed key 
significance, the restructuring of the public sphere it entailed, simply expanded 
the social terrain thought to be subject to the public sphere's interventions. 
Habermas conceives this expansion to be absolute—"social life as such" 
(Habermas 1989a, 127), and "direction and administration of every process 
necessary for the reproduction of society" (Habermas 1989a, 127)-but sums it 
up reductively as, "the enigma of a 'political society1 that Marx posited with his 
critique of the Hegelian doctrine of the state found its resolution a few years
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later in the phrase of a socialization of the means of production" (my emphasis, 
RR) (Habermas 1989a, 127).
Up to this point, the key aspect of interpretation of Marx’s relationship to 
Hegel involves Habermas's provision of a positive content to Marx's theory of 
the non-viable, self-contradictory, transitory, nature of the incipient bourgeois 
society. Habermas supplies this positive content primarily through a reading of 
Marx's "Critique of Hegel's Philosophy of Right". At the same time, however, he 
implies both an essential continuity within the writings of the young Marx 
(through quotations and citations of "On the Jewish Question", as well as 
“Critique of Hegel's Philosophy of Right"), and a fundamental topos of all of 
Marx's work. The latter is supplied through an interpolation which evokes, 
rather than critically presents, a view of Marx's considerably later critique of 
political economy, which was anticipated in (and can hardly be understood 
without) his 1844 Economic-Philosophic Manuscripts, never mentioned in 
STPS.
The last two paragraphs of this section proceed from the view that Marx 
presumed the "restructured public sphere" would be "able to realize in earnest 
what it had promised from the start-the subjection of political domination, as 
domination of human beings over human beings, to reason" (Habermas 1989,
128). These paragraphs feature references to the Communist Manifesto and 
The Poverty of Philosophy and, for the first time in the work, to Capital, 
significantly, however, to Volume Three, not Volume One. In addition, two 
references to Friedrich Engels amount to an argument that the latteris 
theoretical contribution was consistent with, equivalent to, or even, at least in 
some respects, superior to Marx's. In one case, Habermas has Engels 
supplying a supposedly cogent summation of the implications of Marx's work
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(Habermas 1989a, 128) and, in the other, has him anticipate its basis and 
conclusions (Habermas 1989a, 129).
Generally, these final two paragraphs offer a view that Marx resolved the 
internal tension of civil society and the state (recognition of a tension he shared 
with Hegel), ending in the abolition of both sides of the totality (which Habermas 
seems to obscure), merely into the material terms of economic class division. 
From this, Marx is said to have suggested (wrongly) the inevitable resolution of 
all social contradictions, which were thought (again wrongly) to be implied by, 
and dependent upon, these terms.
In Habermas's view, then, the bourgeois concept of the public sphere, as 
understood (in the critical sense) by Marx, logically encompassed and, in fact, in 
its practical development, would lead to a classless society. Moreover, just this 
political idea of a "classless" society exhausted the content and goal of Marx's 
theory, from the earliest writings to the latest.
With the undermining of private property as the basis for participation in 
the public sphere, political domination, always associated with class 
distinctions, would be replaced by reason. This reason, in the absence of the 
basis of political domination, that is, class-determined society, would amount to, 
according to Habermas's interpolation of Engels, the administration of things 
and direction of production processes taking the place of the rule over men.
Here there is a further development of Habermas's understanding of 
Marx's analysis of the relationship between civil society and the state. In that, 
rather than seeing a higher level of intensity of contradiction in theory emerging 
from the analysis of the demise of civil society and the related collapse of its 
opposite as well (the "abstract political state") Habermas attributes to Marx a 
worked out resolution, or synthesis, which seems to have rid itself of internal 
tension. The type of synthesis attributed to Marx entails an understanding of his
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departure from Hegel as associated with the difference between the critical 
stance toward public opinion they shared, and the concept of “false 
consciousness" attributed to Marx alone. "Unmasked" bourgeois public opinion 
could not escape confronting its own particularistic character, and was obliged 
to confront the possible consequences of its instrumentalizing, in the form of 
ideology, the reason with which it had, in the first place, come into its own out of 
the oppressive conditions of the old.
Habermas's idea is that Marx's critique, an expose of "false 
consciousness", was itself constitutive of the process of the restructuring of the 
bourgeois public sphere: It “demolished all fictions to which the idea of the 
public sphere appealed" (Habermas 1989a, 124). Marx revealed the 
vulnerability of an only apparently effective abstraction of reason (as ideology), 
that is, its commitment to, and dependence upon, a universal already shown to 
be bogus. The implication of Habermas’s analysis is that Marx merely aimed to 
"concretize" the idea of a bourgeois public sphere; he aimed to remove 
abstraction and integrate reason and practical life through class analysis. A 
single transparent totality would replace class domination constitutive of and 
dependent upon ideological occlusion. (As we shall see, Habermas will 
conclude, however, that Marx's theory, while "demolishing ail fictions to which 
the idea of the public sphere of civil society appealed", helped establish new 
ones, as well as ultimately left standing the non-fictitious element of the old 
bourgeois form).
In this study of the bourgeois public sphere, in contrast to that of class in 
general, Habermas's analysis of labor is thin. In this early work, labor assumes 
a strikingly subordinate place in his presentation of Marx. Labor appears first in 
the analysis as a detonation of social class (Habermas 1989a, 126), next as the 
non-recognized, or the object of social exclusion, subsequently integrated
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(Habermas 1989a, 127), and finally as the object of social planning writ large 
(Habermas 1989a, 128). (Social planning, in Habermas's view, completes the 
"reversal" of the public and the private first effected by Marx, in that what had, for 
the bourgeoise, defined its position as "man", private property, or means of 
production, while excluding the non-owners, now becomes the only object-as 
subject to social planning--of the public sphere).
That “realm of necessity"-subject to "administration of things and 
direction of production processes"~leaves to the private sphere those aspects 
of social life free from the constraints of social labor, from the economic function. 
(In the following section, I will return to Habermas's concept of labor. In 
Knowledge and Human Interests he develops an original interpretation of 
Marx's concept and offers his initial thoughts on the basic theoretical framework 
required to render Marx's theory as an overall theory of social evolution).
Habermas supplements his analysis of Marx, for the second time, with 
reference to Engels. He cites Engels's early “Principles of Communism" 
(Habermas 1989a, 129). There, it is said, Engels identified private property 
(and/or its absence) as the key to distinguishing social formations and their 
transformations. However, neither the quotation itself, nor Habermas's own 
focus here, is concerned with the general question of the relationship of private 
property to the existence or maintenence of capitalism. (This is a significant 
omission in view of the importance of this question in light of the rapid 
ascendency of Communism, and its even more dramatic recent collapse).
Rather, the context of the citation is the notion he has already articulated- 
Marx's “peculiar reversal" of the classical relationship between the public and 
private spheres. According to Habermas, this reversal was already clearly 
presented in Marx's Communist Manifesto, especially in his anticipation of the 
disappearance of class antagonism with the concentration of production in the
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hands of a "vast association of the whole nation" (Habermas 1989a, 128). This 
would represent a power that was public, but not “political”, the latter depending 
on the existence of social classes. With the removal of private property, and the 
social classes rooted in its existence, the private sphere, as the realm of 
freedom, would be greatly expanded (if not first fully realized), eg; removing 
from the purview of "society" even the relationship between the sexes as in the 
institution of marriage (Habermas 1989a, 129).
Now I want to examine these citations of Engels more closely. They 
appear in two consecutive paragraphs of Habermas’s text. First, Habermas 
makes a case that Marx's theoretical tendency was to subordinate the "political", 
and the social generally, to the more strictly "economic". His statement 
summarizing the movement from Hegel to Marx points in this direction: "The 
enigma of a "political society" that Marx posited with his critique of Hegel's 
doctrine of the state found its resolution a few years later in the phrase of a 
socialization of the means of production" (Habermas 1989a, 127).
Because, apparently, Habermas cannot find a similar formulation in any 
of Marx's own writings, he instead has Engels interpreting Marx such that, "the 
administration of things and the direction of production processes would take 
the place of the rule over men" (Habermas 1989a, 128).
The effect of this is two-fold: a) the uniqueness of Marx's critique of 
Hegel, which Habermas had just expended considerable energy trying to 
disclose, is suddenly dissipated. The forced integration of civil society and state 
which Marx was said to criticize is simply transposed in the late Marx’s theory as 
a "forced" economic integration. Habermas takes up Marx's early writings (from 
the 1843 "Critique of Hegel's Philosophy of Right" to the Communist Manifesto) 
as the theoretical ground from which both Marx and Marxists alike understood 
as virtually automatic the transition from the "realm of necessity" to the "realm of
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freedom". Habermas offers an interpretation of the relationship between the 
1843, "Critique of Hegel's Philosophy of Right", and the 1848 Communist 
Manifesto. In the former, the movement of the "real civil society" into the 
"fictitious" civil society (of the legislature) results in a (theoretical) collapse of the 
contradictory totality which defined the content of the bourgeois social form. 
Habermas characterizes Marx’s interpretation as finally "functionalizing" the 
principle of the public sphere. The latter was developed in practice and then 
(self-consciously) conceived as a universal and non-instrumental form of 
reason which distinguished the new society from the old. The public sphere, 
including the movement of the concept of it, evolves from a practice with an 
immanently universal character to a "role" in effecting the transition from one 
form of society (civil society's antagonistic relationship to an abstract political 
state) to another (free from social conflict rooted exclusively in private property).
For Habermas, the 1848 Communist Manifesto represents Marx's 
"resolution" of an "enigma", which he had posed in 1843. The writings later 
than Marx's CM, Marx's mature writings, then, are situated by Habermas as an 
offer of 'scientific" proof of an original insight which already dismissed as 
theoretically expendable entire spheres of sociality, eg; morality and law, or 
practical life generally.
At this point, I will only note that the way Marx posed the relationship 
between civil society and the state in "Critique of Hegel's Philosophy of Right", 
described as an "enigma" by Habermas, is far richer in theoretical implications 
then Habermas's account suggests. For example, there certainly is a clear 
relationship between, on the one hand, Marx's analysis of civil society and the 
state, and his positing of production in the hands of a "vast association of the 
whole nation" at the time he wrote the Communist Manifesto in one 
organizational (both normative and revolutionary) context and, on the other
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hand, the fully worked out concept of the "The Fetishism of the Commodity and 
its Secret” with its fundamental concepts of abstract and concrete labor at the 
time he wrote the "Critique of the Gotha Programme", another “organizational" 
document. I will develop a view of this relationship after taking up Knowledge 
and Human Interests. (The document which offers the best opportunity for 
initiating such a discussion is the 1971 article, 'Some Difficulties in the Attempt 
to Link Theory and Practice", which served as the introduction to the fourth 
revised German edition of Theory and Practice, and the first, English translation, 
which apperared as an abridged version in 1973).
b) Marx's self-understanding of his own theory is put into question if, 
indeed, Engels must be relied upon to draw such a fundamental conclusion 
from it. (And, in fact, the text of Engels Habermas cites was written very late in 
Marx's life. Marx indicated no interest in it.)
The second citation of Engels implies that Engels's important conclusion 
regarding Marx's anticipation of the radical effects of the abolition of social 
classes rooted in private property might have had its very origins in a text of 
Engels own, written prior to his and Marx's famous Communist Manifesto. 
Habermas cites Engels's The Principles of Communism in connection with the 
relationship of private property, man/woman relations, and the family, written in 
1843, before Engels met Marx. With the effect of reinforcing the "identity" of 
Engels and Marx, Habermas next cites Marx in an 1842 article for the 
Rheinische Zeitung. "If marriage were not the basis for the family, it would not be 
subject to legislation, just as friendship is not". Habermas concludes, "Both 
Mane and Engels considered a relationship to be actualized as “private" only 
when it was no longer saddled with any legal regulations" (Habermas 1989a,
129).
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
66
This might appear to be a narrowly focused statement of fact; however, in 
the context of Habermas's analysis, the statement aims to fundamentally 
challenge the position he attributes to Marx developed in response to his 
confrontation with Hegel, in “Critique of Hegel's Philosophy of Right", and in his, 
"On the Jewish Question". While, remarkably, Habermas never mentions the 
terms "alienation", or "abstraction", these were principal issues in these texts.
Habermas's characterization of Marx's position, which in this section and 
the one following, cites texts of Marx ranging from 1842-1875 leads one to the 
view that Marx understood the bourgeois social formation and the negative 
features endemic to it--ideology, “false consciousness", exploitation, and social 
exclusion-as growing out of, and determined by, private property, especially in 
the "means of production". According to Habermas, “legal regulations", 
apparently inimical to Marx's "realm of freedom", are understood by Marx to be 
an abstraction destined for dissolution along with the "abstract political state" 
generally; both belong to the superstructure dependent upon private property. 
Socialism is essentially a concretization of bourgeois ideals, already alienated 
in materialist interests.
The second chapter in STPS involving Habermas's analysis of Mane 
begins from the conclusion that the, "dialectic of the bourgeois public sphere 
was not completed as anticipated in the early socialist expectations" (Habermas 
1989a, 130), a formulation which collapses Marx not only into Engels's 
positions, but into an altogether broader political tendency. This was because, 
"the extension of equal political rights to all social classes proved to be possible 
within the framework of this class society itself" (Habermas 1989a, 130). While 
the bourgeois public sphere was successfully exposed as "ideology", leading 
even its "social-philosophical representatives" to nearly deny it in principle, the
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socialist expectations of the dialectic of the public sphere completing itself in the 
establishment of a classless society were not met.
This interpretation implies that “Marx and the socialists" were the most 
consistent in their attachment to the "principle" embodied in the bourgeois 
public sphere, dependent on a theory of natural law, or a philosophy of history. 
Habermas concludes that liberalism, gathering strength from the mid-19th 
century, virtually abandoned the principle, even as it continued to be 
celebrated, in favor of a "common sense meliorism" (Habermas 1989a, 131).
Habermas, then, first judges the socialist critique to be superior to the 
self-understanding of the bourgeois public sphere. In exposing the idea of the 
public sphere as bourgeois ideology the socialist critique forced its 
representatives into an ambiguity concerning the theoretical understanding of 
the social order for which they tried to account.
The general outcome--in this battle of ideas--was, however, different. 
What Habermas calls the “liberalist apologetic" (Habermas 1989a, 130) 
managed to retreat from its principle of the public sphere. The developing 
ambiguity of its attitude led to its questioning the “fundamental presuppositions" 
common to both "models" of the public sphere—its own and the socialist. The 
basis common to both was the idea of a “natural" basis for society, tied to a 
philosophy of history. In abandoning these presuppositions, in becoming 
"realistic", the liberal apologetic was, "superior to the socialist critique" 
(Habermas 1989a, 130). Habermas notes that this is not to say that liberalism's 
ambiguity admitted the "structural conflict of society whose very product it was" 
(Habermas 1989a, 130).
Before returning to Marx at the end of this second chapter concerning the 
bourgeois idea of the public sphere and its socialist critique, Habermas outlines 
the evolving liberal views, particularly of Tocqueville and Mill. Both are shown
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to have retreated from the original idea of the public sphere. The latter, as it 
expanded to include masses~a diversity of social classes and therefore social 
interests-resulted in a growth of the state. There was a decline of the public 
sphere's critical function-aimed at replacing power with reason. Instead Mill, 
for example, conceived of public opinion as just one power among others. It 
was seen to function primarily to limit state power, rather than as having the 
potential to dissolve power in favor of the general interest, that is, to replace 
political power with reason, the original ideal (Habermas 1989a, 136).
In the return to Marx, after discussing the evolving liberal view of the public 
sphere and the state, Habermas makes three central points.
First, liberalism, particularly Tocqueville, was ahead of Marx in criticizing 
the implications of the "centralization of government power". Also, in Marx's 
“belated" recognition of its dangers, he instead (for the first time in 1852) called 
for it to be "smashed". And, thirdly, in following the “liberalist warning" about the 
"centralization of government authority", Marx none the less returned to the idea 
of a "socialistically emancipated public opinion" as an insight into the natural 
order (Habermas 1989a, 140).
Habermas supports his position here by arguing that Marx's analysis of 
the Paris Commune entailed the notion that the replacement of bourgeois 
parliamentarianism with a “system of workers councils" would strip public 
authority of its political character. Habermas, returning to Engels's words while 
discussing Marx's views, asserts that the socialist idea was that public authority, 
divested of political content, would be concerned only with, "the administration 
of things and the direction of production processes". These could be "regulated 
by the [natural] laws (discovered once and for all) of political economy without 
extended controversies" (Habermas 1989a, 140).
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Conclusion
Now, after this description of Habermas's presentation of Marx, and in 
conclusion, I want to return to the beginning in order to examine his approach 
more closely. One obvious issue, which Habermas does not explicitly raise, is 
the continuity of Marx's thought. Yet, the sense of his overall argument is that, 
firstly, there was a fundamental continuity in Marx's theoretical position from the 
1840s through the 1870s, and that this could be fully disclosed through 
examination of a concept of a public sphere, which was conceived increasingly 
inclusively. Secondly, a detectable shift in Marx's view of "centralization of 
governmental power“—whi!e not affecting the essential quality of Marx's theory- 
was wholly contingent on certain empirical evidence, principally in the political 
sphere. (This is only conceivable in the absence of an analysis of the 1844 
Economic-Philosophic Manuscripts). Finally, Habermas indirectly puts forth the 
position that Marx failed to fully understand the presuppositions and, indeed, 
the social consequences of his own theory.
Habermas's analysis implicitly includes a thesis involving Marx's work as 
a totality. It argues that early writings of Marx, which Habermas selectively 
specifies, were, in a way, at least as weightly as the "mature" works. The 
argument indirectly states that, however ironically, Marx's critique of Hegel, and 
therefore of bourgeois society's understanding of itself, while on the basis of a 
more penetrating understanding of political economy, nonetheless remained 
grounded in, and dependent upon, categories Habermas distinguishes as 
uniquely associated with the universal elements of the bourgeois socio- 
historical form of society.
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But, a problem with this is that it is possible that Marx did not consider 
Hegel's philosophy merely representative of bourgeois thought. Rather, Marx 
seemed to have viewed Hegel as a seminal thinker who lived within bourgeois 
society, but one whose thought in a unique way transcended that society. 
Characteristics of Hegel's thought pointed to replacement of the existing social 
form, despite the "solution" Hegel offered to antagonisms he identified in the 
Philosophy of Right. This explains the seriousness with which Marx 
approached Hegel's ideas, and the kind of critical attention he devoted to them.
A conventional way of explaining the relationship of the ideas of Marx 
and Hegel is to assert that while Hegel's approach to “reason" was abstract, 
Marx was concerned with the "concrete". Now, on occasion Mane did criticize 
Hegel's use of, or the way he situated, abstraction. Yet, Marx, of course, did not 
categorically dismiss abstraction. Marx attempted to grasp abstraction 
constitutive of a particular set of social relations unique to capitalist society. 
Marx's notion of the concrete cannot be grasped outside the constituting 
element of abstraction internal to the capitalistic social form. Therefore, 
Habermas's unusual implication that Marx's critique of political economy was 
little more than an expose of the non-inclusive structure of the bourgeois public 
sphere, that is, lacked concreteness, and consequently was essentially 
reformist and "naturalistic" (despite the committment to revolution) demands 
closer scrutiny.
Marx's 1844 Economic-Philosophic Manuscripts contain crucial 
conceptual developments highly relevant to theoretical issues raised in STPS. 
Habermas's later analysis of the young Marx in "Marx's Metacritique of Hegel: 
Synthesis Through Social Labor" (1968), takes up the third and final Manuscript 
from 1844. I shall show how Habermas's later essay, while not exactly 
superseding issues he raised in STPS, represented another, different approach
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to Marx. The new approach can be explained with reference to the relationship 
between the emerging coherence of Habermas's own theory, and the 
dependence of the latter on an interpretation of Marx, including earlier ones of 
his own, later recognized as inadequate.
The analysis of Marx in STPS stands out as the first step in the validation, 
stamped with the imprimatur of a rigorous analysis from within the anti-capitalist 
Critical Theory tradition, of the essentially materialistic-and therefore 
problematic-nature of Marx's theory in the context of contemporary theoretical 
and practical developments. The cogent insights of Marx's theory are tied to a 
specific historic period, that of classical free market capitalism. The materialistic 
determinism of the theory is judged to have been, all at once, a mere product of 
the time, a contributing factor in the inability of Marx to fully comprehend his own 
intellectual contribution, and a key element in shaping the entire post-Marx 
historical problematic of the relation of ideas and social reality.
In STPS, Habermas argued that Marx's theory—in the form of an 
exclusively immanent critique of bourgeois political economy-understood itself 
as having proved that the expansion of the public sphere to include non­
bourgeois strata would inevitably lead to a classless society. Marx conceived 
the possibility of fundamental social change on the basis of a planned economy 
in which the rational allocation of resources could be achieved without political 
domination. In actuality, Habermas observed, at the very stage of free-market 
capitalism to which Marx's theory was tied, the public sphere absorbed non­
bourgeois strata without its fundamentally altering the class nature of society. 
(Even later, as the economy again became "politicized", this class nature of 
society even lost its primacy).
The sense of the earlier BPSMC can be clearly seen to have been an 
attempt to come to terms with a situation in which Marx's theory, as understood
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by himself, and as the intellectual basis for one of the two poles (though both 
discredited) of world power, retained some sort of not completely accounted for 
status. Habermas believed that clarification of this status might open the way for 
progress toward a more adequate relation between theory and practice within 
modem society hence seen more soberly. From this perspective, STPS (while 
not always clear to commentators, followed BPSMC by two years) tends to be 
viewed as Habermas's first basically (though anti-orthodox) Marxist work. As I 
have shown, it actually initiated a systematic, comprehensive critique of Marx. 
STPS served, in a fundamental way, as a transition to a type of theory thought 
to be needed in order to replace Marx and Marxism.
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CHAPTER THREE 
THE PROBLEM OF THE CONTEMPORARY RECOGNITION OF MARX
Although I will only later take up LC and, in the next chapter, the Theory 
of Communicative Action, Habermas develops an idea in those works which 
might help orient the present focus on KHI. He develops an early implication 
that Marx failed to take seriously enough the systemic features of contemporary 
society.
In BPSMC, Marx's section in Capital on the "Fetishism of the Commodity 
and its Secret" was utilized by Habermas in a demonstration that Marx identified 
a subsumption of practice by theory, which implied for Habermas the 
"practicality" (as opposed to the technical potential) of theory itself. This (1960) 
was prior to the decisive importance for a critical theory (and in distinction from 
Marx's theory) Habermas was soon to attribute to the difference betwen the 
practical and the technical.
Recall that the "secret" (of the commodity)~which Habermas did not 
mention in BPSMC, but analyzed in the second chapter on Marx in his later KHI 
(which I will analyze below)--was that, according to Marx, the product of labor in 
the form of the commodity which had become generalized was a social 
relationship not readily perceivable as such; but even in KHI Habermas did not 
note that Marx's further (and main) point was that in capitalism labor, in a 
peculiar relationship to its product, constituted a dehumanized society. To the 
contrary, Habermas developed an argument, based primarily on a reading of 
Marx's German Ideology, that labor, seen as transhistorical, was a "mechanism
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of evolution", the latter depicted (by Marx) as a process of "humanization" 
(Habermas 1972, 29).
Since it is already linked to the intital, basic unit of Marx's critque of 
political economy in Chapter One of Volume One of Capital, a work which 
Habermas suggests is analogous to (or a materialist appropriation of) Hegel's 
Science of Logic, Habermas interprets the element of Marx's description of the 
fetish to mean that labor's essence is concealed, and thus represented the 
"lowest rung on the ideological ladder"; this interpretation has the commodity 
paralleling Being, determined as the other of an essence, in Hegel's Logic. 
(Later, in KHI, Habermas distinguishes Marx from Hegel primarily in the former's 
rejection of "identity philosophy", and hence reconceptualizes, at least 
provisionally, the relationship of Hegel's Logic and Marx's Capital).
In BPSMC, and consistently in several later works, Habermas's analysis 
does not take into consideration that Marx's concept of fetishism of the 
commodity was a unique theoretical result of his several decades of 
development of a critique of political economy, beginning as early as 1844 and, 
in fact, flowed from his writings of that year; crucially, this "result", or conclusion, 
was in the form of a "return" to the beginning--in the Hegelian dialectical sense— 
to the concept of humanism he had first generally outlined in the 1844 
manuscripts as a whole. In analyzing the fetish, Marx suggested that "freely 
associated" human relations in respect to material production was a necessary 
condition for overcoming the social domination in which abstract forms 
prevailed, uniquely characterizing capitalist society.
The dialectical "height" of the conceptual is not to be found merely 
through results following sequential development of a text (such as Hegel's 
Logic), or through a series of Marx’s texts. Marx’s fully developed "fetishism of 
commodity", while appearing in the first chapter of Capital, was conceived (and
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was only conceivable) much later than this suggests, only after the many drafts 
(including the one finally published) of what became Capital, were completed. 
The concept marks the completion of Marx's immanent critique of political 
economy and constitutes the real genesis of his own theory proper.
Every stage of Marx's analysis (in respect to his mature theory) 
presupposes the fully unfolded theory (Postone 1993). From this perspective, it 
is difficult to to even accept a conception of an ideological "ladder" of concepts, 
or a hierarchy, either within Marx's thought generally, or within Capital, 
(unarguably his greatest work).
At this stage of his thought, a clear ambiguity, which I will examine further 
in Chapter Four (where he finally decides for the identity in the most crucial 
respects of the thought of Hegel and Marx) consists in the fact that though 
Habermas's main argument is that Marx's theory amounts to a "metacritique" of 
Hegel, he finds more relevant a basic affinity between the two thinkers when he 
apparently views hierarchial characteristics as integral to Hegel’s philosophy as 
well, particularly the relation he assigns to Hegel's Phenomenology of Mind, a 
"first" work (seen as akin to a “lifeworld" perspective on knowledge 
development) and the Philosophy of Mind, the final work (seen as the realm of 
“formal", “pure" and/or systematic thought) (Habermas 1972, 22).
It has been suggested (see Chapter Six) that, in respect to the latter work 
of Hegel's just mentioned, the final three paragraphs, added to the text only in 
the last year of Hegel's life (Dunayevskaya 1989, 39) are especially important 
for this issue. These paragraphs are not consistent with Habermas's 
interpretation of Hegel, or the relationship of the latter to Marx's theory. These 
final paragraphs, in departing from the syllogistic form, undermined an apparent 
conceptual continuity of key concepts such as "transition" and "mediation"; most
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importantly, they open to serious question any interpretation which views the 
closure of a system constituting the outcome, or “result", of Hegel’s philosophy.
In contrast to Habermas's suggestion in BPSMC, Marx’s analysis of the 
"lowly" commodity (supposedly the lowest rung on the ideological ladder) 
already contains the absolute, not as a "closure", but as a new beginning, when 
Marx posits "freely associated" social relations’ impact on material production 
relations. In contrast to Habermas’s analysis in KHI, Marx's "absolute" in 
Chapter One of Capital (especially the section on the fetishism of the 
commodity) was not a “ground" (nature), but a recreation of the Hegelian 
dialectic itself, from "Hegel's revolution in philosophy to [Marx's] philosophy of 
revolution" (Dunayevskaya 1991, 188).
In Marx's conception, commodity fetishism marks the highest rung of the 
ideological ladder of an historically specific social formation, or “bourgeois" 
society. It exemplifies the "absolute" in the true Hegelian sense of containing 
the greatest opposition within itself. With this simplest unit of the capitalist social 
form, Marx once again depicts the non-viability of "bourgeois" society itself— 
suggesting that its characteristic, universalist, forms of thought must also meet 
their historic barrier. As Hegel had already intimated in his own "Absolutes", the 
highest form of the development of the idea includes the greatest opposition 
within (Hegel 1976, 824). In this sense, the product of labor in capitalism-the 
commodity-has its basis ("absolute ground") in the opposition between abstract 
and concrete labor. In order to see how the "highest" form (developed capitalist 
society) contains the greatest opposition within and whether Habermas's failure 
to recognize this is relevant for an explanation of Habermas's various 
approaches to Marx, it is necessary to keep in mind Habermas's intital 
sequence of steps.
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In the literature on Habermas, Marx and Marxism, which is surprisingly 
sparse (Rockmore 1989, 18), there is little careful analysis of the relationship of 
BPSMC and STPS. But these are works wherein Habermas might have 
recovered from Marx's thought the theoretical direction for a release from the 
older Frankfurt School's thesis of contemporary society as imprisoned in a one- 
dimensionality, now lacking an internally generated, potentially revolutionary 
opposition.
For example, at least in the English language discussion there is virtually 
no serious analysis of the way Marx is taken up in STPS (even since its 
translation into English). It is often seen as such a different kind of study, 
primarily distinguished by historical description, the serious critical intent of its 
portrayal of Marx is scarcely recognized (Calhoun 1992, 39-40). Nor does there 
even now seem to be an awareness that significance might be found in the fact 
that STPS followed by two years the writing of BPSMC. (This is partly explained 
by the circumstance that BPSMC (in the original German) did not appear in 
book form until after STPS was published in German in 1962; also, when STPS 
was finally published in English translation (1989) it was often described as 
though it were Habermas's earliest “major" theoretical work). Thus, it may have 
been difficult to see that STPS, in important ways, represented Habermas's first 
(and only) attempt at a comprehensive and systematic critique of Marx, quite 
unlike BPSMC; or, in other worlds, that the initial trajectory of Habermas's 
theory (from BPSMC to STPS) was already toward a rejection of Mane's 
theoretical and practical relevance for the establishment of a viable 
contemporary critical theory.
BPSMC, seen as contemporaneous with, or even following from STPS, 
might have seemed directed toward revitalizing Marx's thought by dispelling a 
characteristic Marxist assumption of crisis narrowly imbedded historically
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contingent conditions grasped by political economy, specifically by what 
Habermas presented as merely particular (and perhaps outdated and 
dispensible) critical elements developed by Marx, such as his labor theory of 
value and the law of the falling rate of profit. Habermas clearly associated this 
traditional Marxist assumption with Left intellectual stagnation; relatedly (and 
perhaps ironically) the later STPS clearly argued that there was intrinsic to 
Marx's thought the impulse only fully developed later for a misguided activist, 
technocratic approach to practical problems.
It should not be overlooked that the aporias Habermas attributed to a 
critical theory still (clandestinely) wedded to Marx importantly shaped 
Habermas's diagnosis of contemporary society. The lack of vitality of public 
democratic deliberation was ascribed not so much to "late capitalism" as to 
"modernity", closer to Weber's sense than Marx's. STPS, in contrast to his 
positing of a dogmatic Marxism (which Habermas will increasingly only 
ambiguously distinguish from Marx), attempted to demonstrate the past (and 
therefore possibly future) efficacy of a non-dogmatic idea (including Marx's) in 
furthering emancipation. In this, Habermas meant to uncover the socially 
integrative potential of an abstraction effective as a social organizing principle 
(and with it to indicate the historical boundedness of the contemporary Marxist 
hypostatization of labor seen, in continuity with the older Frankfurt School, as a 
transhistorical relation of man to nature). In also recalling the historical 
negation of the efficacy of an implicitly universal idea (reason in place of power) 
unable to escape its particularism in practice as exposed in theory, the need for 
reflection on the "dialectical" next step in linking theory and practice in the 
context of a human "interest" in social change was to be made apparent.
Partly because of Habermas's purpose in respect to Marxism, which 
included redirecting critical theory away from a "hidden orthodoxy" (Habermas
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1973, 203), there is an evident lack of reflection on a concept of labor in these 
two important early works. In Habermas's view, labor and concept are often 
viewed as opposites. Labor is asumed to be “labor" (as Postone characterizes 
the traditional Marxist view), the instrumental relation of man to nature. At this 
stage of his writings, there is little indication on Habermas's part that a concept 
of labor might be seriously problematic.
A reinterpretation of Marx’s basic concepts (such as Postone has 
acheived) proved necessary in order to convincingly demonstrate that 
Habermas did not, as he claimed at important theoretical junctures, understand 
Mane better than Marx understood himself (Habermas 1973, 212; Habermas 
1972; 62; Habermas 1989b, 383) and, in fact, failed to understand, in the first 
place, Marx's basic concept of labor.
In BPSMC, labor appears as a presupposed and minor, or particularistic 
element of a more central concept of crisis pulled by Marx from out of the entire 
Western intellectual tradition. This way of analyzing the "crisis" element in 
Marx's theory, from a broadly cultural, even theological, standpoint attributed to 
Marx, opens the way for Habermas's developing critique of Marx. Later, he will 
write that Marx slighted the need for examination of socially effective, 
ameliorative institutional features regarded by Habermas as permanent, and 
through which a developmental logic, or social evolution could be discerned.
In posing the issue of "crisis", Habermas refers to the question of the 
stability of the economic system; he only includes the status and function of 
labor as a subordinate element within it. This empirical stability-considered as 
a "test" of the viability of Marx's more general theory-the critique of political 
economy, or the aim to resolve crisis—is implied to belie the continuity of Marx's 
age with contemporaneity, but not yet Marx's theory as such.
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In addition, without discussion of a possible intrinsic relation of crisis to 
other than empirical systemic features. Habermas also relates crisis to the 
"doctrine of ideology" (Habermas 1973, 222); he asks whether "critique"-in the 
form given it by Marx--sti!l contained a practical potential (Habermas 1972,
239). Not yet here, but by the second chapter on Marx in KHI Habermas has 
decided that Marx's form of critique is not adequate to contemporary conditions. 
He then suggests it is necessary to reconstitute the idea of critique under the 
diagnosis of a dualistic concept of modem society. Moreover, the problem of 
the relation of labor and interaction, which Habermas identifies as the key 
problem, demands a concept of theory, at variance with Marx's, which allows for 
an altogether different form of critique. Prior to KHI, recall that in STPS, the 
writing of which followed BPSMC by two years, labor initially appears as a 
detonation of social class, next as a proxy for the socially excluded, the "non­
citizen" (subsequently integrated), and finally as the object of social planning 
writ large. There are a number of important things to note here. It is difficult to 
disentangle-especially in STPS-what concept of labor Habermas is attributing 
to Marx, what exactly is supposed to be seen as the given interpretation of 
Marx’s concept, and/or what is specifically Habermas’s contribution, based on 
the results of the (possibly) promising originality of his analysis of the bourgeois 
public sphere.
In the earlier BPSMC, the concept of labor in itself (and aside from the 
labor theory of value which he tended to situate on a transhistorical systemic 
level) is hardly an object of Habermas's reflections. It does not appear that the 
greater part of an explanation of this is that Habermas's idea was that labor 
could only be explicated by imbedding it in "higher" categories, eg; “crisis", and 
"the philosophy of history." Rather, it seems more likely that he believed labor in
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Marx’s theory was, in the most important respects, non-controversial, and 
required no specific theoretical focus.
Due to the same lack of attention to the conceptual problematic, labor in 
STPS receives more attention, but it is presented as not having a single known 
meaning; it assumes a variety of roles in the analyses. Habermas does not 
reflect on the process of their succession, or comment on how or why these 
metamorphoses were possible. Moreover, he does not indicate that he is 
aware of them in his own analysis.
Knowledge and Human Interests
However, the two chapters on Marx in KHI offer an indication that 
Habermas reached some awareness that labor, particularly Marx's concept, 
needed far closer examination. "Marx's Metacritique of Hegel: Synthesis 
Through Social Labor" should be seen as an especially important shift in 
Habermas's approach to Marx. This shift coincides with his first specific 
examination of a concept of labor, despite his several years of previous work 
analyzing Marx.
The circumstances of the evident compulsion to return to Marx once 
again might have led Habermas to ask himself whether Marx intentionally 
embedded the "lowest" forms of cultural life in the highest refinement of the 
conceptual. (The "lowest" explained the "highest".) Habermas's initial failure to 
consider this (he does take it up in KHI) contributed to his relatively late 
examination of the possible depth of the concept of labor.
An especially potent example of the conceptual relation of the "high" and 
"low" (or dialectical social theory and labor) in respect to his approach to 
modem society is the way Marx analyzed the commodity, the fetish and de­
humanization as peculiarly capitalist, especially how the relation of the three
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were possible through the particular (degraded, but none the less socially 
determining) form labor assumed only in "developed" capitalism. At the same 
time, analysis of the relation of the three could yield a potentially opposite future 
based on free, and fully developed, human relations definitely not attainable 
within the confines of the old.
Marx's Metacritique of Hegel: Synthesis Through Social Labor
Habermas had already sifted a wide range of concepts and periods of 
Marx's theoretical work. But he focuses only now, in KHI, on the potential of a 
reinterpretation of Marx's concept of labor. The most immediately striking 
feature in the approach to Marx in Habermas's late 1960s chapter on “Marx’s 
Metacritique" is the textual starting point, a location hardly in sight in his early 
1960s approaches in the two earlier texts I considered in Chapter Two.
Some, including many in the Marxist tradition, commented upon what 
they observed as Marx's procedure in turning Hegel "right- side up", which was 
supposedly capable of explaining the greater part of the originality, such as it 
was, of Marx’s theory. Habermas approaches this issue at its source.
He begins his analysis by citing three passages, two in Hegel's final work 
that is, in the Introduction to the Philosophy of Mind (Hegel 1971), and one in 
the last part of Marx's third and final manuscript from the collection known as the 
Economic-Philosophic Manuscripts of 1844 (Marx 1967b). The comparison, 
then, is between works only thirteen years apart: Hegel's Philosophy of Mind, 
including the important addition of the final three paragraphs (which neither 
Habermas nor Marx discussed) was completed in 1831.
In beginning with and focusing on the afore mentioned passages, 
Habermas seems to want to quickly distinguish himself from traditional Marxism
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by stating plainly that what Marx opposed to Hegel was, "no coarse materialism" 
(Habermas 1972, 26). The starting point for his analysis of the relationship 
between Hegel and Marx is the most "mature" Hegel and a work of the young 
Marx not cited in his earlier studies I have already discussed. In this, however, 
there is some continuity with STPS, where Habermas juxtaposed some of 
Marx's even earlier (pre-1844) works with Hegel's "mature" Philosophy of Right 
Recall that a range of humanist interpretations of Marx (often focused on 
1844) were already rejected by Habermas in the opening pages of BPSMC.
Two years later, in STPS, where a wide spectrum of periods of Marx's writings 
were cited, those writings which are usually classified under the category of the 
young Marx were instead represented by "Critique of Hegel's Philosophy of 
Right" and "On the Jewish Question". No reference was made to the 1844 
manuscripts. Now, in 1968, with the consideration of a concept of labor, 
missing in the earlier works, 1844 becomes central; in addition, here there is an 
implication that not only an understanding of Marx, but a grasp of social theory 
generally, depends in fundamental ways on coming to terms with a section of 
Marx's 1844 manuscripts.
The crucial aspect of Habermas's approach to Marx in "Marx's 
Metacritique of Hegel" is directly related to his overall theme, stated in his 
Preface to KHI. There, in the opening sentence, Habermas writes,
I am undertaking a historically oriented attempt to reconstruct the 
prehistory of modem positivism with the systematic intention of analyzing 
the connection between knowledge and human interests (Habermas 
1972, vii).
His two chapters on Marx then argue that Marx while identifying, and even 
elaborating, the elements necessary for an emancipatory social theory failed to 
appreciate and therefore satisfactorily develop his own achievement, and
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thereby point a way out of a philosophical position (positivism) which acheived 
hegemony (Habermas 1972, 5). Just this failure of self-recognition was 
historically effective in diverting succeeding generations. In chapters Five and 
Six I will discuss how the theory Habermas developed as an alternative to 
Marxism relied significantly on what he viewed as his own separation from a 
typical mode of social theory which seriously lacked a "dialogic" dimension. 
This missing dimension, Habermas often implies, might have precluded the 
most serious--and historically consequential-misinterpretations of Marx's 
thought, even by Marx himself.
At this stage, the form of Habermas's argument borrows directly from 
Marx's critique of Hegel found in the very text of Marx Habermas examines. 
However, there is no indication in Habermas’s own text that he is aware that his 
critique of Marx is indebted in this way.
Marx, in his "Critique of Hegelian Dialectic and Philosophy in General", 
writes that Hegel’s Phenomenology is,
concealed and mystifying criticism, unclear to itself...all the elements of 
criticism are implicit in it, already prepared and elaborated in a manner 
far surpassing the Hegelian standpoint...(Marx 1967b, 320-321).
Yet, in the paragraph directly preceding the above, Marx had written,
Hence there is already implicit in the Phenomenology as a germ, 
potentiality and secret-despite its thoroughly negative and critical 
appearance and despite the actual criticism it contains which often 
anticipates later developments-the uncritical positivism and equally 
uncritical idealism of Hegel's later works, the philosophical dissolution 
and restoration of the existing empirical world (Marx 1967b, 320-321).
It is clear that Habermas’s argument contains the same type of criticism 
against Marx-that the philosophic foundations of his thought (Habermas 1972, 
42) held within them an opening for a non-emancipatory strain of social theory
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when fully developed is modem (unreflective) positivism. The full potential of 
Marx's achievements in his actual socio-historical investigations lie dormant, an 
outcome that could be attributed in some measure to a "peculiar disproportion" 
between theory and practice in his intellectual inquiry. Yet, Marx, in his social 
inquiry, equally emphasized "critical abolition of ideologies", and the synthetic 
quality of social labor. Habermas traces Marx's self-understanding of his 
theory, however, to a philosophic framework that was conceived too narrowly to 
include the ideology critique (Habermas 1972, 42).
Interestingly, in the very text of Marx Habermas examines, it can be seen 
that his critique of Marx here is simply opposite of how Hegel was said by Marx 
to have developed within his philosophy (the Phenomenology) all the elements 
of critique, but failed to apprehend his own achievement as evidenced by, in his 
later works, "the philosophical dissolution and restoration of the existing 
empirial world" (Marx 1967b, 320-321).
In Habermas's view, Marx (from the standpoint of practice) critcized 
Hegel for philosophical dissolution and (subsequent) restoration of the existing 
empirical world; Marx (seen from the standpoint of philosophy) abolished 
"ideologies" only to play a constitutive part in the triumph of postivism, or the 
subsumption of social theory by the natural sciences, a turn of events which 
constituted a formidable barrier in respect to development of a critical theory in 
the context of late capitalism.
Besides the fact that Habermas borrowed directly from Marx's critique of 
Hegel (without saying so) in order to criticize Marx, of further interest is the 
obvious difference in the two critiques. Marx intimated that he would set about 
uncovering the “lie" (Marx 1967b, 329) of Hegel's underlying philosophic 
principle. I have already alluded to Habermas's key point (what seems a sort of 
parallel to Marx's critique of Hegel) in BPSMC. Habermas argued that in the
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Grundrisse Marx had already expressed a theoretical reservation in respect to 
the labor theory of value on which Capital, written several years later, none the 
less depended.
In KHI, the second article on Marx titled, "The Idea of the Theory of 
Knowledge as Social Theory", Habermas returns to and develops this analysis. 
There, eight years later, he characterizes Marx’s problem in the Grundrisse as 
"indecision", that, “has its foundation in Marx’s theoretical approach itself 
(Habermas 1972, 52). (In order to clarify the difference between Marx's critique 
of Hegel and Habermas's critique of Marx, which it resembles, I will return to the 
Grundrisse after my consideration here of "Marx’s Metacritique.")
In the opening paragraphs of "Marx's Metacritique of Hegel" Habermas 
describes the last of Marx’s 1844 Economic-Philosophic Manuscripts: Marx is 
"coming to grips” with Hegel's Phenomenology, "especially the last chapter on 
Absolute Knowledge" (Habermas 1972, 25). Habermas writes,
Marx follows the strategy of detaching the exposition of consciousness in 
its manifestations from the framework of the philosophy of identity. He 
does this in order to bring to light the elements of a critique that often "far 
surpasses Hegel's standpoint", elements that are already contained, 
though concealed, in the Phenomenology (Habermas 1972, 25).
In this specific passage, Habermas attributes to Marx primarily “strategic" 
intentions; Habermas amalgmates, in a confusing way, his interpretation of 
Marx with his presentation of the text he is examining. In the full passage from 
Marx, which I quoted above, Marx emphasizes that he finds in Hegel all the 
elements of criticism, prepared and elaborated (also emphasized), "in a 
manner far surpassing the Hegelian standpoint."
Hegel's "standpoint", according to Marx in the same text, is "modem 
political economy" (Marx 1967b, 322); below, I will discuss the doubt this casts
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
87
on Habermas's view that Marx's own "standpoint" was political economy, at 
least in so far as Habermas understood it to include a "materialist appropriation" 
of Hegel.
The above comparision of the full passage from Marx with Habermas's 
paraphrase of it suggests that Marx is not only granting a higher status to 
Hegel's thought than Habermas suggests. The uniqueness of Hegel's 
philosophy is such that a category of "return" to it (as an indispensibe source for 
critical social theory) will become central to grasping Marx’s own theory.
The form of Marx's 1844 presentation of a critique of Hegel is "dialogic" in 
an eminent philosophic sense. Specifically, "all"~the word with which 
Habermas's text dispenses—is the word needed in order to grasp the meaning 
of the passage. In context, the word "all" indicates that Marx's intention was 
already to bring out the full revolutionary potential of Hegel's dialectic. Hegel's 
achievement (even in the face of a critique of it at the deepest level) remains for 
Marx the vital source of critical ideas.
Similarly, in Habermas's KHI the word "often" qualifies Marx's statement, 
that “all" these elements are, "already prepared and elaborated in a manner far 
surpassing the Hegelian standpoint." Even though subtle, these divergences 
raise a question of just how circumscribed Marx was in deciding his own 
originality vis a vis Hegel. Habermas's underlying thesis, that Marx's intention 
involved a global contradiction of Hegel based on a simple reversal of the 
ground of an Absolute, already appears suspect.
Habermas's text introduces a subtle revision, which then creates an 
opening for wide critical latitude. As I will demonstrate below, the apparently 
small “revisions" are the basis for Habermas's eventual claim that Marx's 
theory-indeed the very process of its formation-hid within it a potential, actually 
developed by Marx himself, for the non-democratic, repressive features
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associated with later Marxist-oriented political organizations' relationship to 
ideas.
Following what might be called an amalgamation of textual citation, 
interpretation and revision of the opening pages of Marx's "Critique of Hegelian 
Dialectic and Philosophy in General", Habermas moves to its penultimate 
paragraph, Marx's quotation of paragraph 381 of Hegel's Philosophy of Mind. 
(Habermas directly cites Hegel's Encyclopedia, not Marx's text. There is no 
indication he has moved from the beginning to the end of Marx's manuscript).
Habermas reproduces only this part of paragraph #381 of Hegel's 
Philosophy of Mind (not as it appeared in Marx's manuscript) as follows:
For us the mind has nature as its presupposition; it is the truth and thus 
the absolute ground (Erstes) of nature. In this truth nature has 
disappeared, and mind has emerged as the Idea existing for itself; both 
object and the subject of the Idea is the notion (Habermas 1972, 25).
Immediately following this, Habermas concludes, "For Marx, on the contrary, it is 
nature that is the absolute ground of Mind" (Habermas 1972, 25).
This conclusion functions to magnify the effect arising from the alterations 
of Marx's text Habermas had initially introduced. In the first place, by 
substituting, "the elements of a critique" (for "all the elements of criticism" in 
Marx's text), and, "often 'far surpasses Hegel's standpoint'" (for "already 
prepared and elaborated in a manner far surpassing the Hegelian standpoint" 
in Marx's text) Habermas at least minimizes (or perhaps makes it impossible to 
see) the specific moments (and their lasting import) of Marx's self-understood 
identity with Hegel; with these moments eliminated, Habermas then posits Marx 
(in his understanding of himself) to be schematically opposite of Hegel, 
especially in respect to assessment of the potential of philosophy in 
transformation of social relations.
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Habermas, at the outset of “Marx's Metacritique of Hegel", drew attention 
to the fact that Marx, at the end of his manuscript, quoted two paragraphs from 
Hegel's Philosophy of Mind. Here it is necessary to bring to the fore the 
following sequence of references to Marx and Hegel in Habermas's text: First, 
Habermas quotes a part of what Marx quoted from paragraph #381 of Hegel's 
Philosophy of Mincf, next, in the course of his discussion concerning Marx's 
interpretation of Hegel involving this paragraph, and paragraph #384, he 
quotes Marx, not on these paragraphs (which involve, as Habermas correctly 
states, the transition from nature to mind) but rather a passage taken from the 
beginning of Hegel's Philosophy of Nature Marx includes in his 1844 
manuscript. Before presenting it, Marx clearly stated that the passage had to do 
with, "the transition from Logic to Philosophy of Nature" (Marx 1967b, 334).
Hegel's concept of "transition" is perhaps the critical distinguishing 
feature of his dialectic. If so, it is hightly controversial to analyze his work in a 
way which ignores the specificity of the actual transitions, eg; from the 
Phenomenology, to the Logic, to Nature and to Mind. This issue is relevant in 
approaching Marx's "Critique of Hegelian Dialectic", especially the "interior" 
section which, as I have pointed out, was not taken up by Habermas. I will 
consider this section of Marx's manuscript below (see p. 111 ff).
Finally, in "Marx's Metacritique" Habermas characterizes while 
paraphrasing, rather than quoting, Hegel's paragraph #384 as, "the idealist 
sense of a mind that, as Idea existing for itself, posits a natural world as its own 
self-created presupposition" (Habermas 1972, 26).
Habermas had already rejected humanist interpretations of Marx 
(Habermas 1973, 200-201). They were seen as incompatible with 
contemporary standards of social theory, including its "critical" strand, on the 
basis of Habermas's view that Marx's "mature" theory could be understood
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virtually without reference to elements within Marx to which these 
characteristically referred. Habermas does not probe further into the quality of 
Marx's humanism after his initial focus on Marx's relationship to Hegel. His 
interpretation of "Critique of Hegelian Dialectic and Philosophy in General" 
instead moves ahead and actually pivots on what he understands as Marx's 
later (1845), limited critique of Feuerbach, the impact of which, he seems to 
believe, outweighed Marx's 1844 critique of Hegel in specifing what was 
characteristic of Marx's fully developed social theory. (This was not 
unprecedented. One need only recall the in other ways excellent translation of, 
The Writings of the Young Marx on Philosophy and Society (Easton and Guddat 
1967), which situated Marx's 1844 text of Marx under the heading, 
"Feuerbachian Criticism of Hegel"). Note that this work appeared in the year 
before Habermas's "Marx's Metacritique of Hegel."
Later, in “Marx's Metacritique", Habermas returns Hegel to his analysis, 
but only through what he argues is Marx's appropriation of Kant, after Marx 
developed a more critical attitude to Feuerbach: Hegel's residual influence on 
Marx's theory is hastily related to the "something general" which Hegel saw as 
accumulating in "the tool" (Habermas 1972, 29). Habermas's argument ties this 
to historical materialism as a theory of evolution in Marx. Several years later he 
develops this idea in his, "Reconstruction of Historical Materialism" (Held 1980 
326), first presented as a talk at a German Hegel society
Here it is necessary to quote Habermas's summary paragraph of his 
analysis of the source of Marx's philosophic relationship to Hegel. Habermas 
views this relationship as materialized through the context created by the 
reflection of Hegel's Phenomenology of Mind in the the Philosophy of Mind, the 
third and final part of Hegel's later Encyclopedia of the Philosophical Sciences,
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(and therefore through Marx's analysis of the relation between the "first" and 
"last" stages of Hegel’s philosophy):
This seal placed on absolute knowledge by the philosophy of identity is 
broken [by Marx] if the externality of nature, both objective environmental 
and subjective bodily nature, not only seems external to a consciousness 
that finds itself within nature but refers instead to the immediacy of a 
substratum on which the mind contigently depends. Here the mind 
presupposes nature, but in the sense of a natural process that from within 
itself, gives rise likewise to the natural being man and the nature that 
surrounds him—and not in the idealist sense of a mind that, as idea 
existing for itself, posits a natural world as its own self-created 
presupposition (Habermas 1972, 26).
Though I have not found recognition of this elsewhere in the literature, 
the above reinvokes the theme Habermas developed in STPS; Habermas's 
analysis here can therefore be seen as a summary of his work on Hegel and 
Marx, a summary preparatory for the genesis of his own, different theory.
In STPS, Habermas found an "enigmatic" quality in Marx's relationship to 
Hegel—specifically where I earlier noted Marx had, without explicitly saying so, 
reintegrated Hegel's philosophically unique, "negation of negation" into a 
historically derived problematic-the relationship of civil society to the state. 
Habermas had noted that Marx implied (in "Critique of Hegel's Philosophy of 
Right") that, according to the dialectic developed by Hegel himself, Hegel's 
"recision by reminiscence" of the already factual separation of civil society and 
the state unnecessarily left philosophy at an impasse. Therefore, in 1844 (one 
year later) it can be deduced that Marx is now more sharply posing that critique- 
-that Hegel's philosophy, up against such an impasse, was not viable in the 
form lent it by Hegel.
However, the real reason 1844 is key, and not 1843 (Critique of Hegel's 
Philosophy of Right) or 1845 (Theses on Feuerbach) lies in the way Marx 
abstracts Hegel's strictly philosophic uniqueness (the concept and method of
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negation of negation) and connects it to 1) humanism; and, 2) an early 
intimation of a two-fold concept of labor. The first idea is explicitly rejected, the 
second not noted, in Habermas’s analysis in "Marx’s Metacritique". Yet, 
precisely these two concepts represented the beginning of what has been 
called a transformation of Hegel's revolution in philosophy into a philosophy of 
revolution (Dunayevskaya 1991, xxiii); this did not negate the unique character 
of dialectic found in Hegel, it recreated it.
Marx, in specifying socially "negation of negation", defined the particular 
contemporary sociopolitical problematic--the relation of civil society and the 
state-identifying a movement from within the practical sphere of society as on a 
par with, if not in advance of, the theoretical sphere represented both by Hegel's 
Philosophy of Right and the young Hegelians. Marx developed a critique of the 
latter in his own break (1844) from "bourgeois" society, the latter now seen as 
historically specific. In contrast, the young Hegelians, though critical of the 
"master's" (Hegel’s) accomodation (to the state), still did not grasp the "lie" of the 
"master’s" principle which compelled (and explained) the accomodation (Marx 
1967c, 60-61). In other words, in not grasping the method implied in negation 
of negation, their approach to (and departure from) Hegel retrogressed to the 
level of simple “critique", or a first negation.
In STPS, recall that Habermas concluded that Marx, in taking Hegel’s 
abstraction (recision by reminiscence of the separation of state and society) to 
its limit, aimed to demonstrate the "illusion" (or non-viability) of abstraction in 
social life (thus Marx's later underestimation of society's systemic dimension), 
as well as its self-dissolving quality in theory. According to Habermas, contrary 
to Marx's own expectations, this none the less contributed to the institution of 
abstraction in the form of a scientistic conception of natural law applied to 
society, a conception Habermas claims Marx on some level shared. Among
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other things, this constituted a barrier to identifying normative structures as a 
precondition for renewing, as the foundation of social life, the emancipatory 
potential of the public use of reason.
KHI represents a different approach to Marx, that is, through 
philosophical reflection on the concept of labor. Yet, this does not lead 
Habermas to abandon an understanding of Marx which attaches to him an 
unwarranted partiality for a conception of the "natural". Habermas proposes an 
interpretation of Marx's concept of labor which he then embraces while implying 
it required supplementation. In important respects, this concept of labor 
remains one-dimensional. The thrust of Habermas's argument is to root Marx 
(even more so than usually) deeply in materialism, only a materialism with 
some unique turns. While Mane's materialism was not "coarse", it was 
essentially materialism nonetheless. As I have noted, within the first two pages 
of KHI's chapters on Marx Habermas offers two observations: 1) In Hegel, mind 
has nature as its presupposition; mind is the absolute ground of nature. 2) In 
Marx, mind presupposes nature. In Marx, mind “depends" on the nature it 
presupposes. In Hegel, nature, "could only exist (my emphasis, RR) as mind 
reflexively remembers it while returning to itself from nature" (Habermas, 1972, 
25)--nature "depends" on mind.
Though Habermas does not make the connection himself, this further 
illuminates the "enigma" Habermas first noted in STPS; he saw in Marx's earlier 
(1843) critique of Hegel's Philosophy of Right that Marx exposed Hegel's 
approach to the separation (and opposition) of civil society and the state as 
amounting to an attempt of "recision" (of this separation) by "reminiscence".
It can be seen in tracing the evolution of Habermas's view, Marx's 
"metacritique" of Hegel (quite likely without Habermas explicitly intending it to) 
revisits the theme in STPS, which cited Hegel's belief that civil society,
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could exist only as the mind [state in STPS ] reflexively remembers it 
while returning to itself from nature [civil society in STPS ].
Mind and Nature are simply substituted for State and Civil Society, the concepts 
of interest in STPS.
I have already pointed out that Habermas's analysis of Marx's 1844 
“Critique of Hegelian Dialectic", in so far as that analysis directly concerns 
Marx's critique of Hegel, is mainly restricted to the opening pages of Marx's text, 
and to its last pages—two quotes Marx includes from Hegel's Philosophy of 
Mind, and one from the Philosophy of Nature (a textual location Habermas fails 
to identify). That is, Habermas refers to a passage in Marx which is concerned 
with Hegel's analysis of a transition from the Logic to Nature. But his reference 
is for the purpose of characterizing Marx's concern with Hegel's analysis of the 
transition to Mind from Nature. Habermas describes how Marx objected to the 
"disappearance" of nature. In the passage Habermas quotes, Marx objects to 
the "elimination of Nature" by the, "abstract thinker [for whom] nature must 
eliminate itself, because it has already been posited by him as a potentially 
eliminated being" (Habermas 1972, 24). Yet, on the preceding page,
Habermas made clear that he was considering Marx's analysis of paragraphs 
381 and 384 of Philosophy of Mind, where the "transition from the philosophy of 
nature to the philosophy of mind is delineated" (Habermas 1972, 25). Both of 
these paragraphs appear in the Introduction to the Philosophy of Mind (the final 
part of Hegel's Encyclopedia).
It is in connection with the latter that Marx subseqently makes clear that a 
"defense" of nature is not his primary intention. In comments focused on the 
issue of the transition in Hegel's Encyclopedia from the philosophy of nature to 
the philosophy of mind (Habermas’s own ostensible focus) Marx promises to
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explain as well why Hegel’s philosophy, "separates thinking from the subject" 
(Marx 1967b, 335). Here Marx's principal concern is not the elimination of 
nature by the abstract thinker, but the "elimination" of even the abstract thinker 
by absolute spirit.
Marx’s later theory-in Capital-w ill develop the idea that the power of 
abstraction is laid bare in Hegel’s revolution in philosophy, and is indispensible 
for penetration of the transcendence inherent in capital. Marx demonstrates that 
"transcendence" of capitalism (including its own transcendent features) is not 
conceivable without Hegel's concepts; yet, unless these concepts are effectively 
developed in association with a dialectics of social organization, no abolition of 
capitalism is possible. In short, Marx aimed to work out the relationship of 
philosophic critique to social relations which have become dehumanized. This 
can be researched as the relation of dialectics of philosophy to dialectics of 
organization (Dunayevskaya 1991).
Limiting his account, for the most part, to the beginning and the end of 
Marx's text, Habermas now introduces the argument that Marx, as late as 1844, 
was involved in little more than, "renewing the naturalism of Feuerbach's 
anthropolgy" (Habermas 1972, 26). This is only qualified by granting that Marx, 
in contrast to Feuerbachian materialism, emphasized, "the adaptive modes of 
behavior and active expressions of life as an active natural being" (Habermas 
1972,26). Habermas continues,
But as long as he attributes to “objective activity" the still unspecific 
meaning that man, like every organism, "can only express his life through 
real, sensuous objects", Marx remains caught in the realm of naturalistic 
ideas. The first thesis against Feuerbach, however, already goes beyond 
this...(Habermas 1972, 26).
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The conclusion that might be expected to be drawn from this is two-fold: 
1) that Marx, in "Critique of Hegelian Dialectic", by presenting an alternative 
interpretation of the relation of nature and mind, directly opposite of Hegel, 
rejected the idealistic features of the latter's thought; and, 2) embraced 
Feuerbach’s naturalism, or at least granted to it a higher status than the 
originality of Hegel’s dialectic. If this were indeed the case, 1844 (particularly 
the final manuscript) should be viewed as ony slightly important, even when 
assessed against earlier and later writings of Marx himself. In fact, its 
contemporary importance, then, according to Habermas's account, is restricted 
to Habermas's own abstraction of certain of its elements useful for piecing 
together with theoretical statements derived from Marx’s later writings. From 
this perspective, there are disparate insights scattered through Marx's texts 
which Marx was unable to unify, unified indecisively or, at worst, unified in bad 
faith. Nonetheless, according to Habermas, contemporary theorists (with the 
aid of more useful social scientific concepts) ignore at their own peril Mane’s 
individual insights in their attempt to work out a contemporary critical theory.
The primary import of Habermas's analysis here is by no means the 
issue of Marx’s assessment of, or identification with, Feuerbach’s thought. 
(Habermas, in later writings, never returns to Marx/Feuerbach; but he does 
continuously return to Hegel, Marx and their relationship). Rather, the central 
contention put forth by Habermas is that Marx himself, in the 1844 manuscripts, 
particularly their last part, separating from Hegel's "identity philosophy" while 
only marginally going beyond Feuerbach, led not much later to his practical 
rejection, if not particular aspects of, then the basic philosophical orientation, 
the 1844 manuscripts attempted to establish. The outcome of this is that 
Habermas's earlier rejection of humanist interpretations of Marx is now implied 
to be immanent to Marx's own philosophical development, or lack of it: Marx's
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own recognition of his failure to successfully “renew" Feuerbach's philosophical 
anthropology.
For support of the underlying contention that characteristics which specify 
Marx's thought are exclusively located outside the 1844 manuscripts,
Habermas cites, in consecutive footnotes, two passages from the same page of 
Marx's 1844 text. Quotation of these passages is supposed to further 
demonstrate that Marx's critique of Hegel was essentially of his "idealism", and 
that Marx was "for" materialism as opposed to idealism (Habermas 1972, 28-
29). Yet, these two passages directly precede and follow respectively this not- 
so-easily interpreted passage:
We see here how a consistent naturalism or humanism is distinguished 
from both idealism and materialism as well, and at the same time is the 
unifying truth of both. We also see how only naturalism is able to 
comprehend the act of world history (Marx 1967b, 325).
Habermas, in passing over just this paragraph (while quoting from the 
one which precedes and the one which follows) avoids confronting the question 
of the uniqueness of Marx's thought in 1844, at least in as much as Marx began 
to seek to come to terms with it. This weakens Habermas's own immanent 
critique of Marx, and is especially noticeable in view of Habermas's explicit 
judgment, discussed earlier, which attributed to Marx a lack of self-reflection, 
which was then assessed to be at the core of a Marxism, developed across 
generations, the effect of which is said by Habermas to have diverged so far 
from its original intention.
The paragraph just quoted above directly addresses the issue of Marx's 
self-understanding of his thought. It clearly signals Marx's intention-in the 
greater part of the manuscript ahead-to develop a philosophic conception
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identical with neither Hegel's nor Feuerbach's, though related in some way to 
both.
Nevertheless Habermas does intend to develop an idea which attributes 
unique features to Marx's philosophic thought. But it is important to keep in 
view the question of whether these features are the same ones Marx 
understood to be his own or are the more eccentric (and one-dimensional) ones 
attributed to him by Habermas. It is significant that Habermas makes, only 
implicitly, a case that these are to be found mainly outside, "Critique of Hegelian 
Dialectic and Philosophy in General."
Habermas, in moving to Marx's "Theses on Feuerbach", next develops 
an interpretation of Marx's originality in which elements of Kantian 
epistemology, though reflected through Hegel's critique, are given prominence. 
While "objective activity" is said to be given only an "unspecific" meaning in 
1844, by the time of Marx's critique of Feuerbach in the next year this same 
concept is given, “the specific meaning of constituting the objectivity of possible 
objects of experience" (Habermas 1972, 27). Habermas suggests that it is this 
movement from the unspecific (in 1844) to the specific (1845) which underlies 
the cogency of Marx's identification of the "main flaw" in all previous 
"materialisms" (including Feuerbach's) (Habermas 1972, 27).
Previous materialisms (unlike the one noted by Habermas to have been 
first discovered by Marx in his critique of Feuerbach) did not apprehend reality, 
"as sensuous human activity, as practice, subjectively." Here, then, Marx's 
discourse is seen as referring to practical as well as theoretical dimensions; in 
fact, Habermas’s implication is that from the perspective of German idealism 
(particulary Hegel) Marx prematurely, and in some instances exclusively so, 
oriented toward the Practical Idea, underestimating in various ways the need for
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self-reflection in respect to the Theoretical Idea, the responsibility of philosophy 
in critical social theory.
In Marx's "superior" form of materialism, according to Habermas, 
elements of Kant's transcendental philosophy reappear in his developing 
critique of the young Hegelians, including Feuerbach. Habermas writes,
On the one hand Marx conceives of objective activity as a transcendental 
accomplishment; it has its counter-part in the construction of a world in 
which reality appears subject to conditions of the objectivity of possible 
objects of experience. On the other hand, he sees this transcendental 
accomplishment as rooted in real labor processes (Habermas 1972, 27).
Marx's concept of labor, understood in a certain way (epistemologically) can be 
viewed, according to Habermas, as the necessary ingredient in Marx's 
movement from the unspecific to the specific, from natural being to human 
activity specified as labor transhistorically understood. This accounts for Marx's 
originality in comparison to Feuerbach, and to Hegel as well.
Habermas's analysis here raises questions internal to his own argument 
because already in “Critique of Hegelian Dialectic" Marx had criticized Hegel 
thusly: from Hegel’s standpoint, that of "modem political economy", Hegel 
views, "labor as the essence, the self-confirming essence of man; he sees only 
the positive side of labor, not its negative side (Marx 1967b, 322).
Habermas, in furthering his argument concerning potentially fertile 
consequences of Marx's break with a "philosophy of identiy" does not notice 
that the critical break in question does not lead directly to "labor” or "labor 
processes" (a synthesis of man and nature in oppposition to "idealism"), but 
instead applies with equal cogency to a one-dimensional concept of labor-itself 
idealistic as well as mistakenly conceived transhistorically. Marx's own view in 
1844 does not include the fully developed concept of labor worked out in his
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mature theory, but it is already conceived in at least two dimensions—the 
"positive" and the "negative".
Habermas, in trying to demonstrate the potential productiveness, were it 
to be conceived adequately, of a more sophisticated concept of labor in Marx's 
thought, that is, one which could be accounted for epistemologically without 
dilluting its "functional" character, is propelled away from full examination of the 
uniqueness of Marx's 1844 critique. Thus, at this point Habermas makes it 
appear that Marx's 1844 manuscripts were a stillbirth, and Marx's "progressive" 
theory (only fully apparent in later work) relied upon a (unspoken) direct "return" 
to Kant, although taking in to consideration Hegel's and Fichte's critique of Kant.
In thus moving away from a full examination of 1844, and any possibility 
of finding the uniqueness of Marx's thought grounded there, and constitutive of 
the conceptual creativity of his developing theory, Habermas, after introducing 
the argument about Marx's return to Kant, also contrasts Marx to the latter.
While the "productive" (or progressive) difference between Hegel and Marx was 
earlier argued to be based on Marx's rejection of "identity philosophy", Kant's 
epistemology (taken account of Hegel’s critique of it) is transformed by Marx 
such that in place of "transcendental conciousness in general", the "concrete 
human species" (rooted in "real labor processes") is the subject of world 
constitution. Then, in order to show that the epistemological characteristic of 
labor, made possible to see by Hegel's radicalization of Kant (consciousness as 
a historical process of self-formation) is the basic insight of Marx in 1844, and is 
carried all the way through to Marx's mature theory, Habermas here cites two 
passages from Volume One of Capital. In the first passage Habermas quotes 
Marx stating that labor is a,
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condition of human existence that is independent of all forms of society, a 
perpetual necessity of nature in order to mediate the material exchange 
between man and nature, in other words, human life (Habermas 1972,
27).
Habermas also quotes Marx in a later passage of Capital where Marx
writes,
Labor is above all a process between man and nature, a process in 
which man through his own action mediates, regulates and controls his 
material exchange with nature. He confronts the substance of nature 
itself as a natural power. He sets in motion the natural forces belonging 
to his corporeal being, that is his arms and legs, head and hand, in order 
to appropriate nature in a form usable for his own life (Habermas 1972, 
27-28).
Recall that these are the passages I referred to earlier (Chapter One) in 
regard to which Postone, in criticizing Habermas's interpretation of them, also 
questioned whether they were not problematic in themselves.
Now a range of interpretations at issue can be seen more clearly:
Postone argues for a fundamental development (at least in regard to a concept 
of labor) from 1844 to Marx's mature theory in the Gmndrisse and Capital. He 
recognizes, however, that Marx retained a concept of “alienated labor". 
Habermas wants to show no difference in Marx's concept of labor in 1844 
compared to the definition Marx gave it in Volume One of Capital more than two 
decades later. In doing so, Habermas practically limits the importance of 1844 
to Marx's rejection of "identity philosophy", a rejection (which leads Mane back to 
Kant) he understands as only later made relevant for Marx's, as well as later, 
social theory.
Now, within the text of "Critique of Hegelian Dialectic" it is not clear that 
Marx conceives the "concrete human species" to be "the subject". In the first 
place, it is difficult to see how Habermas can attribute to Marx a notion of a
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concrete human species, "rooted in real labor processes", as the subject of 
world constitution, without discussing Marx's concept of alienation. Already, in 
"Critique of Hegelian Dialectic", although he had not yet investigated "real labor 
processes" (fully doing so only later in Capital) Marx had criticized Hegel for not 
seeing the "negative side of labor." The subject of Marx's 1844 text was a 
specific aspect of Hegel's philosophy-negation of negation as the ungrasped 
but revolutionary element of the dialectic. Marx refers to labor, but it is not his 
central focus, and he attributes to Hegel the standpoint of political economy in 
which "labor" was seen only from its "positive" side. Marx suggests that the 
elements (in Hegel's philosophy) which far surpass political economy are 
related to concepts whose intrinsic potential lie in achievement of social 
revolution.
In a very obvious departure from Marx’s own emphasis in 1844, 
Habermas disregards Marx's ideas (which were even more fully developed in 
other parts of the 1844 manuscripts) concerning alienated labor. "Alienation" 
(and "abstraction") were for Marx key in overcoming the philosophical impasse 
reached both by Hegel and his followers (including Feuerbach).
Habermas connects Capital most clearly to his analysis of Marx's later 
(1845) relationship to Feuerbach, not to 1844. But after the two quotes from 
Chapter One of Capital (on the metabolic relationship of labor and nature) he 
does return to 1844, offering another passage from "Critique of Hegelian 
Dialectic":
Man is not only a natural being, but a human natural being: that is a 
being that exists for itself and is therefore a species-being and must 
confirm and activate itself as such both in its being and its knowledge. 
Thus human objects are not natural objects as they are immediately 
given. Nor is the human mind in its immediate, objective form the same 
as human sensuousness. Nature is not immediately present adequately 
to the human being either objectively or subjectively (Habermas 1972,
28).
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This then amounts to an analysis of Mane which includes two of social 
theory’s most controversial texts--"Critique of Hegelian Dialectic" and Chapter 
One of Capital-stripped of several concepts (alienation, fetishism, abstraction), 
a critical, historically specific approach to which, in Marx's own view, was 
central to his distinctive contribution concerning both "world" constitution and 
self-constitution.
This point can be summarized as follows: according to Habermas, first 
the 1844 "Critique of Hegelian Dialectic" is said not to go substantially beyond 
Feuerbach's naturalism. It was only with his critique of Feuerbach's naturalism 
a year later that Marx fully understood activity as praxis, that is, subjectively, 
wherein "objective activity" acquires the "specific meaning of constituting the 
objectivity of possible objects of experience," and hence appreciated, as well, 
the "active side" idealism had developed in distinction from materialism.
Next, to show that the "activity" to which Marx refers is the idea of labor 
which informs Capital as well, Habermas next cites the two passages from 
Capital I reproduced above (see p. 101). The passages from Chapter One of 
Capital are intended to make clear and direct the specific meaning of activity, or 
practice, which Marx discovered only in his critique of Feuerbach. Habermas 
limits the significance of these passages to an attempt to show that external 
nature is objective for us only through processes of "social labor": only insofar 
as "extemalization" is mediated by the subjective nature of man, a subjectivity 
confined to an instrumentalist relation. Habermas writes,
The system of objective activities creates the factual conditions of the 
possible reproduction of social life and at the same time the 
transcendental conditions of the possible objectivity of the objects of 
experience (Habermas 1972, 28).
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But now the emphasis is on the activity of a species being for whom nature 
constitutes itself as objective only through its subjective nature, that is, mediated 
by "processes of social labor."
Habermas here refers to man as a “tool-making animal", which, "signifies 
a schema of both action and of apprehending the world" (Habermas 1972, 28). 
Man as a "tool-making animal" has not been introduced by Marx in any of the 
texts Habermas has so far cited. None the less, from this perspective Habermas 
concludes this part of his argument by returning to “Critique of Hegelian 
Dialectic", which he had ostensibly left behind in favor of Marx's "progress" in 
his Theses on Feuerbach. He interprets Marx as seeing in labor a natural 
process in so far as it regulates a "material exchange with nature", but also as 
more: it, "constitutes a world."
But the passage Habermas quotes here at length (see p. 102) does not 
refer to labor. Rather, it continues a critique of the solely abstract quality of 
Hegel's dialectic. Following it (and continuing with the preceding exposition 
which moved from 1844 to 1845, and to Chapter One of Capital, then back to 
1844) Habermas concludes, "Thus in materialism labor has the function of 
synthesis" (Habermas 1972, 28).
This is a turning point in Habermas's theoretical work on Marx and 
Marxism. At this stage of his analysis, which has included piecing together and 
presenting passages from the 1844 "Critique of the Hegelian Dialectic", the 
Theses on Feuerbach, written a year later, and Volume One of Capital, Marx is 
presented such that it should be clear he made a more or less precisely 
identifiable potential contribution to modem social theory-social labor as 
evolutionary mechanism. Yet, according to Habermas, just as important, Marx 
can equally be held responsible for ensuing misunderstandings. Habermas 
illustrates this point in the form of a critique of several contemporary individual
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thinkers and theoretical tendencies whose ideas, due to the fundamental 
misconception they shared, helped make possible Habermas's own pinpointing 
of what in the first place may and may not be appropriated from Marx in the 
interest of contemporary critical theory. Habermas criticizes the more or less 
Marxist theorists Herbert Marcuse, Jean-Paul Sartre, Karel Kosik and Gajo 
Petrovic from the standpoint of a "different" Marx he is just now in the very 
process of establishing (or re-establishing) from the perspective of examination 
of the possibility of a contemporary critical social theory.
Synthesis, "denuded of its idealist meaning" [in Marx], that is, established 
as social labor, creates a, "danger of a transcendental logical 
misunderstanding” because, "the category of labor then acquires unawares the 
meaning of world-constituting life activity in general" (Habermas 1972, 28).
In a digression from the immanent theoretical investigation I have so far 
attempted, a couple of important historical facts must not be ignored. They are 
important in themselves but also for making clear the theoretical ground 
Habermas is now claiming. Herbert Marcuse's 1932 review of Marx's 
Economic-Philosophic Manuscripts (Marcuse, 1972), the final part of which is 
the center-piece of Habermas analysis, was the first to bring them into the public 
domain after they remained virutally untouched, even by an already long 
tradition of Marxism, in the near century following their writing. Habermas does 
not make this directly evident; he only cites his own 1958 work, Literaturbericht 
Zur Diskussion Um Mane und den Marxismus, which included a critical analysis 
of Marcuse's review. Habermas states that at the time Marcuse's review was 
written, the latter was "under the influence of Heidegger", and Marcuse's 
thought represented an example of a “phenomenological strain of Marxism" 
(Habermas 1973, 29). However, even as late as today it is not difficult to find 
contention precisely on the question of whether Marcuse's review instead
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exemplified the decisive and fruitful break with Heidegger; in any case, 
Marcuse's analysis certainly holds up as an important and lasting contribution 
to a critical (though undoubtedly diverse) strand of Marxism which seriously 
challenged not only the repressive regimes ruling in its name, but all previous 
interpretations of Marx developed without access to the 1844 Manuscripts 
themselves. Interestingly, it should be considered whether Habermas in his 
prior attempt at a comprehensive critique of Marx in STPS (which by-passed 
1844) failed due in part to retrogression behind the point when Marx's 1844 
writings entered the public domain.
The twist here is that Habermas, evoking the authority of Marx against 
Marcuse, criticizes the latter (and the others) for what he implies is the 
"conservative" result of their "phenomenological" appropriation of Marx- 
wherein the labor process is seen as the, "foundation for the construction of 
invariant meaning structures of possible social lifeworids" (Habermas 1973, 29). 
In fact, in addition to Marcuse and Sartre, this view is said to "govern the 
interpretaion of Marx in several socialist countries" (Habermas 1973, 29). 
Habermas refers to the 1967 German translation of Karel Kosik's, Dialectic of 
the Concrete (which he does not note contains criticisms of both Marcuse and 
Sartre) and to the Yugoslavian Gajo Petrovic’s, Marx in the Midtwentieth 
Century, also published in 1967.
Now it was, and is, not difficult to see that Kosik's book, although, 
remarkably, published in Czechoslovakia at the time, represented a bold 
critique of totalitarian Communism (socialist countries, in Habermas’s terms) 
identifying itself as "Marxist." Both Kosik himself and Petrovic's tendency-the 
Marxist Humanists-were hounded out of political life, importantly on the basis of 
their view of the contemporary import of an interpretation of Marx's theory as 
revolutionary and humanist. This was seen as a threat to the stability of the
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
107
Communist state. A case can in fact be made that the works to which Habermas 
referred were integral to the revolutionay upheaval of 1968, which was followed 
by Communism's invasion of Czechoslovakia. I recount these well-known facts 
because they provide the necessary prespective for asking various questions 
about just what was politically at stake, and might still be, in Habermas’s 
examination of Marx and Marxism. For example, given the facts as stated 
above, what should one think of Habermas's description of Kosik's and 
Petrovic’s views "governing the interpretation of Marx in several socialist 
countries?"
Were these countries socialist in any way except ideologically? In the 
context of a cri*ical examination of Marx and Marxism it seems odd that this be 
taken for granted, rather than something that first needs to be demonstrated.
KHI took it as its task a new beginning of a critical approach to ideas, including 
examination of the question whether ideas might still be potentially constituitve 
of a changed, improved social life; certainly "socialism" has been one of the key, 
contentious ideas of recent times. But, according to Habermas, not only could it 
be assumed that these Communist states were socialist, but some of those 
dissident thinkers whose social positions were most tenuous, due to their 
dissident, Marxist ideas, are said to have "governed the interpretation of Marx." 
Charitably, Habermas might have been saying that while the "Marxists" running 
the state had all the power, at least the dissident Marxists, "govern the 
interpretation." Yet, it still should be remembered that KHI was written in the 
West, where much was known about the extreme repression of intelletuals (and 
workers) in the "socialist" countries. Despite the availability of much information 
about the opposition (including theoretical) within these states, Habermas's 
analysis amalgamates the Communist state and its dissident Marxists.
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In any case, Habermas's present theoretical concern here is to delineate 
the function of labor given it by Marx. In mediating objective and subjective 
nature, the category of social labor, "designates the mechanism of the evolution 
of the species in history" (Habermas 1973, 29). In contrast, in the 
phenomenological interpretation of Marx labor is regarded as, "the foundation 
for the construction of invariant meaning structures of possible social lifeworids" 
(Habermas 1973, 29).
Once Habermas has, in his view, convincingly identified Marx's 
"metacritique" of Hegel, he indicates that several things should become clear, 
and hence subject to theoretical, and perhaps even practical, resolution: Marx, 
strongly influenced by the times in which he lived, believed "philosophy" could 
and should be replaced with "science." According to Habermas, far from the 
young Maw (“discovered" long after the "mature" Marx) casting doubt on such a 
conclusion long since drawn by many (especially those with some amount of 
sympathy for governments ruling with a "Marxist" ideology) Marx's 1844 
“metacritique", when carefully examined, is precisely what compels this 
interpretation.
When Habermas implicitly concludes that no fundamental distinction 
should be drawn between the “coarse materialism" of ideological Marxism 
(such as was in power in East Europe) and the dissident Marxism which 
attempted to make relevant the 1844 themes of alienation and humanism, he is 
actually making a case for the affinity of Marx and ail (or practically all)
Marxisms in that the latter shared with Marx an understanding of labor as 
transhistorical, exclusively determinant of possible interpretations of society at 
the categorical level. Habermas concludes that in so far as something might be 
retrieved from Marx's theory, it can be found neither in Marx's own self- 
understanding, nor the contemporary Marxism which had established state
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power. The alternative posed by Marxist dissidents is hardly distinguishable 
from the latter.
Habermas, in an oblique (if not ironic) criticism of humanist Marxism in 
particular, instead singles out a, "mechanism of humanization" (Habermas 
1973, 24) (certainly not to be mistaken for the concept of humanism I showed 
that Marx named as his philosophic contribution) as a category designating the 
mediation of objective and subjective nature, which refers to the evolution of the 
species in history.
What might be easy to lose sight of here is that Habermas’s argument 
relies on two concepts not found in the text of Marx to which he refers. Rather, 
these concepts belong to Habermas and are subtly introduced in the course of 
his argument. Now, from this, I intend to pose the possibility that all the terms in 
the title to the article under consideration here ("Marx's Metacritique of Hegel: 
Synthesis Through Social Labor") have little or no basis in the texts to which 
Habermas mainly refers.
First, the idea that Marx's "Critique of Hegelian Dialectic” amounts to a 
"metacritique" of Hegel would imply that one could not find through an 
immanent investigation of Marx's theory a continuous return to Hegel's 
dialectical philosophy as constitutive of Marx’s "mature" critical theory. Yet, 
there is evidence of a remarkable series of returns to Hegel at key points in the 
development of Marx's theory.
Second, Habermas himself writes that Marx did not "arrive at" an explicit 
concept of synthesis, that he had only a "vague conception" of it, and that he 
would have found, "the very concept of synthesis suspect" (Habermas 1973,
30).
Finally, I have already mentioned that labor, in "Critique of Hegelian 
Dialectic", while occasionally discussed by Marx, is not the main focus. At the
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
110
least, this early critique of Hegel does not rely on an explicit, developed concept 
of labor, and certainly not, as Habermas's argument attempts to demonstrate, 
one which emerged essentially unmodified in 1867, compared to 1844 to 1845.
In the course of this examination of Habermas's relationship to Marx the 
latter’s myriad returns to Hegel will become evident. The first return, which I will 
consider now, already occurs within “Critique of Hegelian Dialectic". This 
“return" is to be found in the "interior" section of the article, a part to which 
Habermas does not refer. Marx does not name Hegel here, but the conceptual 
return to his dialectical categories is not difficult to see.
In the early part of the article Marx had praised Feuerbach for his "critical" 
relationship to Hegel, how he, unlike all the other "young Hegelians", had 
established a “naturalism", which was capable of both criticizing and explaining 
Hegel's abstractions. For example, Feuerbach had criticized Hegel's negation 
of negation which "re-establishes abstraction" as theology after the 
transcendence of religion by philosophy. Marx writes,
Feuerbach views negation of negation as merely a contradiction of 
philosophy with itself, as philosophy which affirms theology (the 
transcendent, etc.) after having denied it, thus affirming it in opposition to 
itself (Marx 1967b, 317).
The implication is that Marx has a view of the real meaning and import of 
Hegelian dialectic (its distinguishing feature being negation of negation) 
different from, and explanatory of, both Feuerbach's and Hegel's ideas. Marx, 
in fact, writes,
We shall explain both the abstract form of this movement as conceived 
by Hegel and, in contrast, by modem criticism in Feuerbach's Essence of 
Christianity, or rather the critical form of this movement which is still 
uncritical in Hegel (Marx 1967b, 318).
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The implication is that Feuerbach, though alone among the young Hegelians in 
adopting a genuinely critical stance toward Hegel, is himself to be criticized: 
Marx intends to demonstrate that negation of negation is not merely a 
contradiction of philosophy with itself or, in other words, is not merely formal. 
This can be seen after the section of Marx's manuscript containing the 
passages Habermas cited to tie Marx to Feuerbach's materialism; Marx, turning 
to the, "positive moments or aspects of the Hegelian dialectic", writes,
...Transcendence as an objective movement reabsorbing extemalization 
into itself...This is the insight into the appropriation of objective being, 
expressed within alienation, through the transcendence of its alienation.
It is the alienated insight into the actual objectification of man and into the 
actual appropriation of his objective nature by the destruction of the 
alienated character of the objective world, by the transcendence of the 
objective world in its alienated existence, just as atheism which 
transcends God is the emergence of theoretical humanism, and 
communism which transcends private property is the vindication of actual 
human life as man's property, the emergence of practical humanism. Or, 
atheism is humanism mediated through itself by the transcendence of 
private property. Only through the transcendence of this mediation- 
which is however a necessary presupposition-emerges positive 
humanism, humanism emerging positively from itself..., (Marx 1967b, 
331).
The above passage in Marx's "Critique of Hegelian Dialectic" is clearly 
germane to Habermas's argument, but an interpretation of it is not included in 
his analysis. It cannot be taken into consideration, for one reason, because 
Habermas disregards the enitre section in which it is situated. (Of the four 
references Habermas actually makes to "Critique of Hegelian Dialectic", three 
are situated within the first half of Marx's manuscript, the fourth on the last page 
of an approximately twenty-five page manuscript).
I want to consider the passage from the interior of Marx's manuscript in 
some detail. It represents an especially creative moment not only of "Critique of 
Hegelian Dialectic", or the 1844 manuscripts generally, but of the entirety of
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Marx’s theory. Moreover, such an analysis need not detour from an immanent 
critique of Habermas’s approaches to Marx.
In fact, the passage in question begins with the concept ("objective 
activity”) Habermas identified as providing the great divide between Marx's 
mere “renewal” of the insight of another thinker (Feuerbach) and his own 
originality (see p. 95). This originality of Marx-distinct from Hegel’s idealism 
and Feuerbach's naturalism-must be found, according to Habermas, not in 
1844, but only later in the 1845 Theses on Feuerbach. There Marx is said to 
have stressed the “active” side idealism had developed in comparison with 
materialism. This idea of activity, though gaining in conceptual power in its 
movement from an unspecific to a specific meaning, as so argued by 
Habermas, was still insufficient when Marx confined it to "social labor." 
Habermas's argument does not take fully into account the problematical nature 
of the "objective", as it refers to both being and knowledge (through activity, or 
labor).
According to the passage in Marx, Hegel's is the fundamental insight into 
the "objectification" of man. Hegel's true insight precedes a proper 
understanding of objective activity, translated by Habermas as "social labor." 
According to Marx, from within the perspective of a universalizing alienation 
characteristic of developing capitalist society, man's "objective" being itself is 
not given but is "appropriated" only by an act of of negation, "the destruction of 
the alienated character of the objective world, by the transcendence of the 
objective world in its alienated existence..." (Marx 1967b, 331).
Hegel, himself "within alienation", developed negation of negation 
through the opposite of alienation, the latter seen as just as objective as the 
existing reality. It is this movement of extemalization and re-intemalization 
which Marx, early in his essay, promised to explain and develop. This
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movement, more abstract compared to "labor", is also instrinsic to man's social 
"nature". According to Marx, appropriation of this "nature" is achieved through 
the negation (the destruction) of a world attribute—not objectivity itself, but its 
alienated character.
According to Marx's analysis, Hegel's "insight" cannot be "transcended" 
by only another idea, even conceived as "metacritique." Rather, Marx describes 
Hegel's insight to be “just as" (Marx 1967b, 331) what Marx later summarizes as 
the dual movement of theoretical and practical humanism. Feuerbach's critical 
approach to Hegel is descriptive of one of the moments of this movement— 
atheism which transcends God....the emergence of "theoretical humanism"; the 
other moment is specifically "Marxian"-"communism which transcends private 
property, or the vindication of human life as man's property, the emergence of 
practical humanism."
Here, Marx is holding in tension Hegel, Feuerbach and the "results" of his 
current investigation. As Habermas remarks, Marx of course did not argue for, 
“invariant meaning structures of possible social lifeworids", or some 
transhistorical concept of human nature. What can be seen in the above 
passage is the "sublation" of Hegel in the form of a negation of Feuerbach's 
negation, or Marx's particularization of negation of negation. Marx's real thrust 
is the recovery of the revolutionary character of Hegel's dialectic-the theoretical 
and practical idea as each a moment of the fullest development of the concept. 
Thus Marx arrives at the point where, rather than resolution or "synthesis", the 
greatest tension resides.
Earlier in this section I had noted that in his introductory remarks in 
"Critique of Hegelian Dialectic", at the same time he affirmed Feuerbach's 
genuinely critical approach to Hegel, Marx indicated that the first negation 
Feuerbach represented was not sufficient; Marx was preparing the ground for
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passing beyond him. This was seen in his seemingly matter-of-fact statement 
that Feuerbach viewed Hegel's "negation of negation" as “merely" a 
contradiction of philosophy with itself. It was not obvious from this off-hand 
remark that Marx viewed Feuerbach's critique of Hegel (or any successful 
materialist critique) while an advance, was still incapable of "burying" Hegel 
once and for all.
In contrast, what seems readily identifiable as specifically "Marxian" is 
Marx's description of "practical humanism" in this later passage: "...communism 
which transcends private property is the vindication of actual human life as 
man’s property, the emergence of practical humanism. Or, atheism is 
humanism mediated through itself by the transcendence of private property...". 
However, it is possible to grasp the meaning of this passage only in reference to 
what Marx has already forewarned in regard to the two opposing concepts at 
issue here: private property and communism.
Notice that the whole passage, as I quoted it (see p.111) is divided about 
equally between a description of Hegel's "transcendence" of alienation and 
Marx's own recreation of this moment as a "humanism". The two "halves* of the 
passage are connected with the phrase, "just as": Marx's concept of "movement" 
is (in his words) "just as" Hegel’s. Contrary to the position Habermas often 
attributed to Marx, including in "Marx's Metacritique of Hegel", this passage 
does not express a decision for "materialism" over "idealism", which in turn can 
be traced to a notion of nature as the “absoute ground" of mind.
Already in the first manuscript of 1844, titled, "Alienated Labor" (Marx 
1967a), Marx's first dozen pages consisted of an immanent critique of political 
economy (to which he later directly tied Hegel as well), the main result of which 
was that rather than alienation an effect of private property, it was its cause.
Marx writes,
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...alienated labor is the direct cause of private property (private 
ownership of the means of production). The downfall of one is 
necessarily the downfall of the other (Marx 1967a, 299).
Therefore, it cannot be the case that Marx, in the passage under consideration 
here, is, eg; counterposing the concrete materialist overcoming of property 
relations to Hegel’s abstract, "idealist" transcendence of alienation.
Nor can it be the case that Marx is suggesting that the overcoming of 
private property relations as the establishment of communism exhausts the 
dialectic of negation of negation or, in other words, represents for theory the 
materialist appropriation or “subsumption" of Hegelian dialectic. This is already 
made evident in the passage that closes the second Manuscript of 1844, 
"Private Property and Communism":
The position of communism is the negation of the negation and hence, 
for the next stage of historical development, the necessary actual phase 
and dynamic principle of the immediate future but not as such the goal of 
human development-the form of human society (Marx 1967d, 314).
What this makes clear is that the specifically "Marxian" dialectic, or the 
outcome of his explicit critique of Hegel wherein he also classifies and explains 
modes of thought (including Feuerbach's) emerging in the latteris shadow, is a 
humanism which only fully emerges in opposing, or transcending, not mere 
atheism or simple private property as such, but the "mediation" of social 
individual and collective self-development by the opposition of atheism and 
communism to, respectively, religion and private property. Atheism "depends" 
on religion, as communism "depends" on private property. Even with the 
establishment of atheism and communism, their opposites remain constitutive of 
social reality. The "transcendence" of these oppositions, the necessary second
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negation, first makes possible, "positive humanism, humanism emerging 
positively from itself." Marx, in tracing the movement of thought after the 
revolutionizing impact of Hegel's philosophy, demonstrates how a recreation of 
Hegel's dialectic as a humanism is the only way out of the impasse reached by 
political economy and the young Hegelians.
Marx's fundamental cirtique of Hegel involves the fact that the 
revolutionary element in Hegel's philosophy remains bottled up in the individual 
philosopher, lacking dissemenation through social relations. This is so despite 
the fact that Hegel's critique of Kant aimed to overcome just this limited 
idealism. Marx, for his part, does not accept the abstract negation of "nature" by 
the abstract thinker and, moreover, how ultimately Hegelian dialectic "separates 
thinking from the subject" (Marx 1967b, 335). This refers to a (philosophical) 
attitude which opposes itself to the "non-theoretica!" character of the lifeworld, 
but even to the philosopher, or Hegel himself. Marx is not merely critical of this. 
He also promises to explain it.
"Critique of Hegelian Dialectic" established the ground of a humanism 
which incorporated the revolutionary element in Hegel's philosophy. Now I will 
try to develop a perspective following from this argument by viewing "Critique of 
Hegelian Dialectic" from the vantage point in the manuscript where Marx 
identifies the, "closing chapter of the Phenomenology on absolute knowledge-- 
a chapter containing the pervasive spirit of the whole book..." (Marx 1967b,
321). Marx begins his exposition of the last chapter of the Phenomenology by 
remarking that, “objectivity as such is regarded by Hegel as an alienated human 
relationship which does not correspond to the essence of man" (Marx 1967b,
322).
Marx indicates at the outset that this is the fundamental error of not only 
Hegel's greatest work, the Phenomenology, but its final chapter, which contains,
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"the pervasive spirit of the whole book." Because he equates "man" with self- 
consciousness, the "question" for Hegel is the surmounting of the object of 
consciousness. "Man", in Hegel's view, is a spiritual being. Therefore, the 
objective appearances, or phenomenology of mind, are the coming to be of 
man's true self, the overcoming not only of alienation from spirit, but of 
objectivity itself. Marx criticizes this as precluding from the beginning, and in 
principle, the self-overcoming of forms of alienation intrinsic to man's objective 
"nature", an example for which he offers is man's "suffering being" (Marx 1967b, 
335). Marx writes,
Suppose there is a being which is not an object itself and does not have 
one. First of all, such a being would be the only being; no other being 
would exist outside of it; it would be solitary and alone (Marx 1967b,
326).
What is intriguing in the above is that Marx, in analyzing the general 
movement of the last chapter of Hegel’s Phenomenology, does not indicate in 
his text that Hegel himself seemed to recognize just such a problem in the last 
couple paragraphs of the work. In the last couple of paragraphs of the final 
chapter of the Phenomenology Hegel describes Golgotha in terms of Absolute 
Spirit-the crucifiction and resurrection necessary for the birth of the new. 
Absolute Spirit, as a goal, finds its pathway in a process of recollection of 
spiritual forms, seen from the side of their free existence, "as they are in 
themselves" (history, or the form of contingency), and, "looked at from the side of 
their intellectually comprehended organization" (science) (Hegel 1977, 808). 
Hegel writes that, "both together form at once the recollection and Golgotha of 
Absolute Spirit, the reality, the truth, the certainty of its throne, without which it 
were lifeless, solitary and alone" (Hegel 1977, 808). This is an evocation of the 
suffering of a revolution in philosophy which has not found social,
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organizational form. From this emerges Marx's perspective, the direction and 
meaning of his own concept and practice of organization. The various forms 
they assumed (hardly mentioned by Habermas) are related to the revolutionary 
element in Hegel's philosophy Marx made his own.
The beginning of Marx's concept of organization (not just his "critique" of 
political economy) is rooted in the 1844 "Critique of Hegelian Dialectic." It is 
necessary to see such a concept of organization, as it developed through the 
1840s-1880s, in order to grasp the meaning of Marx's relationship to Hegel’s 
thought, a theme to which Habermas constantly returned. I want to keep this 
question of Marx's idea of organization in view, not only for analysis of 
Habermas's second chapter on Marx in KHI, to which I will now turn, but 
because it is among Marx's most misunderstood concepts. Such 
misunderstanding occurs among both Marx's supporters and his detractors, 
including Habermas. Thus, the concept is in need of special investigation.
“The Idea of the Theory of Knowledge as Social Theory"
The second chapter on Marx in KHI, which I will take up now, can be 
shown to proceed on the basis of Habermas's view of a concept of labor 
constituted by, and constitutive of, Marx's relationship to Hegel. But as I just 
uncovered in a consideration of "Marx's Metacritique of Hegel", "organization" is 
an equally critical concept, though not made nearly explicit as labor. I will now 
show that, in fact, "The Idea of the Theory of Knowledge as Social Theory", the 
continuation of Habermas's immanent critique of Marx, begins with Mane's 
concept of labor, and its historical, supposedly mostly negative consequences, 
as well as its effects on the potential for a contemporary critical theory. But the 
chapter's "result" actually moves social "organization" to the center. Ironically,
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just when Habermas finally focuses on Marx's concept of labor (toward which, 
when not ignoring it, he often indicated suspicion) he largely agrees with what 
he interprets Marx's concept to be. In doing so, however, Habermas "discovers" 
an absence of a concept of social organization. It is the latter which then 
strongly influences the direction of his future work, not only in respect to Marx 
and Marxism, but in its entirety, ultimately self-understood as a necessary 
alternative to Marx and Marxism, that is, as adequate to the conditons of a 
changed capitalism.
Just at that point where Habermas understands Marx's concept of labor, 
such that it demands to be thoroughly criticized on the basis of its exclusion at 
the categorical level of a concept of social organization, Habermas no longer 
refers to works of Marx he had earlier taken up, works he had already brought 
up for discussion in connection with “organization". For example, in STPS 
Habermas discussed the Communist Manifesto, Critique of the Gotha 
Programme and The Civil War in France (on the Paris Commune). These works 
(and a recognition that they might be importantly related to a concept of 
organization) are inexplicably missing in KHI.
(Interestingly, three years after the completion of the latter work,
Habermas acknowledged, and responded to, criticism on this very basis. In the 
1971, "Some Difficulties in the Attempt to Link Theory and Practice", which 
served as an introduction for the second German edition (and first English 
translation) of the collection of essays known as Theory and Practice,
Habermas confronts the challenge by, 1) informing his readers that he, unlike 
Marx, no longer “depended" on Hegelian dialectics; and, 2) indicated that 
Georg Lukacs's philosophic concept of the Party was essentially identical with 
Lenin's practice of it, and both could find their justification, or basis, in Mane's 
own theory).
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In KHI, Habermas begins his second chapter on Marx, "The Idea of the 
Theory of Knowledge as Social Theory", with quotation of another passage from 
Marx’s 1844 "Critique of Hegelian Dialectic."
The greatness of Hegel's phenomenology and its end result-the 
dialectic of negativity as motive and productive principle—is this...that 
Hegel grasps the self-generation of man as a process, objectification as 
de-objectification, as aiienation...and the overcoming of this alienation; in 
other words, that he grasps the essence of labor and 
comprehends objective man, who is true because of his reality, as the 
result of his own labor (Habermas 1972, 43).
Presentation of this passage serves to anchor the next several pages of 
conclusions following from "Marx’s Metacritique of Hegel". In that article (as I 
have just shown) Habermas was concerned to make clear the philosophic 
argumentation implicit in Marx’s position without which the meaning for 
contemporary theoretical problems and possible relevance for construction of a 
contemporary theory could not be discerned. In contrast, Marx's “metacritique" 
of Hegel now established, Habermas, in "The Idea of the Theory of Knowledge 
as Social Theory", returns to Mane's "Critique of Hegelian Dialectic" from a new, 
more explicitly critical standpoint. Now, all of Marx’s work, beginning with the 
passage I just reproduced, is posited as unified under the category of an 
"instrumental" appropriation of Hegel. (Recall that already in the beginning of 
"Marx's Metacritique" Habermas characterized Marx's approach to Hegel as 
'strategic"--"Marx follows the strategy of detaching the exposition of 
consciousness in its manifestations from the framework of the philosophy of 
identity..." (see p.86).
In view of the alternative interpretation of Marx's 1844 "Critique of 
Hegelian Dialectic" I have so far indicated in conjunction with a reading of 
Habermas's first article on Marx in KHI, it is not difficult to see that Habermas's
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conclusions, which he constructs as an introduction to his second article on 
Marx, contain the potential for extensive controversy in regard to specific texts, 
but also the relevance of Hegel, Marx and the relationship of their ideas for a 
critical theory which departs from the older Frankfurt School of Marcuse and 
others.
Following from my discussion thus far, the context must be seen as 
defined on the one hand by Marx's promissory note in his introductory remarks 
to explain both Hegel's conception of negation of negation (as the abstract form 
of the movement of history) and the difference between it and the critical form it 
assumes in Feuerbach and, on the other hand, the passage Habermas quoted 
in the opening sentences of his "Marx's Metacritique of Hegel", that is, where 
Marx sees "a//the elements of criticism" in Hegel's Phenomenology. (I 
previously questioned whether Habermas's treatment of this passage in Marx's 
"Critique of Hegelian Dialectic" amounted to a misleading "amalgamation" of 
textual citation, interpretation and revision.)
The passage from Marx's "Critique of Hegelian Dialectic" which opens 
the second article on Marx in KHI, then, appears in Marx's text in the paragraph 
directly following the one in which Marx recognizes "all the elements of 
criticism" in Hegel's Phenomenology. What characterizes both these passages 
is a fundamental affirmation of elements in Hegel's philosophy, though not yet 
fully defined by Marx. Simultaneously Marx intimates that a genuine critical 
grasp of these elements can only be demonstrated with a conceptual 
development which re-creates them as a “humanism".
Now the form of Habermas's presentation-in which his second article on 
Marx in KHI flows from his opening quotation of Marx’s passage-implies that 
there is something very much like a linear development, which Marx 
consciously constructs, from Hegel's idealism to "historical materialism".
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Habermas's characterization of this is in the sentence opening, "The Idea of the 
Theory of Knowledge as Social Theory":
The interpretive scheme set forth by Marx for the Phenomenology of 
Mind contains the program for an instrumentalist translation of Hegel's 
philosophy of absolute reflection...(Habermas 1972, 43).
The remainder of "The Idea of the Theory of Knowledge as Social Theory"-with 
all but a very few of its references to the Gmndrisse and Cap/faA-argues that 
from the very first pages of "Critique of Hegelian Dialectic", through the writing of 
Capital, Marx's nearly single-minded purpose was an "instrumentalist 
translation" of Hegel’s philosophy.
Now, Marx's aim-as he stated it-was to "explain" negation of negation 
through its appearances in Hegel and "modem criticism" (Feuerbach). By 
contrast, Habermas's opening description of the research problem as Marx 
supposedly understood it is also posited as the conclusion; from the point in 
Marx's text with which Habermas opens his second chapter on Marx, the 
conclusions from the several decades of Marx's theoretical work were already 
decided. The remainder of "The Idea of the Theory of Knowledge as Social 
Theory" consists in an attempt to prove this thesis.
The major parts of Habermas's argument consist in discussions of, 1) a 
combination of references to the 1844 Manuscripts, and to the Epilogue to the 
second edition of Capital, in which an "astonishing" conflation of the human and 
natural sciences is said to have been affirmed by Marx; 2) the Grundrisse, 
wherein, "there is a model according to which the history of the species is linked 
to an automatic transposition of natural science and technology in to the self- 
consciousness of the social subject" (Habermas 1972, 48; 3) "communicative 
action", as neglected in Marx, and as in need of decoupling from “self­
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constitution through labor", and which refers to "individuals and the organization 
of their interrelations" (Habermas 1972, 53); 4) Capital, by way of return to, and 
development of, Habermas's own previous analysis of "fetishism of commodity", 
in light of the thought of the young Hegel, that is, the Hegel prior even to the 
Phenomenology. I will briefly summarize these four discusssions and the way 
in which Habermas connects them in order to establish the ground of his own 
theory, which he implies incorporates and passes beyond Marx's 
instrumentalist “translation" of Hegel.
First, it is important to point out that the last discussion enumerated above 
actually constitutes the material for the philosophic ground of Habermas's entire 
interpretation of the relation of Hegel and Marx in the chapters on Marx in KHI, 
at least in so far as Habermas claims originality for his own view in connection 
with this. The "beginning" is placed at the “end." Such a presentation, then, 
demands an explanation.
The concluding section to “Labor and Interaction: Remarks on Hegel's 
Jena Philosophy of Mind" (1967), written in the year before KHI, contains the 
same quotation which began "The Idea of the Theory of Knowledge as Social 
Theory" (see p. 120).
However, in “Labor and Interaction" the first few lines appear as:
What is great in Hegel’s Phenomenology and its final results is that
Hegel comprehends the self-generation of man as a process..."
(Habermas 1973, 168).
The actual passage, even as it appears one year later in KHI, is the 
following:
The greatness of Hegel's phenomenology and its end result—the
dialectic of negativity as motive and productive principle~is this...that
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Hegel grasps the self-generation of man as a process...[my emphasis, 
RR] (Habermas 1972, 43).
In Habermas's earlier "Labor and Interaction" (which I will argue is the 
material for the philosophic ground of Habermas's approach to Marx in KHI), the 
key phrase is missing from the one passage of Marx’s 1844 Economic- 
Philosophic Manuscripts, which Habermas selects as characteristic of Marx's 
philosophic relation to Hegel, and as defining the point of departure for 
Habemas's original contribution toward overcoming the aporias of German 
Idealism. Moreover, there is no ellipsis indicating any part of the quoted text 
had been excluded. The missing "dialectic of negativity as motive and 
productive principle" (which is several times in Marx’s text referred to as 
“negation of negation") was precisely the philosophic concept the young Marx 
set out to explain in his investigation of Hegelian dialectic. Even when this 
missing phrase re-appears in KHI, it has no effect on Habermas's argument. He 
still pays no attention to the concept. Rather, he interprets Marx’s intent as to 
translate the Hegelian dialectic as "labor", or the instrumental relation of man to 
nature. Clearly, the sentence which directly follows in Marx’s text casts doubt 
on Habermas's reductive interpretation. Marx writes,
The actual active relation of man to himself as a species-being or the 
confirmation of his species being as actual, that is, human, being is only 
possible so far as he actually brings forth all [my emphasis, RR] his 
species powers-which in turn is only possible through the collective 
effort of mankind, only as a result of history-and treats them as objects, 
something which immediately is again only possible in the form of 
alienation (Marx 1967b, 321).
Marx's next two paragraphs indicate that the preceding passages (on all 
the elements of criticism and dialectic of negativity) were meant to delineate the 
lasting value, but limited social specificity, of Hegelian dialectic. The two
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paragraphs in Marx’s 1844 text which follow next, however, single out one 
particular chapter of the Phenomenology—its final one--in order to , "indicate in 
detail Hegel's one-sidedness and limitations" (Marx 1967b, 321) Marx writes,
Provisionally, let us say this much in advance: Hegel's standpoint is that 
of modem political economy. He views labor as the essence, the self­
confirming essence of man; he sees only the positive side of labor not its 
negative side (Marx 1967b, 322).
Despite this, Habermas interprets Marx's passage, “that he [Hegel] 
grasps the essence of labor and comprehends objective man, who is true man 
because of his reality, as the result of his own labor", such that Marx, “discloses 
the mechanism of progress in the experience of reflection, a mechanism that 
was concealed in Hegel's philosophy" (Habermas 1972, 43). Habermas 
continues,
It is the development of the forces of production that provides the 
impetus to abolishing and surpassing a form of life that has been 
rigidified in positivity and become an abstraction. But at the same time, 
Marx deludes himself about the nature of reflection when he reduces it to 
labor.
In the two consecutive paragraphs of Marx's text (the first from which 
Habermas quoted about half, and the one following which Habermas didn"t 
cite) a critical distinction should be drawn. On the one hand, Marx discerns that 
Hegel, in a distinctive mode, "grasps the essence of labor." On the other hand, 
Marx critically notes in the following paragraph that Hegel, "views labor as the 
essence, the self-confirming essence of man; he sees only the positive side of 
labor, not its negative side." It should also be re-emphasized here that in Marx's 
essay there has been no discussion of the “forces of production". Therefore, it 
must be concluded that a characterization of Marx's view as being that 
development of the forces of production "provides the impetus to abolishing and
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surpassing a form of life that has been rigidified in positivity and become an 
abstraction" is dependent upon Habermas’s previous interpretation (or virtual 
reconstruction) of the full range of Marx's writings presented in his previous 
chapter, "Marx's Metacritique."
None the less, Habermas approves of the way in which Marx is said to 
have disclosed labor as a "mechanism" which was concealed in Hegel's 
philosophy. However, he is critical of Marx's "delusion" which, according to 
Habermas, reduces the nature of reflection to labor. Habermas offers as the 
basis for identification of this "delusion" another quotation from Marx's "Critique 
of Hegelian Dialectic". This appears in the sentence immediately following 
Habermas's passage (on forces of production) I quoted above (p.125).
...[Marx] identifies "transformative abolition... as objective movement 
which absorbs extemalization", with the appropriation of essential 
powers that have been externalized in working on material 
(Habermas 1973, 43-44).
As can almost be seen just from the above construction, Habermas's 
conclusion again consists of a confusing amalgamation of textual citation, 
interpretation and revision. First of all, Habermas does not indicate where, or in 
which, of Mane's text appears the phrase, "transformative abolition as objective 
movement which absorbs extemalization". It, in fact, follows ten pages after 
Marx's comments on "essence of labor" to which Habermas directly ties it. In 
the absence of such an indication, it might seem that Habermas's argument— 
while critical-respects Marx's originality as it is presented in "Critique of 
Hegelian Dialectic".
Clearly, this not the case. As I have already shown (see p.111) 
Habermas, in the prior "Mane's Metacritique", glaringly disregarded the specific 
passage in which Marx commented on "transformative abolition as objective
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movement which absorbs extemalization." This really was not difficult to 
observe because Habermas's analysis did not reach that far in to Marx's text; it 
began with the final pages, followed by a few quotations from the first half of the 
text. Crucially, the particular passage in which Marx comments on 
"transformative abolition as objective movement which absorbs extemalization" 
(and which Habermas does not provide reference to) is the one in which Marx 
describes his philosophy of negation of negation as "humanism" which is only 
conceivable on the basis of the ovecoming of the mediation of religion by 
atheism and private property by communism. As I discussed in the previous 
section of this chapter, this means religion and private property constitute a 
negative relation with atheism and communism, a first negation. In this sense, 
Marx views humanism as a second negation, that which first begins (represents 
a new beginning) out of the specified mediation (religion by atheism and 
private property by communism). Since “humanism" was a "philosophy" long 
before Hegel or Marx, Marx uses the term here for the specific pupose of 
designating his understanding of the originality of his conception of dialectic in 
contrast with Hegel's and Feuerbach’s.
As I have indicated, early in his text Marx reports his insight that Hegel 
“grasps the essence of labor". Immediately following this observation, Marx 
indicates that he departs from Hegel in so far as Hegel's "standpoint" is that of 
modem political economy, and Hegel, "views labor as (my emphasis, RR) the 
essence, the self-confirming essence of man..." (Marx 1967b, 322).
Here the difference is expressed as that between "essence of labor", and 
labor as essence. The further development of Habermas's presentation of 
Marx in "The Idea of the Theory of Knowledge as Social Theory", including his 
first argument in the chapter concerning Marx's alleged "astonishing demand"
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for a "natural science of man", proceeds on the basis of Habermas's failure to 
recognize this difference.
Aside from Habermas's analyses which proceed on the basis of a 
questionable reading and presentation of "Critique of Hegelian Dialectic” in 
particular, there is an additional peculiarity in his general mode of presentation 
of Marx's texts. In the first place, it is difficult to trace Habermas's argument in 
both chapters on Marx (Two and Three in KHI) simply because he fails to note 
in the references the particular essay of the young Marx (1844) to which he 
refers. Ail citations to the young Marx are simply to MEGA (Marx-Engels 
Collected Works), and a volume and page number.
Habermas opens "The Idea of the Theory of Knowledge as Social 
Theory" with a quotation from Marx's "Critique of Hegelian Dialectic." 
Habermas’s ensuing argument implies that Marx’s “strategic" re-interpretation of 
Hegel's Phenomenology was the basis of his entire social theory. I have just 
shown, from a perspective within Marx's argument in "Critique of Hegelian 
Dialectic", that Habermas's position, in so far as it proposed a textual basis for 
its acceptance, was not viable.
A further difficulty now consists in the way in which “The Idea of the 
Theory of Knowledge as Social Theory" opens with a quotation of a passage 
from “Critique of Hegelian Dialectic", and proposes from it to explain not only 
the entirety of Marx’s theory when it was fully developed, but its motivating 
principle as well. However, in order to support his argument that a "program" of 
an instrumental translation of Hegel explained Marx's demand for a “natural 
science of man", with its "positivist overtones”, Habermas offers a quotation of a 
passage not from "Critique of Hegelian Dialectic", but from the essay in Marx's 
1844 Economic-Philosophic Manuscripts which proceeded it, “Private Property 
and Communism" (Marx 1967d, 301-314). Habermas writes,
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...For Marx as for Kant the criterion of what makes science scientific is 
methodologically guranteed cognitive progress. Yet, Marx did not simply 
assume this progress as evident. Instead, he measured it in relation to 
the degree to which natural-scientific information, regarded as in 
essence technically exploitable knowledge, enters the process of 
production... (Habermas 1972, 45).
Habermas then presents the following, including his bracketed material, from 
Marx's “Private Property and Communism".
The natural sciences have developed an enormous activity and 
appropriated an ever growing body of material. Philosophy has 
remained just as foreign to them as these remained to philosophy. Their 
momentary union [criticizing Schelling and Hegel] was only a fantastic 
illusion.Jn a much more practical fashion, natural science has 
intervened in human life and transformed it by means of 
industry...Industry is the real historical relation of nature, and thus of 
natural science, to man (Habermas 1972, 45).
What Habermas excludes, indicated by the ellipsis, is necessary in order 
to grasp Marx's meaning. One of Marx's sentences Habermas left out, following 
the one stating that the momentary union of science and philosophy was a 
fantastic illusion, criticizes historiography because it, “only occasionally takes 
account of natural science as a moment of enlightenment, utility, some 
particular great discoveries" (Marx 1967d, 311).
With this observation included, it can be seen that Marx's point is that in 
contrast (but certainly not with his endorsement) natural science (apparently 
immune from the critical attention of the cultural life of society) proceeded to 
reconstruct (or undermine) the practical life of millions. This critical approach, 
contrary to Habermas's interpretation, is made clear in Marx's sentences which 
follow in the same paragraph from which Habermas quoted:
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But natural science has penetrated and transformed human life all the 
more practically through industry, preparing for human emancipation 
however much it immediately had to accentuate dehumanization (my 
emphasis, RR). Industry is the actual historical relationship of nature, and 
thus of natural science, to man. If it is grasped as the exoteric 
manifestation of man's essential powers, the human essence of nature, 
or the natural essence of man can also be understood. Hence, natural 
science will lose its abstract material~or rather idealistic—tendency and 
become the basis of human science as it has already become, though in 
an alienated form, the basis of actual human life. One basis for life and 
another for science is in itself a lie (Marx 1967d, 311).
Here Marx is commenting on a new, expansive science which 
understands itself as an abstraction from practical life. Its specificity consists in 
the detachment of its thought as thought from its historical concretization in the 
form of "industry." Describing this situation, perhaps the most telling sentence 
among those I just quoted, left out by Habermas, is the one wherein Marx 
indicates the moving together of (and thus the difficulty in distinguishing 
between) materialism and idealism. This alienation develops at a time when 
natural science is coming to so directly "determine" practical life; at the same 
time, the socially established "thought" of the society so determined does not 
regard the process (practically or philosophically conceived) as within its 
domain. In criticizing this Marx is also staking a claim in what he identifies as 
the historically conditioned need for a new relationship of ideas to social reality.
Marx's analysis demonstrates a peculiar reversal. "Nature", the object of 
the emerging science, is materialist at its core. Yet, because this science 
abstracts from human natural attributes their natural objects, and in doing so 
adopts a passive attitude toward the relation of the two forms of "nature" as it 
develops (importantly as following from science's own achievements) in 
"industry", its materialistic mode of knowledge is "abstract", transforming itself 
into an abstract materialism, or an idealistic tendency. As I have noted, Marx 
describes his own philosophic originality in terms of a humanism which gets at
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the root of idealism's and materialism’s aporias, the impasse reached in the 
shadow of Hegel's Absolutes. This is the basis upon which Marx describes the 
process of development of natural science and industry as "dehumanized", the 
description which is indispensible for understanding the passage at issue here; 
and, it is this description which Habermas's quotation of the text ignores.
When Marx writes that, “however much it [natural science through 
industry] had to accentuate dehumanization", clearly he is not affirming the 
process. Instead, he is disclosing a process which, in his view, is not even 
critically approached by society's existing phiiosophies—idealist or materialist. I 
have already shown that Marx, in the final part of these 1844 manuscripts, and 
thus in something like a "summation", describes his own philosophy as 
"humanism". Here, in "Private Property and Communism", Marx is clearly 
searching for a divergence—particularly in thought-from a powerful historical 
tendency in which thought (natural science applied in industry) is uncoupling 
from life, not unlike the description of Hegel’s Absolute as a separation of 
thinking from the subject, including the philosopher (Hegel) himself, I recounted 
in the first part of this chapter.
Following his questionable presentation of a part of a paragraph from 
"Private Property and Communism", Habermas quotes a Russian reviewer of 
Capital, in order to reinforce his argument concerning Marx's, "program" for an 
instrumentalist translation of Hegel's philosophy of absolute reflection, in which 
Habermas holds Marx identifies "labor" as the "mechanism" of "progress" in the 
experience of reflection, and in which this progress is measured, "in relation to 
the degree to which natural-scientific information, regarded as in essence 
technically exploitable knowledge, enters the process of production."
The features of the passage he quotes include the reviewer's reference to 
Marx's demonstration,
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through "precise scientific investigation", and to how Marx, "considers the 
movement of society as a process of natural history, governed by laws 
that are not only independent of the will, consciousness and intention of 
men, but instead, and conversely, determine their will, consciousness, 
and intentions... "(Habermas 1972, 46).
In the epilogue to the second edition of Capital, Marx is said to quote with 
approval this passage from the Russian reviewer,
Marx's Capital did analyze historically specific features of capitalist 
society-fomns of abstract social domination specific to capitalism of which the 
Russian reviewer's description is accurate. However, Marx's theory pointed to 
the possibility of overcoming precisely the historically specified society of which 
this form of domination was characteristic.
Obviously, this interpretation is not congruent with Habermas's 
presentation. Following the quotation from the Russian reviewer, Habermas 
returns to "Private Property and Communism", and quotes a sentence from the 
paragraph directly following the one he quoted (see p. 129 this chapter) before 
citing the Russian reviewer of Capital.
Natural science will eventually subsume the science of man just as the 
science of man will subsume natural science: there will be a single 
science (Habermas 1972, 46).
Since Habermas has already excluded the important context in which 
Marx poses the challenge of bringing the knowledge attained in natural science 
to the point where its results are not imposed on life, he is able to then argue 
that from 1844 to 1867 (completion of volume one of Capital, what motivated 
Marx's theory construction was an endorsement of the "subsumption" of the 
human sciences by natural science.
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More generally, Habermas's argument implies that all of Marx's work was 
intentionally molded into a preconceived framework already set in the 1844 
manuscripts. (This raises a different problem in that earlier I showed that in 
"Marx's Metacritique" Habermas's argument implied the contrary, that 1844, 
because it remained for the most part, within the naturalistic realm of 
Feuerbach, still lacking a specified epistemological dimension, was relatively 
unimportant in his more mature theory).
Habermas's ensuing argument aims to demonstrate that Marx only 
recognized the real consequences of his early intentions when confronted with 
problems in his later working out of the Grundrisse. In this connection,
Habermas returns to his conclusion in "Marx's Metacritique" wherein it is said 
the philosophic framework of Marx's thought was too narrow to include all the 
elements his actual theory admitted. Thus, it is precisely at this point, that is, in 
his consideration of the Grundrisse, where Habermas first proposes 
"communicative action" (organization of social relations) as the "second 
dimension" necessary in order to grasp the meaning of "dialectic" of forces and 
relations of production, supposedly Marx's essential finding. Hence now I will 
consider how Habermas relates his analysis of 1844 to the Grundrisse, 
including his initiation of “communicative action", related to the impasse Marx is 
said to have reached (the transposition of natural science into a self-conscious 
subject).
First, recall that in BPSMC, Habermas had already found in some of the 
same passages in the Grundrisse an economic argument which contradicted 
Marx's "labor theory of value." Habermas had concluded from this that Marx 
chose to ignore the finding, suggesting that this was perhaps because Marx's 
preconceptions were at odds with rigorous social theoretic concerns.
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Similarly, in “The Idea of the Theory of Knowledge as Social Theory", 
Habermas finds that Marx identified how development of the forces of 
production, the direction of which was toward the reduction of necessary labor 
time to a minimum, leads to a qualitative change, wherein the worker takes a, 
“place alongside the process of production instead of being its chief agent".
The Grundrisse also indicated that such a state of affairs (an automatic 
regulation of social production) was not in itself a sufficient condition of social 
emancipation; yet, in view of Marx’s “metacritque of Hegel", which emerged as 
an idea of "synthesis through social labor", Marx's hypothetical example in the 
Grundrisse depicted the limits intrinsic to Marx's philosophical self- 
understanding. Hence, Habermas in effect claims that the philosophical 
foundations of Marx's thought, traced directly from the 1844 "Critique of the 
Heglian Dialectic" to the Grundrisse, are thrown into serious doubt not primarily 
by the opposition to them of another theory, but by the logic and development of 
Marx's own investigations. At this point, Habermas understands his critique of 
Marx's theory as immanent. If, however, contemporary theory is unable to 
understand Marx better than Marx understood himself, and thereby “rescue" the 
theory, the obvious alternative would be to reject Marx's theory, assuming that a 
better theory was available or was in the process of development.
Habermas notes that in the Grundrisse Marx, "very precisely 
distinguishes the self-conscious control of the social life process by the 
combined producers from an automatic regulation of the process of production 
that has become independent of these individuals" (Habermas 1972, 51).
Yet, according to Habermas, this was only one of the two versions Marx 
presented. The important feature of Habermas's analysis consists in the idea 
that Marx presented in the Grundrisse two separate models: one according to 
which there is, “an automatic transposition of natural science and technology
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into a self-consciousness of the social subject"; and another according to which 
(in Habermas's view), “the self constitution of the species takes place not only in 
the context of men's instrumental action upon nature but simultaneously in the 
dimension of power relations that regulate men's interaction among 
themselves" (Habermas 1972, 51). It is on the basis of his detection of two 
different "models", or "versions" that, Habermas concludes, "makes visible an 
indecision that has its foundation in Marx's theoretical approach itself” 
(Habermas 1972, 52).
Before considering Habermas's Grundrisse argument in detail, it is 
important to make clear the way in which he links the 1844 Marx to it. Recall the 
passage Habermas quoted from "Private Property and Communism" in which, 
"natural science will eventually subsume the science of man just as the science 
of man will subsume natural science: there will be a single science." In 
interpreting this as an "astonishing demand" for a natural science of man, "with 
its positivist overtones", Habermas views this passage as Marx's “self- 
understanding of economics." Moreover, he understands it as an "abbreviated 
methodological self-understanding...nevertheless a logical consequence of a 
frame of reference restricted to instrumental action" (Habermas 1972, 46). 
Habermas argues that 'synthesis through social labor" or, in other words, 
acceptance of his interpretation of Marx's "Critique of Hegelian Dialectic" as a 
“metacritique of Hegel", leads to a science of man analogous to natural science, 
both under categories of "knowledge for control" (Habermas 1972, 47).
Earlier I found that the context of Marx's passage Habermas quoted did 
not support Habermas's interpretation. Now, by reference to a long passage in 
the Grundrisse, Habermas proposes to reinforce and extend further into the 
"mature theory" Marx's supposed early, non-critical approach to the natural
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sciences, an approach with which Habermas argues Marx ’subsumes" the 
‘science of man":
To the degree...that large-scale industry develops, the creation of social 
wealth depends less on labor time and the quanity of labor expended 
than on the power of the instruments that are set in motion during labor 
time and which themselves in turn—their powerful effectiveness- 
themselves in turn are in no proportion to the immediate labor time that 
their production costs. Rather they depend on the general level of 
science and technological progress, or the application of science to 
production. (The development of this science, especially natural science, 
and all others along with it, is itself in turn proportional to the 
development of material production.) For example, agriculture becomes 
the mere application of the science of material exchange as it is to be 
regulated most advantageously for the entire social body. Real wealth 
manifests itself rather-and large industry reveals this—in the tremendous 
disproportion between labor that has been reduced to a pure abstraction 
and the power of the productive process that it oversees. As man relates 
to the process of production as overseer and regulator, labor no longer 
seems so much to be enclosed within the process of production. (What 
holds for machinery holds just as well for the combination of human 
activities and the development of human intercourse.) The laborer no 
longer inserts a modified natural object between the object and himself. 
Instead he inserts the natural process that he has transformed into an 
industrial one as a medium between himself and inorganic nature, of 
which he takes command. He takes his place alongside the process of 
production instead of being its chief agent. In this transformation what 
appears as the keystone of production and wealth is neither the 
immediate labor performed by man himself nor the time he labors but the 
appropriation of his own general productive force, his understanding of 
nature and its mastery through his societal existence-in a word, the 
development of the social individual...
Therewith production based on exchange value collapses, and the 
immediate material process of production sheds the form of scantiness 
and antagonism. The free development of individualities and therefore 
not the reduction of necessary labor time in order to create surplus value, 
but rather the reduction of society's necessary labor to a minimum, which 
then has its counterpart in the artistic, scientific, and other education of 
individuals through the time that has become free for all of them and 
through the means that have been created (Habermas 1972, 48-50).
In respect to Habermas's transition from Marx's 1844 manuscripts to the 
Grundrisse, quotation of the above passage is intended to show the obvious
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limits of Marx's early notion, as interpreted by Habermas, that "synthesis 
through social labor" potentially characterized an emancipatory theory of 
society. Habermas presents a nearly seamless theoretical progression from the 
short passage in "Private Property and Communism" to the passages he then 
quotes in the Grundrisse. However, the alternative interpretation I suggested— 
that the context of "Private Property and Communism" rendered Marx's 
observations unambiguously critical of what Habermas argues they affirm~is 
supported as well in the long passage from the Grundrisse Habermas selects to 
illustrate his argument.
Although I intend to summarize (though briefly) in more general terms 
Habermas's argument concerning the Grundrisse, first it should be noted that 
the ellipsis in Habermas's quotation of Marx's Grundrisse refers to a passage 
that seems to be relevant in respect to Habermas's investigation. As a matter of 
fact, the several sentences Habermas does not quote, from a passage he 
reproduces covering nearly one and a half pages, are the only ones containing 
phrases Marx emphasized. Beginning at the ellipsis, and ending where 
Habermas continues his quotation, Marx writes,
The theft of alien labor time, on which the present wealth is based, 
appears as a miserable foundation in face of this new one creatd by 
large-scale industry itself. As soon as labor in the direct form has ceased 
to be the great well-spring of wealth, labor time ceases and must cease 
to be its measure, and hence exchange value of use value. The surplus 
labor of the mass has ceased to be the condition for the development of 
general wealth, just as the non-labor of the few, for the development of 
the general powers of the human head (Marx 1973, 705).
Marx develops his analysis of alienated labor, here as the basis of a 
contradictory relationship of value and wealth constitutive of capitalism as a 
historically specific social formation. The specificity of this formation is made 
vivid by way of a demonstration of self-abolition immanent in the categories
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adequate to their object. It is a way of making a point Marx emphasized on 
many occasions: that a specification of the unique features of a social formation, 
or demonstration of its particularity, is the ground for conceiving that formation 
as transient. Obviously, the “particular" features thus identified could be held to 
be bound up with the "absolute", or universality as such. Here, Marx's analysis 
of the contradictory relation of value and wealth specifies the relation of the 
universal (value) to the particular (form of wealth) as pointing to the "end" of 
capitalism intrinsic to its constitutive feature (labor as mediating itself and social 
relations generally).
The last sentence is most directly relevant in the present context, that is, 
for the particular issue of the importance of the part of the text not quoted by 
Habermas in his connection of the theoretical basis of 1844 to the Grundrisse:
The surplus labor of the mass has ceased to the condition for the 
development of general wealth, just as the non-labor of the few, for the 
development of the general powers of the human head.
The idea in “Private Property and Communism", that the relation of 
natural science and industry was the dehumanized but "real historical relation" 
of nature, and thus of natural science, to man", is developed here in the 
Grundrisse as the division between mental and manual activity (labor) 
constitutive of the capitalist social form, its abolition immanent in the 
contradictory relationship of value and wealth. The idea of the relationship of 
the development of the "general powers of the human head" to "the non-labor of 
the few" as its condition is akin to the relation of natural science to industry Marx 
had analyzed in 1844 as a mode of alienation constitutive of a historically 
specific social formation. Marx's analysis does not imply a transhistorical 
concept of labor, a "non-theory" of knowledge which conceives nature as an
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"absolute" ground of mind. Rather, it suggests a socio-historical theory of 
knowledge, in which the mediation of labor by labor, and of social relations by 
labor, characterizes only modem (capitalist) society.
While the interpretation I just suggested makes clear that Marx viewed 
his investigation in the Grundrisse as making more concrete his earlier criticism 
of the relation of natural science and industry, Habermas argues that the same 
investigation, to the contrary, rendered Marx's philosophy as the ground for 
social theory non-viable. Habermas indicates that the significance of this 
section of the Grundrisse lies in a dead-end Marx reached in his attempted 
narrow, materialistic appropriation of Hegel. This is expressed as the idea that 
in order for Marx's attempt to have succeeded, the end of direct labor as the 
source of value, and labor time as its measure, would have to include an 
"automatic transposition of natural science and technology into a self- 
consciousness of the social subject (general intellect)..." (Habermas 1972, 48).
Habermas concludes that the Grundrisse contains evidence that Marx 
recoiled from such a notion. The section of the Grundrisse containing the 
passage Habermas quoted at length (see p.136) marks, for Habermas, the end 
of a line of thought he had traced, originating in "Marx's Metacritique of Hegel". 
Noting that the Grundrisse was only a "rough sketch" (Habermas 1972, 50) of 
Capital, Habermas now brings to view that his entire preceding expositon, of the 
movement of Marx's thought over the period 1844-1858, was of only the "non- 
official" version of Marx's theory, a version based on an appropriation of Hegel 
on a relatively narrow scale, that is, "production as the "activity" of a self- 
constituting species" (Habermas 1972, 51). Habermas writes,
Even in the Grundrisse we find already the official view that the 
transformation of science into machinery does not by any means lead of 
itself to the liberation of a self-conscious subject (Habermas 1972, 51).
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Without commenting on it, much less providing an explanation, 
Habermas now cites passages (which he says articulate Mane's "official 
version") appearing more than two hundred pages prior to those he has just 
analyzed and consigned to the non-official version. These earlier passages 
(Marx 1973, 470), which Habermas characterizes as a departure from an idea 
of a self-constitution of the species through instrumental action upon nature 
only, are said to recognize another dimension, that of "power relations" that 
regulate men's interaction among themselves" (Habermas 1972, 51):
...so that the aggregate labor as a totality is not the work of the individual 
worker, and is the work of the various workers together only insofar as 
they are combined and not insofar as they relate to each other as 
combining of their own accord...(Habermas 1972, 51).
...In its combination this labor [of scientized production] appears just as 
much in the service of an alien will and an alien intelligence, which 
directs it. It has its psychic unity outside itself and its material unity 
subordinated to the unity of the machinery, of fixed capital, which is 
grounded in the object. Fixed capital, as an animated monster, 
objectifies scientific thought and is in fact the encompassing aspect. It 
does not relate to the individual worker as an instrument. Instead he 
exists as an animated individual detail, a living isolated accessory to the 
machinery (Habermas 1972, 51-52).
Now, the passages do not indicate a possibility (and therefore any 
necessity at the categorical level) of separating labor (insturmental action) in 
capitalism from "interaction" (power relations). Rather, Marx's observation is 
that intrinsic to the specific mode of production with which he is there 
concerned, not only is the individual subsumed by the general. The general 
itself has its unity outside itself. This insight is the basis of Marx’s distinction 
between abstract and concrete labor, or more precisely, the mediation of labor 
by itself, constitutive of captialist social relations generally. In the passage 
which appears later in the Grundrisse, specifically those sentences Habermas
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
141
excluded, Marx held that, "As soon as labor in the direct form has ceased to be 
the great well-spring of wealth, labor time ceases and must cease to be its 
measure, and hence exchange value of use value" (Marx 1973, 705).
Here Marx is describing an abstract form of social compulsion (and its 
transience) which is not captured through an uncovering of "power relations" 
alone, or in an evocation of the concreteness associated with characterizations 
such as "class domination". The more abstract type of social domination is 
rooted in the process whereby labor mediates itself, and also mediates social 
relations generally, captured at the categorical level through the concepts of 
value, commodity, captial, etc. In capitalist society the instrumental and social, 
which might exist as two different dimensions in other forms of society, 
constitute in a historically specific relationship a single contradictory social 
totality.
Habermas interprets as Marx’s "official" version the above passage 
(p. 140) in the Grundrisse, and another he next quotes from the same text. 
Habermas's view is that Marx was forced by his own investigation to recognize 
a critical second (differentiated) dimension of social constitution not only in a 
general historical sense, but even with capitalism specifically.
Following this, Habermas next explains Marx's idea of class struggle in 
terms of the, "institutional framework that resists a new stage of reflection" 
(Habermas 1972, 52). In other words, from the perspective of development of 
science and technology, wealth (which Habermas conflates with Marx's concept 
of value), when losing its basis in labor time, does not automatically lead to “self 
conscious control of the social life process" (Habermas 1972, 52).
According to Habermas, the "distinctive feature of capitalism" (Habermas 
1972, 52) is that the "power relations" at the basis of class struggle are defined 
economically, not politically (Habermas 1972, 52). Habermas then concludes
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that Marx‘s attempt to develop an emancipatory social theory as self-constitution 
through labor intended to escape, but in fact necessarily compelled, labor's 
distinction from social interaction. In fact, it became clear there was a need to 
directly confront the former's primacy.
One more peculiarity in Habermas's citation of Marx's texts should be 
noted here. As I mentioned earlier, Habermas's argument begins with an 
analysis of what he eventually designates as only one of two versions of Marx's 
appropriation of Hegel. His attention first to this "unofficial version" relies on 
passages in Marx’s Grundrisse which appear much later in the text than those 
he subsequently cites to ground his analysis of Marx's "official" version, which is 
said to recognize the centrality of "interaction", and is connected to a much 
broader materialist appropriation of Hegel. Yet, Habermas's final citation of the 
Grundrisse, offered as conclusive support of his idea of Marx's second, "official" 
version, reverts to the same page he initially cited for support of his idea of the 
existence of a first, non-official version:
On the one hand it [capital] thus calls to life all the powers of science and 
of nature as of social combination and social intercourse, to make the 
creation of wealth (relatively) independent of the labor time expended on 
it. On the other, it wants to take the gigantic social forces generated in 
this way and measure them against labor time and confine them within 
the bounds required in order to preserve as value the value already 
created (Habermas 1972, 52).
In short, for textual support of his thesis of two versions or models, 
characteristic of Marx’s attempt to develop a social theory, Habermas relies for 
his reconstruction of the later officiated version on portions of the Grundrisse 
preceding by hundreds of pages the paragraphs he maintains describe the first 
(or earlier) non-offical version. Moreover, while on the one hand implying that a 
comprehensive reading of the Grundrisse brings to view "two versions” of
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Marx's attempt at a critical social theory not otherwise easily accessible, 
Habermas ends his treatment of the Grundrisse by citing the same page in 
Marx's text to support the "official" version he had already cited to support the 
non-official version. I point this out to suggest that while it is in principle 
possible to argue that Marx offers two mutually exclusive versions (or models) of 
a possible social theory on a single page, this does not appear to have been 
Habermas's intent. None the less, for support of an idea of a second, "offical" 
model, Habermas inexplicably quotes from the textual evidence he offered for 
his assertion of the first, non-official model.
This in itself does not demand a rejection of an idea that two (or more) 
versions of the conditions for social theory might be found in Marx's Grundrisse. 
Neither, however, does it provide convincing support for Habermas's major 
thesis, originating in "Marx's Metacritique of Hegel", that Marx embarked on a 
futile quest (over nearly two decades) to construct a social theory on the basis of 
the idea of "synthesis through social labor."
Predominately on the basis of his tracing a sort of subterranean line of 
development found in a pair of texts Marx never published (both of which 
remained unpublished for several generations after Marx's death) Habermas 
next characterizes Marx's theoretic originality. From Marx's broad, evolutionary 
perspective, a new stage of reflection connected to objective changes following 
from the relationship of man to nature are met by resistance of an "institutional 
framework...not immediately the result of a labor process" (Habermas 1972, 52). 
Habermas connects this to a broader, materialist appropriation of Hegel.
In light of this broad, evolutionary context Habermas, then, pinpoints 
Marx’s specific theoretical contribution-identification of the distinctive feature of 
capitalism, which consists of grasping "power" and/or class-struggle (apparently 
common to all societies) as economically instead of politically defined. The
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implication is that Marx, as his material investigations unfolded, was forced to 
take account of both labor and interaction, despite the fact that he never revised 
the metatheory of “synthesis through social labor.“ Habermas writes,
While instrumental action corresponds to the constraint of external nature 
and the level of the forces of production determine the extent of social 
control over natural forces, communicative action stands in 
correspondence to the suppression of man's own nature (Habermas 
1972, 53).
Habermas, continuing an apparent paraphrase of Marx's “official" 
version, describes, on the one hand, a transhistorical concept of labor in which, 
“society owes emancipation from the external forces of nature to labor 
processes, that is to technically exploitable knowledge (including the 
'transformation of natural sciences into machinery’") (Habermas 1972, 53).
On the other hand, "the revolutionary activity of struggling classes 
(including the critical activity of reflective sciences") (Habermas 1972, 53), 
needed for emancipation from the compulsion of internal nature, and the 
replacement of institutions based on force by an, "organization of social 
relations that is bound only to communication free from domination", occurs in a 
different medium that that of "productive activity" (Habermas 1972, 53).
Habermas emphasizes that Marx sees both categories of social practice 
connected in the system of social labor. Yet, as Marx was led to see by his 
investigations found in the Grundrisse, constitution of the species in the 
dimension of labor, a supression of the constraint of external nature, finds its 
limits none the less in the “organization of society itself as an automaton" 
(Habermas 1972, 55). In the other medium, the "social formative process", 
communicative action is set free as communicative action...the organization of 
society linked to decision-making processes on the basis of discussion free 
from domination" (Habermas 1972, 55).
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Following these observasions (among others)-which sen/e the purpose 
of defining the limits of Marx’s attempted materialist appropriation of Hegel on 
the narrow scale of self-constitution of the species through social labor, and 
moving the intial outline of his own theory of communicative action into the 
philosophic vacuum thus identified-Habermas concludes the chapter with a 
discussion linking the young Hegel's theoretical-practical synthesis (not 
incorporated into his system) to Marx's concept of commodity fetishism in the 
first chapter of Capital.
As Habermas describes it, the basis of the synthesis, found only in the 
early Hegel, is the "dialectic of the moral life" in Christianity (Habermas 1972, 
56). Hegel construed crime as a destruction of the moral totality which negates 
the complementarity of unconstrained communication, placing the individual 
over the (social) totality. After struggle there is reconciliation between the 
criminal and the other when they experience the common ground of their 
existence through a dialogic relation of recognizing oneself in the other.
Here, Habermas returns to the question of the specificity of contemporary 
capitalism. Habermas sees Marx's “mystery of the commodity form" as a 
description of ‘objective illusion", wherein the object of social conflict is 
unrecognizable for both parties (Habermas 1972, 59). The significance of this, 
according to Habermas, is that it restricts the communication of the conflicting 
classes while bringing, "ideologies from the heights of mythological or religious 
legitimation of tangible domination and power down into the system of social 
labor" (Habermas 1972, 60). This is "unmasked by the critique of commodity 
fetishism" (Habermas 1972, 60).
From this, Habermas argues for two consequences for the 
methodological status of social theory. The "science of man" includes the 'self­
reflection of class consciousness in its manifestations" (Habermas 1972, 61),
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and as self-consciousness, knows, "itself to be involved in the self-formative 
process that it recollects", in order to free itself from "objective illusion" 
(Habermas 1972, 61). Marx does not distinguish between a "science of man" 
as critique of ideology and the natural sciences:
By equating critique with natural science, he disavowed it. Materialist 
scientism only reconfirms what absolute idealism had already 
accomplished: the elimination of epistemology, in favor of unchained 
universal scientific knowledge—but this time of scientific materialism 
instead of absolute knowledge (Habermas 1972, 63).
The meaning of "The idea of the Theory of Knowledge as Social Theory", 
the title to his second chapter on Marx in KHI, only becomes clear in view of the 
difficult conclusion I just outlined. The idea in the title does not ultimately refer 
to Hegel, to Marx, or to Marx's attempted "materialist appropriation" of Hegel. 
Rather, it proposes a new ground for a contemporary critical theory, dependent 
upon a reconfiguration of not only the elements of labor and interaction, but of 
philosophy and natural science. The implication is that Hegel substantially 
worked out, but abandoned, a dialectic of morality intrinsic to which was the 
dialogic relation missing in his absolute knowledge. The negative historical 
effects of Hegel's abandonment of this dialectic are equated with Marx's refusal 
to separate natural science from critique as the principle of a science of man. 
Habermas, in contrast, proposes the task of a reconstruction of forms of class 
consciousness which would include "self-consciousness" in the form of critique, 
the only way to escape "objective illusion", his characterization of what Marx 
identified with his analysis of "fetishism of commodity."
In view of "Marx's Metacritique of Hegel", this amounts to the idea that 
both Hegel's absolute ground (of nature) as mind, and Marx's metacritical 
absolute ground (of mind) as nature, not only were both perhaps constitutive of
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the state of affairs in which a non-refiective positivism prevailed; equally 
importantly, these "absolutes" proved not to contain within them the resources 
for an emancipatory critical theory of contemporary society. I will conclude this 
section with some brief critical comments on Habermas's conclusion.
In Habermas's interpretation, Marx's section on "Fetishism of the 
Commodity and its Secret" analyzes a phenomenon of "objective illusion". He 
traces this sort of illusion to the historical condition wherein class domination 
(and conflict) shifted from a more or less direct political form to an imbededness 
in the economic relation, defined by the free labor contract, or the, "justice of the 
exchange of equivalents inherent in exchange relations" (Habermas 1972, 60). 
It is precisely "self reflexive critique" (of ideology), then, which would dissolve 
the fetish of the commodity. Just as labor as the relation of man to nature has 
historically created the material conditions free of scarcity (constraint of external 
nature) "critique" as specific to "science of man" has its purpose in the freeing of 
people from "ideological delusion" (Habermas 1972, 55).
As I have previously emphasized, Marx's analysis of capitalism 
developed a concept of a specific and, in crucial respects, unique form of social 
relations. Apparently, with similar close attention to nuance, he also remarked 
on the indebtedness of his own theory to previous thought, and reflected on its 
unique features. This is especially so in regard to the section on "The Fetishism 
of the Commodity and its Secret." In fact, in the first edition of volume one of 
Capital, this section was not even included as a separate section of Chapter 
One (Anderson 1998).
In the "Fetish of the Commodity" Marx appears to be at pains to dispel 
any possible illusion that capitalism's social fetish is any sort of illusion- 
objective or otherwise Marx writes,
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In other words, the labor of the private individual manifests itself as an 
element of the total labor of society only through the relations which the 
act of exchange establishes between the products, and, through their 
mediation, between the producers. To the producers, therefore, the 
social relations between their private labors appear as what they are (my 
emphasis, RR) ie; they do not appear as direct social relations between 
persons in their work, but rather as material relations between persons 
and social relations between things (Marx 1977, 165-166).
In addition, Marx does not root this dehumanized social form (which is 
not an illusion) in the “justice of the exchange of equivalents inherent in 
exchange relations", but rather in the “two-fold character of labor itself" (Marx 
1977, 166). Marx is referring to the abstract domination characteristic of 
capitalism, the mediation of labor by itself, and of social relations generally.
Next, Marx proceeds to argue that no amount of “ideology critique" can 
alter the basic form of dehumanization that has been identified at the basis of 
the capitalist social formation. Marx writes,
The religious reflections of the real world can, in any case, vanish only 
when the practical relations of everyday life between man and man, and 
man and nature, generally present themselves to him in a transparent 
and rational form. The veil is not removed from the countenance of the 
social life process, ie; the process of material production, until it becomes 
production by freely associated men, and stands under their conscious 
and planned control (Marx 1977, 173).
Legitimation Crisis
Legitimation Crisis (LC) is comparable to the earlier works of Habermas I 
have already considered in that it too depends on an approach to Marx in order 
to ground its inquiry into the possibility of a contemporary critical theory. In 
contrast to the previous studies I have considered, however, there is little 
evidence of an increasingly close reading of Marx in any way constitutive of 
Habermas's work. To the contrary, Marx's theory is presented as largely
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assimilated and classifiable within the history of critical thought. Habermas, in 
fact, classifies it, on one level, as belonging to one of four social formations, 
intrinsic to each of which is a typical crisis potential. Marx "belongs" to the 
liberal-capitalist social formation while, by implication, the emerging theory of 
which LC itself is a groundwork, “belongs" to a qualitatively changed "advanced 
capitalism".
KHI could be interpreted to have suggested that, from a contemporary 
perspective, and in recognition of the particular problems to which it must 
respond, Marx's theory was inadequate in the form in which he presented it.
The inadequacy was rooted in Marx's own ambiguity and indecision, and also 
tied to Marx’s own theoretical principle concerning dependency of theory on 
historical specificity.
According to Habermas, the theory itself, however, might still, on the 
basis of a process of reconstruction, be supplemented in such a way as to make 
plausible its contemporary relevance. None the less, in the previous section my 
close reading of Habermas's text raised questions concerning Habermas's 
methodology and mode of appropriation of Marx's ideas upon which one would 
be expected to evaluate what might be relevant for a contemporary critical 
theory. The importance of this challenge to Habermas's approach to Marx is 
two-fold: if Habermas's immanent critique of Marx fails, and that proposed 
critique's specificity is judged by Habermas to be a necessary step toward 
overcoming the predominance of a traditional, non-emancipatory form of theory, 
then it might be concluded that a different approach to, and interpretation of, 
Marx demands a different orientation than that which is found in Legitmation 
Crisis and in later works which follow. In other words, yet another rethinking of 
Marx's theory might be necessary in order to accomplish Habermas’s goal (a 
contemporary emancipatory social theory which has settled accounts with
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Marx’s theory), a rethinking that might also, however, open to very close scrutiny 
as well Habermas’s various claims for the status of his own, emerging theory. 
Arguably,Habermas's claims are substantially based on overcoming limitations 
he claimed to disclose but did not credibly demonstrate in his close examination 
of Marx's theory.
Upon close examiniation, Habermas's presentation of Marx was weakly 
executed. This can be seen in the examples I provided concerning what has to 
be frankly described as inaccuracies in key textual citations of Marx's work. On 
the theoretical level, I demonstrated that Habermas's interpretation of Marx led 
not to reasonable prospects for its possible supplementation and/or 
reconstruction, but rather to a necessity for its rejection.
In LC, Habermas's dual form of approach to Marx's theory continues. On 
the one hand, and in the most affirmitive sense, Marx's theory is presented as 
adequate, though bound, to liberal capitalism. In a negative sense, the 
presence of Mane’s theory is extremely tangential to Habermas's attempt to 
conceptualize what has succeeded the form of capitalism to which he has 
confined the problematic identified with Mane. The exception to the latter is 
Habermas's couple of reminders to the effect that Marx, besides his 
development of an economic theory (or a theory of society as basically 
economic) was also the author of political works, such as The Eighteenth 
Brumaire of Louis Bonaparte (Habermas 1975, 31; 114). However, he does 
not attribute contemporary importance to the political orientation of those works. 
Rather, he suggests that their current significance lies in how Marx (not even 
fully consciously so) felt compelled to link the systemic theory of crisis he had 
worked out with the law of value to actual historical events; in other words, 
Habermas implies that Marx's economic theory of society as a crisis theory was 
not intrinsically related to actual social relations but, as he holds Marx's shows,
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was capable of offering a certain type of explanation of them, through a 
basically external standpoint. However, it is precisely this form of theory 
Habermas proposes to overcome with an increasingly invoked theory of 
communicative action.
My consideration of LC will not be in the form of a close reading of the 
text, unlike in previous sections. In earlier sections, a careful reading of 
Habermas demanded a close reading of Marx's texts. Much more than was the 
case with the first generation of Critical Theorists, Habermas made his 
interpretation of Marx's texts directly accessible, and deliberately rendered 
transparent his evaluation of the consequences flowing from his reading. In 
doing so, he thus consistently attempted to illustrate the importance of preparing 
the ground for, and thus making it possible to practice, critical self-reflection. 
Here, "critical self-reflection" refers to the type of "dialogue" Habermas invoked 
in KHI, where he proposed to uncover abandoned stages of reflection from Kant 
to Marx in order to reorient a contemporary critical theory characterized by its 
own pessimism and apparent lack of social relevance.
Yet, to re-emphasize, in contrast to Habermas's earlier studies, LC quite 
clearly is not based on any further close reading of Marx. Rather, Marx's theory 
is quickly relegated to the background, as Habermas proposes a framework for 
a theory of social evolution, the inspiration for which, ironically, is attributed to 
Marx. In respect to this, Habermas implies his willingness to learn from Marx. 
The primary lesson he recognizes derives from his interpretation of Marx's 
notion of the specificity of capitalism. This specificity is defined primarily in 
terms of property relations and the market, or the legitimating function of the 
latter for the former. In addition, Marx's concept of crisis is thought to describe 
the "deep" structure underlying their surface complementarity.
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In Habermas's view, capitalism according to Marx is distinguishable from 
other social formations in that its “principle of organization” is defined 
economically, through wage labor and capital, a relationship of classes, the 
initial expression of which however is not directly political. The idea of the 
exchange of equivalents in the market is the legitimating ideological form said 
to be the target of Marx's "unmasking" critique. Thus, very early on in LC 
Habermas attributes to Marx, "the first social-scientific concept of system crisis" 
(Habermas 1975, 2). Yet, in what sets the basic tone for the remainder of the 
study, Habermas writes,
But I do not wish to add to the history of Marxian dogmatics yet another 
elucidation of his crisis theory...My aim is rather to introduce 
systematically a social scientifically useful concept of crisis (Habermas 
1975, 2).
Hence, Habermas defines the context as essentially set by, on the one 
hand, "dogmatic" crisis theory rooted in an idea of the contradiction between the 
social production of wealth and its private appropriation, the systemic effects of 
which turn back on and threaten that which is socially integrated. On the other 
hand, in consideration of possible basic changes in the social formation since 
Marx, the potential for a social-scientific concept of crisis has emerged. In 
counter-posing these two perspectives-the one dependent primarily on an idea 
of economic integration of society, the other mainly systems theoretic, 
dependent on an idea of political integration (Habermas 1975, 5)—Habermas 
highlights the originality, and suggests the superiority, of his own theory, in so 
far as it offers a salient critique of both positions. He analyzes the socio-cuiturai 
sphere as the locus of crisis potential integral to specifying the contemporary 
social formation in contrast with early captialism.
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Legitimation in late capitalism has been re-politicized in that the state 
plays a major role in the distribution of obligations and rewards, thus rendering 
Marx's "scientistic economism" obsolete: Politics has been introduced into the 
foundation of value theory. In view of Weber's research on rationalization, 
autonomous forms of reason-science, art, and morality-characterize a 
modernity wherein demands for legitimation of decisions uncouple from purely 
market mechanisms. Functionalist systems theory, in attempting to 
conceptualize the integration of society at only the political level, ignores the 
problem that, according to Habermas, “there is no administrative production of 
meaning" (Habermas 1975, 70). Habermas argues that "meaning"-bound up 
with the intersubjectivity central to the practical, moral domain—must be socially 
generated.
The dessication of the public sphere, and its substitution with "formal 
democracy", is concurrent with civil privatism (Habermas 1975, 75) and certain 
traditional values and meanings whose very resilience lied in their not being 
problematized, or thematized, a situation upon which the development of early 
capitalism parisitically fed (Habermas 1975, 76). Yet, with the politicization of 
the economy, and the need for legitimation of decisions which followed, the civil 
privatism upn which its administration of power depended become increasingly 
endangered. Habermas sees the greatest crisis potential located in the socio­
cultural sphere, where the purely traditional basis of motivation to perform the 
roles required by the political and economic systems are eroding, leading to the 
possibility of a revitalization of a public sphere. H ie latter is conceived as the 
rational potential alternative to tradition, the market, and power. At this stage of 
Habermas's theory formation, the public sphere is conceived as containing a 
potential for a needed "discursive redemption of validity claims" (Habermas 
1975, 89) upon which motivation and legitimation increasingly depends. Such
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a revitalization, however, must upset the requirements of the merely formal 
democracy prevalent in “late capitalism.”
Even with this brief overview of the thrust of Habermas's argument it is 
not difficult to see that while it seems to bracket Marx's theory (following his view 
of Marx's own insights concerning what specified capitalism) Habermas 
ultimately must rely on a specific interpretation of Marx's theory. I will now 
consider Habermas's interpretation, in LC, of several of Marx's basic concepts. 
This is both in the sense of in light of competing interpretations and in view of 
any possible alterations compared to his works I have previously taken up.
Value, abstract labor, and commodity fetishism are three fundamental 
concepts, most fully worked out in Marx's Capital. Therefore, these concepts 
are characteristic of what Postone has specified (through a reinterpretation) as 
Marx's "mature critical theory." The reinterpretation is primarily (though far from 
exclusively) as against the positions of early members of the Frankfurt School, 
but with the heaviest emphasis on Habermas-understood to be the most 
important contemporary representative of the Critical Theory tradition.
In connection with this it is important to recall here that Postone's 
"reinterpretation", though proceeding through critique of individual founding 
members of the Frankfurt School, as well as of Habermas, still situates himself 
within the tradition. Not only his selection of theorists for critical attention are 
predominately from within this tradition, but his very characterization of Marx's 
thought as "critical theory", indicate theoretical affinity at some basic, but 
perhaps not easily identifiable level. My intention here, then, is to assess the 
status of Marx's theory reflected through the stage Habermas has reached with 
LC, suggest the extent to which Habermas's claims depend on an interpretation 
of Marx, and what effect a successful critique of that interpretation might have on 
the viability of Habermas's own theory. Central to Postone's critique of
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Habermas is his position that Habermas misconceived Marx's concept of value. 
His misconception led to an inability to grasp Marx's “mature critical theory". 
This in itself would be a substantial topic for analysis. However, Postone's 
intent is not limited to singling out a figure of classical social theory (Marx) in 
order to measure the depth of the understanding of his theory by an important 
contemporary thinker, even one, such as Habermas, who happens to be 
perhaps the most closely followed within the so-called neo-Marxist tradition. 
Rather, that Habermas did not grasp Marx's concept of value (and the 
categories unfolded from it in Marx's Capital) is linked to a demonstration that 
this misunderstanding was constitutive of the form and content of Habermas's 
own theory formation. Postone’s critique is with the awareness that Habermas 
believed his own theory to be original in the sense it avoided internal defects in 
Marx's theory, while also taking into account the historical contingencies 
external to Marx's horizon.
Following from this, it is clear that a critique which confined itself to 
contrasting with another thinker one's own understanding of an “original" 
concept really proposes at most a delineation of three observations for the 
purposes of comparison. The crucial second step, however, consists in 
showing that the attributed misconception was constitutive of a divergent theory, 
and that that (perhaps incompatible) theory itself could be explained in 
reference to the characteristics of the social formation it did not (and could not) 
specifiy. After executing this second step, Postone then provides arguments to 
support his claim that Marx's mature critical theory, when interpreted through a 
critique of important strands of Marxism which succeeded Marx, grasps the 
essential features of contemporary (post-Marx) society, including the problem of 
a contemporary recognition of Marx. In LC, Habermas's starting point is a
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heuristic question posed in combination with a critical summary of Marx's 
"theory of value". He writes,
...the theory of value is...directly a systems analysis of the economic 
process of reproduction. The fundamental categories of the theory of 
value are thereby set up in such a way that propositions that follow from a 
theory of contradictory capital accumulation can be transformed into 
action-theoretic assumptions of the theory of classes. Marx holds open 
for himself the possibility of retranslating the economic processes of 
capital utilization, which take place within the bounds of class structure 
into social processes between classes-after all, he is the author of the 
Eighteenth Brumaire as well as Capital. It is precisely this sociological 
retranslation of an economic analysis that proceeds immanently that 
gives rise to difficulties in the altered conditions of organized capitalism. I 
would like to take up the not yet satisfactorily answered question Has 
capitalism changed? (Habermas 1975, 31).
It is clear from his starting point that Habermas's understanding of Marx's 
value theory has not substantially changed in comparison to his analyses in 
earlier works. For Habermas, Marx's theory of value constitutes an "economic 
analysis" dependent on a view of labor--the instrumental relation of man to 
nature-and the division of classes on the basis of distribution of a surplus. A 
result of the changed conditions of capitalism is to make increasingly 
problematic the character of Marx’s "indecision" concerning the emancipatory 
potential of the instrumental relation of man to nature, or of scientized 
production, versus the need to recognize "power relations that regulate men's 
interaction among themselves" (see 135). Habermas had already argued that 
this problem lie at the foundation of Marx's philosophy seen as a "metacritique" 
of Hegel. The interesting difference is that, unlike KHI, there is a specific 
reference to political (or historical) investigations (The Eighteenth Bmmaire), but 
with the implication that even if granted such a study was "successful" in 
translating an instrumental labor-determined value theory into interaction terms,
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it is precisely that type of "translation" which developed capitalism has made 
increasingly improbable.
Habermas’s implication here is that Marx understood his own theory of 
value such that it explained capitalism's distinction from prior social formations. 
In capitalism, class relations assumed a non-political form, that is, through the 
labor-capital relationship and the supposed exchange of equivalents in the free 
market. In respect to this, Habermas sees the cogency of his question, "has 
capitalism changed?" Once the state intervenes directly in the economic 
process (Habermas 1975, 52), class domination can no longer be conceived as 
"non-political." This is a variation on Habermas's critique of a theory of value on 
the basis of his “traditional Marxist" transhistorical concept of labor.
Marx's "value theory" depends on an understanding of a mode of labor 
specific to capitalism, not on property relations or the existence of the market. 
Labor in capitalism, as analyzed by Marx, possesses a dual character, concrete 
and abstract. It is the fundamental contradictory nature of labor in capitalism 
which determines the dual character of the basic unit of its mode of production, 
the use value and exchange value of the commodity.
Marx's value theory entails a demonstration of how quasi-independent 
structures (such as the commodity and capital), related to structured forms of 
practice, exercise a form of domination on a different, higher level of abstaction 
than that which Habermas argues Marx needed to empirically demonstrate 
through "translation" in the concrete relationship between classes. In crucial 
respects, Habermas's analysis in LC simply fails to grasp these fundamental 
concepts of Marx's "mature critical theory." In not demonstrating that he has first 
grasped them, there is no way for him to supply a valid criticism.
Thus, also in Part II (Chapter Six on "Theorems of LC"), which composes 
his analysis of "crisis tendencies in advanced capitalism", Habermas writes,
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....class domination can no longer take the anonymous form of the law of 
value. Instead it now depends on factual constellations of power 
whether, and how, production of surplus value can be guaranteed 
through the public sector, and how the terms of class compromise look. 
With this development, crisis tendencies shift, of course, from the 
economic to the adminstrative system. Indeed, the self-containment of 
exchange processes, mediated only through the market, is destroyed. 
But after the liberal-capitalist spell of commodity production is broken 
(and all participants have become, more or less, good practioners of 
value theory), the unplanned, nature-like development of economic 
processes can re-establish itself, at least in secondary form, in the 
political system (Habermas 1975, 68).
Recall that in the final pages of "The Theory of Knowledge as Social 
Theory" Habermas discussed the meaning of the "Fetishism of the Commodity", 
and the conditions for dispelling the "objective illusion" he interpreted it to 
describe: Habermas believed it required a certain type of "self-reflective" 
critique. Here, in contrast, the implication is that the systematic development of 
"private" capitalism into "state" capitalism was itself a sufficient condition for 
dispelling what Marx analyzed as commodity fetishism. Such a radical shift in 
the formulation of the relationship between "system" and social theory, and their 
respective efficacies, is due primarily to yet a third treatment of a concept of 
Marx Habermas offers in Part II of LC.
Habermas never discussed the dual character of labor Marx understood 
to be his sole original contribution to political economy. If this is the case, in all 
the works I have considered to this point, when he took up Marx's concept of 
fetishism of commodity, it could not have been on the basis of how Marx 
understood labor in capitalism. Thus, in Chapter Five of LC, a couple of pages 
before he implied that the systematic development of capitalism itself led to the 
unraveling of the "objective illusion" at the core of Marx's concept of commodity 
fetishism, Habermas writes, "...in connection with the functions of the public
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sector, there arise occupational spheres in which abstract labor is increasingly 
replaced by concrete labor, that is, labor oriented to use values" (Habermas 
1975, 66). And, again, in Chapter Seven, "Motivation Crisis":
...tendencies that are weakening the socialization effects of the market, 
especially, on the one hand, the growth of those segments of the 
population who do not produce their lives through income for 
labor...and...the spread of areas of activity in which abstract labor is 
replaced by concrete labor (Habermas 1975, 83-84).
Now, in Marx's analysis of capitalism, which brings into focus an 
historically specific social formation, no concept is more fundamental than that 
one and the same labor assumes a contradictory form of both a concrete and 
abstract character. Marx's concept of abstract labor does not refer to one type of 
labor in capitalism. Rather, abstract labor describes the specificity of labor in 
capitalism only in its contradictory relationship to concrete labor as one and 
same labor. In contrast, what I have quoted above clearly indicates that 
Habermas misconceives Marx's concept of labor in capitalism. He cannot then 
explain Marx's concept of commodity fetishism, and is not able to account for 
Marx's concept of value production as unique to the capitalist mode of 
production.
Thomas McCarthy (1978), in the comprehensive treatment of 
Habermas's theory up to and including LC, argued that the latter assumed, a 
Marxist form of critique (McCarthy 1978, 358). It was, however a Marxist form of 
critique, "with important differences" (McCarthy 1978, 358). By the time of 
Moishe Postone's study (1993) a decade and a half later the tables had been 
turned completely. For many, the issue had rather become whether Marx's 
theory belonged in the Critical Theory tradition, despite its "important 
differences".
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After a brief consideration of Habermas's ostensible attempt at a 
"Reconstruction of Historical Materialism", I will take up The Theory of 
Communicative Action and its aftermath, the real beginning of Habermas’s 
theory proper, in so far as he and his supporters conceived of it as “instead o f 
Marx.
"Reconstruction of Historical Materialism"
In part, Habermas seems to have conceived his exercise in LC to 
represent a practical demonstration of how one might experiment with, or test 
for, the possibility of an immanent critique of Marx's theory. The basis of such a 
critique presupposes identification of what Marx regarded as capitalism's 
specificity. The formation and clarification of concepts is necessary for 
determining whether the specificity so identified still defined contemporary 
society. If features Marx identified with capitalism's specificity were no longer 
dominant in contemporary society then, immanent to Marx's theory, a different 
social formation might be said to have emerged. Since, according to 
Habermas, Marx's theory was essentially a theory of crisis, or a “crisis theory", 
immanent critique of Marx's theory should either affirm the crisis potential of 
contemporary society on the basis of the original theory, re-identify it for the 
possibly changed conditions of what was heretofore understood as capitalism 
or, finally, reject the idea that contemporary society is best understood in terms 
of "crisis" potential.
LC still held out the possibility that the specific features of capitalism 
identified by Marx (characterized by the displacement of class domination from 
the political sphere to the economic sphere, where it was veiled) might still 
inhere and be connected to contemporaneity by a concept of a displacement of 
their crisis potential into the socio-cultural sphere. Marx's directly "economic
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crisis", mediated politically (overtly) reappears in the form of a “motivation 
crisis". In other words, it was clear to Habermas that what defined "organized 
capitalism" (as opposed to private property/free-market capitalism) was the 
overt politicization of economic conflict (or opposed interests) in the state. 
Furthermore, on the basis of a class compromise at the heart of this form of 
capitalism, it was not inconceivable (in fact was conceived by systems theory) 
that this type of crisis could also be "managed". A potential system-threatening 
political, as opposed to economic crisis, should be conceived on essentially the 
same model as Marx's original economic conception, where crisis proved 
resolvable within capitalism itself.
The move, then, to a consideration of a theory of social evolution is 
implicitly conceived by Habermas on the basis of a proposal for an investigation 
into the question of whether empirically-identifiable changes in the social 
formation-which came about without the kind of overt social revolution Marx 
assumed to be intrinsic to the formation's basic contradictory character-might 
offer clues to the possibility for the development of a contemporary critical 
theory of society which, rather than rejecting Marx's ideas wholesale, would 
reconstruct them at a higher level of abstraction. As opposed to basing a 
refutation of Marx's theory on historical contingencies to which Habermas 
believed Marx tended to tie his own theory, Habermas proposes to examine 
whether the theory (as Habermas understood it) might be reconceived on a 
higher level of abstraction. One purpose of such an attempt would be to 
theoretically unlock the unrealized potential of certain social learning processes 
(which Habermas began to identify in LC) accompanying the social alteration 
(the object of Habermas's question, “has capitalism changed?") in relation to 
which, according to Marx's own understanding, Marx's analysis (bound up with 
too specific concepts of what constitutes capitalism) should no longer apply.
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It is important that Habermas in "Reconstruction of Historical Materialism" 
assumes for his starting point what he had at several points in LC explicitly 
noted. In the earlier work he emphasized that Marxism (as opposed to a re­
engagement of abandoned stages of reflection represented in part by the 
original Marx) was trapped within its own dogmatism. While Marx, for example, 
could still "hope" that what he had discovered at the level of a systems theoretic 
approach as the law of value might still be directly translated into sociological 
terms ( The Eighteenth Brumaire), today "meaning" itself (in the face of eroding 
tradition and the problematizing of previously taken-for-granted world views) is 
precisely the problem. The dogmatism characteristic of Marxism, however, is 
still ultimately (if only implicitly) traced to Marx and, in a different way, to Engels. 
This becomes clearer, and assumes more importance, in "Reconstruction of 
Historical Materialism".
First, in relationship to Marx, Habermas identifies only two texts where 
Marx is said to have, “expressed himself connectedly and fundamentally on the 
materialist conception of history" (Habermas 1979, 130). Outside the first part of 
the German Ideology and the Preface to A Contribution to the Critique of 
Political Economy, it is Habermas's view that the materialist conception of 
history, as a theoretical framework, served Marx to interpret particular historical 
situations or developments. However, since in "Reconstruction of Historical 
Materialism" Habermas does not analyze Marx's historical interpretations, the 
appropriateness of his declaration that he will treat historical materialism as a 
theory, "indeed as a theory of social evolution" (Habermas 1979, 130), can only 
be assessed on the basis of his interpretation of the two texts.
A complication of the matter consists, on the one hand, in Habermas's 
reference to a current work of Lawrence Krader "on the relationship of the 
assessments of historical materialism by Marx and Engels" (Habermas 1979,
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225) (a notation which doesn"t give away whether they are assessed to be 
fundamentally divergent, complimentary, or identical) and, on the other hand, 
positively linking Marx, Engels and "Marxist theoreticians", as well as the 
"history of the labor movement" (Habermas 1979, 130). All these are said not to 
have understood "historical materialism" simply as a "heuristic". Importantly, 
Habermas does not say, to the contrary, that they understood historical 
materialism as a theory.
Rather, Habermas's position is that since Marx and Marxists generally, as 
well as the labor movement he apparently identifies with them, did not 
understand historical materialism as a "heuristic" but, to the contrary, in respect 
to a particular content, the motivating aspect of the latter needs to be examined. 
But more importantly, Habermas's central focus will be the prospective viability 
of Marx's historical materialism in respect to its potential contribution to a 
general theory of social evolution. This should be understood against the 
background of LC wherein Habermas’s analysis already "included" Marx's 
theory. This was mainly polemically; it implied that Marx's economic theory, at 
least, was unable to stand independently-to capture categorically the essential 
features of contemporary society.
As might already be apparent, the opening paragraphs of 
“Reconstruction of Historical Materialism", while phrased rather matter-of-factly, 
contain controversial implications which, in some ways, are more informative for 
understanding Habermas's approach to Marx (and Marxism) at this stage than 
the ensuing arguments for which they supposedly provide only the general 
perspective.
For example, Habermas states, in effect, that just the fact that in only two 
places Mane reflected on historical materialism might constitute the predominant 
factor in an explanation for a divergence between practice and theory in much
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of recent history. Yet, Marxism is stiil accorded reflective status, and hence 
Habermas deems it socially useful in terms of political action; it, “can under 
certain circumstances be connected with the theory and strategy of revolution" 
(Habermas 1979, 130). But, Habermas, in the course of his argument never 
returns to and explicitly develops precisely how this might be so. Perhaps his 
argument, which I will consider below, that Marx regarded the economic base 
as determinant for the superstructure only in the transition from one social form 
to another, is indirectly related to this.
From the perspective of these opening statements and the earlier 
writings I have already considered what stands out most clearly is Habermas's 
rather uncharacteristically polemical statement in the early part of LC. There 
Habermas wrote that though Marx's was the first social scientific theory of 
system crisis, he did not intend to offer yet another exposition of Marx's "crisis 
theory." In contrast, he intended to offer a "socially useful" discussion of crisis.
In comparing this with the opening paragraphs of "Toward a Reconstruction of 
Historical Materialism", it becomes clear that while Habermas regarded Marx's 
economic theory, or a fundamentally economic theory of society to be 
exhausted, and hence not "socially useful", the more general concept of 
historical materialism, though (or perhaps because) not substantially developed 
as theory (and hence adding to the weight of his earlier charge that Marx's 
"unofficial" synthesis through social labor lacked a self-reflective dimension), 
potentially contained resourcs valuable for developemt of a contemporary 
critical theory. Habermas sums up this "second chance" he is willing to grant 
Marx's theory in the single sentence concluding the first paragraph of, "Toward 
a Reconstruction of Historical Materialism": "The theory of capitalist 
development that Marx worked out in the Grundrisse and Capital fits into 
historical materialism as a subtheory (Habermas 1979,130).
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If only briefly, it should be recounted that Habermas's most substantial 
discussion of Marx's theory prior to this statement occurred in the chapters I 
analyzed in KHI. There, in an interesting mode of presentation, he traced what 
he described to be Marx's "unofficial" appropriation of Hegel on a narrow scale. 
This was rooted in what he viewed as a simple reversal of terms in reference to 
an "absolute". For Hegel, mind was the absolute ground of nature; for Marx, to 
the contrary, nature was the absolute ground of mind. From this reorientation of 
an absolute Marx developed a "metacritique" of Hegel, or a synthesis through 
social labor, rather than through a Logic. Yet, already in the Grundrisse Marx is 
said to have reached an impasse, which led him to an "official" position 
characterized by recognition of the distinctiveness of social interaction 
compared to social labor. Habermas uses for illustrative purposes the 
"Fetishism of the Commodity" section from the first chapter of Capital. There 
Habermas sees in the dispelling of "objective illusion" (said to describe the 
meaning of identification of commodity fetishism) Marx's practical move to 
appropriation of Hegel on a much broader scale. Thus Habermas's mode of 
appropriation of Marx in KHI (where he attempted to reconstruct Marx's position 
primarily with the resources available in the latteris writings not published in his 
lifetime) is in contrast to "Reconstruction of Historical Materialism". In the latter 
he tests the ability of Marx's theory to "absorb" later research. Habermas's 
procedure here-testing the possibilities of appropriating Marx's theory- might 
be seen as analogous to Marx's "narrow" and "broad" attempted appropriations 
of Hegel.
It is also important to recall, however, that Habermas ends his discussion 
of Marx by drawing the conclusion that, in retrospect, seemed inevitable, given 
his starting point. The mere transposition of nature and mind—when from either 
of which is accounted the unfoldment of an absolute-does not result in a very
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consequential distinction in terms of an interest in the development of a 
contemporary critical social theory. Habermas, in fact, concluded that Marx 
merely reconfirmed the "elimination of epistemology" in a scientific materialism 
Hegel had already accomplished as "absolute knowledge".
Thus, his earlier consideration of Marx’s theory, particularly the 
movement from the Grundrisse to Capital, pivoting on the addition of "Fetishism 
of Commodity", strongly distinguished Marx’s two works, only the latter 
published in Marx's lifetime. Now, in contrast, the Grundrisse and Capital 
together represent a subtheory of capitalist development within a theory of 
social evolution; the categories internal to Marx’s analysis of capitalism, then, 
are not to be seen as constitutive of the specificity of Marx's theory, or at least of 
its potential utility.
In connection with the above, it should also be kept in mind that 
"Reconstruction of Historical Materialism" is but one piece in a collection 
representing a series of occasional writings devoted largely to elaborating 
Habermas's own incipient theory. I have already described, in the section on 
KHI how Habermas’s intervention at a point where he had concluded that 
contemporary critical, or dissident Marxist, theory had failed to grasp (on the 
basis of the ideas of the young Marx) labor as a "mechanism of evolution". 
Habermas proposed an alternative to a phenomenological approach to labor, 
where labor was considered to be the, "foundation for the construction of 
invariant meaning structures of possible social lifeworlds". It is precisely there 
where Habermas seemed to put a stamp of approval on what he understood to 
be Marx's own concept of labor, not grasped adequately, that is, as a 
"mechanism of evolution", even by "critical" Marxists.
In LC, Habermas suggested that the "dynamic" of contemporary society- 
in so far as it might be conceived in other than the pessimistic terms of the older
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
167
Frankfurt School, or the “romantic" terms of a "resurrection of nature" (Habermas 
1972, 32)-resided in the socio-cultural sphere as a potential "motivation crisis". 
Now Marx's analysis of capitalism was to be taken as relevant only in its place 
of a subtheory within a broader theory which had yet to be satisfactorily 
elaborated.
This could be viewed in at least two different ways. Writings of Marx 
preceding the Grundrisse and Capita/, such as the German Ideology, were the 
basis for explaining the former and pointing to elements necessary for a 
contemporay critical theory or, alternatively, assessed not to possess the 
necessary resources out of which a theory adequate to contemporary 
conditions might be developed. If the latter were the case, this reflected a shift 
in the social formation's identity, and the focus should shift to Habermas’s 
nascent theory.
Now, t is Habermas's contention that the prospects for the substantial 
contemporary relevance of Marx's theory depended on the very element of 
Marx's methodology which Habermas had heavily and consistently criticized 
over the course of many years and in various texts. Habermas often contended 
that Marx's theory lacked a self-reflective dimension, the absence of which 
proved historically consequential. He now locates Marx's theoretical self­
reflection in sparse comments confined to the German Ideology and the Preface 
to a Contribution to a Critique of Political Economy. The full import of this 
emphasis is only seen in his next comment:
In 1938 Stalin codified historical materialism in a way that has proven of 
great consequence...the historical materialist research since undertaken 
has remained largely bound to this theoretical framework. The version 
set down by Stalin needs to be reconstructed (Habermas 1979,131).
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This emphasizes Habermas’s position, made clear practically from the 
start of his theoretical writings, that Marx’s social theory, while perhaps 
adequate to the times in which he lived, both lacked a critical self-reflective 
dimension and, in so far as the latter could be discovered retrospectively, was 
not in itself adequate to contemporary social conditions. Most remarkable here, 
however, is Habermas's assertion that, whether or not it was possible to 
"reconstruct" Marx's historical materialism, due to Marx's own failure to 
adequately reflect on it, Stalin's version was in need of “reconstruction." 
According to Habermas, to reconstruct a theory,
signifies taking a theory apart and putting it back together again in a new 
form in order to attain more fully the goal it has set for itself (Habermas 
1979, 95).
Since Habermas's lengthy discussion briefly refers to Stalin on only two 
other occasions, one possible interpretation of this is that a re-interpretation of 
Marx's theoretical self-reflections might prove productive in formulating an 
adequate theory of historical materialism. In the context of the collection to 
which this proposed reconstruction belongs, however, this would require a new 
attempt equipped with theoretical concepts so far developed by Habermas, 
often to either supplement perceived deficiencies in Marx's theory, or as a 
means for critical departures from it.
In respect to this issue, Rockmore, for one, in an otherwise excellent 
study, is not able to adequately explain Habermas's references to Stalin. He 
decides, based on his notice of only two references to Stalin (there are in fact 
three) that the evocation of Stalin and theory was merely "tactical" (Rockmore 
1989, 84) But he does not clearly explain toward what end the tactic was 
employed.
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Habermas’s important discussion in the third German edition of the 
collection of essays titled, Theory and Practice, is relevant for this issue. The 
first English translation of the work was of this edition, and the 1971 
introduction, "Some Difficulities in the Attempt to Link Theory and Practice", was 
written for it. In this introduction, Habermas summarizes criticisms directed at 
his earlier KHI. He then directly responds to these criticisms.
In one instance, Habermas acknowledges Oskar Negt's criticism that 
Habermas, in KHI, failed to consider a concept of organization in his discussion 
of the conditions for the possibility of an emancipatory social theory.
Habermas's response is broader even than was perhaps necessary in order to 
answer the particular question. In what might have sounded somewhat jarring 
to some at the time, in the course of somewhat lengthy remarks on the subject, 
Habermas wrote,
We no longer find, in dialectical logic, as in a certain way Marx still did, 
the normative basis for a social theory constructed with practical intent 
(Habermas 1973, 16).
Following this comment, he proceeds with a lengthy discussion of the 
problem of organization, viewed from within the Marxist tradition. He refers to 
Lukacs's relatively little discussed, "Toward a Theory of Organization", an essay 
included in History and Class Consciousness (Lukacs 1971). He criticizes it for 
recapitulating at a philosophical level Lenin's practice of Party organization in 
which scientific (theoretical) discourse is not separable from perceived 
organizational requisites. Habermas's argument suggests that his own 
supersession of Hegelian Marxian dialectics provides a standpoint capable of 
critically linking Lenin's practice of subordination of theory to organization 
through Lukacs's Hegelian Marxism to, finally, Stalin's totalitarianism. 
(Habermas 1973, 36).
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It is difficult to overstate the importance of this discussion. It mediates the 
movement of Habermas’s thought from KHI to his ostensible attempt to 
reconstruct historical materialism. This is especially so in light of the, eg; 
otherwise unelaborated observation in “Reconstruction of Historical 
Materialism" that, while various Marxists interpreted differently the 
"superstructure theorem" (consideration of which is central to Habermas's 
attempt at a reconstruction of historical materialism and to which I will therefore 
soon return), “Among Hegelian Marxists like Lukacs, Korsch and Adorno, the 
concept of the totality excludes a model of levels" (Habermas 1979, 143).
Habermas does not elaborate the significance of this remark. But in the 
context of his then recent introduction to Theory and Practice, and a 
presentation to a German Hegel society (for which "Reconstruction of Historical 
Materialism" was prepared) it reinforces the importance Habermas now 
attributes to his own efforts to construct his own theory-and the concomitant 
need he sees to separate Marx from Hegel (which Stalin certainly did). 
Moreover, through the allusion to Adorno as a Hegelian Marxist whose concept 
of totality excluded a “model of levels", Habermas strongly hints at the possible 
benefits of a break from the very (Critical Theory) tradition with which he himself 
was hitherto associated.
Recall that at the outset of LC Habermas disqualified Marx's theory of 
crisis, while declaring that he was interested only in a "socially useful" concept 
of crisis. With this in mind, it seems even the more remarkable that he now 
makes a reference to Stalin's theory as potentially useful, at least in the sense it 
was one from which an adequate reconstructed theory might emerge. Stalin's 
theory of historical materialism as a theory of evolution, not Hegelian Marxism 
which excludes levels, was relevant to Habermas's current efforts.
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I interpret Habermas's approach to Marx here, then, as motivated by the 
increasing urgency (and the potential efficacy) he attributes to a need for 
grasping the distinctiveness of the domains of labor and interaction. Habermas 
has not conceived capitalism's specificity (as does Postone) in terms of 
structured forms of practice constituted by, and constitutive of, quasi­
independent structures. According to Postone's re-interpretation, Marx 
analyzes these as exerting a social compulsion which is not overt, and as such 
explain not history generally, but capitalism's trajectory as dynamic, directional, 
and inevitable. Habermas implies that a break up of the hegemony of 
traditional Marxism (which largely shares his basic concept of labor as the 
transhistorical relation of man to nature, but not his view of the emancipatory 
potential of communication) could be effective in releasing the potential of 
society "outside" the sphere of labor, or instrumental action.
That Habermas in this new approach to Marx has not re-specified what 
constitutes capitalism (though he does pose it anew as a system-theoretic 
problem) is seen in his characterization of the form of its evolution as economic 
(the dialectic of forces and relations of production) in distinction from other 
social formations. This, however, is not substantially different from his previous 
specifications wherein class domination, a situation in which socially produced 
wealth is privately appropriated, is legitimated through an ideology of an 
exchange of equivalents.
Habermas, in another attempt at focusing on Marx's specifications, 
supplements his interpretation of the "base" as economic only in capitalism with 
an observation that the context of Marx's articulation of historical materialism in 
the Preface to the Critique of Political Economy leads to the conclusion that the 
dependency of the superstructure on the base was intended only for the critical
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phase in which a society passes into a new developmental level (Habermas 
1979, 143).
After drawing out these specifications, which he attributes to Marx and 
indicates are often overlooked, Habermas next proposes the insertion, at its 
own level, of his incipient theory of communicative action. The significance of 
this is two-fold. On the one hand, it implicitly refers back to the opening 
paragraph where historical materialism was said to be potentially useful for 
purposes of political action, and even for the "theory and strategy of revolution". 
On the other hand, it proposes a crucial place for his own theory in a possible 
“reconstruction of historical materialism" in opposition to technologistic 
conceptions attributed to the young Mane, Engels, Plekhanov, Stalin and others. 
The dialectic of forces and relations of production, in order to be reconstructed, 
must separate out the, "level of communicative action from that of the 
instrumental and strategic action combined in social cooperation” (Habermas 
1979, 145). Habermas's proposed “reconstruction", then, hinges on the 
separability within capitalism of a domain of strategic and instrumentalist action 
from one of communicative action.
The critical perspective of a differentiation of the level of communicative 
action, in which, "knowledge of a practical and moral sort" (Habermas 1979,
146) is required, is apparently able to unify thinkers as diverse as Marx and 
Stalin as against Habermas's emerging theory. Such a prespective harbors the 
potential of a new form of social integration—or principle of organization—which 
must be conceived more abstractly than can be the case with a concept of an 
evolution of modes of production alone. The latter is incapable of explaining 
evolutionary innovation. While,
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the rules of communicative action develop in reaction to changes in the 
domain of instrumental and strategic action.Jn doing so they follow their 
own logic (Habermas 1979, 148).
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
174
CHAPTER FOUR
THE THEORY OF COMMUNICATIVE ACTION: CRITICAL THEORY'S 
THEORETICAL EXILE OF MARX?
Habermas on several occasions in the Theory of Communicative Action 
orients his attention to Marx with a succinct description of its circumscribed 
purpose. He writes that his is a second attempt from within Western Marxism to 
appropriate Max Weber for a contemporary social theory (Habermas 1989,
302). Lukacs, and later Horkheimer and Adomo, were key figures in the first 
attempt, an attempt which failed, in Habermas's view, due to aporias identifiable 
only in light of a theory of communicative action once it had reached a certain 
level of maturity. Perhaps the key conceptual advance Habermas sees here is 
in his analysis of the rationality implicit in language, and its even greater 
potential--a basis and prospect unrecognized by Weber, but hinted at in the 
later years of the older Critical Theory (Habermas 1984, 390). In an elaboration 
fully his own, Habermas analyzes this potential as preceding and underlying 
the societal rationalization elaborated by Weber (Habermas 1984, 342, 343; 
Habermas 1989, 318).
Among the implications to be drawn from this are the following: in spite of 
the "neo-Marxist" status generally ascribed to it, contemporary Critical Theory's 
stake in (let alone reliance upon) Marx's theory should no longer be assumed 
as it might have been in the past; since the early Lukacs himself, apparently, no
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interpretation of Marx has provided a convincing explanation of contemporary 
society. Rather than the test of the theory of communicative action lying in its 
ability to bring Marx's critique of capitalism to bear on contemporary problems, 
the idea now was to show that the possible continuing relevance of Marx's 
theory necessarily depended on the positive development of Habermas's own 
communication theory, the potential of which he now attempts to demonstrate 
through a critical appropriation of Weber and a consignment of Marx to 
essentially an historical interest. The potential relevance of Marx's theory is 
confined to a function of a historic/theoretic marker from which the theory of 
communicative action gets its bearings.
This, of course, contrasts very sharply with Lukacs's "first attempt" at an 
"appropriation" of Weber. Lukacs's attempt is inextricably bound to a certain re­
interpretation of Marx's “mature critical theory" (principally commodity fetishism) 
which then gained power and credibility when publication of Marx's early 
writings, previously unknown to him, confirmed the reconceptualization of 
Marx's theory he initiated. He demonstrated that Marx’s theory of overcoming 
capitalism was dependent on philosophic concepts, without which it would not 
be possible to specify capitalism, and therefore how to oppose it. Lukacs's 
approach (contradicting existing Marxism's self-understanding that its own 
genesis was from the overcoming of philosophy) was necessary for an 
uprooting of modem, fully developed capitalist social relations, in as much as 
he correctly identified them.
The sharp contrast of Habermas's "second attempt" (which might be 
more accurately described as a Weberian appropriation of Marx) with the first 
attempt (Lukacs's Marxist appropriation of Weber) raises the following 
questions: Can Habermas's attempt be defended as a second from within 
Western Marxism? Were there, in any case, serious flaws with the very
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
176
conception of Western Marxism from the beginning (see Chapter Six), such that 
its “revival" (even for, arguably, Habermas's purpose of dissolving it) could 
provide a basis for no more than a strawman argument, in so far as it 
developed, in the first place (in the wake of Lukacs's History and Class 
Consciousness) as a stand-in for Marx’s "outmoded" theory?
As I have discussed, Habermas's preparation for replacing Marx and 
Marxism had already progressed over the decades. He then in fact leaves it 
behind in TCA. How dependable is Habermas's allusion to Lukacs’s History 
and Class Consciousness in support of his argument which attributes 
considerable significance to Lukacs's positive relationship to Max Weber's 
theories, while under-emphasizing, or even disregarding, its more central 
critical thrust? This is not the place to take up these questions in detail. While 
keeping them in mind, however, it is important to also remember that among 
Lukacs's strongest theoretical motivations was to explain, and thus point a way 
to overcome, the fact that the 1917 Russian Revolution, seen (not only by 
Marxists) as a beginning of a process of world-wide uprooting of capitalism, was 
not extending to Western Europe. This is not just an historical issue. Habermas 
himself often appealed to historical or empirical facts in order to support an idea 
of the need for his theory in place of Marx's (Habermas 1973, 195-198; 1990, 
11-13).
In short, after at least two decades of publications in which Habermas 
occasionally invoked the implications of a theory of communicative action for 
purposes of critical evaluation of the entire German philosophical tradition from 
Kant to Marx, without being able to offer recourse to the actual theory itself, he 
draws a necessarily controversial parallel. He now compares his own theory to 
Lukacs's, an earlier thinker whose primary goal was an end to capitalism; given 
this, it was necessary that Habermas more carefully specify capitalism (which
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he began to do in LC), and the distinctiveness of his own theory in relation to 
Marx's.
Even at this late date Habermas had not made his goal vis a vis Marx 
and Marxism crystal clear. Though it certainly differed from Lukacs's (Dews 
1992, 81) his presentation assumed an obligation (like Lukacs's) to include 
consideration of the problem of understanding the potential effects of his own 
theory on the comprehension and molding of the meaning and purpose, not 
alone of critical theory, but social theory generally. But while Lukacs evidently 
believed that his Marxism was uniquely qualified to explain the limitations of 
social theory generally (within capitalism) Habermas, to the contrary, argued 
that his own theory (particularly in its appropriation of classical social theory) 
revealed the limitations of Marx and all of Marxism. In connection with this, a 
detailed discussion of its metamorphoses from Marx to Lukacs to Horkheimer 
and Adorno would provide a valuable perspective on Habermas's muted but 
potentially telling allusions to a concept of revolution, arguably what he implies 
is constitutive of the boundary marking off Marxian dogmatics from social 
scientific theory, including that of Mead, Durkheim, Weber, and his own. In 
Habermas's argument, dogmatism, while not strictly attributable to Marx's own 
theory, was traceable to it none the less, and not obviously to other forms of 
social theory. Moreover, according to Habermas, Marx set a damaging 
precedent when he insisted upon certain practical/political applications of his 
theory (Habermas 1989, 339-340).
Yet, Lukacs's theory, in its approach to Kant, Hegel and Marx, not unlike 
what Habermas uncovered in his examination of Mead, Durkheim and Weber 
(and Parsons's analysis of them) disclosed undigested features of classical 
thought and, in doing so, rescued them from a dogmatism of a sort. Lukacs's 
essays in History and Class Consciousness were suggestive of the notion that
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philosophy itself had a revolutionary potential and was a missing dimension in 
Marxism. This dimension was indispensible for any conceivable revolution 
abolishing capitalism, establishing essentially different social relations; 
Habermas's “second attempt* required mainly acceptance of his own self­
consciously normative social theory-a "social theory" which none the less 
criticized someone of the stature of Parsons for the "non-philosophical" 
character of his strictly social theory (Habermas 1989, 200). But the ground of 
this philosophic critique was Habermas's break with Hegelian Marxian 
dialectical logic, a break he thought to be necessary in large part due not 
merely to the fact it was philosophy (which he held still contained metaphysical 
qualities) and not social theory, but precisely because the Hegelian Marxian 
dialectic contained philosophy and revolution as importantly linked 
(Dunayevskaya 1989), a link Lukacs insisted upon and succeeded, to some 
extent, in specifying in the historical circumstances.
With respect to Marx, it is useful to recall that Habermas's major critique 
of Marx and Marxism, immediately prior to the TCA, suggested a "reconstruction 
of historical materialism". As he often experimented with ways of placing Marx 
and Marxism in the history and development of social theory generally, several 
notable features of this particular attempt are relevant to recall here: 1) His 
ostensible theoretical appropriation of Marx found no continuity with earlier 
thinkers within the Critical Theory tradition; 2) As I pointed out in the previous 
chapter, it contained suggestive, fundamentally critical allusions to both 
especially the young Marx and Hegelian Marxism specifically; 3) Rather than a 
refutation, it implied (with no direct reference to Hegel) the possibility of an 
appropriation of a different Hegel (along the lines of rational reconstruction) on 
what he conceived as necessarily a higher level of abstraction than that 
attributed to previous Hegelian Marxian attempts; 4) Finally, a very large part of
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“Reconstruction of Historical Materialism" delineated an area of sociality- 
specifically a moral domain—and presented it, on the one hand, as basically 
inaccessible to any theory still committed to Hegel's logic (dialectic), effectively 
and lastingly appropriated in Marx's "coup de main" (Habermas 1989, 334) as 
development of the species through social labor; on the other hand, the moral 
domain was suggested to be the key contemporary problem area for a critical 
social theory.
Hence, Habermas's "Toward a Reconstruction of Historical Materialism", 
as the title indicates, did not actually carry out the reconstruction in question 
(Rockmore 1989); Habermas offered suggestions for such a project, but one, it 
turned out, which might (ironically) dispense with Marx, and instead proceed 
primarily on the basis of concepts Habermas introduced in the context of his 
own incipient communication theory. The implications, often ignored, were that, 
1) Habermas's theory was adequate to contemporary society in a way which 
disclosed the inadequacy of Marx's, and 2) an adequate social theory was in 
the interest of, in fact was essential to, the current stage of social development; 
its capitalist element was a deformation of a pre-established universal potential, 
"tameable" with the development of social, primarily moral, domains.
Already, then, in "Toward a Reconstruction of Historical Materialism", 
Habermas's analysis implied a fundamental criticism of the Critical Theory 
tradition with which he was heretofore identified. This was, however, 
overshadowed by a confusing, only ostensible direct return to Marx, along with 
a barely noticeable new type of appropriation of Hegel, which he extended in 
TCA (Habermas 1989, 383). His explicit criticism of Critical Theory is 
elaborated only in the later volumes (of TCA) as well. Yet, in respect to the 
theories of Horkheimer and Adomo, Habermas eventually understands his own
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theory, in the aftermath of an elaboration of basic differences with them, as still 
just the re-establishment of a viable "critical" theory (Habermas 1989, 401).
For one thing, there now comes into its own (with Habermas's theory) a 
firm “convergence" of, a) heretofore presumed non-official, or only quasi- 
institutionally based, theoretical forms with, b) social theory generally. The latter 
(Habermas would agree) is for the most part driven by, and shaped within, a 
("split-off") culture of experts (Habermas 1989, 330; 397-398) who are certified 
and pass on certification.
Recall that "Critical" as opposed to "Traditional" was the distinctive 
characteristic Horkheimer attributed to Marx's philosophy, tying to it a 
requirement of some degree of autonomous status not only from political party 
organization or the state, but vis a vis even, eg; the University as such. It was 
mainly (if not alone) Lukacs who earlier was seen to have managed to some 
extent to restore this element of Critical Theory's specificity, extracting it from its 
submergence in the institutionalized forms of the Marxist Second International, 
which was in (or on its way to) state power. It is difficult to see how Habermas's 
approach to Weber, Marx and contemporary social theory tries to return, 
particularly in this practical sense, the "critical" edge to Critical Theory.
Charitably, it naturally goes without saying that it must remain open to question 
whether, substantively, Habermas’s interpretation of Marx (if not Weber) was in 
fact regressive compared to that of Lukacs.
It is often remarked that Lukacs's basic achievement consisted in his 
conceptualization of the historical specificity of the processes of societal 
rationalization (as described by Weber). Lukacs tied them to a particular, that is, 
a commodity, form of production which had become generalized; but just as 
crucial (and more problematic) was his simultaneous radical universalization 
as "reification" of thought what Marx had carefully circumscribed in his analysis
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of the capitalist mode of labor and production as a self-contradictory, non- 
viable ground of "bourgeois society”. According to Marx, materialization of the 
non-viability of this mode involved, besides uncovering, forming a theoretical 
(as well as practical) relationship with, a certain type of subjective opposition, 
and self-development, of workers in capitalist production, as well as with other 
types of revolutionary subjectivity (Dunayevskaya 1991). The limited extent to 
which Lukacs captured the latter can be measured in terms of the weakness of 
his theoretical approach to organization (though not limited to it) (Lukacs 1967, 
295-342) which hardly departed from Lenin's 1903 concept of the vanguard 
party-to-lead, a concept (peculiar in Lukacs's case) singularly antithetical to 
dialectical philosophy.
None the less, assessments of Lukacs's attempt, rather than simply 
requiring an abandonment of Hegelian Marxian dialectic, have instead often led 
to further examination of the latter, and thus to new possibilities of theory in the 
context of contemporary capitalism (Anderson 1995). In any case, it is hardly 
disputed (including by Habermas) that early Lukacs's theory was a deeper 
penetration of Marx's thought than that achieved by tendencies within the 
Second International, traditional social sceince, or the "actually existing 
socialist" states and their supporters, and therefore than among all post-Marx 
Marxists. Lukacs's interpretation has served as something of a model of 
creativity if only in the sense that it went some distance in explaining both the 
continued existence of capitalism and an institutionalized form of Marxism as its 
psuedo-opposite. Habermas noted the latter point, but did not elaborate 
(Habermas 1989, 332). A key question lost in his not doing so is whether 
Lukacs's theoretical attempt contains a viable argument that social science 
generally, as well as post-Marx Marxism (possibly implicating Habermas 
himself), was constitutive of what it ostensibly opposed.
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Lukacs's central essay in History and Class Consciousness develops 
his concept of reification from an analysis of the commodity fetishism section of 
the first volume of Capital. Along with this he did not have available to him the 
young Marx's detailed analysis of Hegel's concept of alienation and its 
transcendence, the meaning Marx gave it in terms of his concept of revolution, 
the uprooting of capitalist social relations. The later (1932) publication of Marx's 
1844 Economic-Philosophic Manuscripts confirmed in crucial respects 
Lukacs's direction by highlighting the theoretical features of Marx's "mature" 
critique of capitalism which were hardly comprehensible unless considered as 
recreations of certain unique aspects of Hegel’s dialectic, most explicitly 
investigated in Mane's early (1844) writings. Thus, the brilliance of Lukacs's 
"anticipation" of the young Marx via close philosophical investigation of the 
"mature" Marx (commodity fetishism) represents one type of proof of the 
indivisible concepts of alienation and “law of value" intrinsic to Marx’s theory of 
capitalism. Unfortunately, as the historical situation changed, Lukacs never 
gave Marx's 1844 writings (when they became available) the attention his own 
theory implied was eminently warranted. Consequently, there are theoretic 
strands, especially in Marx's 1844 essay, “Private Property and Communism", 
which Lukacs did not anticipate, and never felt compelled to address, despite 
their obvious relevance to developments of the the post-World War II realities 
(Dunayevskya [1998]).
In TCA, it is the denial of a unity of the concept of alienation and the law 
of value in Marx's own understanding from which Habermas builds his critique 
which amounts to a theoretical exile of Marx from the terrain of contemporary 
critical theory. This unity might be sought not so much in any single example of 
Marx's study of Hegel's dialectic as by attention to Marx's continuous return to 
the latter as a practically inexhaustible source of the notion of philosophy as the
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key revolutionary dimension in the context of socio-historical features which 
were only coming to be understood as specifically capitalist. In this sense, 
Marx's earliest articulation of his theory (1844) “anticipated" the situation to 
which Lukacs's theory responded, a situation in which those most committed to 
Marx's ideas tended to reduce them to "economics", or a "critical political 
economy", or (as to some extent in Habermas and definitely in Postone's case) 
to "social theory".
Another perspective I intend to develop in the following contrasts with 
Habermas's analysis in TCA wherein it is presupposed that the basic resources 
for a contemporary critical theory were not to be found in any reinterpretation of 
Marx, practically consigning the theoretical significance of Lukacs's attempt to 
recover Marx in this way to the unintentional side effects of vitalizing the 
discussion of Weber. Lukacs is thus classified as an essentially transitional 
figure. He is positioned as unintentionally contributing to bringing Weber’s 
theses to the point where they could eventually be made fruitful for what was an 
epochal task when viewed from within the Critical Theory tradition, and which 
only Habermas was to carry out--a social-theoretic break from Hegel and Marx, 
sometimes characterized as from a "Hegelianizing philosophy of history" 
(Habermas 1989b, 332). Hence, according to Habermas, the lasting (though 
unintended) effect of Lukacs's work was that it stimulated a turn to "serious" 
social theory proper, that is, a grounding in its own proper element, without the 
“philosophic balfast”~autonomous in respect to metaphysical residues of 
idealist philosophy (Habermas 1989b, 383).
In the TCA, then, it seems Habermas is quite concerned to avoid an 
identification of his latest revisitation of Marx with his encounter with Weber, 
Mead, Durkheim or Parsons. In this work, Habermas develops a direct re­
interpretation of the theories of the latter four. In contrast, in TCA the opening
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sentence of his section on Mam explicitly proposes a different sort of approach. 
Habermas writes,
There are a number of reasons for going back to Marx, or more
precisely, to the interpretation of Marx stemming from Western Marxism's
reception of Weber (Habermas 1989, 332).
This detached justification clearly contrasts with his apparent enthusiasm in re­
interpreting the theories of Mead, Durkheim, and even Weber in light of, and as 
constitutive of, a first fully articulated theory of communicative action. In 
contrast, here he could, in fact, be taken to mean that a re-interpretation of 
Marx's theory was neither of interest nor possible. With his "going back" to a 
previous interpretation (rather than working out a re-interpretation) Habermas 
tends to emphasize that the only Marx of consequence was the one constituted 
by the predominant influence Weber is judged to have achieved in the 
movement from Lukacs to Horkheimer and Adomo, culminating in Habermas's 
own theory. In short, the end of Marx (as in Horkheimeris and Adorno's 
Dialectic of Enlightenment) would constitute the condition for the beginning of 
contemporary social theory proper, even if unclear to itself at the time.
However, keeping in mind results of the close reading of Habermas's 
earlier considerations of Marx's theories, it is not difficult to discover that, aside 
from Habermas's characterization of his current concern with Marx (which 
focuses away from, or precludes the need for, a direct re-examination of his 
theories), his actual analysis of Marx breaks new ground, not in comparison 
with Marxism generally, but surely in relationship to Habermas's own earlier 
studies. The most obvious example in this regard consists of his new 
dependence on a description of the "dual character” of the commodity, 
understood to be the concept characteristic of the originality and even 
"superiority" of Marx's theory.
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
185
Thus, Habermas tends, in the explicit justifications for his return to Marx, 
to evoke the “taken for granted” (including by him) Marx. Yet, in the actual 
course of his analysis it becomes clear that he has substantially revised and/or 
updated his own view of the characteristic substantive and methodolgical 
aspects of Marx’s work, and especially the relationship of the two. He begins 
the section, "Marx and the Thesis of Internal Colonization" by suggesting that a 
plausible justification for his current preoccupation with Marx could be that 
"dynamics of class opposition" (and thus Marx),
might explain the inner dynamics of bureaucratization—the hypertrophic 
growth of media-steered subsystems, resulting in the encroachment of 
administrative and monetary steering mechanisms upon the lifeworld 
(Habermas 1989, 332).
Habermas sees Lukacs (who differed from Marx, in that Marx supposedly could 
not anticipate the emergent structures of "late capitalism") responding to 
Weber’s competing interpretation of this, the latteris diagnosis of modernity in 
terms of a societal rationalization which is "class unspecific".
However, Lukacs's aim was far from primarily an appropriation of Weber 
in the interest of a more adequate social theory generally. Rather, his aim was 
to explain the existence of Marxism and overcome the philosophic void in the 
Marxist revolutionary movement in particular. Only with the filling of this void 
could the deep structures of capitalism (the ground of a social domination no 
less pernicious for its abstract character), as analyzed in Marx's mature critical 
theory, be recognized by contemporaneity. (At the same time, Lukacs is 
responsible to some extent for Habermas’s type of interpretation of his theory, 
because Lukacs did not extend to the Marxist concept of organization his well- 
known challenge to the traditional, "orthodox" Marxist idea of the passive role of 
philosophy). In respect to this, in so far as neither of them extended their
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development of Hegelian dialectic to a fundamental critique of the vanguard 
party, Habermas's coupling of Lenin and Lukacs (Habermas 1973, 35; 1984, 
364-367; 1990, 12-13) is not far off the mark; however, neither Lenin (despite 
his "return" to Hegel's Logic and Critique of the Gotha Programme) on the eve 
of the 1917 Russian Revolution nor Lukacs (despite his recovering the 
importance of the "Fetishism of Commodity" section of Capital, in its aftermath) 
extended their rethinking of Hegelian Marxian dialectic to new probings in to 
Hegel's and Marx's own concepts of "organization" (Dunayeveskaya [1998]), 
that is, what follows labor's mediation of capitalism's social relations.
Instead, Habermas confines the significance of Lukacs the Marxist to an 
idea of a certain expansion of complexity of what Habermas sees as Marx's 
basic and characteristic "class theory". Only with this expansion (as opposed to 
a deepening) Habermas argues, could a "supplemented" Marxism even hope to 
claim some explanatory power in regard to increasingly apparent social 
phenomenon (societal rationalization processes) which were recognized only 
in their incipient form by Marx, according to Habermas, under the category of 
the "realm of necessity", as opposed to the "realm of freedom" represented in 
the lifeworld (Habermas 1989, 340). They became a predominant concern to 
social theorists after their twentieth century expansion was analyzed by Weber.
As described by Habermas, Lukacs's contribution is centered on a view 
of class unspecific "side effects" (Habermas 1989, 332) seen (unlike in Weber) 
as a "result" of “underlying class conflict". While this may seem adequate in 
respect to a goal of appropriating Lukacs for social theory proper (even its 
"critical” persuasions) it excludes (or at least minimizes) consideration of 
Lukacs's internal challenge to Marxist thought which had become 
institutionalized in such a way as to be inimical to philosophy. This issue is 
important because it touches directly on the question of an alternative to
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Habermas's thesis that Marx's societal critique rested upon a view of the 
primacy for capitalism of private property and the market, and their external 
analysis by a theoretical avant garde committed to exposing and thereby 
eliminating their inequities. Habermas's view on this radically departs from the 
genesis and structure of Marx's theory I examined in earlier chapters. Even 
more seriously, it precludes from the start consideration of the part Habermas's 
more or less typical interpretation of Marx's theory possibly played in producing 
the reification effects he sets out to isolate from, "structural differentiations" 
necessary for, or common to, "every modem society" (Habermas 1989, 340).
Habermas's interpretation of Marx's theory is naturally incapable of 
providing a critique of Communist societies. Communist states eliminated 
private property and markets, but not capitalism in the sense of its deep defining 
structures analyzed by, eg; Postone. In this, it is clear that critique involves the 
need to take into consideration the effects of failed revolutions, revolutions 
which, identified with Marx's philosophy as the radical critique of capitalism, 
turned into their total opposite. This rendered deeply suspect (including down 
to the deepest layers of society) even the idea of existing society as a particular 
from of social relations, and therefore transformable, since attempts at a 
revolutionary alteration proved not only misguided and therefore spurious but 
apparently destructive of even any semblance of freedom. Lukacs’s idea of 
proletarian class consciousness as in principle capable of grasping the social 
totality in counter-distinction to bourgeois society's endemic dualisms seemed 
to at least point in the direction of potential forms of opposition to capitalism 
which, from practice, demanded a new relationship (or unity) of philosophy and 
revolution.
Habermas argues that Lukacs's Marxism amounted to something like a 
concession. It conceded the importance of "class unspecific" modem social
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phenomenon. (This, of course, assumes that "class analysis" specified Marx's 
own claim to critical, revolutionary theory). From these class unspecific 
phenomenon outliving adherence to the idea of revolutionary proletarian class 
consciousness, it was a “small step" (Habermas 1989, 333) on the part of 
Horkheimer and Adorno to a more complete turn to Weber and beyond, to a 
theory of instrumental reason and a totally administered society. It is only from 
this definition of the situation, Habermas makes clear, that in his pursuit of a 
contemporary social theory there is still a warrant for discussion of Marx. This 
means that Marx’s theory, at its deepest level, might today still be characterized 
as exhausting itself in the aim of explaining merely the distribution of negative 
social phenomenon in a class specific manner.
Marx, the "Thesis of Internal Colonization", and Habermas's Appropriation of 
Geora Lohmann's "Original Interpretation" of Marx's Capital
The title of the one section of TCA devoted to Marx, "Marx and the Thesis 
of Internal Colonization", should not then be interpreted to mean that Habermas 
was suggesting that the "thesis of internal colonization" could still have its basis 
in Marx's theory. To the contrary, the title summarizes the form of Habermas's 
critique of Marx in which he proposes to translate a theory of reification (Lukacs 
derived from Marx) in to the fundamental concepts of his own incipient social 
theory. The central idea here is to test what (if indeed any) residual explanatory 
power Marx's theory of value (after its merely tacit retention in Horkheimer and 
Adorno despite their dropping of the early Lukacs's theory of class 
consciousness) retains for a contemporary critical theory. Accordingly, 
Habermas sets the ground for his discussion of Marx in the following:
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Horkheimer and Adomo were unable to appropriate the systematic 
content of Weber’s diagnosis of the times and to make it fruitful for social 
scientific inquiry, because...they did not take seriously enough Weber's 
studies on the rationalization of worldviews, or the independent logic of 
cultural modernity; but also because they were uncritical in two 
directions...vis-a-vis Mane in that they held fast to the basic assumptions 
of the theory of value as the core of their tacit orthodoxy, and in this way 
blinded themselves to the realities of a developed capitalism based on 
the pacification of class conflict through welfare state measures... 
(Habermas 1989, 333-334).
Habermas then proposes to examine, "what Marx's theory of value can 
contribute to a theory of reification translated in to system-lifeworld concepts..." 
(Habermas 1989, 334). He writes that he will point out its weaknesses, in order, 
"...to see how we might explain the pacification of class conflict in welfare-state 
mass democracies and how we could combine the Marxian view of ideology 
with Weber's reflections on cultural modernity" (Habermas 1989, 334).
While it will be necessary to follow the declared synthetic intent here, I 
also want to avoid departing from the question of Habermas's approach (or 
various approaches) to Marx specifically. As I have already demonstrated 
through analysis of several of Habermas's earlier works, specific interpretations 
and criticisms of Marx's thought were clearly constitutive of the direction of 
Habermas's theory formation. The resulting theory is first fully articulated in 
TCA. Yet, some of Marx's basic concepts, neglected or simply not grasped by 
Habermas in his two decade-long examination of the theory, now suprisingly 
serve as the starting point for an argument he carefully characterizes not as a 
return to a consideration of Marx's theories, but in crucial contrast, "the 
interpretation of Marx stemming from Western Marxism's reception of Weber" 
(Habermas 1989, 332).
Reading Habermas in the way Habermas himself suggests here pulls in 
a direction opposite of what my investigation demands. My aim has been a
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critical interpretation of Habermas’s various approaches to Marx, attempting to 
demonstrate that they were strongly constitute of his own theory. Due to his 
unsatisfactory accounts of Marx's theories, there are grounds for serious 
concern with the viability of Habermas's own theory, or at least the claims 
Habermas makes for it.
With TCA, it is easy to see that there was a turning point from which 
Habermas understood his theory, if not a replacement for, then something of an 
alternative to, Marx's theory. This presents a problem of consistency in terms of 
fulfilling the intentions of an immanent critique of Habermas's approach to Marx. 
A tension arises between, on the one hand, Habermas's new attempt here to 
circumscribe in advance the content and meaning of his current return to Marx 
and, on the other hand, the critical requirements of an assessment of a theory 
that, at least up until this point, had internal to it a principle of reflection on the 
formative steps of this theory. Habermas now seems to direct scrutiny of these 
steps to only the volume (TCA) principally devoted to elaboration of his own 
theory, which up until now he had not fully presented. This moves in a direction 
opposite from and, in fact, a priori excludes, a possibly more viable and 
convincing alternative of "reinterpretation" of Marx's theory, which Postone 
indeed later produced.
The notes to Habermas’s section (of about fourty pages) on Marx 
(Habermas 1989, 332-373) illustrate the different quality of this approach to 
Marx. Unlike his previous analyses of Marx, these notes contain no references 
to Marx's writings; also, Habermas does not refer to his own previous analyses 
of Marx. In contrast, there are plentiful textual references in his TCA studies of 
the other classical theorists, Mead, Durkheim and Weber, as well as of Parsons. 
Among possible interpretations of this might be that Habermas is, in effect, 
arguing that, once and for all, the notion should be discarded that there was
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separate (or competing) potential in research in to Marx's ideas in the wake of 
his own new appropriations of other classical theory, principally Weber.
Another problem, which will emerge in the analysis which follows, is that 
the negative rationale Habermas offers for his return to Marx-that it is justified 
mainly (or even only) from discoveries resulting from the productive relationship 
of his own maturing theory and classical social theory-does not hold up in so 
far as it is clear that Habermas not only must give an account of Marx's ideas yet 
again (as opposed, for example, to dropping consideration of them altogether) 
but also shift his own interpretations, compared to earlier texts I have already 
considered. On this last point, it is peculiar that Habermas fails to note, even 
indirectly, that his approach to Marx substantially differs from his earlier ones, let 
alone reflect on the significance of this.
From the beginning of this section, the new approach to Marx is clear.
For the first time, after extensive analyses of Marx's work in STPS, BPSMC, KHI, 
LC and "Reconstruction of Historical Materialism", right from the start Capital is 
presented as containing analyses of both labor and interaction, and/or the later 
re-conceptualization of lifeworld and system, and as representing a credible (in 
a contemporary sense) attempt to "combine" them. For example, as late as the 
mid-1970s--in LC and "Reconstruction of Historical Materialism“--while 
Habermas recognized that Marx investigated both dimensions in his work as a 
whole, he held that Capital contained the "scientific" exposition of the theory of 
value, while he located in separate volumes the "historical" writings (Habermas 
1979, 130), or the "political" writings (Habermas 1975, 30). Following from this 
re-srtuation of the problem of a conception of systematic and social integration 
by his late recognition that it was already realized and taken up by Marx within 
Capital (obviously Marx's central work of social theory) Habermas, yet again, 
revisits the concept of labor.
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Recall that earlier I criticized his failure to analyze Marx’s concept of the 
dual character of the commodity, or the further step Marx takes in rooting it in the 
two-fold character of the labor which produced it, an understanding of both of 
which was crucial for grasping what Marx saw as capitalism's specificity. For 
example, in LC Habermas employed the terms abstract and concrete labor in a 
way which indicated that he understood them, in Marx’s analysis, as two 
different kinds of labor. In his new approach in TCA Habermas combines his 
familiar (and inadequate) formulation of Marx's idea of capitalism's specificity 
with a nod to the crucial element of Marx’s theory expressed in the idea of the 
"double character of the commodity":
...Marx starts from the idea that the form of the conflict bred in all class 
societies by the priviliged appropriation of socially produced wealth had 
changed in a characteristic way with the establishment of the capitalist 
mode of production. Whereas the dynamics of class in politically 
constituted, stratified societies were manifested directly on the level of 
conflicts of interest between social groups, in bourgeois society they are 
objectivistically concealed and objectivated through the medium of 
exchange value. The mechanism of the labor market, institutionalized in 
private law, takes over functions that had previously been performed by 
politically institutionalized relations of social force and economic 
exploitation. The monetarization of labor power becomes the basis of 
class relations. The analysis of these relations has to begin therefore 
with the double character of the commodity (my emphasis, RR) 
(Habermas 1989, 334-335).
The familiar portion of this passage expresses Habermas's basic idea that the 
specificity of capitalist domination lies in the non-overt character of the 
determination of its class relations, wherein a mechanism of actual unequal 
distribution of social wealth is masked as equal exchange. The unfamiliar 
element (compared to Habermas's earlier texts) expressed in the last two 
sentences seems to pay closer attention to Marx's Capital in its tracing
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specifically capitalist social domination to unique features of one commodity 
among all others—labor power.
Yet, on closer examination it is not intrinsic characteristics of the 
commodity "labor power" despite being a commodity like all others which 
Habermas posits as unique to capitalism, but rather monetarization of labor 
power. This latter suggests that capitalism's specificity is grounded in a 
relationship of labor to something outside itself. Habermas complicates this 
analysis by, while identifying the necessity of beginning with the "double 
character" of the commodity (due to a particular commodity's "monetarization"), 
presenting a passage from a work of Claus Offe (Habermas 1989, 355). The 
latter describes Marx's understanding of the features of the commodity labor 
power which differs from all others; it is a "living" labor power that, 1) does not 
arise for the purpose of salability; 2) cannot be separated from its owner; and, 3) 
can be set in motion only by its owner. From these, Offe concludes an,
inextirpable subject-rootedness of labor power [which] implies that in 
wage labor the categories of action and functioning, of social and system 
integration are inextricably intertwined (Habermas 1989, 335).
In citing this passage, Habermas means to develop his argument that Marx was 
preoccupied with the contradiction between a complete abstraction of 
monetarization versus an "inextirpable subject-rootedness" of labor power 
determinant of a synthetic function—a duality suggestive of a return to a Kantian 
formulation of the problem he had developed in KHI.
Offe, and Georg Lohmann as well, two thinkers, like Habermas (and 
Postone, who I have discussed on several occasions), associated with the 
Critical Theory tradition, are cited in support of his analysis of Marx's "theory of 
value”, identification of strengths and weaknesses of which is supposed to
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compel a turn to Habermas's own theory. Citation of two contemporary thinkers 
within the tradtition (as opposed to directly confronting Marx's "mature critical 
theory") has the effect of down-playing that his own analysis in the end implies 
an argument for the vitality of Marx for contemporary social theory. Habermas, 
in yet another approach to Marx's theories, and without directly saying so, 
supports his argument with two contemporary Critical Theorists already heavily 
influenced by his own social-theoretic concepts.
Habermas begins by asserting that analysis of class relations when their 
basis has become the monetarization of labor power, "has to begin with the 
double character of the commodity". In line with this proposal, Habermas next 
associates expenditure of labor power in "concrete actions” and its absorption 
as an "abstract performance" with, on the one hand, imperatives of social 
integration and, on the other hand, system integration (Habermas 1989, 335). 
Habermas writes,
...as an action it [labor power] belongs to the lifeworid of the producers, 
as a performance to the functional nexus of the capitalist enterprise and 
of the economic system as a whole. Marx was concerned to uncover the 
illusion that labor power is a commodity like any other (Habermas 1989,
335).
This seems to imply that Marx conceived transhistorical "labor" in a functional 
sense, that it served to underpin the "unity" of society (in opposition to the 
individualistic, privatistic outlook of the bourgeioise) and, furthermore, Marx 
affirmed this uncritically. Yet, Marx's analysis, to the contrary, draws a crucial 
distinction between labor and labor power; only the latter is capable of 
assuming the commodity form. Marx's analysis in Capital proceeds to 
demonstrate that the very recognition of a distinction between labor and "labor 
power in capitalism" reflects the value form, intrinsic to capitalism's particular
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form of wealth. Living labor (concrete labor "shaped" by abstract labor), not 
"labor power", is the source of value, capitalism's "substance" (Postone 1993, 
75). Capital's drive to absorb living labor and to reduce the socially necessary 
labor time for the production of commodites lies at the heart of the non-viable 
ground of a social formation based on value, that is, constituted as a 
contradictory totality. It is just as accurate to say that Capital was concerned to 
show that in capitalism "labor power", alienable from the person, and, in fact, 
antithetical to him or her, was a commodity like any other. Then, in addition to 
the unique value producing capacity of living labor I identified, Marx's 
description referred to in the passage from Offe, would not indicate merely 
Marx's "concern" to uncover an illusion, but his attempt to closely specify with 
the concept labor power the contradictory nature of capitalism, pointing to its 
non-viability. Seen in this way, Marx's specification of the commodity labor 
power is not ultimately concerned with "uncovering an illusion". Marx 
dispenses with the efficacy of this procedure already in Chapter One of Capital); 
rather it aims at analyzing a subjectivity intrinsic to which is a dynamic tension 
between concrete labor “shaped", or subsumed, by abstract labor (the ground of 
the "automatic" regulation of social relations in capitalism) and freedom. Critical 
revolutionary theory must connect to this type of subjectivity in order to not 
merely oppose capitalism, but contribute positively in its abolition to the 
creation of the new. The latter represents the domain of second negation, 
which Marx took from Hegel. Marx identified it as the thoroughly revolutionary 
element of Hegel's dialectic. The non-viability, expressed at the level of the 
contradiction between living labor and labor power (rather than a synthetic 
feature), at the core of the capitalist mode of production, is disclosed in Marx's 
analysis with his examination of a situation in which, immanently, "labor power"
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is a commodity like all others and, from the perspective of the possibility of 
transcendence of capitalism, is unique among all others.
In the interpretation immediately following the quotation he takes from 
Offe, Habermas begins to attempt a more precise explanation of “abstract labor" 
in the framework of his theory of communicative action. Following Offe, 
Habermas analyzes abstract labor in terms of its role in an explanation of the 
necessity of the concepts of system and lifeworld for an adequate categorical 
interpretation of modem society. Habermas employs a peculiar mode of 
expression for this. Under conditions of the wage labor relation (which he has 
already translated with the underspecified "monetarization" of labor power),
wage laborers declare their general willingness to expend their labor 
power as a suitably programmed contribution to maintaining the capitalist 
enterprise (Habermas 1989, 335).
In this it is difficult to distinguish the metaphorical from the theoretical.
Attribution to "wage laborers" some sort of "declaration" (pro or con) concerning 
the "capitalist enterprise", is certainly not a conventional view. Habermas 
continues,
It is this monetarized labor power which is appropriated as a commodity 
and alienated from the life context of producers, that Marx calls "abstract 
labor" (Habermas 1989, 335).
However, "labor power" is not alienated from the life context of producers, it is 
the life context of producers.
But then at the same time (though in sharp contrast to the "general 
willingness to expend their labor power as a suitably programmed contribution 
to maintaining the capitalist enterprise"), Habermas, quoting Georg Lohmann 
(whom I consider below), describes a process wherein abstract labor makes
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highly unlikely a wage laborer's concern with capitalist enterprise or, for that 
matter, anything else:
It [abstract labor] is indifferent to the natural-material object of use and to 
the need it satisfies; it is indifferent to the particular kinds of activity, as 
well as to the working individuals and their social situations. These 
marks of indifference find expression in the determinations of labor which 
produce exchange value; it is characterized as "human labor" that is the 
'same", "without difference", "without individuality", "abstract", "universal". 
These same features continue on in the relations of indifference that 
mark the workers" behavior toward others and himself [my emphasis,
RR] (Habermas 1989, 335).
Habermas, then, before assessing the strengths and weaknesses of "this 
theoretical approach" (which he holds describes Marx's "theory of value") 
summarizes it as Marx's explanation of a process of real abstraction (Habermas 
1989, 336). In line with his proposal to translate into system-lifeworld concepts 
a theory of reification (which Lukacs was the first to trace, and describe as a 
central feature of Capital) Habermas argues that Marx (while not employing 
social-theoretic terms developed later) referred to,
objectification of socially integrated contexts of action, which takes place 
when interactions are no longer coordinated via norms and values, or via 
processes of reaching understanding, but via the medium of exchange 
value. In this case, participants are primarily interested in the 
consequences of their actions. Inasmuch as they orient themselves to 
"values" in a purposive-rational manner, as if the latter were objects in a 
second nature, they adopt an objectivating attitude to each other and to 
themselves, and they transform social and intrapsychic relations into 
instrumental relations. In this respect, the transformation of concrete into 
abstract labor power is a process in which communal and individual life 
become reified (Habermas 1989, 336).
At this point, Habermas merely makes an argument that Marx's analysis of 
capitalism, when "translated", describes a process following from 
(transhistorical) labor's intrinsic means-ends rationality when, via the market, it
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is transformed from its "natural" concrete form in to a socially abstract form with 
potentially expansive societal effects. What Habermas sees as a form of reason 
(associated with a transhistorical concept of labor) spreads beyond its proper 
place in the relationship between man and nature, and tends to assume a 
function of coordination of social interactions generally.
Habermas, then, in his initial remarks on the "strengths" (attributed 
primarily to its specification of "rules for the fundamental interchange relations 
between the economic system and the lifeworld") of Mane's analysis (Habermas 
1989, 336), writes that the transformation of concrete into abstract labor is a 
"metaphor", tied to a "basic intuition" (because the differentiation of lifeworld and 
system only became an explicit "problem" with Parsons) (Habermas 1989, 336). 
This "basic intuition" (presumably the requirement of a bi-level concept of 
society) is involved in Marx's attempt to make clear how action theoretical 
statements (concerning class interests, concrete labor, etc.) can be “translated" 
in to systems-theoretical statements (concerning "abstract labor" and "value") 
(Habermas 1989, 336).
It is necessary to emphasize several points before describing in greater 
detail what, at this stage, Habermas understands to be the "strengths" of Marx's 
law of value. 1) All of Habermas's arguments which follow this refer back to and 
depend on an understanding of Marx's theory as only an idea of transformation 
of concrete labor in to abstract labor, 2) Yet, Marx's analysis involves the dual 
character of the commodity and the two-fold nature of the labor embodied in it. 
Analysis of the transformation of one in to the other (of concrete into abstract) is 
therefore one-sided; 3) The other way around, the problematic of a 
transformation of abstract labor in to concrete labor (though itself only equally, 
not more than, a moment of the social constitution of a dynamic social totality
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which includes the transformation of concrete into abstract labor) is perhaps 
more crucial for understanding "late capitalism".
In so far as the very constitution of value (though not material wealth) 
remains dependent upon expenditure of direct human labor, and value's 
magnitude on the quanity of labor time abstracted from specific labors, at the 
same time value (and surplus value) is dependent on the reduction of socially 
necessary labor time, the shaping of concrete labor by abstract labor becomes 
telescoped and increasingly effective (socially manifest). Postone, for example, 
recognizes the increasing importance of the transformation of abstract labor in 
to concrete labor (in fact the "determination" of the latter by the former). But he 
seems to avoid discussion of the ramifications in terms of a potentially 
revolutionary subjectivity intrinsic to this type of labor. Instead, Postone 
(significantly in the chapter on Habermas) argues for the potentiality of "dead" 
labor opposed to "living" labor.
Habermas writes that he intends to review the strengths and weaknesses 
of Marx's theory of value in the context of his previous accounts of the current 
status of Weber's action-theoretic framework and Parson's functionalism. He 
attributes to Marx's theory an attempt from a "basic intuition" (Habermas 1989,
336) to connect the two methodological approaches:
Viewed methodologicalfy, the theory of value had for Marx a status 
similar to that which the action-theoretical introduction of steering media 
had for Parsons. From a substantive perspective, however, Marx's 
connecting of systems theory and action theory had from the start a 
critical sense that is absent in Parsons: he wanted to denounce the self- 
maintainence of the economic subsystem as a dynamics of exploitation 
made unrecognizable under the veil of objectification (Habermas 1989,
337).
There are at least two controversial implications in this. First, I have already 
shown in several places where Habermas analyzed Marx's theory not as
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essentially critical of the "self-maintainence of the economic subsystem" but to 
the contrary, as affirmatory toward it and as comprehensible in terms of a 
natural law theory. For example, as early as STPS, Habermas implicitly 
criticized Marx for an idea of a return of social life to the "private" sphere where 
the only "public" function needed (after the full maturation of private capitalism) 
was, "the administration of things" (Habermas 1989, 128). Marx is said to think 
that this could be done on the basis of natural law discovered once and for all in 
political economy. Moreover, Habermas's theoretical trajectory was directed on 
the basis of these assumptions concerning Marx and Marxism (Habermas 1972, 
55).
Habermas's description of Marx's denunciation of the "self-maintainence 
of the economic subsystem as a dynamics of exploitation made unrecognizable 
under the veil of objectification" differs from his earlier approaches to Marx's 
theory both in its reference to "self-maintainence" as the aspect toward which 
Marx is unambiguously critical, and in his placing this criticism as "from the 
start", and within Capital. Remarkably, then, prior to the TCA Habermas's own 
twenty-five year study of Marx's theory had not yet discerned a hermeneutic 
dimension within Capital. This is clear from the mode of presentation here, not 
from any explicit self-criticism on the part of Habermas.
Next, two paragraphs summarize Georg Lohmann's 1980 "original 
interpretation" of Capital, an interpretation more influential in Germany than in 
the U.S., one which happens to have appeared in the interregnum between 
Habermas's LC and TCA. In Lohmann's analysis, rather than strictly a political 
economy, or a critique of political economy, as Capital has previously been 
understood by Habermas, Lohmann provides an original interpretation of the 
intention, "behind Marx's 'critical presentation'" (Habermas 1989, 338). 
Lohmann's achievement, as Habermas sees it, pivots on his explanation of the
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
201
relation of "historical excursuses" to "economic passages" (Habermas 1989, 
338), akin to the lifeworld/system problematic. With this approach, according to 
Habermas, Lohmann in interpreting Capital as a critique of the destruction of 
pre-capitalist forms of life views the Hegelian concept of the whole, not as the, 
“move toward more developed categories" being, "at the same time an advance 
in the manifestation of 'truth1..R a th e r , according to Lohmann,
for Marx the further conceptualization of the whole is an advance in 
uncovering the truth about Capitat that, as a whole, it is something 
"negative", something that is historically changeable (Habermas 1989,
338).
The end of a full-page summary of Lohmann marks the beginning of 
Habermas's remarks on the “weaknesses of the theory of value" (Habermas 
1989, 338).
As indicated, Habermas analyzes concrete/abstract labor such that they 
refer to a virtually uni-directional transformation of the former in to the latter-a 
qualitative change of the one in to the other which can then be viewed as 
determinate of the passage from one form of life to another, a radically different 
conception than one which specifies capitalism as having internal to it a 
contradiction, which points to the non-viability of the form of labor itself. 
According to Marx’s analysis, what is at issue in this is the inseparability of the 
two in capitalism--not only the "transformation" of concrete labor in to abstract 
labor, but also the “transformation" of abstract into concrete: in capitalism, labor 
mediates itself (Postone 1994,169). In contrast, common to otherwise very 
disparate thinkers such as Lukacs and Habermas (or whom can be seen, 
respectively, as the genesis and the dissolution of a critical theory of capitalism) 
is a concept of labor which implies a "one-dimensionality". Such a concept 
(even if internally consistent) is not adequate to its object.
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The above passage (and Lohmann's analysis generally) is important for 
marking Habermas's apparent recognition that an interpretation of Marx at 
variance with his own offered a credible argument that Marx, within Capital, not 
only seriously considered both system and social integration, but also put forth 
a critical perspective concerning their actual relationship that challenged 
Habermas's very understanding of Marx's theory over the course of at least two 
decades. A closer look at a part of Postone's argument in Time, Labor and 
Social Domination (next section) will make it easier to see that Lohmann’s 
argument (and the way Habermas confronts it) is important in a full 
consideration of a critique of Habermas understanding of Marx, particularly in 
TCA. This is so partly because through Lohmann Habermas re-encounters the 
issue of whether Marx’s Capital represented a socio-historical interpretation of 
Hegel’s Absolute, and if so, the theoretical soundness of it. At issue is 
assessment ofLohmann’s type of approach to philosophy which, in contrast to a 
discredited materialist appropriation of Hegel, understands itself as successfully 
integrating Hegel's Absolute in toto (“explaining1' it) in the constitution of a 
critical social theory.
Habermas seemed to refer affirmatively to Lohmann's reinterpretation 
(from within the Critical Theory tradition) of Marx's Capital where it uncovered 
and "explained" the, "relation of the 'historical excurses' to the economic 
passages in the narrower sense" (Habermas 1989, 338). Paraphrasing 
Lohmann's argument, Habermas writes,
The farther it consolidates the production of social wealth into a system 
steered autonomously via the medium of exchange value and has, in that 
respect, become an end in itself, and the further the social reality of the 
sphere of social labor thereby gets adapted to the basic catgegories of 
system theory, all the more does the "whole" reveal itself to be the 
"untrue" (Habermas 1989, 338).
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But Habermas concludes that, even granted Lohmann's point that Marx's 
Capital develolped a "lifeworld perspective" broader than the "narrow 
economic" perspective with which he is more often associated, and therefore 
recognized as a problem, and dealt seriously in a contemporary sense with, 
how to relate action-theoretic concepts to system theoretic concepts, Lohmann 
in the end confirms Habermas's more fundamental thesis first fully developed 
in TCA, that is, that Marx's limitation for social theory might be explained by his 
"inability" to escape the bounds of Hegel's Logic. After paraphrasing and 
quoting Lohmann on Marx's Captial, Habermas writes,
At this point we can see a first weakness in the theory of value. My 
reconstruction tacitly began with the problem of connecting the 
action/lifeworid and system paradigms-a problem that became explicit 
only with Parsons. This was a marked stylization. Marx does move at the 
analytical levels of “system" and "lifeworld", but their separation is not 
really presupposed in his basic economic concepts, which remain tied to 
Hegelian logic. On the contrary, the interconnection between the two 
types of theoretical statements could be explained through a semantic 
explication of the shifts in meaning involved in using these basic terms 
only if it is assumed that there is a logical (in the Hegelian sense) 
connection between the development of the system and the structural 
transformation of the lifeworld. It is only under this assumption that Marx 
could hope to grasp a totality comprising both moments at one blow, so 
to speak, by means of a theory of value that proceeds in terms of 
semantic analysis. Otherwise, it would have been necessary to engage 
in empirical investigations of real abstraction, that is, of the transformation 
of concrete into abstract labor (Habermas 1989, 338-339).
But even if only indirectly, perhaps the most important point Habermas attempts 
to make in this passage has to do with the extent to which Marx's theory of value 
may have been driven by unwarranted assumptions, not unlike those 
Habermas (in KHI) had described in connection with Hegel's critique of Kant. 
Hegel's critique was said to derive much of its power from demonstrating that, 
despite Kant’s intention of a presuppositionless philosophic inquiry, the most 
important features of Kant's philosophy were inextricably tied to fundamental,
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even conventional, assumptions. Habermas, without explicitly recalling his 
description of this sort of critique, employs it here with the purpose of re­
inforcing his obviously controversial (at least from within Critical Theory) claim 
for the central relevance of Talcott Parsons' theory, even perhaps at the direct 
expense of that of Mane's.
The "presupposition" at issue here is the idea of a social totality derived 
from Hegelian logic which, in culminating in an Absolute, presupposes it as that 
from which it unfolds. The course of the Logic describes only so many abstract 
moments of an implicit, unfolding totality, which becomes concrete only in its 
culmination. To the contrary, Habermas's bi-level concept of society, in which 
system and lifeworld develop according to their own logics (Habermas 1979, 
148) is perhaps the fundamental thesis in the TCA. This thesis of autonomous 
logics is the basis for his "negation” of Marx's only “hope” (based upon an 
assumption that there is a logical-in the Hegelian sense—connection between 
the development of the system and the structural transformation of the lifeworld) 
to, “grasp a totality by means of a theory of value..." (Habermas 1989, 339).
Habermas next outlines the consequences following from what he insists 
is Marx's "economistic" appropriation of Hegel's Logic. First, in an unusual 
comparison of the young Marx with the young Hegel, both are said to have 
conceived, "the unity of system and lifeworld...on the model of a ruptured ethical 
totality whose abstractly divided moments are condemned to pass away” 
(Habermas 1989, 339) Then, in a single paragraph, he combines his analysis 
of Marx and Hegel as he developed them first in KHI, and then in 
"Reconstruction of Historical Materialism". Following from KHI, the transposition 
of class domination from an overt politcal form to an embededness in economic 
processes,
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
205
literally amounts to an illusion~the capitalist system is nothing more than 
the ghostly form of class relations that have become perversely 
anonymous and fetishized...Marx is convinced a priori he has before him 
[in the “system"] nothing more than the mystical form of a class relation 
(Habermas 1989, 339).
And, following from "Reconstruction of Historical Materialism", Marx's
interpretation,
excludes from the start the question of whether the systemic 
interconnection of the capitalist economy and the modem state 
administration do not also represent a higher and evolutionarily 
advantageous level of integration by comparison to traditional societies. 
Marx conceives of capitalist society so strongly as a totality that he fails to 
recognize the intrinsic evolutionary value that media steered subsystems 
possess. He does not see that the differentiation of the state apparatus 
and the economy also represents a higher level of system differentiation, 
which simultaneously opens up new steering possibilities and forces a 
reorganization of the old, feudal class relationships. The significance of 
this level of integration goes beyond the institutionalization of a new 
class relationship (Habermas 1989, 339).
Hence, Lohmann's new critical theoretical approach to Marx's Capital 
does no more than delineate and spell out Marx's, "move at the two analytical 
levels of 'system' and 'lifeworld'"; it does not succeed in moving Habermas from 
his long-held position that the fundamental barrier to critical theory's 
appropriation of Marx for an adequate contemporary social theory lies in Marx's 
failure to separate himself from Hegelian logic.
Habermas terms a "misperception" (Habermas 1989, 339) Marx's view of 
the systemic quality of modem society in that Marx viewed its "automony" as 
temporary or false, condemned to pass away, rather than as a possibly 
desirable advance over pre-capitalist, particularly feudal, social formations. 
Hence, Marx's hands are tied theoretically, because he cannot appreciate the 
significance of this possible evolutionary advance for a further challenge to, or 
development of, social theory, particularly the potential of what Habermas 
develops as communicative reason.
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Tied to this circumstance, but perhaps even more ominous, was the 
consequences for Marx's theory of revolution (Habermas 1989, 339), because 
the effect of the latter perhaps unlike the implications for “merely" social theory, 
was clearly practical. Marx was not satisfied to theoretically criticize, "capital's 
self-realization, the subsumption of labor power under the commodity form", or 
the way it, "uproots feudal modes of existence in a plebian fashion, and then 
shapes them into proletarian forms" (Habermas 1989, 339). Rather, "he 
projects a practical-political perspective for action..." (Habermas 1989, 339).
In a perspective opposite of systems theory (and with a sort of reliance upon it), 
Habermas writes,
Marx has in view a future state of affairs in which the objective semblance 
of captial has dissolved and the lifeworld, which has been held captive 
under the dictates of the law of value, gets back its spontaneity. He 
forsees that the forces of the industrial proletariat, at first merely in revolt, 
will under the leadership of a theoretically enlightened avant-garde, form 
themsleves into a movement that seizes political power for the purpose of 
revolutionizing society. Along with the private ownership of the means of 
production, the movement will also destroy the institutional foundations of 
the medium through which the capitalist economic system was 
differentiated out, and will bring the systematically autonomous process 
of economic growth back again into the horizon of the lifeworld 
(Habermas 1989, 340).
An important point to note here is that if Habermas's account of Marx's theory is 
correct, then Marxism itself, for example the form which existed in eastern 
Germany, east Europe and Russia up until the late 1980s, represented a more 
or less adequate practical expression of that theory. In any case, this 
assumption seems to ground Habermas's reflective criticism of Marx's 
"misperception" I cited earlier, that,
...an accumulation process that has broken away from orientations to use 
value literally amounts to an illusion-the capitalist system is nothing 
more than the ghostly form of class relations that have become
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perversely anonymous and fetishized. The systemic autonomy of the 
production process has the character of an enchantment (Habermas 
1989, 339).
Thus, these Marxist "experiments" could be said to have failed perhaps 
primarily as a more or less direct result of Marx's inability to adequately 
distinguish philosophy from social theory. Habermas's principal point, then, is 
that Marx failed to distinguish between his own concept of the relationship 
between lifeworld and system, and that concept's ability-or even the 
advisability of its doing so—to overcome the diremption of an original totality it 
presupposed.
Habermas's view here suggests a peculiar affinity, despite obvious 
differences, of Weber's and Marx's thought. Weber traced a process of cultural 
"disenchantment" in Western society's rationalization, and suggested a 
resulting inevitable loss of meaning and freedom; Marx classified capitalism 
itself as "pre-rational". According to Habermas, Marx attributed capitalism's 
social cohesion to, "the systemic autonomy of the production process [having] 
the character of an enchantment" (Habermas 1989, 339).
By hinting at an important measure of affinity between the two in how 
Marx and Weber dealt with modernity Habermas attempts to strengthen the 
case he makes that Parsons later confronted directly and consciously in theory 
what in Marx, at least, was still an "intuition". Furthermore, both Marx and 
Weber judged the rationality potential of society from an (intrinsically limited) 
action-theoretic point of view (Habermas 1989, 342). This amounts to an 
elaboration of Habermas's opening argument that previous critical theory 
(Horkheimer and Adorno),
...solved the problem of connecting Marx and Weber by leaning all the 
more heavily on Weber. If, following Weber, one conceives of the
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rationalization of life's orders as the institutionalization of purposive 
rational action, it is only a small step to generalizing the reification of 
consciousness in to an expression of instrumental reason (Habermas 
1989, 332-333).
According to Habermas, fundamental to Marx's theory was the 
supposition that private ownership of the means of production (Habermas 1989, 
340) was the basis for what Weber conceived as the "iron cage of modem 
industrial labor", and determined the type of revolutionary expectations attached 
to political action Marx advocated, latter carried out under the Marxist banner. 
These expectations were not met, confirming "Weber's prognosis". Habermas 
writes,
System and lifeworld appear in Marx under the metaphors of "the realm 
of necessity" and "the realm of freedom". The socialist revolution is to 
free the latter from the dictates of the former. It seems as if theoretical 
critique has only to lift the spell cast by abstract labor (subsumed under 
the commodity form). The intersubjectivity of workers associated in large 
industries is crippled under the self-movement of capital; theoretical 
critique has only to free it of its stiffness for an avant-garde to mobilize 
living-critically enlivened-labor against dead labor and lead it to triumph 
of the lifeworld over the system of deworided labor power...
...As against these revolutionary expectations, Weber's diagnosis has 
proven correct: the abolition of private capitalism would not at all mean 
the destruction of the iron cage of modem industrial labor. Marx's error 
stems in the end from dialectically clamping together system and 
lifeworld in such a way that does not allow for a sufficiently sharp 
separation between the level of system differentiation attained in the 
modem period and the class-specific forms in which it has been 
institutionalized (Habermas 1989, 340).
Habermas, concluding his discussion of the "first weakness in [Marx's] 
theory of value", attributes it to Marx's failure to, “withstand the temptations of 
Hegelian totality thinking" (Habermas 1989, 340). This is similar to the 
argument he presented in the second chapter on Marx in KHI (see above,
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Chaper Three). But here he refers not to that analysis, but to Lohmann's 
"original interpretation" of Capital, which I cited above.
However, as Habermas characterizes Lohmann's study, the latteris idea 
was of a reversal of the manifestation of a relationship between "truth" and 
"totality". According to Lohmann, in Hegel there is a positive relationship 
between the two; in Marx's analysis of capital there is a negative, inverse 
relation. Thus, here Habermas seems to obscure the spirit of Lohmann's 
argument, or at least his summary of it, after having introduced it as central to 
the presentation of his new, updated approach to Marx. While Lohmann 
described "capital" as the Hegelian totality Marx rejected, Habermas remains 
focused on an interpretation of Marx's relationship to Hegel which substitutes 
the proletariat (or the lifeworld) for the Hegelian Geist.
A closer look reveals that Habermas's emphasis is on the "totality 
thinking" itself, not whether the totality in question is a manifestation of “truth" or 
"untruth", represents capital or the proletariat. Hence, while at first appearing to 
endorse Lohmann's analysis of the Hegelian basis of Marx's Capital as fruitful 
for social theory, the actual implication is that Lohmann's analysis cannot alter 
Habermas's earlier view in K&HI that,
Materialist scientism [Marx] only reconfirms what absolute idealism 
[Hegel] had already accomplished: the elimination of epistemology in 
favor of unchained scientific knowledge—but this time for scientific 
materialism instead of absolute knowledge (Habermas 1972, 63).
The conclusion of Habermas's discussion of, "the first weakness in 
[Marx's] theory of value" is as follows:
Marx did not withstand the temptations of Hegelian totality thinking; he 
construed the unity of system and lifeworld dialecticaliy as an "untrue 
whole". Otherwise he could not have failed to see that every modem 
society, whatever its class structure, has to exhibit a high degree of 
structural differentiation (Habermas 1989, 340).
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Habermas begins the passage with a seemingly unconscious, but 
obviously controversial, identification of Marx with the "Marxist tradition". 
Habermas writes,
In Marx and the Marxist traditon the concept of "alienation" has been 
applied above all to the wage laborer's mode of existence. In the Paris 
Manuscripts it is still the expressivist model of a creative productivity, in 
which the artist develops his own essential powers as he shapes his 
works, that furnishes the standard for criticizing alienated labor 
(Habermas 1989, 340-341).
While "Alienated Labor" and "Private Property and Communism" (the first two 
Paris Manuscripts) may be characterized as studies of labor and alienation, 
implicit even in those works is the "alienation" of the "mode of existence" of 
theory itself. In contrast, as I recounted in the earlier chapter (Three), Marx's 
third and final Paris Manuscript, "Critique of Hegelian Dialectic and Philosophy 
in General", explicitly analyzes the alienated mode of existence of the individual 
philosopher, as well as philosophy itself. While the essay contains some 
analyses of labor, clearly the focus of the concept of alienation here is not on 
the laborer's mode of existence, but rather the philosopher's, or the theorist's.
(In the present context, it makes no difference). “Critique of Hegelian Dialectic 
and Philosophy in General" is not only the lengthiest of the three Paris 
manuscripts, it is also the most difficult, and the least analyzed. Moreover, just 
on the basis of the fact that it contains Marx's only explicit, detailed analysis of 
Hegel's philosophy would be enough for arguing that it is the most important of 
the three. In any case, Habermas clearly mischaracterizes Marx (though not 
perhaps the "Marxist tradition") with the opening sentence of his argument for 
the “second weakness" of Marx's theory of value.
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After this dual mischaracterization of Marx's 1844 Manuscripts, as well as 
relationship of Marx to Marxists, Habermas's critique of Marx here is basically in 
two steps. The first is immanent, in that he argues that Marx himself, "broke free 
of this ideal of self-formation...when he moved on to the theory of value" 
(Habermas 1989, 341). In counter-posing this, Marx’s supposed fundamental 
revision of his theory, to the "more strongly phenomenologically and 
anthropogically oriented versions of contemporary praxis philosophy" 
(Habermas 1989, 341) where the original model was retained, Habermas 
implies that no fruitful distinction might be drawn within the Marxist tradition, at 
least in terms of the potentialities of an adequate social theory. In other words, 
Habermas argues that Marx, the Marxist tradition generally, as well as those 
tendencies often associated with political and philosophic dissidence within the 
tradition, whatever differences in their various approaches, had in common a 
conception of alienation and labor inadequate to contemporary society. With 
his suggestion that in his analysis of labor Marx "broke free" from an aesthetic 
model of productive activity Habermas attempts to both further secure his initial 
position that Marx’s 1844 Economic and Philosophic Manuscripts were directed 
primarily at a description of alienation as concerning wage laborers' "mode of 
existence", as well as align Marx himself with the overcoming of the "romantic 
idealism" which grounded such a model. According to Habermas, this 
“breaking free" consisted in development of an idea of an "exchange of 
equivalents" in which the theory of value, "retains only a formal perspective of 
distributive justice from which to judge the subsumption of labor power under 
the commodity form" (Habermas 1989, 341). Habermas, consistently 
developing his one-sided view of concrete/abstact labor, concludes,
With the idea of transforming concrete into abstract labor, the concept of
alienation loses its determinancy. It no longer refers to deviations from
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the model of an exemplary praxis, but to the instrumentalization of a life 
that is represented as an end in itself...
...This concept of alienation remains indeterminate insofar as there is no 
historical index for the underlying concept of a life that is reduced in its 
possibilities as a result of violating the ideal of justice inherent in the 
exchange of equivalents. Marx speaks in the abstract about life and life's 
possibilities; he has no concept of a rationalization to which the lifeworld 
is subject to the extent its symbolic structures get differentiated. Thus, in 
the historical context of his investigations, the concept of alienation 
remains peculiarly ambiguous (Habermas 1989, 341).
Habermas's assessment of the movement of Marx's theory consists of the 
criticisms that, on the one hand, the early concept of alienation is not 
"sufficiently selective" to distinguish in the, “repressive uprooting of traditional 
forms of life between the aspect of reification and that of structural differentiation 
of the lifeworld" and, on the other hand, the theory of value, "provides no basis 
for a concept of reification, enabling us to identify syndromes of alienation 
relative to the degree of rationalization attained in the lifeworld" (Habermas 
1989, 341).
The "third and decisive weakness" of Marx's theory of value (which 
Habermas later develops as an immanent critique at the conclusion of TCA in 
such a way as to argue for the replacement of Marx's theory with his own) 
consists in Marx's, "overgeneralization of a specific case of the subsumption of 
the lifeworld under the system" (Habermas 1989, 342). In other words, in 
Marx's identification of the reduction of concrete labor to abstract labor social 
theory is restricted to an analysis of only the media of money, and treats other 
media, such as power, as “derived" phenomenon. Habermas writes,
The Marxian approach requires an economistically foreshortened 
interpretation of developed capitalist societies...As opposed to the 
monism of the theory of value, we have to allow for two steering media, 
and four channels through which the two complementary subsystems 
subject the lifeworld to their imperatives. Reification effects can result in
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like manner from the bureaucratization and monetarization of public and
private areas of life (Habermas 1989, 343).
It should be emphasized that Habermas’s section, "Mane and the Thesis 
of Internal Colonization", specifies the contemporary theoretical highpoint in 
analysis of Marx's theory as worked out in the Critical Theory tradition in an 
"original interpretation" (Lohmann) of the relation of Marx's, "economic analysis 
to the historical excurses". Habermas then structures his entire presentation in 
“Marx and the Thesis of Internal Colonization" on Georg Lohmann's "new" 
approach to Marx, quoting at key points in the section three long passages from 
Lohmann's work.
However, it is clear that if Lohmann's analysis is really considered 
original, and that Marx, contrary to all of Habermas's previous analyses, 
integrated within Capital concepts of "system" and "lifeworld" in an attempt to 
combine them in a single social theory, and there is ongoing controversy within 
Critical Theory concerning the meaning (and success) of this attempt, then 
surely a document such as Marx's Critique of the Gotha Programme, which both 
forcefully focused on his value theory and recapitulated the principal themes in 
his 1844 Economic-Philosophic Manuscripts, must be relevant in this 
discussion. Yet, none of the three-Habermas, Lohmann, or Postone (whom I 
consider in more detail below)~recognize its relevance for their respective 
arguments. Written eight years after the completion of Volume One of Capital, 
the essential point of Critique of the Gotha Programme is negation of the unity of 
the two major tendencies of German Social Democracy, one of which identified 
itself with Marx's theory presented in Capital. In the initial part of his critique, 
Marx writes that the Gotha Programme botched the concept of labor. In the 
concept, as it was wrongly presented in the Programme, Marx saw, in the
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supposed socialist future represented by the new Party, the subsumption yet 
again of the individual by the social. In Marx's criticism of the Programme it was 
not only a question of the subordination of the individual to the "social" state 
(where "equality" meant the reduction of all to what was common to them—the 
ability to labor-all else being ignored), but the subordination of philosophy, the 
sacrifice of the uniqueness of Marx's philosophy, in the service of Party unity. In 
the following passage Marx clearly understands his mature theory as fulfilling 
the potential of his early, humanist concepts:
...after the enslaving subordination of the individual to the division of 
labor, and with it also the antithesis between mental and physical labor, 
has vanished; after labor has become not only a means of life but life's 
prime want, after the productive forces have increased with the all-round 
development of the individual, and all the springs of co-operative wealth 
flow more abundantly-only then can the narrow horizon of bourgeois 
right be crossed in its entirety and society inscribe on its banners: From 
each according to his ability, to each according to his needs! (Marx 1972, 
17.
This is the "post-Capitat Marx (not the young "humanist" Marx). The themes of 
alienation and “law" of value are combined here in such a way that at the least 
they must lead to a rejection of Habermas's thesis that Marx's law of value— 
supposedly a replacement for Marx's previous theory of "wage laborers mode of 
existence"-restricted critique to a "violation of justice in the exchange of 
equivalents". The 1875 Critique of the Gotha Programme indicates that the 
revolutionary humanism Marx posed in 1844 as the "transcendence of 
[capitalism's] mediation" (which he specified even then) had internal to it 
Hegel's concept of second negativity, a concept Marx re-created at key turning 
points in his theory.
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Moishe Postone's Self-Limiting Critique of Habermas's Theoretical Exile of
Marx
Postone's section on abstract labor in his book, Time, Labor and Social 
Domination can be read as a criticism of all previous interpretations of Marx's 
mature critical theory, Habermas's specifically, though the latter is taken up in 
detail only in his following chapter. Here I will call attention to, on the one hand, 
the structure of Postone's presentation and, on the other, an aspect of the 
substantive interpretation, that is, where it refers to Marx's Capital, particularly 
Chapter One. First, it is important to consider the overall structure of Postone's 
investigation, at least in so far as it situates itself in respect to the Critical Theory 
tradition. Postone writes,
This reinterpretation both has been influenced by, and is intended as a 
critique of, the approaches developed by Georg Lukacs (especially in 
History and Class Consciousness) and members of the Frankfurt School 
of critical theory-they remained bound...to [a] transhistorical conception 
of labor. I intend to appropriate the critical thrust of this interpretive 
tradition by reinterpreting Marx's analysis of the nature and significance 
of labor in capitalism (Postone 1994,15-16).
Postone's book is divided in to three parts. Part I (A Critique of traditional 
Marxism) criticizes a range of interpretations of Marx. This initial part concludes 
with a Chapter 3, "The limits of traditional Marxism and the pessimistic turn of 
Critical Theory", in which the theories of Friedrich Pollock and Max Horkheimer 
are shown to share a concept of labor erroneously attributed to, or at least 
thought to derive from, Marx.
"Toward a Reconstruction of the Marxian critique", then, is divided over 
the other two Parts of the book-Part II taking up the commodity, Part III 
analyzing capital. Thus, while Pollock and Horkheimer are considered under 
Postone's "critique of traditional Marxism" in the initial Part, Habermas is
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
216
accorded a separate chapter in Part il ("Toward a reconstruction of the Marxian 
Critique: the commodity”). This division should not be seen as a result merely of 
the fact that Habermas belongs in a different historical context than the earlier 
representatives of Critical Theory. Rather, it reflects the circumstance that 
Habermas directly criticized certain basic theoretic assumptions and their 
presumed ramifications for critical social theory shared by founders of the 
tradition, such as Pollock and Horkheimer. At the same time, Postone indicates, 
with his placement of Habermas, that Habermas's departure from Pollock and 
Horkheimer (including Habermas’s erroneous assumption that their positions 
were largely congruent with Marx's) is appropriately considered at the early 
stage of Marx's analysis of the commodity, as opposed to Marx's further 
development of his critique in its treatment of capital.
This is not to say that "Habermas's Critique of Marx” (the final chapter of 
Part II of Postone's book) judges Habermas's approach to Marx to be adequate 
to the level of the commodity (unlike the early Critical Theorists) but only proves 
inadequate in the further determination of Marx's theory at the level of the 
concept of capital. Postone, in his theoretic location of Habermas indicates that 
because Habermas's critique of Marx (and indirectly, or implicitly, of Pollock and 
Horkheimer) fails to grasp the concepts already basic to the commodity (such as 
abstract and concrete labor) it cannot be adequate to an appropriation of their 
further determination as capital, the analysis of which composes Part III.
But here, where I intend to show my points of agreement with Postone's 
analysis, as well as provide an immanent critique of his position, it is necessary 
to point out that Postone himself emphasized that Marx's presentation in Capital 
is such that each stage presupposes the whole of his theory. For example,
Marx does not present the commodity as it historically appeared before it 
constituted what he describes as the basic unit of the capitalist mode of
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production. He unfolds it as the material result of the dual character of labor- 
abstract and concrete—which, in its function as a mediation of social relations 
generally, specifies capitalism.
Postone’s re-interpretation of Marx's view of abstract labor relies on a 
two-stage theory of Marx’s concept of alienation (which he understands as two 
inconsistent appropriations of Hegel’s view of "objectification") (Postone 1993,
159). Postone then explains how this evolved concept of alienation figured in 
the later development of commodity fetishism. In fact, Postone holds that Marx's 
early theory of alienation, which he later abandoned, was essentially a 
philosophical anthropology. Only with Marx's develoment of the two-fold nature 
of labor in its function of a social mediation specific to capitalism allowed him to 
ground socially his concept of alienation, and thereby explain and surpass 
Hegel's thought (Postone 1993, 159). Yet, as I have already argued in earlier 
chapters, examination of Marx's progress in socially grounding his early 
appropriation of Hegel's concepts does not exhaust the question of the 
relationship of the early Marx's thought to Hegel's dialectic (or its contemporary 
potential) whether or not one accepts the idea that Marx’s early articulation of 
his theory is best described as a "philosophical anthropology".
In respect to this, Postone's contrast of Marx's 1844 Economic- 
Philosophic Manuscripts and Capital takes a crucial turn. In the text (Postone 
1994, 74, 159) Postone indicates that he understands Marx's early concept of 
labor to be “transhistorical”: he argues that such a misconception was involved 
in Mane’s “well-known" criticism of Hegel for, "not having distinguished between 
alienation and objectification" (Postone 1993, 159). Postone writes,
Yet how one conceptualizes the relation of alienation and objectification 
depends on how one understands labor. If one proceeds from a 
transhistorical notion of "labor”, the difference between objectification 
and alienation necessarily must be grounded in factors extrinsic to the
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objectifying activity-for example, in property relations..., rather than as, 
intrinsic to the character of that labor itself.
Postone then argues that in Marx's “later writings", only after he has worked out 
the “double character of commodity determined labor", another approach to the 
question of the difference between objectification and alienation was possible. 
Postone writes,
This difference, in Marx's mature works, is not a function of what occurs to 
concrete labor and its products; rather, his analyis shows that 
objectification is indeed alienation—if what labor objectifies are social 
relations... (Postone 1993, 160)
The paragraph which follows this, then, argues that the difference 
between the mature Marx's and the young Marx's theory is rooted in the social 
appropriation of Hegel as opposed to, for example, a "materialist" appropriation. 
Just as a "materialist appropriation" of Hegel's thought based on an 
undifferentiated notion of labor leads to an understanding of Hegel's notion of 
an historical subject as a social grouping instead of a “suprahuman structure of 
social relations" (Postone 1993, 160), a failure to grasp Hegel's notion of 
objectification as alienation, specific to capitalism, can also be traced to an 
inadequate understanding of labor in capitalism.
Now, after having traced inadequate versus adequate understandings of 
labor, and materialist appropriations of Hegel, versus a social appropriation, to 
the difference between the young Marx's and the mature Marx's theory, Postone 
writes in a footnote:
Marx's discussion of alienated labor in the Economic and Philosophic 
Manuscripts of 1844 indicates that he has not yet fully worked out the 
basis for his own analysis. On the one hand, he explicitly states that 
alienated labor is the core of capitalism, and is not based on private 
property, but that, on the contrary, private property is the product of
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alienated labor. On the other hand, he has not yet clearly worked out a 
conception of the specificity of labor in capitalism and, hence, cannot 
really ground that argument: his argument regarding alienation is only 
fully worked out later, on the basis of his conception of the twofold 
character of labor in capitalism. This conception, in turn, modifies his 
notion of alienation itself (Postone 1993, 160).
Earlier (see Chapter Three) in a detailed analysis of Habermas's 
interpretation of Marx's 1844 Manuscripts, I referred to Marx's explicit criticism of 
Hegel, where he linked the tatter's thought to political economy on the basis of 
the undifferentiated notion of labor Hegel shared with it. Marx already instead 
split the concept of labor in two, the positive and negative, indicating the special 
importance of the latter dimension. This is not to argue that Marx's concepts did 
not develop from the beginning of the 1840s through the late 1850s. It signifies, 
however, that the uniqueness of Marx's theory, which was perhaps fully 
grounded socially in its later articulation, was intrinsic to his early critique of 
Hegel's dialectic. Furthermore, "Critique of Hegelian Dialectic" was not 
exhausted by Marx's progress in socially grounding it. "Critique of Hegelian 
Dialectic and Philosophy in General" retained the transcendent element 
intrinsic to Hegel's philosophic thought, and continued to develop that, even in 
works later than Capital. This interpretation suggests caution in (and the distinct 
possibility of) overemphasizing the capacity of "social theory" to one-sidedly 
"explain" philosophy, a tendency in Postone, which he actually attributes to 
Marx as well.
Postone's argument that, "the difference [between objectification and 
alienation] in Marx's mature works is not a function of what occurs to concrete 
labor and its products" is even more problematic because it implies that this (in 
a pivotal sense) is in contrast to Marx's earlier analysis of labor, which
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supposedly was not only undifferentiated, but referred immediately and 
narrowly to the relationship of humans to nature.
As I considered in some detail in earlier chapters, in “Critique of Hegelian 
Dialectic and Philosophy in General" Marx's approach to labor involved (even 
primarily) his attempt to "explain" Hegel's philosophic concept, "negation of 
negation". Marx first evaluated positively Feuerbach's critical relationship to 
Hegel in comparison to other "Young Hegelians", who adopted what they 
believed was a thoroughly critical attitude toward everything, without noticing 
this was except the "master", meaning Hegel's own dialectic. More difficult to 
see in that analysis was that, after Marx affirmed aspects of Feuerbach's 
thought, he criticized Feuerbach's notion that Hegel's negation of negation 
merely represented the re-establishment of theology after the negation of 
religion. I suggested that Marx, instead (and as opposed to Feuerbach), 
grounded a conception of a relation of philosophy, labor and social 
organization, shaped by a "return" (in the same manuscript) to Hegel. 
Considering this, it is questionable whether Postone's analysis of Marx's "social 
appropriation" of Hegel, which he distinguishes from the more typical idea of a 
"materialist" appropriation, itself fully captures either Marx’s own relationship to 
Hegel or that relationship's potential for a contemporary critical theory of 
capitalism, which encompasses a potential for overcoming it.
There are several instances in which Postone demonstrates his 
contention that an important dimension of Marx's theory can be explicated in 
reference to a "social appropriation" of Hegel, which at the same time discloses 
severe limitations in practically the entire range of post-Marx Marxism. While 
this is so, it is questionable whether such a conception of Marx's relationship to 
Hegel exhausts either Hegel's own potential relevance for contemporaneity, or 
Marx's relationship to Hegel particularly. Perhaps the pivotal example is
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Postone’s equation of Marx's concept of capital with Hegel's Absolute, an 
equation I will discuss below.
First, Postone presents Marx's analysis of the "fetish" character of the 
commodity as the intermediate stage between the young Marx's concept of 
alienation, still on the basis of a transhistorical concept of labor, and the fully 
“unfolded" concept of capital. In the latter, abstract labor "shapes” concrete 
labor. Abstract labor "subsumes" the worker. Postone, unlike Habermas, 
recognizes the structure of Marx's analysis where, in addition to transformation 
of concrete labor into abstract labor, there is a transformation of abstract into 
concrete. He, in fact, grants to the latter movement the distinguishing feature of 
capitalism. In this way, his analysis surpasses TCA, wherein Habermas views 
the conceptual movement, at least in respect to labor, as a movement from the 
concrete to the abstract only. But Postone situates his own analysis of "abstract" 
labor and alienation-in so far as it grasps Mane's concept of labor as a concept 
of social mediation--in respect to debates around Habermas's early KHI. These 
included the question of whether Marx's concept of labor was,
sufficiently synthetic to fulfill all that Marx demanded of it, or whether the 
category of labor needed to be supplemented conceptually with a sphere 
of interaction (Postone 1993, 158).
Remaining within such a framework necessarily confines a reinterpretation of 
Marx's theory to capturing the essential features of existing society. This is the 
level of social theory as critique, or critical theory, but does not grasp Marx's 
appropriation of Hegel's negation of negation in terms of the potentiality of 
revolutionary social transformation.
Recall that in a previous chapter (see Chapter Three) I discussed 
Habermas's analysis of the movement of a "subterranean” Marx (from the 1844
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Manuscripts to the Grundrisse). In respect to this analysis, I showed the power 
of Postone's re-interpretation of Marx's concepts of labor and wealth in its ability 
to criticize Habermas's approach. The power of Postone's approach was 
manifest not only in its ability to criticize particular arguments of Habermas 
having to do with Marx, but in its implication that Habermas's own theory was 
shaped, in crucial respects, by mistaken conceptions of Marx's ideas.
Much of Postone’s analysis of Habermas's treatment of Marx was 
centered on a criticism of texts in KHI, where Habermas explicitly analyzed 
Marx's works. Postone's analysis of TCA does not and cannot so directly 
engage Habermas's treatment of Marx's basic concepts. As I have already 
described in respect to TCA, in contrast to KHI, there is an explicit tension 
between, on the one hand, Habermas's statement of his intentions in respect to 
Marx's theory, along with the form of his subsequent presentation (in which 
there are no direct references to Marx's text) and, on the other hand, his actual 
argument. Thus, at least immediately, it seems unquestionable when Postone 
does not directly address the circumstance that Habermas's analysis of Marx in 
TCA takes as its starting point the relation of concrete and abstract labor, the 
dual character of the commodity as its product, fundamental to Marx's theory. 
Postone's presentation implies that his criticism of “Marxism as Critique" and 
KHI is sufficient in respect to Habermas's treatment of these concepts. Yet, 
Habermas's "new" approach in TCA, particularly the affinity with Postone of his 
analysis of the young Marx, is crucial for grasping Postone's decision to not 
break from the Critical Theory tradition, while leveling the strongest possible 
critique.
The consistent failure of “traditional" Marxism (where Postone's own 
analysis implies even Critical Theory belongs) to grasp the categories abstract 
and concrete labor and their implications for overcoming “state" capitalism is a
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central theme of Postone's work. Surprisingly, however, Postone does not 
note, let alone directly analyze, this new, unprecedented development in 
Habermas’s approach. Following from this, I want to examine whether his not 
doing so is somehow related to the limitations of his argument concerning 
Marx's "social appropriation" of Hegel versus a "traditional" materialist 
appropriation, that is, is sufficient in terms of possible conceptions of the Hegel- 
Marx dialectic.
Essence and Notion in Postone's Critique of Critical Theory's Approach to
Marx's Theory
In Postone's analysis, a “social appropriation" of Hegel's dialectic refers 
to Marx's "explanation" of Hegel's philosophy, the latteris concepts of Essence 
and Notion, especially the Absolute's situation in the latter. In Postone's view, 
determinate social relations issue forth forms of objectivity and subjectivity. 
Generally, Postone's analysis proposes to develop a socio-historical 
epistemology in which subject/object relations themselves characterize 
specifically capitalist social relations. Thus, Hegel's philosophy, Hegel's self- 
understanding notwithstanding, can be understood as the philosophy most 
adequate to a particular socio-historical form of society, the capitalist. Marx, in 
specifying this social form, was able to situate and explain the "universality" 
characteristic of Hegel's Absolutes. In Postone's view, contrary to traditional 
Marxism, wherein the proletariat was the subject, and capital was the object (or 
in the radicalized, critical perspective of Lukacs, where implicit in the proletariat 
was subject/object identity) Marx analyzed capital as the Subject of history, the 
unfolding Absolute subsuming difference in realizing itself. As Postone cites 
Marx in Capital, when it has reached its mature form, capital is a "self-moving 
substance" which "moves itself" (Postone 1993, 75).
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Postone's type of analysis implies a sufficiency of merely deepening 
what he sees as Marx's own trajectory-secularization of Hegel's mystified 
dialectic-despite decades of a Marxist tradition presumably already expert in 
that procedure. Postone implies (in substantial accord with Habermas) that 
Marx’s 1844 Economic-Philosophic Manuscripts did not go beyond Feuerbach, 
and he explicitly, "rejects the humanist reaction to structuralist neo-objectivism, 
which fails to recognize the major changes in the development of Marx's 
analysis" (Postone 1993, 74).
In connection with this, in a comparison of Marx's relationship to 
Feuerbach's and Hegel's thought within the 1844 Economic-Philosophic 
Manuscripts, I criticized Habermas's view that Marx did not really "go beyond" 
Feuerbachian materialism in the 1844, "Critique of Hegelian Dialectic and 
Philosophy in General". I pointed out that in these manuscripts Marx already 
made clear that Feuerbach's "naturalistic" inversion of Hegel was itself 
inadequate, though it did represent for Marx the only truly critical approach to 
Hegel's philosophy among the radical Young Hegelians. According to Marx's 
manuscript, it was not sufficient to demonstrate that in religious representations 
could be found projections of man's natural conditions, or that his social 
relations were reflected in mystified, religious or metaphysical forms.
Postone's argument concerning Hegel's Absolute is similar to (while 
developing) the one I showed Marx criticized in Feuerbach, propelling Marx to a 
return to Hegel, a movement undetected in Habermas's analysis as well. 
Postone’s argument is essentially that Marx explained Hegel's dialectic, outside 
Hegel's own consciousness, as merely a reflection of the movement of capital. 
This is contrary to Marx's own assessment of the power of Hegel's philosophy, 
specifically the concept of negativity, even within the 1844 manuscripts, where 
Hegel was also strongly criticized.
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In the 1844 "Critique of Hegelian Dialectic", Marx returns to an idea of 
the preeminence of Hegel after appreciating Feuerbach's criticism of him. Key 
passages, which describe how Marx preserved Hegel's original dialectic, and 
which I singled out earlier, included Marx's references to, on the one hand, 
labor (where Marx sees a fundamental similarity in Hegel and political economy 
in their inability to grasp its "negative" side) and, on the other hand, Hegel's 
notion of negativity when it is consistently developed, ie; not separated from an 
analysis of labor's specificity, its dual character in capitalism. Then Marx grasps 
Hegel's concept of negativity as the "creative and moving principle of Hegel's 
dialectic", transcendence as objective, what Marx conceived (before, within and 
after 1844) as adequate to a "revolution in permanence" (Dunayevskaya 1991), 
necessary for overcoming capitalism. Following this, when Marx analyzes 
Absolute Knowledge in Hegel's Phenomenology, he indicates that, in addition 
to a dual concept of a labor and a philosophy of negation of negation, a 
dialectical concept of revolutionary social organization is suggested in Hegel's 
thought (See Chapter Three).
Now, with consideration of Postone's counter-posing of the alternatives 
of Marx's "materialist" or "social" appropriation of Hegel, it becomes possible to 
look again at the further importance Marx already (even in the same text 
following his appreciation of Feuerbach's approach in 1844, and before fully 
working out his concept of Capital) attributed to Hegel's Absolute, and therefore 
the necessity of explaining (appropriating) it. Such an appropriation, as 
conceived by Marx, meant the need for its re-concretization in each new 
presentation of his theory. In the 1844, "Critique of Hegelian Dialectic" recall 
that Marx's return to Hegel, after appropriating Feuerbach's criticism, was 
already at the level of Hegel's Absolute (Absolute Knowledge in the 
Phenomenololgy). In this context, Marx grasped the core of Hegel's philosophy
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as "negation of negation," appropriating the transcenent movement of Hegel’s 
dialectic. At the same time, Marx criticized Hegel's making an abstraction of 
nature, including the natural attributes of man. This is clearly the identical form 
in which Marx later (in Capital) developed concrete and abstract labor, as well 
as an idea of the shaping of the former by the latter. Hence, the form of Hegel's 
negation of negation is central in both the early and late expressions of Marx's 
theory, in that it appropriates the internal movement of Hegel's Absolute. Marx 
criticized in Hegel's philosophy the de-humanization not only of that which was 
external to philosophy, but philosophy (and the philosopher) as well. This 
particular criticism was at the core of Marx's own concept of a dialectical 
working out of philosophy and non-alienated forms of organization (in 
attempting a relationship to mass social movements) which aimed at 
overcoming this dehumanization, no longer merely contigent but as crystalized 
in the movement of the developing social form itself (See Chapter Three).
Postone's outline of a socio-historical epistemology (derived from Marx's 
Grundrisse and Capital) implies an identity of chronological and theoretical 
"maturity" in Marx's development of concepts. But while Marx may indeed have 
sharpened over time a socio-historical theory of knowledge, such a conception 
reflexively moved to the center of his social theory early humanist concepts, 
rather than (as Postone holds) merely kept them as "concerns" while further 
"secularizing" his approach in the interest of an adequate "critical theory" of 
capitalist society, a perspective (in tune with the critical theory tradition 
generally) which denies Marx's theory contained a worked out dialectic of 
philosophy and organization, either social or political. Postone considers the 
implications (for social and politcal organization) of his own re-interpretation of 
Marx in his concluding chapters, but seems to believe that these are 
contemporary issues outside Marx's concerns as expressed in his "mature
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critical theory". Both Postone and the critical theory he attempts to criticize and 
develop fail to see that such a concept of philosophy and organization was 
intrinsic to Marx's theory. In fact, it is perhaps the strongest link between the 
early and mature Marx (Dunayevskaya 1991). According to my analysis, 
neither Marx's 1844 critique of Hegel, nor particularly Marx's concept of 
alienation, can be fully explained as superseded by attribution to him of a later 
more fully devloped perspective of a socio-historical epistemology, the core of 
which was a qualitatively developed concept of labor, that is, merely stripped of 
Marx's early supposed transhistorical assumptions. Further consideration of 
this is possible by briefly continuing to follow Postone’s analysis, in Part II of his 
work, of Marx's concept of the commodity. In "Abstract Labor and Alienation", 
Postone writes,
...it is clear that Mane's mature critique succeeds in grasping the "rational 
core" of Hegel's position-in this case that objectification is alienation--by 
analyzing the specificity of labor in capitalism. I noted earlier that a 
"materialist appropriation" of Hegel's thought on the basis of an 
historically undifferentiated notion of "labor" can apprehend socially 
Hegel’s conception of the historical Subject only in terms of a social 
grouping, but not in terms of a suprahuman structure of social relations. 
We now see it also fails to grasp the intrinsic (albeit historically 
determinate) relation between alienation and objectification. In both 
cases, Marx's analysis of the double character of labor in capitalism 
permits a more adequate social appropriation of Hegel's 
thought... (Postone 1993, 160).
In the following section, "Abstract labor and the fetish", Postone 
concludes his analysis of abstract labor and Marx's "social appropriation of 
Hegel" by referring to the final part of Chapter One of Marx's Capital, "The 
Fetishism of the Commodity and Its Secret". He begins by recalling that in his 
own initial section on abstract labor he had noted the problem of explaining why 
Marx (in Volume One of Capital) began his own discussion of abstract labor
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(characteristic of capitalism) by presenting it as physiological labor. Postone 
attributes this to Marx's immanent analysis:
The appearance of labor's mediational character in capitalism as
physiological labor is the fundamental core of the fetishism of capitalism
(Postone 1993, 170).
This judgement follows from a several page analysis in which he depicts 
Chapter One of Capital on the commodity as, on one level, a deliberate 
appropriation of Hegel by Marx. Postone’s view of Marx's critical "immanent 
analysis", here of the commodity as a form of appearance of labor in general 
(transhistorical) as socially mediating, implies that Marx's "fetishism of the 
commodity" section (in merely negating this appearance) did not, and could not, 
"appropriate" (Hegel's) Notion (in which the Absolute appears). Since Postone 
identifies only the fully developed concept of capital with Hegel's Absolute, for 
him commodity (as fetish) refers only to Hegel's concept of Essence. (Here it is 
necessary to recall that Hegel's Logic unfolds the Absolute from Being through 
Essence to Notion, the latter containing the section on the Absolute Idea). 
According to Postone, Marx's "social appropriation" of Hegel, as opposed to 
traditional Marxism's "materialist appropriation" (which Postone, remarkably, 
equates with the young Marx) is distinguished in that while traditional Marxism 
looks "behind" the commodity and finds mere expenditure of labor as 
constitutive of value, actually Marx's analysis identifies the constitution of value 
as the function of socially mediating labor, which is specific to capitalism.
Marx's immanent mode of presentation itself explains the widespread 
misapprehension characteristic of attempted "materialist appropriations” of 
Hegel:
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The fetishized appearance of labor's mediating role as labor in general, 
taken at face value, is the starting point for the various social critiques 
from the standpoint of “labor" I have termed "traditional Marxism". The 
possibility that the object of Marx's critique can be transformed into what 
traditional Marxism affirms with its “paradigm of production" is rooted in 
the circumstance that the core of capitalism, according to Marx, has a 
necessary form of appearance that can be hypostatized as the essence 
of social life...(Postone 1993, 170).
Postone introduces this point earlier with his observation that,
It is labor's unique role in capitalism that constitutes labor both as an 
essence and as a form of appearance. In other words, because the 
social relations characterizing capitalism are mediated by labor, it is a 
peculiarity of that social formation that it has an essence (Postone 1994, 
166).
Thus, Postone, in effect, argues that Hegel's categories of essence and 
appearance--and Hegel's key philosophical argument that "essence must 
appear" (and that, therefore, appearance is no less essential than essence)- 
are adequate categories for illustrating Postone's interpretation of Marx's 
procedure of "social appropriation" of Hegel's dialectic at the categorical level of 
Marx's “Fetishism of the Commodity and its Secret". Here it can be pointed out 
again that in Postone's own immanent analysis (after assessing traditional 
interpretations of Marx), in his reinterpretation of Marx's mature critical theory, 
he begins to analyze the commodity, followed by capital. The last chapter in his 
section on the commodity (which I am analyzing here) first takes up Habermas's 
KHI, then "Marxism as Critique", followed by TCA.
In an earlier chapter (See Chapter Three), I highlighted the power of 
Postone's critique of Habermas's analysis of Marx in KHI. His analysis of 
Habermas's failure to recover and develop Marx's concept of the two-fold 
character of labor as characteristic of the capitalist social formation, and his
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related inability to distinguish between value and material wealth, led me to 
investigate in even more detail Habermas's analysis of the Gmndrisse, 
especially the way in which he related it to Marx's 1844 Economic and 
Philosophic Manuscripts. My study uncovered other points on which to 
question Habermas's reading of Marx, while allowing for an opportunity to 
suggest alternative interpretations. In retrospect, it also becomes clear, 
Postone's critique-unequalled in disclosing the theoretic barrier constituted by 
an historic inability of Critical Theory to grasp Marx's concept of labor and social 
mediation--is importantly shaped, and therefore limited by, Postone's notion of 
Marx's "social appropriation" of Hegel. The main reason for this is Postone's 
failure to discern Marx's concern with a dialectical concept of "organization" that 
was inseparable from his socio-economic explanation of philosophy and, in 
fact, led him back into dialectical philosophy. (Besides Marx's "return" to Hegel 
within "Critique of Hegelian Dialectic and Philosophy in General", the most 
striking example is the Hegelian language permeating the Gmndrisse itself).
For Habermas, and thus for Postone's critique of the latter, at issue is the 
the idea of capital as an automaton, a "moving force that moves itself (a 
description which also fits well Hegel's Absolute, and thus the social 
implications for the control and regulation of "society" following from it). 
Specifically, while Postone (in his re-interpretation of the Gmndrisse) criticizes 
Habermas's conflation of value and wealth, and cogently points out that Marx 
criticized precisely what Habermas suggests he affirms (automatic regulation of 
social relations), Postone does not refer to the parallel analysis in the further 
developed Capitals Chapter One section on "fetishism of the commodity and its 
secret". Marx’s theoretical position there is that only the coming into being of 
"freely associated" relations among people abolishes the fetishism of the 
commodity.
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This suggests that already within Chapter One of Capital, intrinsic to his 
analysis of the commodity, and preceding his unfoldment of the concept of 
capital proper, Marx has already appropriated not only Hegel's "Essence", but 
Hegel's "Notion", as well (Dunayevskaya 1991, 144), here again (thirty-three 
years after “Critique of Hegelian Dialectic and Philosophy in General") as a 
"humanism"-a humanism which can be seen as unfolded from his initial 
determination in 1844 I discussed in an earlier chapter (Chapter Three).
Internal to the commodity form, Hegel's Notion, as appropriated by Marx as a 
humanism, is an expression of the most developed contradiction—that between, 
on the one hand, the automatic regulation of production and society along with 
the predominance of the social relations between things and objective relations 
between persons and, on the other hand, "freely associated" relations, the 
impact of which penetrates even material production. The potential basis for 
the latter was now viewed as creation of material wealth, in place of value.
Such a perspective places at the center the potentiality of the development of 
individual capacities and talents, rather than wealth in general as the aim of 
production.
Postone's chapter on Habermas considers in greater detail than 
anywhere else in the book the contradiction between value and material wealth 
Marx outlined in the Gmndrisse. Yet, oddly enough, it does not directly tie the 
Absolute Marx described explicitly in the Gmndrisse to how he more fully 
worked it out in Chapter One of Capitah Already in the Gmndrisse, Marx writes:
Do we never find in antiquity an inquiry into which form of landed 
property etc. is the most productive, creates the greatest wealth? Wealth 
does not appear as the aim of production...The question is always which 
mode of property creates the best citizens. Wealth appears as an end in 
itself only among the few commercial peoples-monopolists of the 
carrying trade-who live in the pores of the ancient world, like the Jews in 
medieval society. Now, wealth is on one side a thing, realized in things, 
material products, which a human being confronts as subject; on the
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other side, as value, wealth is merely command over alien labor not with 
the aim of ruling, but with the aim of private consumption etc. It appears 
in all forms in the shape of a thing, be it an object or be it a relation 
mediated through the object, which is external and accidental to the 
individual. Thus the old view, in which the human being appears as the 
aim of production, regardless of his limited national, religious, political 
character, seems to be very lofty when compared to the modem world, 
where production appears to be the aim of mankind and wealth as the 
aim of production. In fact, however, when the limited bourgeois form is 
stripped away, what is wealth other than the universality of individual 
needs, capacities, pleasures, productive forces etc., created through 
universal exchange? The full development of human mastery over the 
forces of nature, those of so-called nature as well as humanity's own 
nature? The absolute working out of his creative potentialities, with no 
presupposition other than the previous historic development, which 
makes this totality of development, i.e. the development of all human 
powers as such the end in itself, not as measured on a predetermined 
yardstick? Where he does not reproduce himself in one specificity, but 
produces his totality? Strives not to remain something he has become, 
but is in the absolute movement of becoming?...(Marx 1973, 487-488).
Postone's criticism of Habermas makes clear the severe consequences, for an 
understanding of Marx's theory, of a failure to grasp the two-fold character of 
labor specific to the capitalist social formation. But Postone directs the reader to 
Part III (specifically on capital) of his own work in order to see how Marx unfolds 
his critique of the "automatic regulation of production and society". It is thus 
implied that Part III, "Toward a reconstruction of the Marxian Critique: Capital, is 
the only really appropriate place for a discussion of the mature Marx's treatment 
of the Absolute. Postone writes,
...emancipation would require not the realization but the overcoming of 
the consequences of this mode [capitalist] of social constitution. 
Overcoming the contradiction outlined in the Grundrisse does not, then, 
imply emancipation from hunger and toil alone; overcoming the capitalist 
relations of production, as expressed by the categories of value and 
capital, also entails overcoming the automatic regulation of society... 
Postone 1993, 236-237).
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But Postone's analysis here does not yet return to the individual, to Marx's 
humanist dialectic of the "social individual".
Recall that at this point Postone has already finished considering 
Chapter One of Capital (on the Commodity and Money), an analysis of which 
composes (along with the chapter on Habermas) the entire Part II of his book. 
The significance of the structure of his argument, then, can be seen in one of 
Postone's most original substantive claims—that Marx rooted the possibility of 
overcoming the automatic regulation of production and society in the potentiality 
of "dead labor", exclusive of "living labor" (which he equates with a social 
existent~“proletarian labor").
In his consideration of TCA, in opposing Habermas's contention that 
Marx's critique of capitalism was essentially romantic in its misguided nostalgia 
for destroyed traditional (including proletarian) forms of life, Postone writes,
Marx's vision of emancipation, which follows from his analysis, is 
precisely opposite of what Habermas attributes to him. Jumping ahead 
for a moment, I shall show that, far from conceiving of socialism as the 
victory of living labor over dead labor, Marx understands dead labor-the 
structure constituted by alienated labor-to be not only the locus of 
domination in capitalism but also the locus of possible emancipation.
This makes sense only when Marx's critical analysis of capitalism is 
understood as one that points toward the possible abolition of 
proletarian labor ("living labor"), not toward its affirmation (Postone 1993, 
256)
Yet, according to Postone's own analysis, all the categories Marx develops in 
Capital presuppose the fully developed concept of capital. This is a strikingly 
different feature compared to the "preparatory" Grundrisse. In Capital, within the 
section on commodity fetishism, after he discusses the essence and 
appearance of the commodity (so incisively described by Postone, including the 
observation that capitalist society's specificity consists in the fact that it has an 
essence), Marx proceeds (in a further analysis which Postone does not notice)
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to the realm of the Hegelian Notion, which culminates in the Absolute Idea. 
Marx's analysis in the commodity fetishism section does indeed implicitly 
incorporate "dead labor", or the structure of alienated labor. However, here 
Marx's appropriation of the concept of the Absolute (as containing the highest 
contradiction) unfolded by Hegel in the realm of the Notion (which follows 
Essence in the Science of Logic), does not exclude “living labor" in the 
abolition of proletarian labor. Marx, in fact, explicitly demonstrates the 
specificity of the abolition of capitalism in comparison to the overcoming of 
previous socio-historic forms in terms of social organization of "living labor" in 
thought and activity. After an account of capitalism ("fetishism of the 
commodity") Marx describes the primitive (Robinson Crusoe) and feudal forms 
of production, as well as the religious representations in accord with them. He 
then writes:
Let us imagine, for a change, an association of free men, working with 
the means of production held in common, and expending their many 
different forms of labor power in full self-awareness as one single social 
labor force (Marx 1977, 171-173).
This should be seen as Mane's further working out of the contradiction he 
outlined in the Grundrisse, not only between value and wealth, but between 
conscious social organization and "automatic regulation" of production and 
society. In constrast with both Habermas and Postone, I traced the latter 
problematic's inception to Marx's 1844 Economic-Philosophic Manuscripts 
where, in fact, it was already immanent.
By now it should be clear there is indeed a connection between 
limitations of Postone's powerful critique of the earlier Habermas (up to 1968) 
and his seemingly inexplicable failure to discuss in a direct manner the later 
Habermas's return (in TCA) to analysis of Marx's Capital. Postone's account of
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Habermas’s early treatment of the Grundrisse should have led Postone’s own 
analysis to what Marx had worked out in the later Chapter One of Capital, the 
concept of historic possibility of “freely associated" relations, their effect on 
material production, as the necessary condition for overcoming the 
contradiction intrinsic to the value form of wealth; Marx, in the development of 
this point in Chapter One, went "beyond" the Grundrisse (and later chapters of 
Capital itself), presenting it as the "secret" of the "Fetishism of the Commodity".
Yet, as I have just shown, Postone characterized Marx’s commodity 
fetishism as a socio-historic situation of Hegel’s concept of Essence alone. This 
is related to Postone’s overall thesis that Marx unfolds capital from the 
commodity (as Hegel unfolds the Absolute from Being), two key steps of which 
are the "formal subsumption of labor", followed by the “real subsumption of 
labor" (Postone 1993, 182). The latter refers to chapters of Capital (subsequent 
to Chapter One) wherein is described the shaping of concrete labor by abstract 
labor. These constitute the basis for Postone's position that Marx, in positing 
the abolition of proletarian labor (which Postone equates with "living labor"), 
thus posits "dead labor” as, "not only the locus of capitalist domination, but of its 
possible transcendence" as well. Postone's pursuit of an idea of Marx's 
presentation of a concept of capital as a socio-historic explanation of Hegel's 
Absolute obscures the dialectical presentation fully present in Chapter One of 
Capital, which provides the basis of the resolution of the problem Marx 
identified (or re-identified, considering the 1844 Economic-Philosophic 
Manuscripts) in the Grundrisse.
It is important to see in connection with this that Postone does not directly 
consider Habermas's return to Marx's Capital in TCA. While it is true, as I 
pointed out in the beginning of this chapter, that Habermas takes up Marx in a 
very circumscribed manner (especially so in regard to Capital, where he refers
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exclusively to its interpretations by other contemporary Critical Theorists) his 
analysis in that work tries to critically appropriate what can be described to be 
an understanding of Capital as a socio-historical interpretation of Hegel, 
different from Postone's and, in fact, preceding it by a full decade. Yet, neither 
Habermas (with his acceptance, at least for argument’s sake, of Lohmann's 
idea of capital as a “negative totality"), nor Postone (who understands Marx's 
approach to Hegel in terms of an explanation of the latteris absolute as capital) 
saw the absolute “as new beginning" (Dunayevskaya 1989) Marx already 
embedded in the first Chapter of Capital.
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CHAPTER FIVE
CRITIQUE OF AN INCIPIENT PUBLIC SPHERE: DIALECTIC OF HABERMAS'S 
INTERVENTION IN THE JOURNAL PRAXIS INTERNATIONAL
It is a remarkable that, when viewed from within the post-world War II 
Critical Theory tradition, the attempt to grasp Marx's theory in light of 
contemporary conditions began and concluded with a lack of consensus 
concerning his concept of labor. What makes this doubly remarkable is that 
within Marx's own lifetime he already noted that his concept of labor had been 
"bungled" (Marx 1972, 11), even within the organization whose theoretical 
tendency was in support of his ideas generally. In Critique of the Gotha 
Programme Marx viewed as serious social "retrogression" (Marx 1972, 18) an 
attempt to form a unified German social democratic party on the basis of, or 
despite, such a "bungled” concept. Not a redeemable categorical 
misunderstanding (which might be resolved with organizational unification)
Marx characterized the proposed programme's theoretical core, derived from its 
mistaken concept of labor, as an historical "crime" (Marx 1972, 24) and 
indicated he wished to disassociate from its knowing subordination of 
theoretical achievement to supposed organizational requisites.
As I have demonstrated in previous chapters, Habermas wrote on Marx 
for at least two decades before he found his way to a direct confrontation with 
Marx's concept of the dual character of the commodity, and the two-fold nature 
of the labor which produced it, as the differentia specifica of the capitalist social
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formation. Yet the very inception of Habermas's theory included proposals for 
renewing Critical Theory on the basis of a break from Marx's concept of labor. 
More precisely, the development of Habermas's social theory retained, as a 
permanent feature it turned out, a critique of a concept that, according to even 
his own evolving account, must have miscontrued Marx's theory.
But a decade after the publication of TCA, and also from within the 
Critical Theory tradition, Moishe Postone re-interpreted Marx's “mature critical 
theory", developing labor as the social mediation specific to capitalist society. In 
doing so he provided a convincing up-to-date critique of contemporary 
capitalism and Critical Theory, most extensively Habermas's. On one level, 
Postone formulates his difference with Habermas, in respect to interpretation of 
Marx's theory, as a problem of reflexivity. According to Postone, Marx's 
concepts of labor and capital were developed along with a socio-historic 
epistemology. Aware that an understanding of labor as transhistorical 
amounted to a fundamental barrier to a grasp of the capitalist social formation, 
Marx restricted his own basic concepts to a particular set of social relations.
From the standpoint of his idea of a deepening of the secularization of 
philosophy, Postone attempts to explain subsequent misunderstandings at the 
core of traditional Marxism. Moreover, he attempts to show how these 
misunderstandings are constitutive of limitations of oppositional practice, ie; the 
labor movement, Social Democratic and Communist parties, etc., where 
traditional Marxist thought has been influential (Postone 1993, 371).
But Postone's critique of these forms of opposition to features of 
contemporary capitalism (though sufficient to discredit the traditional Marxism 
integral to them) are derived exclusively from his re-interpretation of what he 
delineates as Marx's "mature critical theory". Thus, Postone cuts away Marx's 
own conceptualization of the relation of philosophy and organization, which
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(though more implicit in his earlier writings) can be traced from "Critique of 
Hegelian Dialectic" (1844) to its most focused treatment in the post-Capital 
Critique of the Gotha Programme (1875). This conceptual development had 
internal to it a continuous return to the dialectic in Hegel's philosophy.
Postone’s interest in the Marx-Hegel relationship is exhausted with a "secular" 
explanation of the latter by the former.
In my examination of the journal Praxis International, where practical and 
theoretical discourse intersected, I will argue that Habermas's intervention 
shaped an incipient public sphere in line with his critique of Marx and Marxism. 
The core of this critique was an attempted theoretical reconstruction of the 
relation of labor and social organization (with implications for the self­
organization of Critical Theory itself) following from more than one experimental 
separation of Marx from Hegel, the two of which, in the end, he rejoins and 
abandons as inimical to an adequate contemporary social theory.
The central purpose here is to deepen my analysis of Habermas's 
peculiar relationship to Marx’s thought. As Postone has remarked, Habermas’s 
mistaken conceptions of Marx's ideas blunted the critical edge of his own 
theory. He understood the latter, contrasted with the former, as adequate to 
contemporary society; but, since his grasp and presentation of some of Marx’s 
basic ideas are problematic, this self-understanding is thus rendered 
questionable. My analysis will attempt to make clear that Habermas's 
projection of his self-understanding of the distinctiveness of his own theory vis a 
vis Marx's, as it emerged in the 1980s, achieved its goal in many respects; but 
in the process the independent cogency of Habermas's theory was rendered 
even more clearly problematic. This is only partly due to the fact that 
Habermas's critique of modernity and Marxism loses much of its pull along with
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the disintegration of the political and economic power (in East Europe and the 
Soviet Union) associated with the traditional Marxism Habermas assumed.
Praxis International was the descendant of the semi-underground 
dissident international Marxist Humanist journal, Praxis, published in the former 
Yugoslavia. However, the historical and theoretical landscape was shifting 
rapidly. Habermas's TCA appeared in 1981, as did the journal, but now in 
England rather than in the former Yugoslavia. Just when the fact that non- 
Stalinist Yugoslavia had long since found itself unable to tolerate a dissident 
Marxist tendency represented by Praxis might have seemed to point to the 
power and long term determination and prospects of the ruling regimes, not 
only in non-aligned Marxist Yugoslavia, but in the aligned Marxist East bloc 
generally, the Solidarity movement burst on the scene and shattered the Polish 
Communist Party. Martial law descended upon the land. Perhaps 20 million 
workers went out on strike in an oppositional social movement in some ways 
unparalled in the post-World War II period. In my concluding chapter I will 
return to this congruence of pivotal events--the publication of TCA and the 
emergence of Polish Solidarity. Here I just want to note that the historical 
simultaneity of TCA, Polish Solidarity and the disintegration of Communism in 
central and eastern Europe, including the Balkans and the Soviet Union itself, 
presents a potentially instructive challenge for any attempt to grasp the 
relationship between Habermas's theory, Marx, Marxism and social revolution 
in the post-World War II world.
Though rarely noted, Habermas contributed substantially to the founding 
of Praxis International. Richard Bernstein (an American), along with Mihailo 
Markovic (a Yugoslav) were the journal's founding editors. In his Introduction to 
Habermas and Modernity (Bernstein 1985), a collection of 1980s writings which 
appeared in the journal and were concerned with Habermas's theory, Bernstein
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wrote that Habermas, “epitomizes the ideals of Praxis International' (Bernstein 
1985, 32).
Quite likely unknown to Bernstein, Habermas was developing nearly 
simultaneously a theoretical presentation of his radical separation from the 
"praxis philosophers", in the series of lectures, published under the title, 
Philosophical Discourse of Modernity, Habermas questions praxis philosphy's, 
"connection with the conception of reason" (Habermas 1990a, 75).
In contrast, Bernstein concluded his introduction to Habermas and 
Modernity (where he projected a growing "unity" of Habermas and praxis 
philosophy) with a passage taken from Habermas’s "Reply to My Critics", an 
earlier exchange (Thompson & Held 1981, 221): "...[the claim to reason 
develops a] stubbornly transcending power, because it is renewed with each 
act of unconstrained understanding," and with, "each moment of living together 
in solidarity".
Recall for a moment Habermas’s several (somewhat puzzling) illusions 
to Stalin's theory in "The Reconstruction of Historical Materialism". Habermas 
identifies it as the tendency among the varieties of Marxism which was in "need 
of reconstruction". Habermas described theory reconstruction as, "taking a 
theory apart and putting it back together in a new form" (Habermas 1979, 95). 
Such a description seems to imply a "reformist" approach to what many have 
regarded as the most vulgar, if not sinister, perversion of Marx's thought. Recall 
also that "Reconstruction of Historical Materialism" dismissed the young Marx 
as well as Adorno as representing theories which precluded "levels" in terms of 
social analysis and, as such, were not viable subjects for Marxism's potential 
“reconstruction". Also, as early as in his major essay on Marx in Knowledge 
and Human Interests Habermas rather bluntly dismissed thinkers such as 
Marcuse and the Czech dissident Marxist philosopher Karel Kosik, arguing
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
242
(among other issues) that they misunderstood the young Marx's concept of 
labor which, according to Habermas at the time, was a key concept of Marx's 
"metacritique of Hegel". Here, and later, Habermas viewed Marx’s theory as 
essentially a materialist (if not economistic) theory of social evolution, which 
included a materialist appropriation of Hegelian logic (Habermas 1979, 96).
If Bernstein, in his introduction to a volume of essays concerned with 
Habermas's theory, seemed a pains to present a united front of dissident 
Marxist Humanism with Habermas's theory, this was consistent with the peculiar 
manner in which he portrayed "praxis philosophy's" attitude as essentially 
conformist in respect to the social relations which prevailed in Tito's Yugoslavia 
on the eve of that country’s social collapse, its plunge into a nightmare of 
genocide:
The Praxis group considers themselves loyal and comitted members of
Yugoslav society working in the tradition of Marxist humanism (Bernstein
1985, 31).
The implications of such an assessment are numerous, including a surprisingly 
positive assessement of prevailing social conditions, and the possibility of 
maintaining a genuinely critical stance in the shadow of Communist Party 
domination in the former Yugoslavia. Thus, as late as 1985, a thinker of the 
stature, and in possession of the theoretical links, of Richard Bernstein appears, 
at least with the hindsight of the late 1990s, in a dizzying position of 
disorientation. It seems that all the theoretical and practical discourse in the 
world failed to steer this milieu generally from its descent into a morass of 
illusory self-confidence and progressive intellectual "unity". Though the thrust of 
my analysis has been critical in respect to Habermas's long journey of 
confrontation with Marx’s thought, it is evident in examining the inception of his
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approach to PI that he, compared to other theoretical tendencies, was clearly 
more prepared to present a coherent explanation—whether or not one accepted 
it—of the contemporary status of Marx's theory. None the less, here I am not as 
concerned with comparing varying diagnoses of the state of contemporary 
theories as I am with examining how Habermas's theory in particular depended 
upon, and was molded by, inadequacies in his grasp of Marx's concepts.
Keeping this in mind, I want to turn now to a necessarily brief analysis of 
Habermas's "intervention" in PI, the intent not all difficult to discern with a careful 
reading of Albrecht Wellmeris article, "Reason, Utopia, and the Dialectic of 
Enlightenment" (Wellmer 1985, 35-66), as well as Habermas’s own initial 
contribution in memoriam to Herbert Marcuse, "Psychic Thermidor and the 
Rebirth of Rebellious Subjectivity" (Habermas 1985a, 67-77).
Next, I will turn to the 1984 symposium in the journal dedicated to 
discussion of Habermas's ideas. In that special section, Habermas replied 
directly to several essays discussing his work. In the context of the evolution of 
PI, this might have represented a high-point of Habermas's achievement. None 
of the symposium participants challenged (directly, at least) the coming into its 
own of Habermas's critique of Marx. (Thomas McCarthy, only in a later essay 
(McCarthy 1991), seemed to sense, with reservations, Habermas's vulnerability 
in this respect).
The third part of my consideration of PI, while noting the theoretical and 
historical cross-currents involved in the journal's break from its identification 
with Marxism, specifically Marxist humanism, will assess the outcome in terms 
of the status of Marx's theory, taking into account Habermas's TCA critique of 
Marx.
Habermas's Critique of Marcuse and "Praxis Philosophy"
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"Psychic Thermidor and the Rebirth of Rebellious Subjectivity", a 
transcript of a 1980 talk delivered at University of California at San Diego to 
honor the memory of Herbert Marcuse, was included as Habermas's first 
contribution to the re-established PI, its first number appearing in April, 1981.
He begins by establishing that, compared to other critical theorists of his 
generation, Marcuse (according to his own description) was, "an absolutely 
incurable and sentimental romantic" (Habermas 1985a, 70). This is best seen 
in how Marcuse "praised negativity" (Habermas 1985a, 67) (as had other critical 
theorists). Yet, according to Habermas, Marcuse (among them all) was the most 
"affirmative"; he made, "appeals to future alternatives". The question, then, 
which Habermas proposes to address in his talk, is whether this characteristic 
was a "personality trait", or was due to a theoretical position (Habermas 1985,
70). I want to single out two key points he makes on his way to answering this 
question. While not obviously political, they assume a practical/theoretical 
meaning in the context I have just described in respect to the at least implicit 
tensions at the very inception of P I. First, Habermas states,
Since he first joined the Institute, Marcuse had made the most "orthodox" 
contributions to Critical Theory. This is true of his essays in the Zietschrift 
where Marcuse was chosen to write the article, “Philosophy and Critical 
Theory", counter-point to Horkheimer’s famous position paper on 
"Traditional and Critical Theory". But it is also true of his later writings 
including the very last: in Reason and Revolution, in One-Dimensional 
Man and in The Aesthetic Dimension, Marcuse elaborated themes and 
arguments, pursued lines of reasoning, which were more or less shared 
by the whole group (Habermas 1985a, 69).
A few pages later, however, Habermas states that in the years following 
the 1937 "Philosophy and Critical Theory",
...Marcuse elaborated the classical position of Critical Theoiy in careful 
studies of Hegel and the rise of social theory. At the same time,
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Horkheimer and Adorno, who had moved to Santa Monica, had already 
taken a somewhat different line. With Dialectic of Enlightenment they 
definitely lost their trust in the revolutionary dynamic of the productive 
forces, and in the practical impact of negative thinking...(Habermas 
1985a, 73).
What might seem obvious in a comparison of these two passages is that 
Reason and Revolution in the first, classified as just one among several of 
Marcuse's "orthodox" (shared by the whole group) contributions to Critical 
Theory, is the very same work referenced in the second as Marcuse's, careful 
studies of "Hegel and the rise of social theory" (which is, in fact, the subtitle to 
Reason and Revolution), written at the same time (in the midst of the Nazi 
Holocaust) as Horkheimer's and Adorno's radically divergent Dialectic of 
Enlightenment Now, the implication here is that Horkheimer's and Adorno's 
Dialectic of Enlightenment (1944) represented a fundamental break from 
"orthodox" Critical Theory, while Marcuse's Reason and Revolution: Hegel and 
the Rise of Social Theory represented its continuity.
This analysis overlooks key facts. Marcuse's 1941 Reason and 
Revolution, the first work in English to analyze Marx's hitherto virtually unknown 
1844 Economic-Philosophic Manuscripts, represented a further development of 
Marcuse's break with his own philosophic past. Thus, Reason and Revolutions 
essential continuity with the tradition of critical theory was not in general (or the 
elaboration of an "orthodox" position), but only with Marcuse himself. Recall 
that Marcuse, less than a decade earlier (1932) (Marcuse 1972, 1-48) had been 
the first to analyze Marx's 1844 manuscripts when they initially appeared in 
their original German. In a further development, Reason and Revolution was 
the, "first systematic published analysis of Hegel's major works from a Marxist 
standpoint in any language" (Anderson 1993, 244).
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Habermas's 1980 lecture in honor of Marcuse suggests that neither the 
initial appearance of Marx's Economic-Philosophic Manuscripts themselves 
(which Marcuse first interpreted) nor their potential for clarifying the relationship 
between Marx's theory and Hegel's philosophy in the interest of a contemporary 
critical social theory, which Marcuse attempted to further develop in Reason and 
Revolution, represented an alternative basis for the orientation and direction of 
an incipient contemporary Critical Theory. However, what is at issue in the 
context of my analysis is not so much the young Marcuse's philosophic stature 
and orientation vis a vis Marx's thought (compared to Horkheimer and Adorno). 
Rather, the main issue here is the significance of Habermas's 1980 attempt to 
pinpoint chronologically a lasting impact of Heidegger on Marcuse, “in terms of 
personal loyalty...as in terms of philosophical motivations" (Habermas 1985a,
71).
Aside from its condescending tone—perhaps difficult to fully appreciate as 
it is couched in terms of an informal talk-the substance of Habermas's 
argument is that Marcuse's analysis of the "Paris Manuscripts" in no way 
represented a break from Heideggerian philosophy, much less from Critical 
Theory’s incipient neo-Marxism, which Habermas soon intends to show failed 
completely. To the contrary, according to Habermas, Marcuse's analysis 
represented no more than the beginning of existential phenomenology's 
appropriation of the young Marx. The informality, and the affectionate tone of 
the lecture, served to veil its seriously critical quality. For such an informal talk, 
to honor Herbert Marcuse, Habermas reports going to some extraordinary 
lengths. He says,
For the preparation of this lecture Leo Lowenthal lent me a copy of 
Hegel's Ontologie, and in this old copy I found a yellowed cut out from 
feuilleton of the Vossiche Zeitung with a long and intense review of the 
three volumes of Karl Jasper's Philosophie, written by somebody with the
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initials H.M., dated Dec. 14,1933. It is in this context of a criticism of 
Jaspers that we find a passage which indicates, still guarded by clauses, 
Marcuse's detachment from Heidegger. Here, Marcuse insists that the 
formal properties of historicity conceal rather than disclose the substance 
of history. He raises the question, "whether it is not the case that 
particular and contingent situations can destroy the authenticity of human 
existence, can abolish freedom or transform it into sheer illusion." Any 
talk about historicity, he continues, "must remain abstract and 
uncommitted until the analysis focuses on the concrete, 'material' 
situation.
The term "material" is printed in quotes, thereby inconspicuously referring 
to an earlier article of the same author on the recently discoverd Paris 
Manuscripts, not by Karl Jaspers but by Karl Marx. This article shows 
how young Marcuse appropriated the young Marx from the viewpoint of 
existential phenomenology, taking the very notion of Praxis and 
Lebensweit as guidelines for the liberation from alienated labor.
Marcuse was the first Heideggerian Marxist, anticipating the later 
phenomenological Marxism of Jean-Paul Sartre, Karel Kosik, Enzo Paci, 
and the Yugoslav Praxis philosophers (Habermas 1985a, 71-72).
Habermas's lecture reached deeply into recently emergent theoretical 
and practical problems. His connection of Marcuse's Marxism to Heidegger, 
and implicitly to the Marxist humanist tendency with whom Habermas had just 
collaborated in reconstituting the "only Marxist humanist" theoretical journal, 
fulfilled but the first step (A) of Habermas's "ABCs" of what amounted to a 
broadly sketched, though fundamentally based, reminder of his position on the 
past, and (more importantly) virtually non-existent future, of Marx and Marxism 
for the development of a contemporary critical social theory.
Step B, to a part of which I already alluded, has Marcuse himself consign 
to the past his work of the 1930s and early 1940s (Reason and Revolution).
Step C briefly reconstructs Marcuse's acceptance of Adorno and 
Horkheimer's "eclipse of reason" while, unsuccessfully, attempting to 
reconstruct a "rebellious subjectivity" outside of reason, that is, in the instincts.
Habermas summarizes the thesis of Eros and Civilization, "the most 
Marcusian one" (Habermas 1985a, 74):
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Once instinctual repression loses its function for necessary self- 
preservation the two conservative powers [Eros and Thanatos] behind 
the scenes of civilization form a coalition and demand the recalling of 
energies from alienated labor (Habermas 1985a, 75).
Then, higly suggestive of the critique of Critical Theory generally, fully 
worked out in TCA, which appeared in the following year, Habermas explains,
This [Marcuse's] theory has the weakness that it cannot consistently 
account for its own possibility. If rebellious subjectivity had to owe its 
rebirth to something that is beyond~a too deeply corrupted—reason, it is 
hard to explain why some of us should at all be in a position to recognize 
this fact and give reasons in defense of it...However implausible the 
argument may seem, it had the function to preserve in Herbert Marcuse 
one of his most admirable features-not to give in to defeatism...He felt 
the obligation to give theoretical explanations and thereby to ground 
action in reason (Habermas 1985a, 75-76).
However, such attempts (and Habermas concludes with a couple of examples 
where Marcuse appealed to universal morality) are implied to be inconsistent 
with Marcuse's theory.
As I have indicated, it is possible to interpret Marcuse’s approach to 
Marx, especially the work of the 1930s, including Reason and Revolution, in a 
radically different manner. A different interpretation, with an eye to what it might 
still contribute to a contemporary critical theory, would pay closer attention to 
Marcuse's analysis of the Hegel-Marx relationship. (Anderson 1993). My 
purpose here, however, is simply to demonstrate how, at its very inception, 
Habermas's intervention in PI suggested a fundamental opposition not only to 
any notion of a continuing relevance of Marx's theory for today's problems, but 
of either of the two most sophisticated Marxist tendencies as they had hitherto 
developed, Marxist Humanism and Critical Theory itself.
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Wellmer's Programmatic Appropriation of Late Habermas's Social Theory
Albrecht Wellmer's "Reason, Utopia, and the Dialectic of Englighenment", 
placed as the first article in the Bernstein collection, actually appeared a couple 
of years after Habermas's own contribution on Herbert Marcuse in the journal's 
first number. Aside from any advantages Bernstein may have seen in 
disregarding the chronology, for purposes of my study his doing so raises 
interesting questions. The fact is, though a chronological presentation of 
theoretical "events" is not intrinsically superior, Bernstein's collection, in not 
providing dates of publication of the various articles, obscures the dialectic of 
the intervention of Habermas and his supporters into the discussion of Marx and 
Marxism at the opening of the 1980s. Habermas's piece was prepared and 
presented before the publication of TCA. Habermas's fundamental "turn away" 
from a full consideration of the Critical Theory tradition's analysis of Marx, and 
its foreshadowing of Habermas's controversial assessment of the breaking 
apart, or differentiation, of individual thinkers and periods within the Critical 
Theory tradition, was for the most part suggestive and highly implicit.
Albrecht Wellmer's piece, prepared after the publication of TCA, can be 
seen as the first systematic (or perhaps programmatic) presentation of the 
results of TCA in respect to Habermas's conclusions on the status of Marx. 
Habermas has now come to terms with the distinctiveness of his own theory 
versus the entire "critical" tradition, broadly defined. Thus, in placing Wellmer's 
article prior to Habermas's, while perhaps facilitating the comprehension of 
Habermas's earlier analysis of Marcuse, Bernstein closes off an important 
perspective on the internal movement of ideas without which the significance of 
his own journal cannot be understood.
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More than a decade earlier, Wellmer, an early student of Habermas, 
performed a function similar to that represented by his 1982 PI article. His 
Critical Theory of Society (1971) extracted the fundamental critique of Marx 
implicit in Habermas's early work, principally the essays collected in Theory and 
Practice and in the volume, Knowledge and Human Interests.
Because of its apparently programmatic character, I will summarize 
“Reason, Utopia, and the Dialectic of Enlightenment" in some detail. Its 
presentation of Habermas's then current critique of Marx in view, the article 
attempts to demonstrate that Habermas's critical theory, contrasted with Marx's, 
is adequate to a goal of radicalization of democracy in its grasp of the “positive" 
potential of the normative basis of modem social structures.
Divided into five sections, the thirty-one page article attempts a great 
deal. The first part attempts to present Marx's theory in the context of its time. 
This is supposed to be appropriate to a "strategy" of immanent critique. That 
Wellmer is deeply sensitive to "strategy" can be seen clearly in the approach to 
his last section where he writes (in reference to his entire preceding analysis) 
that,
Of course, these statements should be taken with a grain of salt: I am not 
talking here about the substantive content of either Marx's theory or 
Critical Theory as a whole, but about problems of conceptual strategy, 
about problems of depth grammar, as it were...[T]hese metatheoretical 
problems of conceptual strategy evidently have a bearing on the content 
of theoretical analysis as well; it is for this reason that sometimes a 
revision of conceptual strategies appears necessary to save the truth 
content of great theories (Wellmer 1985, 51).
The first section on Marx in his time argues that Marx did not overcome 
the limitations (also present in competing theories) he himself identified as 
necessary to overcome in order to produce an adequate critical theory of 
society. In summarizing this section, I will pay particular attention to arguments
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already familiar from my previous analysis of Habermas's work. In addition, I 
will "read back" into this first section of the essay an idea of "conceptual 
strategy" Wellmer only reveals in his last section. The question here is whether 
Wellmer actually employs in the beginning the notion of “conceptual strategy" 
he reveals only near the end of the article and, if so, to what effect. Finally, this 
will lead to a concluding consideration of whether Wellmer's "conceptual 
strategy" is reflective of Habermas's own approach. Alternatively, if Wellmer's 
analysis is inaccurate in respect to Habermas's theoretical intentions in respect 
to Marx and Marxism I expect to find that misunderstanding the object of critique 
in Habermas's ongoing clarification of his theory. Approaching Wellmer's 
article in this way might make it possible to trace Habermas's own orientation 
and trajectory both in respect to Marx's theory and in terms of his use of a public 
sphere in the interest of crystalizing his self-understanding contrasted with any 
other, including even those who support his basic positions in the way 
supporters generally treat a "founder".
Wellmer begins the first section of his article with a thesis concerning 
Marx's self-understanding of the uniqueness of his theory. Marx, in a lesson 
learned from Hegel, avoided the "futility of opposing ideal, utopian counter­
images to the bad reality of an existing society" (Wellmer 1985, 35). Marx 
distinguished his ideas from ideal conceptions of the future held by socialists 
and anarchists of his time, as well as from what he saw as the mere formulation 
of a problem in, "the reconciliation of opposites in Hegel's theory [which] was for 
Marx only a reconciliation in thought, while in fact it had still to be brought about 
practically" (Wellmer 1985, 35). This description is found in the opening 
paragraph and sets the structure for the ensuing critique of Marx, which is with 
an eye to an idea of Habermas's theory (at least its conceptual strategy) as a
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
252
solution to the aporias of critical theory originating with Marx and extending 
practically all the way to the 1980s.
Certain weaknesses are immediately apparent in Wellmer's argument. 
Contrary to Wellmer's understanding of Marx's critique of Hegel, the "problem", 
in view of my earlier analysis of Marx's 1844 "Critique of Hegelian Dialectic”, 
including the latter text’s permanent ramifications in the development of Marx's 
theory, was not merely that a reconciliation of opposites was in Hegel confined 
to thought. The "secret" (Marx 1967b, 320) of Hegel's reconciliation of 
(accomodation to) state and society, despite the "thoroughly critical" quality of 
his philosophy, was that there was to be found none the less a principle of 
accomodation in his dialectic. Recall that Marx, when analyzing 
Phenomenology of Mind, criticized Hegel's Absolute Knowledge, exemplified in 
Hegel's phrase, "at one with itself in its other as such". This indicated that 
Marx's critique of Hegel's philosophy stood independently, that is, did not 
require (though it did include) a reference to practice generally, much (ess to 
"society".
According to Wellmer, Marx's relationship to Hegel is characterized by a 
sort of division of labor, familiar in the antinomies of "bourgeois society" itself. 
Hegel first achieved the reconciliation in thought Marx sought to carry out in 
practice. But Marx’s text provides evidence that Marx objected, from the start, to 
Hegel's dialectic in thought, at the categorical level. Marx then developed the 
implications of such a critique for thought and practice. I have already 
described how Marx appropriated Hegel's negation of negation, identifing it as 
the revolutionary element in Hegel's philosophy (see Chapter Three). Here it is 
necessary to focus more on its implications for Marx's concept of practice (or the 
practice of philosophy)-a concept which can hardly be fully understood on the 
basis of Wellmer's initial description of Hegel's reconciliation as a model Marx
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employed to imply a future "society". Recall that in connection with an earlier 
discussion of Structural Transformation of the Public Sphere I also emphasized 
Marx's appropriation of Hegel's negation of negation in his analysis of the 
intrinsically contradictory relationship of civil society and state at the basis of the 
peculiarly bourgeois social formation. In view of Mane's critique of Hegel's 
Philosophy of Right (and Marx's critique of Hegelian dialectic proper in 1844 it 
preceded) Wellmer now commits a double mistake.
First, by implication, he attributes to Marx the positivistic presupposition of 
a “sphere" of civil society, the fact of its independent, transhistorical existence 
presumably outside the pale of critical thought. Thus, Wellmer writes that Marx 
merely aimed at a practical negation of the, "loss of 'ethical' life in the sphere of 
civil society" (Wellmer 1985, 36). As I demonstrated in the earlier chapter,
Marx's critique of Hegel's Philosophy of Right was both more fundamental than 
this and at the same time inclusive of an affirmative Hegelian moment, an 
appropriation of the latteris negation of negation. Marx, contrary to Wellmer's 
understanding, did not aim to restore in the future the "ethical life" of a civil 
society, but rather demonstrated the alienated essence, and the dialectical non­
viability of civil society itself, owing to its intrinsic relation to the state.
In the following paragraph, related to how he earlier argued that Marx 
believed that “privatism", or pursuit of individual interest, (or an ethical void) was 
at the basis of capitalist civil society, Wellmer now writes,
The end of capitalism, however, ie; the abolition of private property, will 
according to Marx result in the establishment of a classless society 
(Wellmer 1985, 36).
As I have argued in connection with discussion of Habermas's own texts, Marx 
(as early as 1844) uncovered the possibility that alienated labor was the cause
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of private property (and the oppressive class structure arising from it), instead of 
the reverse. Moreover, Marx wrote that an abolition of private property (or the 
establishment of what he called vulgar communism) could not be the goal or the 
end; rather, Hegel's own dialectic implied non-alienated social relations, what 
Marx termed humanism. Wellmer argues that Marx’s theory—distinguished both 
from Hegel's abstraction from practice and utopian socialism's abstraction from 
theory-is characterized primarily by an attempt to demonstrate, "that 
the...conditions of the communist society were already forming themselves in 
the womb of capitalist society..." (Wellmer 1985, 36). The key words here are 
"forming themselves".
Wellmer writes, again following Habermas's lead (see Chapter Two) in 
appealing to an idea of Marx's insufficient articulation of his own ideas, "Marx, in 
other words, had to transform socialism from utopia into a science, as Engels 
later put it" (Wellmer 1985, 36).
Thus, Marx is rendered scientistic, naturalistic, and deterministic in his 
failed attempt to move beyond "idealism", both of the Hegelian and utopian 
socialist varieties. He fails to specify a normative basis for his critique:
Marx in fact is led back to the impasses of utopian thinking-only now 
they appear in disguised form. For Marx cannot really show that the 
planned economy which he predicts for the time after capitalism will take 
the form of a communist society; consequently, the idea of communism 
remains as much a utopian ideal in his theory it was for earlier socialists 
and anarchists (Wellmer 1985, 36).
His attribution to Marx of an idea of "conditions of the communist 
society...already forming themselves in the womb of capitalist society", is the 
basis for Wellmer's implication that Marx, just as Hegel and the utopian 
socialists before him, failed to develop the conceptual tools necessary for 
breaking through an historical impasse. In fact, Marx's supposed solution
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seems worse than Hegel's idealism or socialism's utopianism because, though 
he really gets no further than his predecessors, the impasses of his theory are 
more difficult to detect: they, "appear in a disguised form" (Wellmer 1985, 36). 
Hence, Wellmer (in a return to an analysis made by Habermas twenty years 
earlier) tries to demonstrate that, due to Marx's unsuccessful attempt at an 
immanent critique of "capitalist commodity production", his vulnerability in 
respect to an adequate concept of social organization can easily be made 
manifest. Or, perhaps more precisely, supposedly it can be demonstrated that 
since Marx's understanding of social transformation is not limited to a concept of 
normativity in respect to social organization, his theory in some ways falls short 
of Hegel's concern (in Philosophy of Right) with an institutionalization of 
freedom, and has little positive to offer beyond typical socialist and anarchist 
ideas.
Utilizing the exact passage from Engels quoted by Habermas twently 
years earlier, Wellmer writes,
With the abolition of capitalism, people will no longer be forced to 
"externalize" their social powers into institutions which then confront the 
individuals with an independent existence and with a logic and power of 
their own. With the background of such assumptions Engels has spoken 
about the transfromation of the domination of humans over humans into 
the administration of things, and Lenin has predicted the, “withering away 
of the state" in the coming communist society (Wellmer 1985, 38).
I have already criticized in connection with Habermas's argument twenty years 
earlier the idea that a formulation from Engels (especially in such a crucial 
context) can substitute for an analysis of Marx (see Chapter Two). Here it is 
clear that Wellmer's reference to Lenin in order to supplement this argument is 
to Lenin's recovery of Marx's Critique of the Gotha Programme, virtually 
undiscussed by Marxists since it had been issued nearly a half century earlier.
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Lenin's analysis of it in State and Revolution on the eve of the Russian 
Revolution notwithstanding, Marx’s 1875 Critique of the Gotha Programme in 
demonstrating the specifically capitalist social organization and the demands of 
a dialectic of theory and organization necessary to overcome it, remains one of 
the "undigested" writings of Marx to the present day (Dunayevskaya 1991; 
Meszaros 1997).
The fundamental error from which Wellmer's argument unfolds consists 
in his misunderstanding of the relationship of Marx's theory to Hegel's thought. 
Marx did not criticize Hegel merely for a reconciliation which was confined to 
thought but, to the contrary, criticized that very reconciliation within thought. At 
the same time, Marx saw a revolutionary element developed in Hegel's 
philosophy, potentially constitutive of revolutionized social relations succeeding 
those of capitalism. The fundamental point of Critique of the Gotha Programme 
was that revolutionary organization take responsibility for an articulation of this 
element--as its primary task. Marx found Hegel’s principle of accomodation in 
Hegel's thought, and purposely distinguished himself from the other "young 
Hegelians" in this respect (Marx 1967b, 316); he therefore certainly did not 
attempt to extend this mode of reconciliation to practice or to a (future) society.
In Marx's view, Hegel's reconciliation in thought constituted a principle of 
accomodation with existing society.
Wellmer argues that a political "strategy", entailing the mere abolition of 
private property thought to lead inevitably to a classless society and a "planned 
economy" (what he identifies as an intended concretization of Hegel's abstract 
reconciliation), long associated with obvious failures of Marxism, is fully 
consistent with the fundamental core of Marx's theory.
Here Wellmer introduces the concept of "associated individuals". Since, 
even in the space of a lengthy essay, he cites a text of Marx on only one
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occasion, this concept’s origin and context in Marx's work is not made clear. 
However, in view of his exposition it is quite likely that he is referring primarily to 
"freely associated men", introduced by Marx in "The Fetishism of the Commodity 
and its Secret" section of Chapter One of Capital. Wellmer relates the concept 
to what he supposes to be Marx’s notion of a communist society which would 
have, "brought [human] metabolism with nature under their conscious and 
rational control" (Wellmer 1985, 36).
But, as should be clear by now, Marx's concept of "freely associated 
humanity" does not refer to "nature". Recall that Marx introduces the concept in 
a disclosure of the commodity's secret—the perspective needed to "see" the 
specificity of social relations of capitalism, while disclosing a real potential to 
overcome them. Recall that in the previous chapter (Chapter Four) I 
documented that Marx's analysis, already in the first chapter of Capital, critically 
appropriates not only Hegel's philosophic concepts of essence and 
appearance, but notion as well. There I argued that Marx's appropriation of 
Hegel's philosophic concepts demonstrates how they point to a society with 
social relations not only different from, but opposite to, those characteristic of 
capitalism. This illustrates how Marx’s critique of Hegel was not simply from the 
plane of practice; rather, Marx makes clear that the revolutionary quality of 
Hegel's philosophy escapes what Hegel understood to be the social bounds. 
Hence, it is impossible to conceive, as Wellmer attempts to, the significance of 
Marx's "freely associated humanity" in terms of "associated individuals" whose 
only barrier to freedom, after the abolition of private property and the institution 
of a rational economic plan, is their metabolism with nature (Wellmer 1985, 37). 
Labor, mediating itself and social relations generally only in capitaiism-though 
appearing to be material and transhistorical-was not, Marx argued, intrinsically
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a mere means of life, in other words, the mediation of humanity and nature, 
determinate of social relations in some ontological sense.
Rather, in a passage in Critique of the Gotha Programme (see p.214) 
Marx demonstrated that, while it is possible (even for Marxists attempting to 
write an organizational programme) to exploit labor in new ways (La Salle's 
concept of the state) in order to once again subsume the individual under the 
social, Hegel's concept of negation of negation points to a potential opposite of 
this. Marx analyzes labor's potential transition from from a “mere means of life" 
and the mediation of social relations, to life's “prime want" or need. In this 
transition, labor need not be and, in fact, cannot be, the “essence" of a society.
Even Wellmer's own argument (its strategy), despite his intentions, points 
to the overriding significance of Marx's Critique of the Gotha Programme in how 
it might inform a conceptualization of the relation of speficically capitalist social 
relations and the requirements of organization of "critical theory" which 
ostensibly aims to overcome them. If Marx's Critique of the Gotha Programme 
could be summarized in a word, it would say that "practice", or its organization, 
when permitted to subsume the fullness of the critical idea already achieved in 
Marx's appropriation of Hegel's dialectic, demonstrated the need to spell out, in 
fully critical terms, negation of negation. After Capital, Marx wanted no part of 
an only apparent opposition (to capitalism) intrinsic to which was something 
other than that philosophic concept (the continuous reappearance of which I 
have traced in Marx) worked out in terms of specifically capitalist social 
relations. But in conceiving the relation of Marx to Hegel, that is, in terms of 
categorical development, Wellmer situates Marx below the achievement of 
Hegel:
As far as the coordination of social interaction and the formation of a
common will is concerned...Marx, in contrast to Hegel, does not develop
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the categories which would allow him to articulate the idea of a free 
association of individuals—given the conditions of modem, industrialized 
societies-beyond its most abstract formulation. Consequently this idea 
[freely associated labor] is abstractly opposed to the system of class 
domination which was the object of Marx’s analysis. Since, however, it 
plays the "theoretical" role of signifying the type of postcapitalist social 
formation which, according to Marx, is already immanent in capitalist 
society, this idea of a free association could only be understood via a 
built-in category mistake...as also spelling out the organizational 
principle of a communist society... (Wellmer 1985, 38).
If it is recalled where Marx first introduces the concept of “freely associated 
humanity", Wellmer's critique of Marx's “abstract formulation", and his failure to 
“develop the categories" cannot be accepted. As I already discussed, Capitats 
categories certainly elaborate “the conditions of modem industrialized 
societies", as well as provide the basis for grasping “freely associated labor* as 
the only concrete perspective for an overcoming of these conditions.
Moreover, while class domination was an object of Marx's analysis it was 
very far from the object. Class domination long predated capitalist social 
relations, the fundamental object of Marx's analysis. Wellmer's “conceptual 
strategy" (which he indicates he borrows from Habermas) is driven (though 
hardly intentionally) by attribution to Marx of precisely what Marx criticized. 
Wellmer writes,
Basically one could say that Habermas has translated the project of 
critical theory of society from the conceptual framework of a philosophy of 
consciousness, geared to a subject-object model of cognition and action, 
into the conceptual framework of a theory of language and 
communicative action. This basic move enabled Habermas to 
distinguish categorically between types of rationality and action—in 
particular between instrumental and communicative rationality and 
action-which for conceptual reasons neither Marx, nor Weber, nor 
Adorno and Horkheimer could clearly keep separate from each other... 
(Wellmer, 1985, 51).
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This passage confirms Wellmer's lack of a grasp of Marx's concept of labor in 
capitalism without which it becomes plausible to postively attribute to Marx's 
theory affirmation of aspects of the social determination of the unity which 
structures capitalism itself. The basis of the latter is a relation of concrete and 
abstract labor, constitutive of an abstract form of social domination. Postone 
has explained Wellmer's type of limited interpretation of Mane's theory by 
focusing attention on the assumption of traditional Marxism, unexamined by 
Critical Theory, that a future non-capitalist society differs from a capitalist society 
primarily (and merely) in that the socially constitutive role of labor is direct and 
transparent in the former, indirect and obscured in the latter (Postone 1993, 10).
Praxis International Symposium on Habermas's Social Theory on the Eve of 
the Collapse of Communism in Eastern Europe
A certain perspective can be gained in viewing the symposium on 
Habermas's theory, which appeared in 1984, against the preceding 
background of Habermas's 1981 contribution in the opening number of PI and 
Wellmer's piece contributed a couple of years later (the two reversed in 
Bernstein's collection). One might have anticipated extensive discussion of the 
status of Marx's theory in a symposium on Habermas ("Modernity and 
Postmodemity") in the aftermath of the publication of TCA, and in the context of 
the fundamental nature of the critique of virtually all forms of Marxism levelled 
by himself and a closest collaborator. Recall that PI, at its inception, described 
itself as the only "Marxist Humanist" journal. What is remarkable about the 
symposium is that there is virtually no mention of Marx's theory or of 
Habermas's critique of Marx and Marxism, let alone any challenge issued to the 
latter. The simplest explanation of this might be that the four authors found 
nothing new in Habermas's up-to-date critique of Marx and Marxism, or found it
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non-controversial. Moreover, they might have shared an assumption that 
Habermas (and the times) had left Mane and Marxism behind.
Perhaps even more surprising is Habermas's reply, titled "Questions and 
Counter-Questions" (Habermas 1985b, 192-216); it is as if he detected an 
unwarranted attitude underlying the various approaches, an attitude not 
conducive to full comprehension of precisely how, and with what 
consequences, he believed that had moved beyond Marx's theory in particular.
Before taking up Habermas’s reply, I will briefly mention the basic themes 
of the other four contributions to the symposium. Richard Bernstein’s 
introduction to Habermas and Modernity, while it was not previously published 
in the PI symposium, none the less prompts Habermas in his "Questions and 
Counter-Questions” to include consideration of Bernstein's current work. Also, it 
should not be overlooked that U.S. theorists supplied all the contributions to the 
symposium. This is relevant in respect to Habermas's subtle but key critique of 
the fact that none of the contributors noticed his fundamentally new approach to 
the concept of “alienation". Habermas writes,
What is perhaps specifically German is the philosophic concept of 
alienation, both in the Hegelian-Marxist version and the early Romantic 
version taken up by Nietzsche.
And, perhaps related to this, Habermas remarks,
An added difficulty is that only McCarthy directs his remarks to my 
more recent works (Habermas 1985b, 197-198).
In a general characterization of the symposium, Habermas writes,
Rorty puts in question the entire undertaking of the theory of 
communicative action. As opposed to this form of questioning, the 
reservations of Martin Jay, Thomas McCarthy, and Joel Whitebook are 
directed toward particular steps in its execution. These authors direct 
their attention to complications in my attempt to work out the concept of
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communicative rationality. Jay points out an under-illuminated aspect; 
McCarthy touches upon a central difficulty; Whitebook deals with a 
problem which emerges as a consequence of the theory (Habermas 
1985b, 198).
While, on the one hand, Habermas seems to question the void in 
discussion in respect to the "specifically German" philosophic theme of 
alienation, on the other hand, in attempting to draw up a balance sheet, or 
coherently summarize the various contributions, he concludes that all of them, 
except Rorty, concede a great deal of the claim he has attached to his working 
out the theory of communicative rationality, including (at least implicitly) its 
critique of Marx.
An examination of Habermas's response as a whole (and to Rorty in 
particular) might demonstrate that Habermas implicitly serves notice on the 
participants, including Bernstein (and excepting only Jay), that while refraining 
from issuing wholesale rejections of Habermas's theory, none was immune to, 
or lacking potentially important affinity with, Rorty's position. Motivating this 
subtle, but actually potentially far more fundamental counter-critique, is 
Habermas's aspiration to vitalize a critical public sphere in line with a diagnosis 
of a dissipation of Marxist energies (an assessment perhaps also derived from 
the threadbare contributions from Marxist humanists in prior issues of the re­
born journal), and a resulting critical theoretic void. An article by Mihailo 
Markovic, Pi's co-editor at the time, illustrates the weakness of the Marxist 
humanist response to Habermas's theory (Markovic 1982). If a symposium in a 
Marxist Humanist journal could take place in which none were prepared to 
counter (or seriously assess) Habermas's critique of Marx and Marxism 
(including the neo-Marxism of the Frankfurt School from which he traced his 
own departure) and how it was fundamental in shaping his own theory, then 
was this in itself demonstrative of an exhaustion of critical energies as such, that
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is beyond too specialized and/or merely current intellectual, or political, 
interests?
The "problem" Whitebook brings to the fore (Whitebook 1985, 140-160) 
as a consequence of Habermas's theory of communicative rationality is 
"materialism". Both Whitebook and Habermas used the term as something of a 
theoretic code for Marx and Marxism. Whitebook, in tracing the incorporation of 
Freud in the theory of the original Frankfurt School's neo-Marxism, and its basic 
alteration in Habermas's theory, suggests that the price of this alteration is the 
loss of much of the claim to originality of the Critical Theory tradition. He sees a 
danger in Habermas's theory of giving up the individual, subjectivity, and the 
concrete, which had previously served to "fill-in" Marx's too objectivistic theory 
of classes.
Thomas McCarthy's contribution, "Reflections on Rationalization in the 
Theory of Communicative Action" (McCarthy 1985, 176-191) provokes by far the 
most extensive response from Habermas. Connected to this is the fact that it is 
the one symposium contribution which takes up the recently published TCA. 
More precisely, it takes up two elements of TCA. According to Habermas’s own 
characterization, McCarthy succeeds in touching upon, "a central difficulty" of 
"communicative rationality". In dissecting a schema, presented in Volume One 
of TCA, of "rationalization complexes" derived from Max Weber's view of 
societal rationalization, McCarthy puts in question both the core of Habermas's 
claim to have developed a concept of rationality adequate to a contemporary 
social theory (White 1989), as well as the status of critical theory, even if a 
successful appropriation of Weber is granted Habermas. When it is recalled 
that Habermas's sharpest critique of Marcuse (though it was presented in a form 
of special appreciation) was that the tetter's theory lacked a concept of 
rationality and, in effect, was the result of an "abandonment of reason", the full
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significance of McCarthy's questioning of Habermas's own concept of rationality 
can be discerned. It should be added, however, that McCarthy by no means, 
directly or indirectly, suggests that what might be seen as his implicit attempt at 
melioration of Habermas's critique of Marcuse and perhaps other more 
"subject", or praxis-oriented forms of Marxism, points to a need for re-evaluation 
of the potential of Marx's theory, or of Habermas's interpretation of it in 
particular. In short, Habermas's description of McCarthy's approach-"touching 
upon a central difficulty of communicative rationality"~as well as Habermas's 
title to his reply-“Questions and Counter-Questions"—accurately reflect the 
carefully circumscribed quality of McCarthy's critique. Yet, in so far as 
Habermas stakes so much on his appropriation, "from within Western Marxism", 
of Weber's theory of rationality, McCarthy's focused attack on this appropriation 
clearly provokes what seems to be a sort of emotional quality in Habermas's 
reply.
Only in some respects McCarthy continues the role he assumed several 
years earlier with the publication of The Critical Theory of Jurgen Habermas 
(McCarthy 1978). The pioneering character of the latter work is reflected in the 
fact that, among the symposium participants, McCarthy's PI piece was the only 
one that focused on Habermas's latest work. But, in contrast to his earlier 
comprehensive study, McCarthy, from the outset, casts doubt on Habermas's 
theoretical direction. In this primarily critical approach, McCarthy highlights, 
with references (McCarthy 1985, 190) the central criticisms of Habermas's early 
work, specifically Knowledge and Human Interests, which were present in the 
1978 study.
McCarthy's critique of Habermas centers on the letter’s presentation (in 
Chapter Two of TCA) of a schema he says is derived from Weber's "Religious 
Rejections of the World" (Habermas 1984). In Weber’s study Habermas finds
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an analysis of cultural modernity and societal rationalization. Habermas 
interprets Weber’s analysis as disclosing differentiated rationality complexes 
characteristic of the West. A reason split into its various parts exists as 
differentiated value spheres-science, morality and art. Connected to these are 
formally defined worlds-the objective, the social and the subjective—and 
corresponding basic attitudes: objectivating, norm-conformative and expressive 
(McCarthy 1985, 177).
In a dense and compressed examination of Habermas's schema, 
McCarthy does not question the interpretation of Weber from which it is derived. 
Rather, he poses questions on the level of the possibility of the internal relations 
the schema delineates. Then, in order to explain the numerous weaknesses he 
finds, he turns to Habermas's discussion of the logic of Verstehen 
(understanding meaning) in Chapter One of TCA: McCarthy writes,
Habermas attempts to establish the very strong thesis that meaning, 
intelligibility and understanding are in the final analysis inseparable from 
validity, rationality and assessment, that, "access to the object domain of 
social action through understanding meaning makes the rationality 
problematic unavoidable. Communicative actions always require an 
interpretation that is rational in approach...(McCarthy 1985, 183).
McCarthy quotes a long passage in TCA in which Habermas explicates the 
internal relation of the rationality problematic and the, "paradigm case of a 
speech act oriented to reaching understanding" (McCarthy 1985, 183-184).
The basic idea is that interpretation depends on familiarity of the conditions 
under which the validity of a speech act is acceptable or would have to be 
acknowledged by a hearer. The only way to gain this knowledge is from the 
context. In this an interpreter must reflect on the reasons a speaker would offer 
in the defense of the validity of an expression. Thus, an interpreter is, "drawn 
into the process of assessing validity claims" (McCarthy 1985, 183). McCarthy
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questions what he calls the "very strong thesis" that interpretation requires 
judgement of validity claims. He writes,
Habermas does...allow for a reaction of "abstention”, of leaving the 
validity claim "to one side as not yet decided"...lt might appear that his 
type of suspension of judgement is nothing else than Weber’s 
Werturteilsfreiheit (value freedom);...but...Weber...thought that questions 
of value were ultimately undecidable in any rationally binding 
sense...Habermas is not a skeptic in such matters. For him normative 
validity claims, no less than truth claims, admit of rationally motivated 
consensus...But even if one grants Habermas's version of cognitivism in 
matters ethical, and even if one agrees that the social scientist can, may, 
and even should adopt a critical stance toward validity claims, the 
questions remains: Must he or she? (McCarthy 1985, 185).
McCarthy's principal objection is to the "methodological consequences" 
(McCarthy 1985, 183) of Habermas’s interpretation and appropriation of 
Weber’s concept of rationality. This criticism turns on Habermas's analysis of 
the schema, which presents nine possible world relations. Habermas states 
that only six of these are "suitable for the accumulation of knowledge", and thus 
rationalizable (McCarthy 1985, 178). The differentiation of just these six world 
relations characterize the West.
Thus, after raising questions concerning Habermas's theory of 
“understanding meaning", McCarthy returns to the schema itself. He concludes 
by arguing that the three world relations not admitting of rationalization 
(according to Habermas's interpretation) might actually not be fundamentally 
different than the six Habermas analyzes as rationalizable. McCarthy traces 
what he sees as the fallacy of Habermas's position to Habemas's implicit 
admission of "complementary" attitudes in the relations he designates as 
rationalizable, while denying the same potential to the relations he excludes 
from rationalizability.
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McCarthy's criticism continues themes present in his original study of 
Habermas’s early theory; Habermas elaborated his differences with McCarthy 
in Critical Debates (1981). These revolve around the social relationship to 
nature, principally Habermas’s view that only an objectifying relation to nature 
can be "theoretically fruitful". Here McCarthy returns to his earlier objection, 
expanding it to the two other relations Habermas now identifies and excludes 
from rationalizability, based on his interpretation of Weber’s “Religious 
Rejections of the World". Essentially, McCarthy is looking for a stronger 
hermeneutic dimension in critical social theory than Habermas appears ready 
to admit. After taking up Martin Jay’s contribution, I will return to some further 
implications of McCarthy's critique in my consideration of the full significance of 
Habermas's reply to the symposium participants.
Martin Jay's “Habermas and Modernism" (Jay 1985, 125-139) traces the 
treatment of aesthetic experience from Walter Benjamin through Adomo and 
Marcuse. Against this background, he then gathers together Habermas's 
scattered statements on the subject, arguing that, while cohering slowly, an idea 
of the aesthetic has emerged as a central, unresolved issue in Habermas's 
theory. Jay pays special attention to the importance of this theoretic dimension 
in assessing the prospects for both filling out Habermas's theory generally, and 
as pivotal in responding to recent critiques of Marxism and neo-Marxism 
(including Critical Theory), such as those of Jean-Francois Lyotard and Andreas 
Huyssen. In addition, Jay indicates with a reference to Thomas McCarthy's 
arguments with Habermas, that even within Critical Theory one of Habermas's 
least clarified themes was that of aesthetic experience.
As I noted earlier, Habermas's response to the various contributions to 
the symposium ("Habermas, Modernity and Postmodemity"), appearing in 
Volume Three of PI, seemed implicitly critical of an apparent lack of awareness
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of the significance of his critique of Marx, and his assessment of the status of 
Marx’s theory, for an understanding of his own theory. An equally important 
aspect of his reply was that it contained not only a serious individual criticism of 
each of the participants (with the possible exception of Jay) but also suggested 
an internal link among apparently quite disparate approaches. Finally, 
Habermas's reply suggested that it was only the maturation of his own theory 
which provided the perspective necessary to forge the unity he ascribes to the 
various contributions, the background against which the particularity (that is, the 
universality) of his own theory could be projected.
That, in a Marxist Humanist journal, no symposium participant chose to 
discuss in a direct manner the relationship of Habermas's ideas to Marx’s, and 
that it was Habermas who flagged this, seemed to serve to round-out and 
extend Habermas's initial position in the very first issue of the journal: 1) Neither 
Marxist Humanism (nor praxis philosophy which Habermas believes is 
traceable to Marcuse’s "Heidegerrian Marxism"), nor Critical Theory in the mold 
of Horkheimer’s and Adorno’s, were adequate to a contemporary standard of 
rationality; and, 2) that there was no alternative to a grasp of his own theory of 
communicative action and reason as a whole in confronting this unavoidable 
rationality problematic.
To begin with, it would have been difficult for Habermas to pose in a 
sharper manner his theoretical difference with the co-editor of PI, Richard 
Bernstein. This issue might be approached in view of Hegel's Science of Logic, 
where the absolute idea contains the "highest degree of opposition" (Hegel 
1976, 824), ie; the practical and and the theoretical idea.
The structure of the beginning of Habermas’s "Questions and Counter- 
Questions" (Habermas 1985b, 192-216) is the key to grasping the way he 
shapes the symposium as a whole. Habermas begins with some general
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comments aimed at establishing a minimum commonality among all the 
symposium participants, including himself. They are, "concerned if not with the 
same problems, then at least with the same themes" (Habermas 1985b, 192). 
He contrasts this situation with controversies among adversaries who, “feeling 
that their identity is threatened by the other’s fundamental convictions, struggle 
with rhetorical weapons" (Habermas 1985b, 192). It is this latter condition, 
Habermas then argues, which charaterizes “the modem experience", or what 
he says Hegel called the shattering of naive consensus as an impetus for "the 
experience of reflection" (Habermas 1985b, 192). In this way Habermas views 
the symposium self-reflexively. According to this philosophic/historic approach, 
then, the symposium can be viewed either as a function of modernity (in so far 
as Habermas adds that, "In the framework of our culture, invested as it is with 
reflection, the thrust of this experience had to be worked through politically but 
also philosophically") (Habermas 1985b, 193), or its negation: “We cannot 
simply wish this experience away; we can only negate it" (Habermas 1985b, 
193).
Habermas’s starting point is philosophy. From the vantage point of the 
mid-1980s, the "modem experience" has the fluidity of a spectrum, running from 
historicism to transcendentalism. These two poles are also in tension. In 
characterizing the state of philosophy in this manner Habermas also selects out 
from among the symposium participants the philosophers. In comparison to 
himself, then, he begins his response with a consideration of the views of 
Richard Rorty and Richard Bernstein. Commenting that no one who gives the 
situation of a tension between historicism and transcendentalism, "much 
thought would want to be left in this bind" (Habermas 1985b, 193), Habermas 
states that he, Rorty and Bernstein react to it in different ways.
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In a comparison of Rorty and Bernstein, Habermas concludes that Rorty 
(in seeing philosphy itself as the sickness whose symptoms it previously and 
unsuccessfully tried to cure) absolutizes the perspective of the observer while 
Bernstein (who, "refuses to regard the procedural unity of rationality within the 
historical and cultural multiplicity of standards of rationality as a question that is 
accessible to theoretical treatment...") absolutizes the perspective of the 
participant (Habermas 1985b, 196). While he does not directly pose it as a 
conclusion, the idea seems to be that neither Rorty nor Bernstein, from their 
respective standpoints of observer and participant, escape the bounds of the 
historicism/transcendentalist spectrum.
More importantly, in his description of Rorty's advice (that, "philosophers 
need only recognize the hybrid character of their controversies and give the 
field over to the practicioners of science, politics and daily life to be rid of the 
problem") (Habermas 1985b, 193-194) and Bernstein's conclusion to Beyond 
Objectivism and Relativism (Bernstein 1983) (that the utility of philosophy is 
restricted to the horizon of practical reason) (Habermas 1985b, 196) Habermas 
might be understood to be saying that only his own theory offers an alternative 
to the “end of philosophy" thesis, taken up most directly and extensively in 
postmodernist theory. Rorty and Bernstein, certainly aware of the "bind of 
historicism and transcendentalism", propose symmetrical, though each 
unsatisfactorily one-sided solutions. Next, in a single paragraph, Habermas 
makes a succinct case for precisely how his own theory (which he calls a third 
path) is superior to that of either Rorty's or Bernstein's, or their theories in 
combination, and overcomes particularly Bernstein's restriction of the potential 
of theory and, by extension, philosophy. The main emphasis in the paragraph 
is, again, the problem of rationality. Habermas writes of his “third path" ("my 
theory of communicative action”) that, "...philosophy surrenders its claim to be
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the sole representative in matters of rationality and enters into a nonexclusive 
division of labor with the reconstructive sciences" (Habermas 1985b, 196). 
(These include theories of the development of human competencies, eg; 
learning and moral development in Piaget and Kohlberg, respectively). Further 
down in the same paragraph, Habermas adds,
This revisionary self-understanding of the role of philosophy marks a 
break with the aspirations of first philosophy (ursprungphilosophie) in 
any form, even that of the theory of knowledge; but it does not mean that 
philosophy abandons its role as the guardian of rationality (Habermas 
1985b, 196).
Then, in a comparison of science and philosophy, which serves to justify 
the autonomy, and reason for existence, of the latter, Habermas refers, with a 
footnote in the text, to the final chapter of TCA: "Unlike the sciences, it 
[philosophy] has to account reflectively for its own context of emergence and 
thus its own place in history..." (Habermas 1985b,196).
While a response to Rorty and Bernstein is the immediate occasion for 
these remarks, it is clear that they are directed more broadly to the symposium 
as a whole, especially to the criticisms developed in Thomas McCarthy's 
contribution. In fact, in both these "introductory" remarks and in his reply to 
McCarthy Habermas refers to precisely the same page in the final chapter of 
TCA. Thus, there is a clear indication that Habermas believed that his recently 
completed TCA went some way toward answering questions, implicit and 
otherwise, raised in the symposium as a whole. Interestingly, as I indicated in 
Chapter One, an analysis of the metatheoretical implications of Marx's 
approach to labor in the Grundrisse served as the model for Habermas's self- 
understanding of "the context of emergence and thus its own place in history" of 
his own theory.
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Habermas is hostile to Rorty's "bid adieu" to philosophy as such. It is 
apparently Rorty's judgement that Habermas's approach does little to alter a 
situation of an exhaustion of philosophical discourse. Habermas attributes this 
to Rorty's notion that Western logocentrism defines the potential of philosophy 
as such, rather than the specific manner in which a full spectrum of rationality 
potential present in the modem lifeworld has been cut-off by a “restriction of 
reason to its cognitive-instrumental dimension" (Habermas 1985b, 197). Here, 
Habermas adds parenthetically, "...a dimension, we might add, that has been 
noticeably privileged and selectively utilized in processes of capitalist 
modernization" (Habermas 1985b,197).
The mode of presentation of his position here is key to my attempt to 
illuminate his dual aim in the symposium to both emphasize the importance of 
the Marxist perspective in order to gain a full appreciation of the potential of his 
critique of it, and bring to the foreground the singularity of the achievement of 
his own theory. Habermas appears to concede Western "logocentrism" and 
even accept it as an indication of an exhaustion of philosophical discourse, at 
least as one possibility. He in fact states that the alternative is nothing less than 
a transformation of philosophy (Habermas 1985b, 197). However, it is 
Habermas’s view that Rorty attributes to “philosophy as such" not only 
conceptual limitations, or limitations of the conceptual, but destructive practical 
effects. Habermas sees Rorty particularizing the modem need for self­
reassurance in, that first, he attributes to intellectuals creation of a capricious 
problem and second, identifies the latter with Germany especially. Habermas 
believes that Rorty's argument, that an unnecessary problem is created by the 
response, the weltshmerz, of small circles of intellectuals to the loss of a world 
along with the religious beliefs of their fathers, implies an unmistakably 
conservative attitude toward critical thought and is associated with serious
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political ramifications. Yet, Habermas does not approach the issue directly 
through a discussion of any political differences he might have with Rorty. 
Rather, he raises the question of whether Rorty's diagnosis of the times is based 
on a misplaced theoretical specification. Habermas argues that both German 
idealism and the best of American pragmatism were motivated by the attempt to 
find an equivalent in reason for the social integrative powers of the religious 
tradition, which were shaken by the Enlightenment. Since Rorty identifies 
himself with thinkers in the tradition of American pragmatism, Habermas’s 
observation both serves to open to question Rorty's apparent attempt at a 
separation of himself from his object of criticism, and point to the objectivity of 
the direction philosophy has taken, contrary to Rorty's interpretation, an 
interpretation nearly completely subjectivistic and culturally-bound, in a too 
narrow, restrictive sense.
Habermas's key point here is that there is, however, something 
"specifically German" relevant to the problem which concerns Rorty. In 
identifying it as "the philosophical concept of alienation", Habermas intends to 
strongly dispute the idiosyncratic quality Rorty attaches to what Habermas 
regards as the necessary and positive features of critical social thought. This 
philosophic dimension was not an imposition from outside the vanishing of an 
old world and the beginning of a new, but rather was intrinsic to it. Furthermore, 
the world is neither done with the problem by philosophy washing its hands of it 
and moving on, nor by an "intellectuals as a new class" explanation. Rather, 
Habermas indicates, the problem is still central and unavoidable. It has affected 
contemporary politics in different ways in Germany and the U.S. The 
philosophic concept of alienation has, in one way or another, basically defined 
the current situation in so far as both postmodernism and its target are rooted in
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the concept, that is, "the Hegelian-Marxian version and the early Romantic 
version taken up by Nietzsche" (Habermas 1985b, 197).
Habermas concludes this opening section of his reply, which focuses 
mainly on Rorty's contribution to the symposium, by suggesting that the latter 
confuses cause and effect:
Do not these and similar signs [the uneasiness with the direction of 
modernity and the prominence of postmodern themes in France since the 
1960s, as well as neo-conservative movements in the U.S. and 
Germany] indicate that intellectuals articulate shifts in mood, which they 
in no way invent, but which have instead palpable social and often 
economic causes? (Habermas 1985b,198).
As I previously noted, in both his reply to Rorty, whom he designated as 
the one symposium participant who "put in question the entire undertaking of 
the theory of communicative action" (Habermas 1985b, 198), and his 
engagement with McCarthy, who provoked by far his most extensive response, 
Habermas referred to the final pages of TCA. Recall that in the case of Rorty the 
issue was the defense of philosophy, particularly the continuity of its role as the 
"guardian of rationality". In contrast to the sciences, now philosophy must, 
"account reflectively for its own context of emergence and thus its own place in 
history" (Habermas 1985b, 196). With regard to McCarthy, rationality is again 
what is generally at issue. But here, instead of emphasizing the centrality of 
philosophy, Habermas demonstrates a need for its self-limitation. Habermas 
interprets McCarthy's criticism as implying that Habermas's theory of 
communicative action bars, "all substantive moments from [a] concept of 
procedural rationality" (Habermas 1985b, 211). In countering this, Habermas 
suggests that the concluding arguments in TCA have not been fully digested. 
First, he points out,
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...science, morality and art have not only been differentiated from each 
other, they also communicate with each other. But within the boundaries 
of each expert culture, the different moments of reason come into contact 
with one another in such a way as to avoid violating the inner logic of the 
dominant form of argumentation specialized either in truth, normative 
correctness, or aesthetic harmony. This is one concern of the last 
chapter of The Theory of Communicative Action...(Habemas 1985b, 
209).
Next, Habermas argues that two other separate questions are involved, 
questions he says McCarthy conflates with the first. These are
...how the knowledge produced in expert cultures can be mediated with 
everyday practices...and second, the question of whether we can provide 
an equivalent for the meaning of traditional worldviews-for their function 
o f“sinngebuncf (Habermas 1985b, 209).
Habermas describes how the three moments of a differentiated reason have 
produced similar problems. In the case of science, the question is of a relation 
between theory and practice; of morality, its relation to ethical life; and, finally, 
the relation of art to life.
In the final two paragraphs of his reply to McCarthy Habermas 
circumscribes the capacity of philosophy, referring for the second time to an 
idea he first presented in the final pages of TCA on the relationship of his 
philosophy to that of Marx's. Habermas notes that discussions of morality and 
ethical life, theory and practice, art and life, all center around the “idea of a non­
reified everyday communicative practice". In his most direct suggestion of an 
active role for Critical Theory, he writes that the possibility of a
form of life with structures of an undistorted intersubjectivity...must be 
wrung from the professional, specialized, self-sufficient culture of experts 
and from the systems-imperatives of state and economy which 
destructively invade the ecological basis of life and communicative 
infrastructure of our lifeworld (Habermas 1985b, 210).
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The self-sufficient culture of experts-presumably including the reconstructive 
sciences with which philosophy forms a relationship of a "non-exclusive division 
of labor" (as described in his reply to Rorty)—representsf on a par with state and 
economy, the potentially reifying forces of contemporary society.
In a reinforcement of Albrecht Wellmer's analysis I criticized earlier, 
Habermas next tries to distinguish his Critical Theory from Marx's theory by 
attributing to the latter dependence on an utopian element absent in his own, 
demystified approach. First, what he shares with Marx, he says, is an "intuition":
This same intuition [a form of life with structures of an undistorted 
intersubjectivity] is expressed in Marx's utopian perspective on the 
realization of philosophy: to the extent that the reason expressed in 
Hegel's philosophy can be embodied in the forms of life of an 
emancipated society, philosophy somehow becomes pointless. For 
Marx, philosophy realized is philosophy aufgehoben (Habermas 1985b, 
210).
However, in contrast to Marx's supposed attempt to have life conform to an idea, 
Habermas claims to have turned things around, to have given the idea of the 
realization of philosophy "another reading" (Habermas 1985b, 210). Here 
Habermas claims that his theory of communicative action makes good the goal 
present in the "intuition" it shares with Marx's theory. Habermas suggests an 
incompatibility of Mane's practical intent and the possibilities of theory in the 
context of the modem structures and understanding of the world. The utopian 
element of Marx's theory consisted in the wish, or expectation, that the reason 
expressed in Hegel's philosophy was irresistible in its pull on society. In so far 
as the reason of philosophy was embodied in society, the impulse responsible 
for philosophy--the diremption between idea and social reality-would dissipate. 
Habermas claims to have radically revised this approach in locating an already
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(at least in a certain way) realized unity of reason in communicative action. The 
"certain way" is defined as only in so far as "we have an intuitive knowledge of 
it". There is no direct access to it, nor any prospect of bringing it to full 
realization, "on the level of cultural traditions in terms of a substantive world 
view, but only on this side of the expert cultures, in a non-reified, communicative 
practice of everyday life" (Habermas 1985b, 210).
Habermas classifies McCarthy with Marx, that is, with a discredited and 
outmoded theoretical approach, when he, at the conclusion of his remarks in 
response to him writes,
A philosophy that wants to bring this intuition to a conceptual level must 
retrieve the scattered traces of reason in communicative practices 
themselves, no matter how muted they may be. However, it cannot 
simply repeat the attempt, long since discredited, to project some 
theoretical picture of the world as a whole.
I think that I have learned from the tradition of Hegelian-Marxism, from the 
history of critical social theory from Marx to Benjamin, Bloch to Marcuse 
and Adomo that any attempt to embed the perspective of reconciliation in 
a philosophy of history of nature, however indirectly it is done, must pay 
the price of dedifferentiating forms of knowledge behind whose 
categorical distinctions we can no longer retreat in good conscience 
(Habermas 1985b, 210-211).
A Habermasian Turn in Critical Social Theory?
The PI symposium on Habermas’s theory, what Ferrara later called the 
"Habermasian turn" in critical social theory (Ferrara 1989), actually transversed 
three editions of the journal, covering nearly the whole of 1984. The articles of 
Jay, Whitebook and Rorty appeared in April; McCarthy’s in July; Habermas's 
reply in October.
One of the complexities involved was that while Habermas himself 
observed that only McCarthy discussed his latest work (TCA), translated into the 
English the same year by the latter, the fact of the matter was that Habermas
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was set to present a second major work of the still young 1980s: Der 
philosophische Diskurs der Modeme: Zwolf Vorlesungen was published in 
Frankfurt in 1985.
It was the latter work (first prepared as a series of lectures in Paris, then 
later in the United States), which most directly criticized what Habermas 
regarded as the remaining vestiges of a credible, contemporary Marxism, 
namely the "praxis philosophy" he associated with Marcuse, as well as Kosik 
and other East European theorists. The work, however, is far more often 
recognized for its confrontation with the theories of Nietzsche, Heidegger, 
Foucault, and the contemporary postmodern theories based upon them.
As late as 1988, Richard Bernstein was confronted with this issue during an 
interview with Duja Melcic (Melcic 1989). Bernstein explained that,
We had a symposium on Habermas's work in the journal and it was the 
idea of the publisher of the journal to collect the contributions to that 
discussion. Since the publisher made this suggestion when I decided to 
resign as editor of the journal, Habermas and Modernity was a farewell 
present to the journal (Melcic 1989, 209).
In substantial sections of the long interview, Bernstein's overall tone is not 
always approving of Habermas and his supporters. Initially, he refrains from a 
directly critical approach when the interviewer recalls Bernstein's statement in 
the introduction to Habermas and Modernity. "Habermas epitomizes the ideals 
of Praxis International. Consequently, the journal has served as a vehicle for 
the expression and critique of his views". She then asks, "Do we see here a 
sign of how the spirit of the journal has changed according to a new historical 
situation?" (Melcic 1989, 209). Bernstein replies,
Its true that the social theory of Habermas has been one of the most 
outstanding topics of the journal, but nevertheless it is important to 
realize that there have also been many other types of discussion,
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including the issue (in my opinion one of the best) on feminism and 
critique. Indeed the guest editors of this issue, Seyla Benhabib and 
Drucilla Cornell, have published a book, Feminism as Critique, based on 
this issue...There have also been many other social theories and 
movements discussed, such as the work of Foucault and the political 
movements of the Third World...(Melcic 1989, 209).
This reply does not, of course, respond to the interviewer's obvious 
inference that since the departing editor's 1984 perspective that Habermas 
epitomized the ideals of PI, conditions had changed so radically by 1988 it 
would be far more accurate to state that PI now epitomized the ideals of 
Habermas's (and his supporters') social theory. Bernstein's reply also ignores 
the important fact that in the issue on “Feminism and Critique" the dominant 
topic was the implications of Habermas’s "discourse ethic" for feminist theory. 
In addition, it was an article of Seyla Benhabib, "The Marxian Method of 
Critique: Normative Presuppositions" (Benhabib 1984), appearing in the same 
issue of the journal as Habermas's reply to Rorty, Jay, Whitebook, McCarthy 
and Bernstein, which served as the focal point for the special issue on feminist 
theory (January, 1986) for which Benhabib served as guest editor. Finally, 
before that year (1986) is out, Seyla Benhabib (along with Svetozar 
Stojanovic), in a new Editor's Introduction to PI, writes,
When Praxis International was launched over five years ago...the 
programmatic spirit behind it was expressed as follows: "At the moment 
there is no journal of Marxist humanist orientation, despite the increasing 
urgency for it...
...discussions among members of the Editorial Board, usually taking 
place in conjunction with the course on "Philosphy and the Social 
Sciences" at the Inter-University Center at Dubrovnik, Yugoslavia, have 
led to some reformulations and revisons in these original statements. A 
consensus has eventually emerged that the dominant orientation of the 
journal would be best characterized not as "Marxist humanist" but as 
“democratic socialist", since Marxist humanism is one among a number 
of theoretical orientations compatible with goals and aims of democratic 
socialism...
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...since the beginning of this decade, a growing sense of being at the end 
of a process, at times named "modernity", at others "industrial society", 
and even the "Enlightenment" has spread. Post-modem, post-industrial, 
post-Enlightenment, post-structuralist, post-analytic, post-empiricist, and 
post-Marxist are by now familiar terms of intellectual discourse in 
Western Europe and North America...lf, as some have argued, Marxist 
theory is very much shaped by the experience of capitalist modernity; if 
Marxism endorses the naive faith in scientific-technological progress and 
in the emancipatory content of production relations; if Marxism as a class- 
based theory has remained insufficiently sensitive to forms of opression 
deriving from gender, race, ethnic, linguistic and religious identity, can it 
still serve as the primary theoretical framework for an emancipatory 
social praxis?...
...the intellectual climate of the 1980s can best be described as that of an 
"interparadigmatic struggle", when Marxism itself has been radically 
challenged by the post-structuralist, hermeneutic-contextualist, and post­
modernist epistemology and political theory. It will be important for 
Praxis International to address this "inter-paradigmatic struggle" in 
contemporary science and philosophy, and to encourage critical 
exchanges between varieties of Marxist and non-Marxist theories of 
social and political emancipation... (Benhabib & Stojanovic 1986, 251- 
255).
Hence, the next two concluding parts of my analysis of an incipient public 
sphere, importantly shaped by Habermas and his supporters in line with the 
former's critique of Marx and Marxism, which he initiated at least a quarter 
century earlier, will first take up the inaugural article of the soon-to-be new 
editor of PI, Seyla Benhabib, in the journal, "The Marxian Method of Critique: 
Normative Presuppositions" (Benhabib 1984). Following this, I will analyze the 
conceptual linkage of this article with a contribution of Georg Lohmann's,
"Marx’s Capital and the Question of Normative Standards" (Lohmann 1986, 
353-372), a work which appeared in the first edition of Benhabib's editorship of 
PI, and contained original theses in reference to which Benhabib had, in her 
just cited article in PI which preceded his, noted, "I am much indebted to Georg 
Lohmann's insightful analysis..." (Benhabib 1984, 298). Recall that Habermas's 
final chapter in TCA, where he at last takes up Marx's theory of the two-fold
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character of labor In capitalism, relied heavily for this on a perhaps too-selective 
appropriation of Lohmann’s theses. However, it should be clear with a careful 
reading of his PI article that Lohmann is fundamentally critical of Habermas's 
notion of Marx’s theory of capitalism, since Habermas views the latter as a 
"subtheory" within a broader evolutionary theory of historical materialism. To 
the contrary, Lohmann views any theory of historical materialism as internal to 
Marx's critique of capitalism.
Seyla Benhabib and Habermas’s Critical Social Theory as an Incipient 
Political/Philosophical Tendency
If there were indeed a "Habermasian turn" in critical social theory, the 
real substance of which was a level of consensus, even if expo facto, involving 
a concession to the idea of a positive replacement with Habermas's theory of 
Marx's critical approach to contemporary society, then Benhabib’s “The Marxian 
Method of Critique: Normative Presuppositions" should be judged to be 
exemplary of that new direction.
The first thing to notice is that Benhabib’s article was not included in the 
original symposium on Habermas's theory. However, it did appear in the issue 
of the journal which contained Habermas's reply to the symposium articles 
assigned to assess his theory. Consequently, Habermas did not consider 
Benhabib's article.
The real affinity of Benhabib's contribution is with Albrecht Wellmer's, 
"Reason, Utopia and the Dialectic of Enlightenment", which preceded the 
original symposium on Habermas's theory. (As I have shown Bernstein 
included the latter in Habermas and Modernity, though it was not either 
officially part of the PI symposium on Habermas's theory, having appeared in 
the journal several years earlier).
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Though a rise in the stature of Habermas’s theory and of his critique of 
Marx particularly were results of the symposium, an equally important point was 
that each of the symposium participants seemed ready to place some distance 
between himself and Habermas. Yet, both Wellmer’s (pre-sympopsium) and 
Benhabib's (post-symposium) articles implied a more or less wholesale 
embrace of the fundamental basis of Habermas theory and the "project" it 
suggested. This project proposes a process of reasoned argument for a 
displacement of Marx from the center, implied or otherwise, of a critical theory of 
contemporary society.
A significant difference between the pre-symposium and post-symposium 
programmatic-type appropriations of Habermas's theory as a publicly-reasoned 
separation from Marx's critique of capitalism was that Albrecht Wellmer had 
been Habermas's student in Germany, while Seyla Benhabib’s background 
was American. It is interesting to consider Habermas's remarks, made in his 
reply to the symposium participants (all of whom were American) that what was 
specifically German in respect to the development of modem social theory was 
the "philosophical concept of alienation". As I noted earlier, Habermas's 
implication was that none of the U.S. theorists had confronted this pivotal 
philosophic concept in terms of the question of its contemporary status in critical 
social theory. Coincidentally or not, Benhabib's posf-symposium piece 
confronted the concept directly, as had Wellmeris article which had appeared 
several years earlier-before the Habermas symposium.
While McCarthy, for example, suggested that Habermas had given up too 
much of the holistic quality of Hegel's philosophy for Kanfs distinctions, and 
thereby fell short of providing an adequate replacement for the Hegelian- 
Marxian attempt at social concreteness, and Whitebook saw the weakness of 
Habermas's theory in its lacking a material substitute for the role an
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interpretation of Freud played in the original theory of Horkheimer and Adorno, 
such criticisms failed to get inside the deeper motivations of philosophy which 
had driven the Hegelian Marxian dialectic. It was necessary to recognize and 
confront the latter in order to comprehend Habermas's solution to this still 
contemporary problem. Hence, both “Reason, Utopia and the Dialectic of 
Enlightenment" and "The Marxian Method of Critique: Normative 
Presuppositions" attempt to develop Habermas's basic position on the 
outmoded quality of Marx's approach to contemporary society. They share the 
position that it can be shown that what they view as Marx's fundamental 
appropriation of the Hegelian dialectic of exteriorization and re-intemalization, 
the movement of consciousness in Hegel and labor in Marx, is not adequate to 
the complexity of contemporary society. However, the position they share is 
linked to how both authors understand Marx's critique of capitalism. Both 
believe it pivots on property relations and the market.
Consistently, Benhabib follows Habermas when she selects strategically 
from Lohmann's theses. As Lohmann's subsequent (1986) clarification of his 
analysis of Marx’s Capita! makes clear, Benhabib's attempted appropriation of 
Lohmann's theses notwithstanding, even after the maturation of Habermas's 
social theory, their remains a critical residue in Marx's presentation in Capital. 
This remained unrecognized by Habermas and Benhabib. Thus, Benhabib 
writes of Marx's Capital,
There is by now a long debate on the methodolgical significance of [the] 
historical observations and digressions...whereas the main analysis itself 
proceeds from a systematic abstraction called "the capitalist mode of 
production", the historical digressions rely primarily on the English case 
and the development of the English working class. Are these historical 
digressions illustrations of the systematic analysis, or is there a sense in 
which the main analysis itself is historically specific and expresses the 
development of capitalism in one particular case only? For the purposes 
of my argument, I need not get involved in this debate. The dual 
perspective displayed in Capital through historical observations, on the
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one hand, and systematic analysis, on the other, corresponds to the dual 
quality of labor-power as a commodity. In the historical passages the 
subjects are the laborers themselves as owners of concrete labor power, 
whereas according to the systematic analysis capital itself is the subject; 
from the standpoint of capital, labor-power is simply what is paid in the 
form of wages, ie; variable capital. This dual perspective of the text 
reflects the unresolved struggle between laborers as subjects and capital 
that objectifies them (Benhabib 1984, 293).
With the completion of this paragraph, Benhabib writes in a footnote, "I am much 
indebted to Georg Lohmann's insightful analysis" (Benhabib 1984, 293), in 
reference to "Gesellschaftskritik und normativr Masstab", which had appeared in 
a 1980 collection, Arbeit, Handlung und Normativitat, edited by A. Honneth and 
U. Jaeggi. I must first briefly remark here on two important considerations.
The first, seemingly minor, is perhaps telling in respect to Benhabib's 
apparent reliance on an indirect grasp of Marx's Capital. While referring 
several times to "passages" and "digressions" to describe Marx's attention to the 
"lived crisis" contrasted with his main analysis of a "systematic abstraction", on 
exactly two other occasions Behnabib describes them as "chapters" (Benhabib 
1984, 288; 293).
Georg Lohmann's PI article, "Marx's Capital and the Question of 
Normative Standards" is best understood as an argument constructed to raise 
doubts about 1) Habermas's assessment of Marx prior to TCA; 2) Habermas's 
new attempt (in TCA) to apply the social-theoretic categories heretofore 
developed to an appropriation, as well as a surpassing, of Marx's analysis in 
Capital particularly; and, 3) Benhabib's utilization of his [Lohmann's] analysis, 
because it suggests a lack of understanding, or a disregard on her part, for the 
significance of his thesis at this level. It is in respect to the third point that a first 
consideration should be kept in mind in assessing the quality of the
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"Habermasian turn" in critical social theory, viewed through PI. Lohmann, in 
"Marx’s Capital and the Question of Normative Standards", writes,
these historical observations [in Marx’s Capital which should make it 
possible to correct the...objectivism of the Marxian conception of history 
internally, concerns the pursuit of transcendent critique throughout 
Capital. As an aspect of immanent exposition this occurs through the 
contrasting historiographic passages which finally lead to a separate 
chapter (Lohmann 1986, 366).
Thus, Benhabib, in suggesting that Lohmann's analysis of Marx's Capital 
supposed a division of chapters between "systematic abstraction" and "lived 
crisis", is clearly mistaken.
The second consideration goes to the core of the misconceptions 
underlying Benhabib’s attempted critique of Marx from the standpoint of 
Habermas's social theory. The last sentence of the passage taken from her PI 
article I just quoted refers to “concrete labor power”. This latter, by virtue of its 
being owned, is said to constitute the possibility of a perspective, developed by 
Marx in Capital, of workers as subjects. Benhabib contrasts this with simple 
"labor power" viewed, from the perspective of capital as the subject, as "what 
is paid in the form of wages, ie; variable capital" (Benhabib 1984, 293). Thus, 
according to Benhabib,
the dual perspective displayed in Capital through historical observations, 
on the one hand, and systematic analysis, on the other hand, 
corresponds to the dual quality of labor power as a commodity (Benhabib 
1984, 293).
The starting point such an analysis represents as a normative 
assumption in Marx's theory is precisely what Marx fundamentally criticized. 
Marx, in his analysis of capitalism, develops the implications of a two-fold 
character of labor, concrete and abstract, not labor viewed from two varying
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perspectives, ie; on the one hand, each commodity with an owner and, on the 
other, its representation by capital as merely what is paid in wages. The latter 
views Marx's critique to be from the standpoint of "labor" (human relationship to 
nature), making central property ownership and the market. Postone, for 
example, in criticizing this traditional misconception of Marx's approach, writes,
The difference between an analysis based on the notion of "labor”, as in 
classical political economy, and one based on the concept of the double 
character of concrete and abstract labor in capitalism is crucial; it is, in 
Marx's phrase, "the whole secret of the critical conception"...It delineates 
the difference between a social critique that proceeds from the standpoint 
of “labor”, a standpoint that itself remains unexamined, and one in which 
the form of labor itself is the object of critical investigation. The former 
remains within the bounds of the capitalist formation, whereas the latter 
points beyond it (Postone 1993, 57).
Postone's analysis could be referring to Benhabib's argument as the 
paradigmatic case of where the constructions of even the most sophisticated 
attempts of traditional Marxism, necessarily leads. I can demonstrate this by 
following Benhabib's argument from her questionable appropriation of 
Lohmann's insights into Marx's method, including the significance of the 
"historical chapters", through her conclusions on the contemporary status of 
Marx's theory. Benhabib, after explaining the "dual perspective" in Marx's text 
as merely an identification of two opposing standpoints, next criticizes the 
central problem as involving a lack of "mediation" between, “...these points of 
view. The text weaves in and out of both without an explicit guidance as to what 
is involved" (Benhabib 1984, 293). This "missing" mediation has, she writes, 
theoretical and normative implications.
In Benhabib's explication of the theoretical implication can be found what 
amounts to a brief recapitulation of a central element of Jurgen Habermas's 
argument in Volume Two of TCA. What is peculiar, however, is that in
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identifying modem social theory's, “distinction between social integration and 
system integration", Benhabib first refers to Habermas's 1973 work, 
Legitimation Crisis, and then to an article written by Claus Offe for a collection, 
edited by Habermas, titled, "The Spiritual Crisis of the Age", which she notes 
was translated into the English in 1984. The passage she takes from Offe 
reads:
All social systems reproduce themselves through the normatively 
regulated and meaningful action of their members on the one hand, and 
the effectiveness of objective functional contexts on the other. This 
differentiation between "social integration" and "systems integration", 
between followed mles and rule-like regularities that assert themselves 
beyond subjects, is the basis for the entire sociological tradition 
(Benhabib 1984, 294).
In a summary virtually identical with a statement found in Habermas's analysis 
in Legitimation Crisis, Benhabib writes,
We certainly cannot take Marx to task for not having developed the 
social-theoretical means of analysis by which to integrate these two 
perspectives (Benhabib 1984, 294).
Benhabib relies heavily on Habermas’s critique of Marx without 
reference to TCA, upon which it apparently relies. Since Habermas's work was 
published in 1981, while her own article appeared in 1984, TCA must have 
been available to her. What makes her lack of acknowledgement of TCA 
especially puzzling is the central role the theses developed in Lohmann's 1980 
article piays in her analysis; there is no indication of an awareness that 
Habermas had already clearly highlighted the importance of Lohmann’s work 
for the entire conception of his most recent (TCA) critique of Marx. As a result, 
there appears to be no requirement for Benhabib to take into her account this 
crucial step in Habermas's theory development. Given the serious if somewhat
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unrecognized tensions (which only became public and widely apparent a few 
years later) at the inception of PI, the creation of an impression of some distance 
from Habermas's current project, including critique of Marx and Marxism, 
especially in an article which proved to be "programmatic", probably served well 
the process of replacing the "Marxist Humanist" orientation of PI. Whatever the 
reasons for the form of Benhabib's presentation, the remaining paragraphs of 
her article basically follow the outline of Habermas's three-decade long critique 
of Marx. Thus, after describing the "theoretical" implications of Marx's failure to 
provide "explicit guidance" as to what mediated the "two points of view" in 
Marx's Capital, Behabib turns to the normative implications.
First, the normative implications are "consequences" of the unresolved 
theoretical problem, particularly the lack of explicit guidance from Marx in "what 
is involved" in the shifting of standpoints noticeable in Capital. What is really 
involved, according to Benhabib, is Marx's positive evaluation of the "process of 
the constitution of workers into a class" (Benhabib 1984, 294). The capitalist 
infliction of misery on the workers, which forces them into collective struggle and 
identity, is alone what can bring into being a consciousness of class interests, 
the latter knowable only with the ascriptive abilities of a "thinker-observer".
Thus Marx, in an immanent critique, while demonstrating a dual perspective of 
“lived" experience and the systemic aspect of capitalist society, finally,
adapted [sic] exclusively the point of view of the thinker-observer, 
ignoring the very social experiences of collectivity and plurality 
(Benhabib 1984, 295).
Benhabib offers the explanation for this in Marx's inheritance from 
classical German Idealism and its philosophy of history, the “dual perspective of
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humanity as an empirical subject and as a normative goal" (Benhabib 1984, 
296). She writes,
Marx often conflates the two principles and writes as if what is a 
regulative idea in history-the idea of humanity-is also operative in 
history as an agent-history as an empirical subject" (Benhabib 1984).
Marx, due to a consistently immanent analysis, identifies the proletariat 
as the universal class, "representing" humanity generally: "Marx thereby 
commits the fallacy of 'representational logic'", which Benhabib says he shares 
with the bourgeoise:
This allows for some of the most objectionable equations of traditional 
Marxism. If the working class represents the universal interest of 
humanity, then the Party represents the universal interests of the working 
class, and the Central Committee represents the universal interest of the 
Party. Authoritarian, substitutionalist politics, while not being deducible 
from, is not incompatible with, this point of view (Benhabib 1984, 297).
Recall that Habermas, thirteen years earlier, issued a practically identical 
critique of Marx, tracing the Leninist or political concept of the Party, through 
Lukacs's philosophical justification, back to the opening left by Marx's 
appropriation of Hegel's dialectical logic (see Chapter Three, p. 100). In fact, in 
reaching the conclusion to her analysis Benhabib refers twice, not to classical 
German idealism generally, but to Mane's appropriation of Hegel's negation of 
negation. And, interestingly, in drawing her conclusions, she amplifies an 
interpretation of a passage in the Grundrisse (which I reproduced in Chapter 4, 
p. 58-59) she quotes extensively in an earlier part of her analysis. Shortly, I will 
describe these references, primarily in order to make clear the “programmatic" 
intentions of Benhabib's article.
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In her argument concerning Marx’s method in Capital Benhabib cites the 
German Ideology in order to prove that much earlier in his theoretical work 
Marx understood that class was only a,
meaningful social category for analyzing those social systems in which 
stratification is not ascriptive, in which birth, age, blood-lineage, and 
profession no longer determine social rights and priviliges, and where 
social integration is achieved primarily through the free market of wage 
labor...(Benhabib 1984, 294).
As I have indicated, it is fruitful to compare Benhabib’s conclusions to 
Lohmann's when it is first understood that Lohmann's PI article, which 
appeared a couple of years after Benhabib's, is most properly seen as, firstly, a 
critique of Habermas's approach to Marx (which Lohmann himself indicates at 
the beginning of his article) and, secondly, a rejoinder to Benhabib's attempt to, 
if not carry Habermas's criticism further, at least make it more specific in a 
programmatic sense. But, both Lohmann and Benhabib attempt to identify a 
theoretical barrier Marx could not (or did not) cross at a point where he then 
merely evokes Hegel's "negation of negation". This critique they share of 
Marx's phrase is no less interesting, in fact it is even more so, considering the 
widely divergent texts of Marx to which each respectively refer.
In contrast to the main text of her article, Benhabib writes in the footnote 
referring to the 1845 German Ideology I quoted above, that Marx was,
critical of the subsumption of individuals under the category of "class", 
but has blind faith in the power of double negation (Benhabib 1984, 298).
Marx believed, as a matter of "faith", that the historical process of subsumption 
of individuals under the category of class was necessary and ultimately 
desirable for the realization of humanity. Her central criticism is, then, that Marx
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understood that the category of c\ass-interest could only be "ascriptive". Yet, 
modem social systems are distinguished from the pre-modem precisely in that 
stratification, "is not ascriptive...birth, age, blood-lineage, and profession no 
longer determine social rights and priviliges, and...social integration is achieved 
primarily through the free market of wage labor (Benhabib 1984,.294). Thus, 
class interest can be ascribed only though an objective analysis of the social 
system itself. It presupposes that, at the subjective level,
what is supposed to "bind" members of a class together is their "objective 
interest", ie; the preservation of their material and power status within the 
system of production...(Benhabib 1984, 294).
Benhabib, then, before proceeding to its philosophical basis, 
summarizes her critique of Marx at this more conventional level:
There is...no such purely "objective" analysis; the determination of so- 
called "class interests" requires us to specify what we see as just or 
unjust, as exploitation or domination, in social relations. If the concept of 
class interests is to designate more that just a statistical regularity of the 
behavior of large human groups, and is to be used as a normative 
measure as to how real groups ought to act, then one's normative 
standards must be indentified previously and not subsequently to 
"objective" class analysis...[Marx] was wrong in ascribing normative 
status to the only mode of collective identification that capitalism seemed 
to create...(Benhabib 1984, 295).
According to this, Marx consistently approached the question of future 
social relations fundamentally different from capitalism's on the basis of a 
concept (taken over from Hegel) of negation of negation, appling it religiously 
(with blind faith) even after the critical, socially specific categories developed in 
Capital. I have already described in some detail (see Chapter Three) the depth 
of Marx's discussion (as early as 1844) of Hegel's concepts. I have also 
discussed Postone's reinterpretation (including its limitations) from within the
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Critical Theory tradition of Marx's appropriation of the Hegelian dialectic 
(Chapter Four). Even considering its limitations, Postone's reinterpretation of 
the Hegelian Marxian dialectic certainly contain original and persuasive 
arguments concerning the contemporary potential of Marx's radical 
secularization of Hegel's dialectic, incompatible with Benhabib's cryptic 
description of its "blind faith".
In her conclusion, Benhabib also attempts another, deeper analysis of 
what she sees as Marx's basic mistake. It follows her attribution to Marx's 
theory the concept of organization strongly associated with traditional Marxism, 
as well as with the Communist parties which until recently held power in 
Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union. A persuasive argument of these points 
might be expected to have debilitating consequences for anyone thinking of 
taking up Marx's theory anew. But, beyond this, Benhabib does not specify 
which~if any-theory might be admissable. She is for, "a form of universality in 
ethics and politics that does not deny the otherness of the Other(s)“ (Benhabib 
1984, 297). She writes, in reference to her just completed interpretation of his 
basic ideas, that Marx's was, "a move that pre-empted in theory the kind of 
universality and commonality of interests that could only derive from practice" 
(Benhabib 1984, 297).
Recall that Habermas's reply to the PI symposium participants included 
a direct reference to Richard Bernstein's latest work. Habermas explicitly 
rejected the tatter's elevation of the "Practical Idea". In this context, Habermas 
offered a strong defense of theory, and of the necessity of philosophy. He 
implies that a grasp of his own theory entails, at the least, a continuing 
engagement with the conditions of modernity to which was traceable the key 
concept of the age— the "philosophical concept of alienation", whether found 
developed in the Hegelian Marxian dialectic, or in the early Romantic version
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taken up by Nietzsche. In addition to Habermas himself, recent criticisms of 
"post-Marx Marxism" from within the Marxist humanist tradition have moved to 
the center Hegel's assessments of the limitations of the Practical Idea 
(Dunayevskaya 1989; Anderson 1995).
Benhabib’s second reference to Marx’s negation of negation is indirect. 
Immediately prior to her attempt to link Marx’s theory to "traditional Marxism", 
she quotes Jean Cohen's Class and Civil Society (1982) This is supposed to 
buttress an argument linking Marx's theory to the authoritarian, single party, and 
presumably to the states which have ruled through these forms:
The concept of the universal class and the identification of one 
historically produced, empirically existent group as the bearer of 
universality rests on the problematic attempt, derived from Hegel, to 
present history as positive and rational. The universal class, the 
subject/object of history, the negation of the negation, are concepts in 
Marx's thought that imply a return to Hegel's absolute through the 
substitution, first of species for Geist, second, of the class as the general 
representative of society for the species. The concept of the universal 
class subjugates the contingencies of historical praxis, and the plurality 
of potential actors to the demands of "reason"--to the demands of a logic 
that seeks to discover its own operations on the level of human praxis... 
(Benhabib 1984, 296).
To fully understand the implications of Benhabib's argument here it must 
be recalled that she is writing in a "Marxist Humanist" journal, rooted in the 
dissident Marxist movement which opposed not only totalitarian Stalinism, but 
Tito's anti-Stalinist state as well. Recall that as early as the 1844 "Critique of 
Hegelian Dialectic and Philosophy in General", Marx criticized Hegel’s 
"exemplary" phrase, the dialectic concept, "at one with itself in its other as such". 
Earlier, (Chapter Three) I interpreted this critique as the ground for Marx’s life­
long development of a concept of revolutionary social organization which would 
not subordinate in practice an idea of freedom, but would make its full
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development possible. The full potential of Hegel's concept of negativity, 
transcendence as objective (Marx 1967b, 321), which Marx in the same essay 
termed, "the great thing", the, "productive and moving principle of Hegel's 
dialectic" (Marx 1967b, 321), has its potential realization in a new relationship of 
philosophy and social organization.
Benhabib bases her denouement on Cohen's analysis of the "universal 
class...the negation of negation", pairing Marx with Hegel precisely where the 
former identified "the lie of Hegel's principle" (Marx 1967b, 329). Marx's intent 
was to apprehend the revolutionary core of Hegel's dialectic, not restricted to 
the realm of religion and the individual philosopher, an intent I have suggested 
is not entirely incompatible afterall with, for example, the last pararagraph of 
Hegel's Phenomenology, and the final three "syllogisms" of Hegels 
Encyclopedia of the Philosophical Sciences, in the Philosophy of Mind 
(Dunayevskaya 1989).
On one level, Marx's consideration of Hegel's phrase, which appears in 
the final, Absolute Knowledge chapter of the Phenomenology, criticizes the 
purely abstract character of Hegel's dialectic. This dialectic fails to alter its 
object. The object of Hegel's dialectic is consciousness. The other, the object 
(non-philosophy), is not altered, is not brought through the potentialities 
inherent in it to the level of its concept, just as the philosopher, in contact with its 
object, is not himself altered. In a phrase Marx seemed to borrow from the last 
words of Hegel's Phenomenology, the philosopher is, hence, "solitary and 
alone" (Marx 1967b, 326). Marx attributes the latter to a fundamental alienation 
which "separates thinking from the subject" (Marx 1967b, 335). This alienation 
is originally found both in and by Hegel, though the latter did not recognize its 
full social implications.
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I have argued that Marx's concept of social organization, developed 
along with his participation in a series of revolutionary organizations 
(Dunayevskaya 1991), followed from his 1844 "Critique of Hegelian Dialectic". 
Marx's concept of social organization developed from a critique of Hegel's 
dialectic specific to the problem of abolishing capitalism "Critique of Hegelian 
Dialectic", and is perhaps the single most "undigested" moment in Marx's theory 
(Dunayevskaya 1991; Meszaros 1997).
Marx's confrontation with, "at one with itself in its other as such" is 
actually the paradigmatic critique of what Benhabib (on the authority of Cohen) 
attributes in a positive sense to Marx: subjugation of "the plurality of actors to the 
demands of 'reason'-to the demands of a logic that seeks to discover its own 
operations on the level of human praxis..." (Benhabib 1984, 296). Benhabib’s 
conclusion attributes to Marx's "purely immanent" critique of bourgeios political 
economy an inability to point toward a fundamental shift in the relationship of 
theory and practice which could fully realize the potential of modernity-- 
“overcoming modernity through a fuller and deeper modernity", a phrase she 
borrows from Marshall Berman (Benhabib 1984, 291).
In contrast, Lohmann opposes with another-transcendent-critique an 
interpretation of Marx's Capital structured upon immanent critique. Before 
describing Lohmann's implicit argument with Benhabib's conclusions, I need to 
include one other of Benhabib's references to Marx. Her intention is to expose— 
from the standpoint of widespread disillusionment with modernity irrespective of 
its various political or historical forms-the philosophical limitations of Marx’s 
theory. Benhabib presents the passage from Marx's Grundrisse which I quoted 
in another context (see p.232). In this passage Marx asks a series of questions, 
exploring the socio-historic specificity of the concept of wealth.
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Benhabib's interpretation includes an understanding of Marx's analysis 
of capitalism as opposing to the limiting relations of production the forces of 
production, which the bourgeoise has unleashed and which will underlie as 
well the non-capitalist future. At present, the relations of production are self- 
limiting in the form of a bourgeois civil society structured on the opposition of 
two classes. The universality immanent to civil society will first be realized by 
the coming into its own of the proletariat.
This fails to consider an important dimension of the uniqueness of Marx's 
critique of capitalism. It is rooted in an analysis of value as the form of wealth 
intrinsic to it. Marx's critique is not primarily a counter-position of the future 
potential of bourgeois civil society to its historical form, or a matter of an 
internalization at the level of each individual of its linear, developmental 
dynamic. In analyzing value as the specific form of wealth in capitalism, Marx 
demonstrates that the material and value forms of wealth in that social formation 
are not merely different; they can even be opposites. Value, the specifically 
capitalist form of wealth, has its magnitude measured in abstract labor time. An 
increase in average productivity, while increasing material wealth, does not 
change the total value created in equal periods of time:
...if average productivity doubles, twice as many commodities are 
produced in a given time period, each with half the previous value 
(Postone 1993, 193).
In fully developed capitalist production, direct labor becomes 
increasingly superfluous in the production of material wealth, while value 
remains dependent on the expenditure of this labor. However, value is not 
constituted by the mere expenditure of this labor. Value is constituted by labor's 
mediational role in the capitalist social formation. As opposed to a
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transhistorica! concept of labor, which posits labor as the mediation of nature 
and humanity, I have discussed how labor mediates itself, the dialectic of its 
abstract and concrete dimensions, and constitutes social relations, not 
generally, but in capitalism. With this in mind, consider that Benhabib believes 
that the passage in Marx’s Grundrisse "expresses in a nutshell the normative 
ideal underlying Marx's critique of capitalism" (Benhabib 1984, 291). Benhabib 
understands the passage such that it affirms the potential of "capitalist civil 
society", its dynamic of "change and growth" versus ail previous societies, the 
basis of whose ideologies was order and stability. In fact, Benhabib writes, for 
this reason Marx demanded that the bourgeoise is, "not to be rejected, but 
sublated" (Benhabib 1984, 291). Here Benhabib misquotes the very passage 
from the Grundrisse she has just herself reproduced. Once again, Marx writes 
in the Grundrisse,
In fact, however, when the limited bourgeois form is stripped away, what 
is wealth other than the universality of individual needs, capacities and 
pleasures, productive forces, etc., created through universal exchange?
In contrast Benhabib, in elucidating the idea that the passages demonstrated 
that Marx believed the “bourgeoise was not to be rejected", reproduces a part of 
the quoted passage thusly:
For in bourgeois society the “true (my emphasis, RR) universality of 
individual needs, capacities and pleasures" is identified with a limited 
form (Benhabib 1984, 291).
The word "true", which she includes between quotation marks with the rest of 
Marx's sentence, is Benhabib's own addition to Marx's passage she had just 
quoted otherwise (and accurately) on the preceding page. Adding the word 
"true" apparently seemed legitimate to Benhabib based on an interpretation of
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
298
Marx which does not take into account the way Marx analyzes the value form of 
wealth. In Marx's theory, this (value) form does not merely constitute a limit on a 
non-contradictory content, but is in fact capitalism's fundamental core, the result 
of a long historical process. It is what differentiates, or particularizes, the 
capitalist vis a vis all previous social formations, including “needs”, capacities 
and pleasures. Thus, when Marx refers to the "limited bourgeois form" of wealth 
he is not affirming its “true" content, which is presently obscured and/or 
contained by its limited form. Illustrative of his critique, which is far more radical 
and shows how deeply implicated the "bourgeois form of wealth" is in the core 
of the social formation it underlies, Marx writes in the sentence directly following 
the passage Benhabib quotes:
In bourgeois economics-and in the epoch of production to which it 
corresponds-this complete working out of the human content appears as 
a complete emptying out, this universal objectification as total alienation, 
and the tearing down of all limited, one-sided aims as sacrifice of the 
human end-in-itself to an entirely external end. This is why the childish 
world of antiquity appears on one side as loftier...(Marx 1973, 488.)
Clearly, Benhabib's interpretation, which holds that Marx's idea of the 
"limited bourgeois form" refers merely to "wealth in the sense of the mere 
accumulation of material objects" (Benhabib 1984, 291) fails to grasp the depth 
of Marx's critique of capitalism. Marx criticizes how an opposition of material 
wealth and the value form of wealth, following from the two-fold nature of labor 
within the "bourgeois" social formation constitutes its social relations, 
characterized by an abstract form of domination which does not appear social at 
all. Therefore the object of Marx's critique is not the opposition of form to 
content, but the the social content itself, which is characterized by internal 
contradictions. Consequently, Benhabib's conclusion, that Marx's critique of 
modernity held within it normative presuppositions also intrinsic to his object of
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criticism—bourgeois society and production~is dependent on a 
misinterpretation of Marx's texts, as well as a selective utilization of the studies 
of the contemporary Critical Theorist, Georg Lohmann, to whom I shall now turn.
Lohmann's Attempted Appropriation of Marx's Capital as a Radicalization of
Habermas's Critical Theory
Lohmann, though original in developing a detailed analysis of Capital 
with the use of Habermas's categories and even, to some extent, turning 
Habermas's critical categories against the letter's own theory, mistakenly puts at 
the center, as does Habermas himself, Marx's negative view of capitalist 
property relations. Due to his misplacement of the centrality of Marx's critical 
categories, an error he shares with Habermas, several aspects of the tatter's 
critique of Marx are positively affirmed, or simply left standing. In addition, some 
of Lohmann's own analyses of Marx can not make sense of theoretical 
developments after Marx's Capital, especially Critique of the Gotha Programme 
(Dunayevskaya 1991) and writings on the potential of "pre-capitalist", or "non- 
capitalist" lands to bypass the capitalist path of social development (Shanin 
1983); more importantly they tie his hands in respect to his attempt to present an 
interpretation of Marx adequate to contemporary social and political conditions.
Lohmann writes that Marx analyzes, through the "normative, legal and 
voluntary relations accompanying commodity exchange", the ideas of freedom 
and equality of Locke's state of nature, recapitulated, "in part word for word in 
Hegel’s theory of abstract right" (Lohmann 1986, 360). Marx specifies in 
reference to exchange relations the "abstract right” concepts of "person” and 
"private owner". A reifying self-relation of person and individual wherein the 
latter exists in a relation of indifference is the point of reference of social 
integration. The self-relation of person and individual is the basis for, or makes
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
300
possible, with purchase and sale of labor power, interpersonal relations 
becoming a pure relation of ownership and property:
Just as the reifying self-relation is based on indifference to oneself, so 
too, relations among persons are indifferent to their respective 
individuality...
...This graduated inner structure of private owners to one another and to 
their respective selves is based on the mediation of all their relations 
through property. It is this domination of mediating property (my 
emphasis, RR) that specifically restricts the integrating norms of freedom 
and equality. These are formal and universal in their claim but are in fact 
internally related to private property. They are hence abstract norms of 
freedom and equality, valid only because indifferent to one's own 
individuality and that of others. A reconstruction of the fulfillment of their 
validity claims would therefore have to make these limits explicit and this 
would be the task of transcendent critique (Lohmann 1986, 361).
Related to this, near the conclusion to his article Lohmann alludes 
dismissively to the integration of “negation of negation" into Marx's analysis. 
Moreover, his disappointment with this concept is coupled, somewhat 
elliptically, with how Marx brings in organization. He suggests, in his situation 
of the philosophic negation of negation and Marx's concept of organization at 
the point where transcendent critique begins in Capital, that both can be 
explained by historical limitations in the conceptual tools which were available 
to Marx. Still, among the most interesting aspects of Lohmann's analysis is the 
idea (which he does not take as far as he might) that modem social theoretic 
concepts, which Habermas has been among the most important in developing, 
often driven by his perception of Marx's objectivistic or economistic theory, are 
in some cases already found, and in others, at (east implied, in Marx's Capital. 
Moreover, often these can provide the basis for a fundamental critique of 
Habermas's supposedly more developed theory.
So, while Lohmann does indeed incorporate in to his own analysis much 
of Habermas's critique of Marx, as well as adds some additional criticisms of his
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own, the real significance of his article lies in how he shows that Marx’s Capital 
contains many of the elements adequate for a critical approach to contemporary 
society, opening to doubt many of the basic assumptions upon which Habermas 
bases claims for innovations in his own theory. It is precisely this properly 
critical side of Lohmann’s analysis Benhabib obscures, while leaving an 
impression that her own views are-in the most crucial respects—in basic accord 
with those of Lohmann, as well as Habermas.
As I mentioned in my discussion of Benhabib, it is difficult to explain, 
Benhabib does not indicate that Habermas, in TCA, already had taken up in 
some detail (and in a crucial place) Lohmann's new and original insights into 
Capital. It is puzzling, in fact, that Benhabib never refers to TCA. In that work, 
Habermas not only relies heavily on a consideration of Lohmann's analysis for 
the structure of his own most up-to-date critique of Marx. In addition, when 
Habermas comes to the “concluding reflections" of his final chapter he refers to 
an article writtten by Benhabib, an article he finds exemplary of the idea that 
cultural countermovements to unity, as opposed to the radically differentiated 
moments of reason characterizing modernity, "might be established this side of 
expert cultures, in a non-reified everyday practice" (Habermas 1987, 398). Two 
pages later, in the concluding paragraphs of Volume Two of TCA, he returns to 
the basic issue of Marx's method, particularly to a passage in Marx's Gmndrisse 
which remarks on abstract labor and "indifference", concepts basic to 
Lohmann's analysis. Habermas had extensively utilized these a few pages 
earlier. Thus, it is highly unlikely that Benhabib was unaware of these 
theoretical developments when she published her own "programmatic" critique 
of Marx, heavily reliant on Habermas and Lohmann individually.
Since I have already discussed the importance of Lohmann's ideas for 
Habermas's TCA, and for what turned out to be Benhabib's programmatic
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article in the transitional edition of PI containing Habermas's reply to the 
participants in the symposium on his social theory, here I want to just briefly 
consider Lohmann's analysis of Max's "transcendent critique", as a proposed 
radicalization of Habermas's critical social theory. It is an appreciation of Marx's 
theory, which specifies perceived inadequacies. Both of these aspects of 
Lohmann's argument imply sharp disagreement with Habermas's original 
appropriation of Lohmann's views, as well as with Benhabib's independent 
attempt to do likewise.
My purpose here is to mark the limits of the dialogue stimulated by 
Habermas's critique of Marx in the light of what was widely understood to be a 
major breakthrough in contemporary thought, Habermas's social theory. 
Habermas's critique of Marx was arguably the central theme, though until now 
only implicitly so, of a key theoretical journal, international in character, which 
brought into the open, into a public sphere, the question of the contemporary 
viability of various competing interpretations of Marx. While, at the beginning of 
the 1980s decade this could have been prospectively conceived as principally 
a dialogue between the Critical Theory tradition and Marxist Humanism, or two 
forms of neo-Marxism, my analysis has already indicated that Habermas’s 
Critical Theory was just at the point where a substantial break from his own 
tradition might be justified, while the Marxist Humanist tendency virtually 
perished, with few important exceptions (Dunayevskaya 1984, 1988), in the first 
few years of the decade.
Discussion of Habermas’s social theory, which in many ways long pre­
supposed the lack of contemporary social or political relevance of Marx's ideas, 
eventually overwhelmed any and all other themes taken up by the journal.
Thus, it was not until the early 1990s, specifically Moishe Postone's work, that a 
comprehensive (and credible) challenge to Habermas's critique of Marx
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appeared. I have already discussed in some detail specific points of Postone's 
challenge to Habermas's presentation of Marx's ideas. I have emphasized the 
importance of the fact that Postone's critique is developed from within the 
Critical Theory tradition. In respect to this, I have raised the question whether 
the nature of his critique even implies, despite his own lack of attention to the 
issue, Postone's own break from this tradition. In the concluding chapter, which 
follows this one, I will discuss further the implications of Postone's critique of 
Habermas from within the Critical Theory tradition, as well as the significance of 
its form of presentation, given recent discussions of Habermas’s concept of a 
public sphere, following from the first English translation in 1989 of Structural 
Transformation of the Public Sphere, a work written in 1962.
I am concluding the present chapter with further consideration of 
Lohmann's PI article because, as I mentioned, it marks the limits of the type of 
discussion of Marx's ideas founded on Habermas's social-theoretic concepts. 
Lohmann's discussion leads ail the way into, but does not succeed in passing 
beyond, the impasses in Habermas's consideration of Marx which then shaped 
his social theory such that it blunted its critical edge. As I will show, Lohmann's 
interpretation, which attempted to preserve the idea of Marx's theory of 
capitalism as critical through and through, is still such that Habermas utilized it 
to reinforce his notion that Marx's ideas are of the past.
Besides this, however, I will show that Lohmann, in taking up the ideas of 
immanent and transcendent critique in Marx's Capital, is confronted with the 
problem of the relationship between Marx's philosophic concepts and his 
concept of organization. Lohmann does not resolve this issue, primarily 
because he does not fully recognize the problematic he has uncovered.
In the passage I reproduced earlier (see p.299) Lohmann suggests that 
Marx's analysis of capitalism, structured on immanent critique, has a
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transcendent critique internal to it. The latter critique, according to Lohmann, 
appears in "historiographic passages" dispersed throughout Marx's dominant 
abstract narrative. Only with "Historical Tendency of Capitalist Accumulation", 
Marx is confronted with the difficulties of his own presentation. Since he has 
depicted capital as an inexorable force, subsuming socio-historical lifeworids, 
while presenting in scattered passages the struggle to preserve their "unitary 
claims", Lohmann asserts that Marx had to "bear the cost" (Lohmann 1986,
364).
After the fully developed concept of capital Marx, in an "astonishingly thin 
chapter" (Lohmann 1986, 364) , merely evokes "negation of negation" at the 
point where transcendent critique begins. Lohmann states that whereas the first 
edition of Capital, at this point in the text, put forth the "category of the 'free 
laborer* as a creation of the creation of the capitalist era", the second edition 
substituted, "for this idea a reference to the 1848 Manifesto of the Communist 
Party" (Lohmann 1986, 364). (I will put aside for now the issue of the meaning 
of Communist "Party" as Marx understood it, and the meaning it assumed later).
Lohmann argues that the ambiguity expressed in the contrasting editions 
indicates that Marx is, "competing with the systematic intentions of his own 
critique" (Lohmann 1986, 366). This is due to Mane's "inadequate means" 
(Lohmann 1986, 366). Here, Lohmann evokes aspects of Habermas's critique 
of Marx. Marx's
understanding of processes of development...underdefine the relation to 
historical agents by hypostatizing them as "subjective earners" of 
development, whose subjectivity is then only interpreted within the 
framework of strategic or purposive rational behavior while treating them 
moreover as a collective singular (Lohmann 1986, 366).
Lohmann believes that certain of Habermas's theories, unlike Marx's, 
allow for theoretically explicit consideration of the normative content of historico-
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social lifeworlds. Habermas's idea of reconstruction of competencies (in what 
Lohmann describes as the later version of Habermas's theory), "tries to bring 
history into play...as a process of enlightenment of all participants", based on a, 
"practical discourse between concerned persons". Lohmann believes that 
something similar can already be found in Capital but, "where the whole of 
capital-formation is not yet thematic" (Lohmann 1986, 369). Lohmann writes,
...under the topic of the "Abolition of Critique by a Practical Turn"...Mane 
gives a paradigmatic version...He changes from the retrospective stance 
of a describer and narrator into the present voice of dramaturgy...in 
which, "the voice of the worker, which had fallen silent in the storm and 
stress of the production process...'suddenly‘" is raised. The worker 
makes his claims and argues for them on the basis of prior development. 
He is thus still ignorant of the exchange of equivalents, so that his 
argumentation still shares its limitations and one-sidedness: But it is a 
practical turn of critique that leads thus to a "struggle for the limitation of 
the work day" (Lohmann 1986, 370).
Unlike Benhabib, Lohmann is sufficiently critical of Habermas's basic 
approach to Marx to allow him to reject the idea that the latteris theory is 
inadequate to contemporary standards of critique. Rather, he holds that in 
some senses elements of Habermas's theory are necessary supplements to 
Marx's still viable critical approach. Yet, like Benhabib, his criticisms of Marx, 
taken largely from Habermas, lead him to subordinate theory to practice. This 
follows from his idea that Marx's later reference to the Manifesto of the 
Communist Party in Capital suggests that Marx's idea of conscious 
organization was congruent with an idea of the vanguard party whose self- 
appointed task was to represent (from the outside) the interests of the proletariat 
and, by extension, humanity.
Clearly, from Chapter One of Capital, Marx made clear that only "freely 
associated men", integral to which was his own analysis of the specificity of 
capital's form of social domination, including its abstact dimension, might
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dissolve the fetishism of the commodity. This anticipated social relations 
radically different from, or opposite to, the dehumanized form constituting 
capitalism. Let me conclude this part by offering an alternative interpretation of 
the link between Marx’s "Historical Tendency of Capitalist Accumulation" 
(Chapter 32 in the English Pelican edition), and the reference to his 1848 
Manifesto of the Communist Party. In connection with this, Lohmann argues 
that a modification in the second edition of Capital, which replaced Marx's 
formulation of the "free laborer" as the "creation of the creation of the capitalist 
era" with a citation of the Manifesto of the Communist Party, reflected Mane's 
broader, unresolved theoretical difficulty. It shows that Marx was,
again competing with the systematic intentions of his own critique, by 
presenting political and evolutionary considerations which approach the 
problem from the outside (Lohmann 1986, 364).
Lohmann simply mentions Marx's citation, which appears after the last 
sentence of "The Historical Tendency of Capitalist Accumulation". He does not 
summarize the content of Marx's citation, thus implying that the Manifesto of the 
Communist Party represented an "external" critique of capitalism. This 
discloses that among the presuppositions of Lohmann's approach is the notion 
that Marx's theory of the overcoming of capitalism did not encompass Marx's 
own working out of the dialectic of philosophy and organization as a necessary 
element of it. The very short (five pages) chapter at issue here summarizes the 
specificity of capitalist private property as the historical negation of individual 
private property. The negation of this negation,
does not re-establish private property, but it does indeed establish 
individual property on the basis of the achievements of the capitalist era: 
namely co-operation and the possession in common of the land and 
means of production produced by labor itself (Marx 1977, 929).
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At the end of this chapter, Marx quotes the Manifesto of the Communist
Party:
The advance of industry, whose involuntary but willing promoter is the 
bourgeoise, replaces the isolation of the workers due to competition with 
their revolutionary combination, due to association. The development of 
large-scale industry, therefore, cuts from under its feet the very 
foundation on which the bourgeoise produces and appropriates products 
for itself. What the bourgeoise, therefore, produces, above all, are its 
own grave-diggers. Its fall and the victory of the proletariat are equally 
inevitable... (Marx 1977, 930).
In mentioning the title of the text referenced by Marx, while not 
characterizing the specific passage, Lohmann leaves an impression of Marx's 
inability to satisfactorily resolve two levels of his analysis. As I have previously 
shown, Habermas consistently, though with some variations, presented 
essentially the same argument. Lohmann states that Marx,
at the very beginning of his critique, flings at the faces of the bourgeois 
economists as an unmasking dictum, that, "there once was a history, but 
there no longer is" (Lohmann 1986, 364).
But when Marx arrives at the end of his analysis, after his "critical exposition", or 
immanent critique,
the capitalist system portrays itself as an eternal, unhistorical formation 
of society, with contingent beginnings, and unsurpassable rationality, to 
which there is no future alternative
At this point, Marx can only appeal to "negation of negation" and fall back on the 
Communist Party.
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Why, if Lohmann's article is strongly critical of both Habermas’s approach 
to Marx, and Benhabib's programmatic use of it, does Lohmann seem 
compelled (just like Benhabib) to refer dismissively to Marx's small conceptual 
phrase, "negation of negation"? Here I will examine more closely the respective 
contexts in which each refer to this concept.
Lohmann, in section III of his PI article, "Immanent and Transcendent 
Critique Reinterpreted", pinpoints "Historical Tendency of Capitalist 
Accumulation", writing that it marks the "end of immanent exposition", even 
though, "immanent exposition structures Capital as a whole" (Lohmann 1986,
365). Prior to this chapter, the immanent exposition includes historiographic 
passages, according to Lohmann, which appear as constrasting to the "system- 
constitutive processes" (Lohmann 1986, 364). Transcendent critique begins 
with "Historical Tendency of Capitalist Accumulation". Lohmann writes,
At the end of immanent exposition the object is considered in its totality, 
as the reproduction process of capital. Marx explains this to be the 
reproduction of the capital-specific precondition, namely the separation 
of capitalists from wage-laborers. Capital has become its own 
precondition, and no longer bothers with historical preconditions that are 
alien to it (Lohmann 1986, 365).
With this, Lohmann believes, there is a clear indication in Marx's text that his 
method of immanent critique creates a great difficulty in presentation of history:
Since in the systematic construction of his critique, Marx undertakes a 
mimetic recapitulation of capitalism in order to achieve a unity of critique 
and exposition, he must also bear the cost: the capitalist system portrays 
itself as an eternal, unhistorical formation of society, with contingent 
beginnings and unsurpassable rationality, to which there is no future 
historical alternative. "Thus there once was a history, but there no longer 
is"...This conclusion which Marx, at the very beginning of his critique, 
flings at the faces of bourgeois economists as an unmasking dictum 
forces itself upon him at the end of his critique: the astonishingly thin 
chapter on the "Historical Tendency of Capitalist Accumulation", where it 
would all have to unfold, itself operates with the make-shift category of 
the "negation of negation"; in the second edition the category of the "free
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laborer” as a creation of the creation of the capitalist era is 
eliminatecL.and the 1848 Manifesto of the Communist Party is cited. 
Again Marx is competing with the systemic intentions of his own critique, 
by presenting political and evolutionary considerations which approach 
the problem from the outside (Lohmann 1986, 364).
Lohmann and Benhabib are in accord with the notion that Marx's 
"negation of negation" covers over a conceptual inadequacy in his attempt to 
specify a society different from capitalism in terms of his own immanent critique. 
Prior to Lohmann's reference to "negation of negation" as it appears in the 
concluding pages of Marx's Capital, Benhabib had cited its appearance in an 
altogether different, far less "mature" work of Marx, the 1845 German Ideology. 
Marx's method of immanent critique of capitalism obliged him to uncritically 
accept features of modernity contemporary critical thinkers have apparently 
since learned to abhor without reservations.
From my previous analysis, it can be recalled that, from the start, that is, 
Chapter One of Capital, the section on the "Fetish of the Commodity and its 
Secret", Marx suggested the possibility of freely associated social relations, on 
the basis of previous historical development, including their negation of labor 
mediated social relations. Lohmann's thesis is that because he did not have 
accessible to him the socio-theoretic concepts developed in response to "late 
capitalism", the unfoldment of Marx's systematic categories overcame his critical 
intentions. Yet, to the contrary, very much like in the first chapter of Capital, in 
the climatic section Lohmann describes, Marx links the overcoming of capitalist 
social relations to a form of "association" possible in view of present capitalist 
social relations, and as the negation of them.
In Chapter One, Marx refers to an "association of free men", and "freely 
associated labor”. In the final part of Capital, in his citation of the Manifesto of 
the Communist Party, the reference is to "revolutionary combination, due to
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association". Lohmann, in his conception of the link of the beginning to the end 
of Volume One of Marx’s Capital, in terms of Marx’s own self-understanding, 
attributes an implausible contradiction to Marx's presentation. An alternative 
interpretation might focus on the question of Marx’s concept of organization, its 
normative and revolutionary dimensions. As I mentioned at the outset of this 
chapter, with Capital's completion, Marx attempted (especially in Critique of the 
Gotha Programe) to clarify as far as possible his critique (immanent and 
transcendent) of the concept and practice of social organization, particularly its 
revolutionary potential, not only its normative dimension. This was in light of, 
and inclusive of, the theory Capital represented.
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CHAPTER SIX 
HABERMAS, MARX AND POST-COMMUNISM
If in the previous chapter I found, somewhat surprisingly, that Habermas 
noted a lack of interest in discussion of Marx (or more precisely in the approach 
to the latter adopted in Habermas's theory) this certainly did not seem to 
stimulate new attention to Marx in Pi's next major symposium (Passerin 
d’Entreves & Benhabib 1996) this one on Habermas's work, The Philosophical 
Discourse of Modernity (1990a) The various contributions focused on 
Habermas's analysis of those thinkers taken up most extensively in postmodern 
social theory-Nitetzsche, Heidegger, Foucault, Derrida and Francois Lyotard.
Since the journal did not carry a response from Habermas, such as I 
described in respect to the earlier symposium, I do not have the advantage of a 
direct exchange on which to base my starting point for this chapter, which seeks 
to extend the analysis of the Habermas-Marx relationship into the 1990s. I will 
demonstrate that in the 1990s he claims a substantial theoretical continuity with 
the early 1960s inception of his critique of Marxism (as well as its 
practical/political character). His 1980s intervention in PI, a theoretical journal 
rooted in an internal opposition to established Communism (even if 
independent of the Soviet bloc) is significantly associated with his subsequent 
analyses of, a) the collapse of Communism; b) dissident, Left Marxism; as well 
as, c) the historical self-understanding of his own theory, which developed from
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1960 through the mid-1990s. Examination of these issues will serve as 
something of a summation of this study of Habermas's relationship to Marx's 
ideas, a relationship I have attempted to demonstrate throughout Habermas 
attempted to make constitutive of a public sphere, the success of which he 
understood to be critical to the coming into its own of his own theory.
That is, with the 1990s it is clear Habermas believes that he has not only 
replaced Marx's theory with his own. In contrast to the the 1960s and 1970s, he 
has now done so in a form adequate to the standards of the emergent theory 
itself—in a public dialogue, the context for which was an international forum 
comprised of interested persons from both "state socialist" as well as “late 
capitalist” historical and, perhaps most importantly, political backgrounds. By 
now Habermas is confident that he has definitively established his own theory 
as the one capable of fulfilling the role—the "guardian of rationality"~he had 
assigned to philosophy. This had practical implications I will discuss in more 
detail when considering his important article, "What does socialism mean 
today?: The rectifying revolution and the need for rethinking on the Left" 
(Habermas 1990b). This established, it is none the less troubling that 
Habermas, unlike his counter-parts in discourse, was still not satisfied with the 
understanding (including his own) of the status of Marx in contemporary theory.
After briefly characterizing Habermas's approach to Marxism in PDM I 
will examine Habermas's political analysis of the revolutions in Eastern and 
Central Europe, an analysis published on the eve of the collapse of 
Communism in Russia itself. Attention to this article is fitting here in so far as, 
internal to it, Habermas summarizes his several decades-long analyses of Mane 
and Marxism. He suggests that his theory represents its rightful heir.
Finally, I will address Habermas's re-assessment of the status of his 
concept of the public sphere, especially in respect to the question of how one
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should now approach Marx and Marxism. Habermas remarks extensively on 
this issue in a 1992 symposium. On his study of the public sphere (thirty years 
after its original publication), the symposium was organized around the 
occasion of its English translation as Structural Transformation of the Public 
Sphere (Habermas 1989a).
In Chapter Five, I considered the curious circumstance that a symposium 
on Habermas's theory featured (over the course of nearly a year) in a Marxist 
Humanist intellectual journal consisted of virtually no discussion of Habermas's 
interpretation of Marx's theory. The main exception was Habermas's own 
reflections on the topic. I analyzed this situation in detail, leading to the 
conjecture that the symposium marked the collapse of a tendency of Marxist 
Humanism and a concomitant definitive "Habermasian turn" in critical social 
theory. This Marxist Humanism was not only politically significant in its internal 
critical relationship to Communism, but historically (and theoretically) important 
through its connection to Marx's 1844 Economic-Philosophic Manuscipts, 
writings available in the German since 1932, but not before the late 1950s in 
English, concurrent with Habermas's initial writings on Marx's theory. Seyla 
Benhabib, who (by the mid-1980s) sought to develop Habermas's specific 
critique of Marx's theory, soon assumed co-editorship of PI, which (I have 
noted) only a few years earlier was re-founded as the world's only "Marxist 
Humanist" journal.
Several years later, Richard Bernstein, an editor of Praxis International at 
the time of the first Habermas symposium, mentioned in an interview published 
in the same journal, that Habermas was developing for publication an explicit 
critique of "praxis philosophy". Bernstein noted that the current editors of PI 
were planning a new symposium on that work, Philosophical Discourse of 
Modernity. Recently, the contributions to that symposium were published in
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book form (Passerin d'Entreves & Benhabib 1996). Yet, among the nine 
contributors to this volume, no one so much as mentioned Habermas’s 
extensive critique of, in turn, Hegel, Marx and Marx's philosophical relationship 
to the former. What makes this especially puzzling is that PDM contains a 
sweeping philosophical critique precisely in terms of an approach to Marx's 
theory which grants a "praxis" interpretation, often referred to as "Marxist 
Humanist" (Rockmore, 1989)~at least within the East European dissident 
millieu during the period of Communist party domination.
In the period of the two PI symposiums on the development of 
Habermas's theory in the 1980s, none of those involved had anticipated the 
imminent collapse of Communism in Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union.
Yet, it is interesting to imagine that Habermas foresaw this possibility. 
Consequently, the politicization of his theory in PI might be seen to have been 
motivated by the wish to dispel any illusions (or pre-empt any notion) that a 
dissident or, if one prefers, any reinterpretation of Marx's theory, offered a 
potentially viable "post-Communist" alternative (for either East or West). 
Imagine-putting aside for a moment the certain distortions of vision resulting 
from the knowledge we have in the present which was precisely what we lacked 
in the moment under consideration—that Habermas's intuition was that the 
question of Marxism (or an alternative Marxism) possessed an immediate 
practical dimension in the late 1980s (while his PI interlocutors had developed 
a tone-deafness on the whole subject). What might that indicate about what I 
have argued was among Habermas's most forceful and focused political 
interventions? In this intervention (a major motivation for which was his newly 
developed critique of left Marxism) he wanted to make effective a notion of 
critical social theory which has changed from monological to a dialogical 
paradigm.
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In a sense, given the role Habermas had assigned to Critical Theory~the 
philosophy which mediates expert cultures and the lifeworld—and the paradigm 
shift defined in part in its change to a dialogical from a monological approach to 
theory, Habermas's intentions would have been sorely disappointed. For 
example in his discussion of The Rectifying Revolution", Habermas 
experienced considerable difficulties explaining the spontaneous mass revolt 
against Communism, in no way connecting it to his analysis of the "new social 
movements" he describes in TCA (Habermas 1989); at the same time, he over­
emphasizes the role of the state, principally Gorbachev's reform policies. Also, 
it can be argued that Habermas's presentation in PDM takes (however 
reluctantly) the ground defined by the discussions of "postmodemity". He 
seems to only hope that development of these discussions might proceed on 
the basis of his long-sought recognition of (and take into account) his particular 
critique of Marx and Marxism; evidence emerged in the event that the 
participants really had no pressing interest in the latter. Hence, at most it might 
be concluded that interpretation of Marx's theory, rather than having been 
conceded to Habermas, was simply abandoned. If this were the case, it should 
be expected that Marx's critique of capitalism will again move to the center of 
attention, as many questions were left untended. Though Habermas failed to 
stimulate much discussion of his fully developed critique of Marx and Marxism 
(particularly of the "praxis philosophy", attributed to what has often been 
referred to as Marxist Humanism), the more general aim I have argued was 
integral to Habermas's theory formation-the replacement of Marx's theory with 
a "critical theory" which could dispense with Marx-seems to have succeeded. 
For example, consider two prominent represenatives of the type of "Left" 
Marxism Habermas brought into focus as he developed his social theory, 
increasingly understanding the latter to be the only viable critical theory
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alternative in the 1980s and 1990s. He took issue with Agnes Heller 
(Habermas 1981), associated with the Budapest School, inspired by the work of 
Lukacs. He then continued his criticism of her theory in PDM ("On the 
Obsolescence of the Production Paradigm"). However, several years later he 
noticed a significant shift in her position, along with Andrew Arato's; Habermas 
pointed out that the two of them had adopted the central features of his theory in 
their recent work (Habermas 1992a).
In a more graphic negative example, Mihailo Markovic, one of the 
principal theorists of dissident Marxist humanism in the Communist party- 
dominated European countries (and the one who leveled the most explicit 
critique of Habermas's theory in PI in the 1980s) joined the Serbian nationalist 
movement of Slobodan Milosevic, serving in the Yugoslav government during 
the genocidal war initiated by Serbia in Bosnia in the 1990s.
These examples both point backward (to the beginnings of Habermas's 
challenge to dissident, non-Communist Marxism) and forward (to the collapse of 
an important strand of Marxism which critiqued Communism philosophically 
and politically, but collapsed along with it—its ostensible opposite). The late 
1980s unexpected collapse of Communism, the perhaps even more shocking 
collapse of the dissident Marxism which opposed it, followed by a “barbarism in 
the heart of Europe"--the 1990s war in the former Yugoslavia while the 
“triumphant" West and NATO stood by passively for several years- made more 
problematic than ever the question of a theoretical and practical alternative to 
"private" capitalism or "state socialism". These observations form the 
background for the following brief consideration of the “Excursus" in PDM 
(Habermas 1990a, 75-82).
The "Overcoming" of Western Marxism
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"The Obsolescence of the Production Paradigm" might be conceived as 
Habermas's "great divide", separating his historical situation of the postmodern 
problematic from his discussion of those thinkers from whom its adherents draw 
their inspiration. This "great divide" essentially argues that the failure of 
Marxism is pivotal to a crisis in social theory which is assumed to require a 
critical dimension at the same time there is, a) the self-understanding of 
postmodern social theory that Marx and Marxism is hardly relevant to more 
pressing concerns; and, b) a persistence of Marxism even when it implicitly 
concedes the "obsolescence of the production paradigm".
Recall that in a little noticed footnote which appeared as early as in his 
discussion of Marx in Knowledge and Human Interests Habermas dismissively 
referred to the theories of Marcuse and Karel Kosik, asserting that their 
"phenomenological Marxism", "governed the interpretation of Marx in several 
socialist [sic] countries" (Habermas 1972,29). Earlier, when I referred to this I 
questioned what seemed to be a rather pointed attempt to, at the least, play 
down the serious political transgression, and veritable threat, a philosophic, 
dissident Marxism represented in the Communist countries (which Habermas 
calls "socialist", "peoples democracies", or later, "state socialist"). Recall that (in 
addition to a philosophical, active dissident Marxism) these countries had 
experienced spontaneous mass revolts practically from the moment of Stalin's 
death in 1953.
In any case, at the moment of publication of Knowledge and Human 
Interests, the Soviet Union invaded Czechoslovakia, overseeing the 
dismantling of "socialism with a human face". The humanist Marxism of 
dissident intellectuals like Kosik, who was imprisoned in the wake of the 
invasion, was integral to this somewhat neglected 1960s freedom movement.
In retrospect, it is difficult to find in Habermas's voluminous writings criticisms of
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the Soviet Union and East European Communist regimes, or much recognition 
of those dissident Marxists who developed critical concepts from a re­
interpretation of Marx in those countries before 1989. Moreover, it is only in the 
post-1989 period that the dissident Marxism, that is, contemporary Marxism to 
the left of established Communism, really becomes a focus of Habermas's 
critical attention.
"The Obsolescence of the Production Paradigm" includes a remarkably 
compressed summary of Habermas's understanding of the aporias of Western 
Marxism unseparated from the solution he believes his own theory-especially 
TCA-offers. In line with an assumption of "praxis philosophy's" interpretation of 
Marx, which serves as the foil throughout PDM, Habermas proposes to 
complete his earlier analysis of Western Marxism by extending his critique from 
the "Weberian Marxism" of Lukacs (and its development in Horkeimer and 
Adorno) to that strand of Marxism initially derived from the way Marcuse 
appropriated the concept of the lifeworid in his, "dissertation on the 
philosophical concept of labor" (Habermas 1990a, 76).
Two rather dramatic points remain relatively undeveloped in this 
"Excursus". Habermas begins by offering a thesis which states that Marx's 
"theory of value", when compared to the "philosophy of reflection" with which 
Hegel attempted to link an idea of rationality or reason with a theory of 
modernity,
still intermesh[es]...the normative contents of the notions of practice and 
reason, productive activity and rationality...though not in a wholly 
perspicuous fashion (Habermas 1990a, 74).
Underlying this lack of clarity, Habermas writes, is that,
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As long as the theory of modernity takes its orientation from the basic 
concepts of the philosophy of reflection-from ideas of knowledge, 
conscious awareness, self-consciousness—the intrinsic connection 
with the concept of reason or rationality is obvious. This is not as 
evident with the basic concepts of the philosophy of praxis, such as 
action, self-generation and labor (Habermas 1990a, 74).
With this thesis Habermas grounds the 1920s inception of Western 
Marxism, which,
brought the originally practical meaning of the critique of reification to 
bear against the economism and historical objectivism of the Second 
International (Habermas 1990a, 74).
Habermas's idea is that Western Marxism's (primarily Lukacs's) critique of 
reification was qualitatively different than the "originar-that what Habermas 
believed to be Marx's original practical intention (to bring back into the horizon 
of the lifeworid through revolution that part of societal integration which had 
been systematized) was overlaid (and thus perhaps forgotten) with Western 
Marxism's theoretical challenge to established Marxism's hegemony.
Habermas's account leaves out a crucial (if academically marginal) 
consideration. Recall that the Second International, in which the German 
Social Democratic Party predominated, already collapsed in all but name when 
the latter supported war credits to the Kaiser, opening the door for World War I. 
Lenin, preceding Lukacs, was ironically perhaps the first "Western Marxist" 
(Anderson 1995). Already, in 1914, Lenin broke philosophically with Second 
International Marxism, which he himself had previously supported uncritically.
Lenin's 1914 Conspectus on Hegel's Science of Logic (Lenin 1961, 85- 
237) provides evidence of this philosophic break. It consists of a sometimes 
detailed analysis of the three sections of Hegel's Logic-Being, Essence and 
Notion. Lenin's consideration of the Notion (which culminates in Absolute Idea)
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makes up the greater part of his notes and commentaries. With observations 
such as, "Consciousness not only reflects the objective world, but creates it" 
(Lenin 1961, 212) he is clearly breaking with his own philosophic past, as well 
as from the "economism and historical objectivism" of established Marxism.
Lenin's 1917 State and Revolution (completed in the hours immediately 
prior to the beginning of the Russian Revolution) then returns to Marx (primarily 
the Critique of the Gotha Programme) with new, Hegelian eyes. This is seen 
most clearly in how Lenin, in the spirit of Hegel's concept of negativity (despite 
Hegel's own accomodation to the state), posits the abolition of the state to be 
the goal of the Russian Revoluton. However, curiously enough, Lenin's new 
look at what is essentially Critique of the Gotha Programmes uncompromising 
critique of LaSalle's mode of politicization of secular, philosophical ideas in 
their relationship to social organization and the state~or more precisely Marx's 
warning of the implications of an institutionalization in (socialist) party form of 
ideas which retrogress below Hegel's concept of second negativity—does not 
bring to Lenin's attention in his State and Revolution even a glimmer of a 
philosophy/organization problematic. This is difficult to explain in respect to 
someone previously so closely associated with the thesis of the revolutionary 
party as had been Lenin, and the particular, controversial subject matter of 
Marx's Critique of the Gotha Programme.
It is then even more difficult once the depth of Lenin's philosophic re­
organization is recognized; Lenin alone among the Marxists of the time 
achieved that type of re-organization at such a pivotal point in the gathering 
crisis of capitalism and its ostensible opposite, socialism. Raya Dunayevskaya 
attributes both Lenin's originality in re-establishing the dialectic in Marxist 
thought, and the limitation of it which subsequently became clear, to Lenin's 
interpretation of Hegel’s Notion (Dunayevskaya 1989a; 1991). Lenin believed
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that, in Hegel's constellation (in the Notion) of the practical and theoretical idea, 
primacy was ultimately granted the former. Dunayevskaya, in contrast, 
demonstrated that a complete understanding of Hegel's Absolute Idea was 
contingent upon following Hegel's direction in the final paragraph of the Logic. 
There Hegel, after earlier criticizing the Practical Idea, as while greater than the 
Theoretical Idea, was still inadequate without the theoretical moment; at that 
precise point, Hegel insists (Hegel 1976, 843-844) that the reader follow his 
philosophy through the Philosophy of Nature (Hegel 1970) and the Philosophy 
of Mind (Hegel 1973). In fact, the final three syllogisms of Philosophy of Mind, 
which were added to the work only in the last year of Hegel's life, "drop" the 
Logic altogether (Dunayevskaya 1992, 10). Dunayevskaya depicts the 
movement of the last three syllogisms (of Philosophy of Mind) as adequate to a 
concept of Absolute Idea "as new beginning" (Dunayevskaya 1989a, 3-46).
She distills from Hegel's Philosophy of Mind a dual movement-from practice 
and from theory-under Hegel's categories of a "self-bringing forth of liberty", 
and a "self-thinking idea" (Dunayevskaya 1989b, 13). In these latest of Hegel's 
concepts Dunayevskaya detects the philosophic precursor of a dialectical social 
transcendence of capitalism and its political party form, as well as what she 
terms ’state-capitalism" (in reference to the Communist states Habermas, and 
most others on the Left, usually referred to as "state socialist").
Lenin, though first among "Western Marxists" in returning to the 
revolutionary potential of Hegel's dialectic, was unable to break with the 
concept of the vanguard party, or even to pose its problematic nature in terms of 
the abolition of the specifically capitalist social formation. Though he certainly 
wanted little to do with the ideas prevalent in the Second International, he 
continued to share the concept of the Marxist party prevalent within it, a
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veritable fetish not unlike the one Marx described as "attached" to the 
commodity-form of production.
Habermas overlooks the question of Lenin’s 1914 philosophic break with 
both his own past and Second International Marxism (Jay 1984); in doing so, he 
mistakenly narrows to Lukacs's 1919-23 relationship to Max Weber’s ideas the 
scope of the inception of Western Marxism. Following from this, it can be 
argued (contrary to Habermas's account in the passage which follows) that 
Western Marxism must be traced to, and can only be understood in the context 
of, Lenin's pioneering, though incomplete, break from Second International 
Marxism:
Two different lines of tradition developed within Western Marxism, 
one determined by the reception of Max Weber, the other by the 
reception of Husserl and Heidegger. The early Lukacs and Critical 
Theory conceived of reification as rationalization and developed a 
ritical concept of rationality on the basis of a materialistic appropriation 
of Hegel, but without appealing to the production paradigm for this 
purpose...
On the other hand, reading the Marx of the Early Writings in the light of 
Husseriian phenomenology and developing a concept of practice with 
normative content, the early Marcuse and later Sartre renewed the 
production paradigm, which had been washed out in the meantime, 
but without appealing to a concept of rationality for this purpose 
(Habermas 1990a, 75).
This development of Habermas's conceptualization through 
disassemblement of the Western Marxist and Critical Theory tradition is 
remarkable. I pointed to its significance in his earlier work (Habermas 1985), 
where the idea seemed to first emerge. One major implication, noticeable as 
well in the earlier piece, is the removal of Marcuse (at least his "early" work) 
from the Critical Theory (though not the Western Marxist) tradition. 
Habermas's abrupt claim for his own mature critical theory is even more 
dramatic:
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These two traditions start to converge only with the paradigm shift 
from productive activity to communicative action and the reformulation 
of the concept of the lifeworid in terms of communications theory-a 
concept that had been connected in various ways with Marx's 
concept of practice ever since Marcuse's dissertation on the 
philosophical concept of labor. That is to say, the theory of 
communicative action establishes an internal relation between 
practice and rationality (Habermas 1990a, 76).
Before I comment further on this claim, Habermas's other significant point 
must be mentioned. While Critical Theory developed from the early Lukacs's 
relationship to the ideas of Max Weber, “praxis philosophy" attempts to "stay 
alive", or gain new life, from the ideas of the later Lukacs. The detailed account 
of Lukacs's work an assessment of this observation would require is beyond the 
scope of this study; what is crucial here is that, according to Habermas, all 
Hegelian, Western Marxism is indebted in one way or another to Lukacs. This, 
of course, ignores Lenin's philosophic re-organization. Again, Habermas 
continues,
This paradigm shift [from productive activity to communicative action] 
is motivated by...the fact that the normative foundations of critical social 
theory could not be demonstrated along either of the traditional lines I 
have analyzed the aporias of Weberian Marxism elsewhere. Here I 
would like to discuss the difficulties of a Marxism that renews the 
production paradigm while depending on phenomenology in 
connection with two works that have come out of the Budapest 
School. Ironically enough, the late Lukacs already paved the way for 
an anthropological turn and a rehabilitation of the concept of 
practice in terms of the "world of everyday life" (Habermas 1990a,
76).
It should immediately be noted that Habermas implies here that the 
difficulty present in contemporary Marxism is identical with social theory as a 
whole. Elsewhere, Habermas has argued for the utility of a bilevel concept of 
society on the basis of the inadequacies of either system or action-oriented
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
324
approaches in modem social theory. Later, Habermas develops this 
implication-that his social theory is significantly different, compared to 
traditional ("bourgeois") ideas, Marx's critique of the latter, and the "unflinching 
critique" (defined by the trajectory of Western Marxism) of Marx's theory 
(Habermas 1990b, 11).
More specifically, there appeared (from the 1920s) two principal strands 
of (Hegelian) Western Marxism Lukacs and Marcuse seemed to have moved 
between. On the one hand, the early Lukacs—concerned with Weber's 
rationalization thesis-represents the genesis of Critical Theory, while the late 
Lukacs kept alive the "praxis philosophy". On the other hand, early Marcuse 
opened the door for "praxis philosophy", while the late Marcuse (with his 
acceptance of the thesis of instrumental reason and one-dimensionality) carried 
forward Critical Theory's (Weberian) Western Marxism. Again, an investigation 
of the relationship of the ideas of Lukacs and Marcuse (particularly an attempt to 
explain the role of their interpretations of Hegel and the young Marx in the 
peculiar mirror-image reversals of their utilization of the concept of the lifeworid) 
would take this study beyond its necessary focus on Habermas's relationship to 
Marx's ideas. I intend to continue to trace what I have conceived to be 
Habermas's attempt to shape the history of Critical Theory such that his own 
social theory is seen to emerge solely available for contemporary development; 
here I can only indicate that what is centrally at issue, even for Habermas in the 
mid-1980s, is discussion of the Practical Idea, and the relationship of Marx to 
Hegel, particularly an idea of a "materialist appropriation" (Habermas 1990a,
75) of the latter by the former. In Chapter Four, I considered in some detail how 
an alternative interpretation (though not without its own limitations) of Marx's 
social appropriation of Hegel's dialectic is not only superior to Habermas's
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imputation to Marx of a materialistic appropriation, but points to serious 
difficulties of important elements of Habermas’s justification of his own theory.
Meaning of Socialism Today
"What does socialism mean today?: The rectifying revolution and the 
need for rethinking on the Left* (Habermas 1990b) contains, on the one hand, 
what appears to be a mere recapitulation of Habermas's various critiques of 
Marx and, on the other hand, an attempt to provide a new dimension to that 
critique in light of the collapse of Communism in Eastern and Central Europe. 
Thus, in the contingency of historical events, the article argues for an essential 
consistency of successful development of Habermas's critique of Marx. It 
affirms the soundness of Habermas's approach to Marx's theory over the course 
of several decades, but also suggests that events in Eastern and Central 
Europe (and perhaps Russia) pointed specifically to his own theory, the only 
available alternative for a Marxism (now either Eastern or Western) facing total 
political annihilation. The new dimension of Habermas's approach contains a 
thesis that the difference between his own theory and others is more basic (and 
emancipatory) than that which can be found, a) between Marx's theory and 
those typical of the "bourgeoisie" he criticized; b) between traditional Marxism 
and Marx's theory and, c) within Marxism, eg; between East and West.
If this an accurate assessment of Habermas's intentions in the article, 
then the crucial next step for him would be to demonstrate; in addition to the 
significant distinction of his theory, its own relevance for the constitution of a 
new beginning in any effort to alter the stubborn preponderance of certain 
features of modem societies Habermas holds are socially destructive but 
alterable.
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Hence, after considering his preliminary comments on Marx's Communist 
Manifesto, I will turn to the content of a list of theoretical arguments Habermas 
presents which he insists "form the sole basis on which impulses from the 
Marxist tradition can be taken up today" (Habermas 1990b, 14). In conjunction 
with this point, I intend to show that Habermas, in lifting points, virtually 
unchanged, from his 1960 article, "Between Philosophy and Science: Marxism 
as Critique", argues for the future of his theory by prominent reliance on a 
retrospective view. This view presupposes a design for the replacement of 
Marx's theory and of Marxism at the very inception of his own theory. This is 
perhaps the closest Habermas comes to actually offering for consideration such 
an intention. I have argued throughout this study that the replacement of Marx's 
theory and of Marxism was a consistently motivating factor in the constitution of 
Habermas’s theory from its inception. Finally, I will assess Habermas's most 
difficult task. Putting aside the question of the success or failure of the two 
previous tasks, Habermas must attempt to demonstrate the immanence of the 
liberating features of his own theory in current political events.
In a sense, the opening paragraph of "Rectifying Revoluton" already 
includes the conclusion to Habermas's analysis of the unfolding events in areas 
of Europe dominated by the Soviet Union. Yet, this opening paragraph 
contains an interesting ambiguity. Habermas begins,
The revolutionary changes in the Soviet bloc have taken many 
different forms. In the land of the Bolshevik revolution itself, a reform 
process is underway that was introduced from the top, from the upper 
echelons of the Communist Party (Habermas 1990b, 4).
Thus, initially, Habermas seems to propose to highlight a variety of actual 
and potential oppositions to the Communist status quo, the form which
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originates from above merely one of several. Yet, the paragraph's concluding 
sentence asserts,
It [the reform process introduced from the top of the Communist Party] 
created the preconditions for the changes in eastern Central Europe 
(including the Baltic states' declaration of independence) and in East 
Germany (Habermas 1990b, 4).
Then, in briefly considering each country in turn, Habermas begins with a 
description of Poland: there, "the revolutionary changes were the result of the 
sustained resistance of Solidarity supported by the Catholic Church"
(Habermas 1990b, 4).
What is somewhat inconvenient, then, for the structure of Habermas's 
argument, is that the Polish Solidarity movement began a full decade before the 
revolutionary events he is describing. Empirically, a more telling argument is 
that the Polish Solidarity movement "created the preconditions" for Mikhail 
Gorbachev's turn to glasnost and perestroika. The East European dissident 
movements often including tendencies of Marxist Humanism antithetical to the 
the ruling Communist parties, were an important feature of the Left in the post- 
World War II period. With Solidarity at its height, and 20 million workers on 
strike, the Communist Party in Russia (as well as in Poland) calculated it had 
perhaps its last chance to reform-or else perish. As it turned out, of course, 
while it attempted the former, the latter was, in effect, its fate anyway.
Habermas, when he refers to Solidarity, describes it as "solidarity 
supported by the Catholic Church" with an apparent intention that the phrase 
should practically be pronounced as a single word, thus obscuring the Polish 
revolt's basic continuity with the history of East European dissidence from under 
Communism, with and without the Catholic Church. The curious fact is, 
throughout the 1960s and 1970s, at least, one would be hard-pressed to find in
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Habermas's theoretical writings any positive recognition of East European 
dissident Marxist thinkers, or reference to the rather full history of workers' revolt 
against the Communist status quo. In contrast, the interior of the opening 
paragraph already puts Habermas's own theory at the center of what Habermas 
presents as revolutionary events, though only immediately, with no reference to 
their own history.
Contrasted to the opposing pulls of administrative political modernization 
from above (Russia), and the impulse for a return to pre-Communism from 
below (Poland), Habermas writes of the reform process that,
Its results, and, more importantly other unintended consequences, 
condense to form a process of revolutionary development, to the 
degree that changes occur not just at the level of general social and 
political orientation, but in essential elements of the power structure 
tself (of particular importance are changes in the mode of legitimation 
as the result of the birth of a political public sphere) (Habermas 1990b,
4).
As will become clear in my consideration of Habermas's theses on Marx 
and Marxism, he argues that a clear perspective on the meaning of the 
overthrow of Communism, including the prospects for what happens after, is 
seriously compromised due to fundamental asssumptions of Marx and Marxism, 
among not only the more Stalinist or Leninist Marxists, but among what he 
characterizes as the non-Communist Left; the latter, wittingly or not, share 
fundamental asssumptions of Marx and Marxism. Habermas believes that his 
theory is uniquely situated to expose those assumptions, the first step, at least, 
toward the needed adoption of his own theory. In fact, Habermas's central 
intention is to demonstrate both the urgency of his theory, and its historical 
vindication vis a vis its critique of Mane and Marxism in the analysis of 
immediate events. The events themselves afforded a unique opportunity for
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such a demonstration. All forms of Marxism (as well as the full spectrum of other 
theoretical and political tendencies) could hardly avoid accounting for 
themselves in the epocal changes so rapidly unfolding.
Habermas's theoretical and practical critique centers on the "non- 
Communist Left". This is perhaps because, among those guided (wittingly or 
unwittingly) by Marxist assumptions, they are the most likely to be saivagable for 
the continuation and development of his own theory. In line with his most 
general thesis (that his theory vis a vis its critique of Marx and Marxism has 
been vindicated and is the latter*s only viable, critical alternative) he makes an 
initial claim that, at least in the case of East Germany,
...voters here have definitely not ratified what the opposition had in 
mind when it overthrew the Stasi-oligarchy with the slogan "We are the 
people"; but the vote they cast will have profound historical effects 
as it interprets this overthrow-as a rectifying revolution. They want 
to make up for all the things that have divided the Western half of 
Germany from the Eastern for forty years—its politically happier, and 
economically more successful development (Habermas 1990b,
5).
This claim emphasizes that the vanguard (the opposition which took to 
the streets and overthrew the stasi-oligarchy) of "revolutionary changes" which 
gather force and become “revolutionary events", had a different orientation, 
perhaps to their surprise, than the East German masses afterall. Consequently, 
only the distinctiveness of Habermas's theory and the spontaneous expression 
of the masses eager to trade Communism for the "form of an affluent Western 
society with a democratic constitution" (Habermas 1990b, 5) remains after the 
overthrow of Stalinist Marxism, and the very feeble interpretations offered by 
other tendencies, both socialist (characterized by Habermas as Leninist and 
reform-communist) and anti-socialist (post-modern, anti-communist and liberal) 
(Habermas 1990b, 5-8).
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Next, Habermas prefaces his explicit enumeration of the "errors and 
defects" (Habermas 1990b, 11) of Marx and Marxism with a critique of Marx's 
Communist Manifesto. A novelty of this critique consists in its implication of 
Marx in an assessment of other recent political phenomena-disintegration of 
totalitarianism in Spain and Portugal which preceded the East and Central 
European events. This was accompanied by "development of a market 
economy independent of the political system", suggesting a, "surge in the 
modernization process reaching out towards Central and Eastern Europe" 
(Habermas 1990b, 9).
The implication of Marx in this is established by attributing to a passage 
in the Communist Manifesto a "triumphalist variation" (Habermas 1990b, 9) of 
interpretation of this process of modernization—Habermas's explanatory 
variable-superseding any question how analyses in the CM fits into Marx's 
theory. Habermas presents the following passages as proof that Marx and 
Engels, "hymn the revolutionary role of the bourgeoisie". In doing so,
Habermas takes the liberty of moving the concluding sentence of Marx's prior 
paragraph to the end of the paragraph he quotes. Below, the sentences in bold, 
following the ellipsis, actually appear as the concluding sentences of Marx's 
prior paragraph in the text of the CM.
The bourgeoisie, by the rapid improvement of all instruments of 
production, by the immensely facilitated means of communications, 
draws all, even the most barbarian, nations into civilization. The cheap 
prices of its commodities are the heavy artillery with which it batters 
down all Chinese walls, with which it forces the barbarians' 
intensely obstinate hatred of foreigners to capitulate. It compels all 
nations, on pain of extinction, to adopt the bourgeois mode of production; 
it compels them to introduce what it calls civilization into their midst, that 
is, to become bourgeois themselves. In one word, it creates a world after 
its own image...And as in material, so also in intellectual 
production. The intellectual creations of individual nations 
become common property. National one-sidedness and 
narrowmindedness become more and more impossible, and
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from the numerous national and local literatures, there arises 
a world literature.(Habermas 1990b, 9).
In response, Habermas writes,
It would be hard to arrive at a better characterization of the mood 
indicated by the replies that capitalists, eager for investment 
opportunities, gave to the last questionnaire circulated by the German 
Chamber of Industry and Commerce. Only the phrase "what it calls", 
qualifying the term “civilization", betrays reservations (Habermas 
1990b, 9).
First, and most important for my current focus, this presentation and 
interpretation of the passage serves to support the dominant theme of 
Habermas's article-that Mane and Marxism share more with their object of 
criticism than Habermas's theory shares with any of the three. (The 
presentation itself consists in moving several sentences of the original text from 
the end of one paragraph to the end of the one which follows).
Second, in view of Marx's fundamental critique of the "bourgeois mode of 
production" generally, and of the Communist Manifesto's specific intent, which 
was to hasten its abolition, an alternative interpretation seems far more 
plausible. This would not take Marx's “so-called" as indicating a subordinate 
"reservation" within a triumphalist hymn. Rather than suggesting a mere 
reservation, the "so-called" indicts not only “Western" society, which is 
dominated by capital, but the prevailing self-understanding of that society.
Marx's description here of social form, and corresponding forms of 
thought, is both reminiscent of his 1844 “Critique of Hegelian Dialectic" (where 
he criticized Hegel's dialectical phrase, "at one with itself in its other as such") 
and anticipatory of his "fetishism of the commodity" section of Capital.
Previously (Chapter Three) I argued that as early as in his 1844 "Critique of
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Hegelian Dialectic and Philosophy in General* Marx's examination of the 
Phenomenology chapter on Absolute Knowledge, Marx saw in the greatness of 
philosophy’s achievement its deepest alienation. Thinking was separated from 
the subject and, even more intriguingly, from the thinker (philosopher) himself. 
“At one with itself in its other as such"-absent any further development-left the 
philosopher "solitary and alone". Finally, I pointed out that-though Marx did not 
say so—Hegel himself had already been aware of this implication and prospect; 
Hegel uses the same phrase ("solitary and alone") in the Phenomenology's 
final paragaraph.
Four years after “Critique of Hegelian Dialectic", in the passage of the 
Communist Manifesto Habermas quotes, it is not difficult to see that Marx's 
phrase, "creates a world after its own image", develops the earlier insight in a 
new field, or context, that of the unleashing of a powerful world historical force, 
apparently not necessarily accessible to the understanding of its "agents".
While Habermas (in this instance) is not concerned to read Marx's analysis 
philosophically, he clearly endorses a primarily economic approach to 
interpretation of its meaning for today. In fact, in-taking the liberty to move 
Marx's description of what Habermas would regard as Marx's understanding of 
bourgeois "superstructure" so that it follows Marx's analysis of the role of cheap 
commodities battering down all Chinese walls, Habermas falsely renders 
Marx’s approach as the type of economic determinism he consistently attributed 
to it
However, in view of my earlier reading of Marx’s "Critique of Hegelian 
Dialectic", the Communist Manifesto can be seen, in addition to its economic 
and politcal aspects, primarily as an attempt to work out the dialectical relation 
of philosophy and organization (or the social organization of philosophy) 
necessary for the abolition of capitalism. For this revolution, conceived as
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opposite to, not constitutive of, bourgeois universality, Marx was no "left 
opposition" (as Habermas seems to want to place him for the purposes of his 
present argument) serving as "civilization's" social conscience.
To look into this, it is necessary to examine more closely the section 
Habermas heads, "Marx on the logic of “civilization" (Habermas, 1990b, 9).
First, consider the expression, "...Marx and Engels hymn the revolutionary role 
of the bourgeoisie". The passage from the Communist Manifesto Habermas 
quotes (which I reproduced on p.330 above) follows several paragraphs after 
Marx's introductory sentence of his argument concerning the bourgeoisie's 
"revolutionary part". From the very beginning of Marx's description, it is clear 
that Marx neither affirms nor condemns this "part". Perhaps even more critically, 
Marx seems to imply that the playing of the part is at the same time its 
destruction. Hence, an interpretation which acknowledges only "reservations", 
or "doubts" (Habermas 1990b, 9, 10) within an overall "hymn* is simply 
implausible. Marx begins ironically:
The bourgeoisie, historically, has played a most revolutionary part.
He then continues,
The bourgeoisie, wherever it has got the upper hand, has put an end to 
all feudal, patriarchal, idyllic relations. It has pitilessly tom asunder the 
motley feudal ties that bound man to his "natural superiors", and has 
left remaining no other nexus between man and man than naked self- 
interest, than callous "cash payment". It has drowned the most 
heavenly ecstasies of religious fervor, of chivalrous enthusiasm, of 
philistine sentimentalism, in the icy water of egotistical calculation. It has 
resolved personal worth into exchange value, and in place of the 
numberless indefeasible chartered freedoms, has set up that single 
unconscionable freedom-free trade. In one word, for exploitation, veiled 
by religious and political illusions, it has substituted naked, shameless, 
direct, brutal exploitation (Marx 1964, 62).
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At least one more thing is immediately clear from the foregoing. Marx has no 
transhistorical, positive bias for revolution as such. Marx seems interested in 
assessing the bourgeiosie (and its connection to social revolution) only in so far 
as knowledge of it might assist in the transcendence of the virtually asocial (or 
dehumanized) "civilization" its predominance implies. Moreover, Marx not only 
qualifies bourgeois civilization with "what it calls". A few paragraphs after that 
"qualification" Marx indicates that there is no actual strict division between 
"civilization" and "barbarism", given capital’s growing predominance. He writes,
It is enough to mention the commercial crises that by their periodical 
return put on trial, each time more threateningly, the existence of the 
entire bourgeois society...Society suddenly finds itself put back into a 
state of momentary barbarism; it appears as if a famine, a universal war 
of devastation had cut off the supply of every means of 
subsistence...(Marx 1964,.67).
Finally, in respect to the passages Habermas quotes from Marx’s CM, I 
have noted that, though appearing in close proximity in Marx's text, Habermas 
(using an ellipsis) reverses their order.
The conclusion of Marx’s original paragraph suggests that the universal 
quality of the agency the bourgeoisie (in so far as it is essentially the 
personification of capital) represents is illusory. In the destruction of national 
and traditional characteristics, what appears is not a potential inhering in them. 
What appears is not even the result of a "synthesis" of the foreign and the 
indigenous; rather, the bourgeoisie, "creates a world after its own image", which 
implies that what appears is not even a world after its actual substance~or that 
its self-image is essentially constitutive of its "substance".
Habermas, in his moving the concluding sentence from the previous 
paragraph, attaching it instead to the end of the one following so that it 
succeeds the phrase, “after its own image", alters the sense of Marx’s critique,
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and does not grasp its depth, in Habermas's reconstructed version of the CM 
Marx is made to appear to endorse an idea of the autonomy of a sphere of 
bourgeois sociality and culture, perhaps potentially as “universal", 
"revolutionary" and effective as capital (or the economy) itself. To the contrary, 
Marx's conclusion—"creating a world after its own image"—incorporates this 
dimension of the capitalist social formation from the start, pointing to the 
particularism, and primarily self-referential (not alone self-serving) character of 
an only apparently limitless expansiveness which carries along in its wake the 
bourgeoise.
Habermas connects his analysis of Marx's Communist Manifesto to 
contemporaneity with an argument which suggests that even what Habermas 
has identified to be the remaining critical element in Marx's exposition, while 
arguably adequate in terms of what should be opposed even today, is no longer 
sufficient (or has lost its relevance) for posing (and answering) questions about 
what one should be for. He offers two observations in support of this.
First, implicitly appealing to his own critical appropriation of systems 
theory and expanding his interpretation of Marx's modifier, "so-called", he writes 
that the latter refers to a,
fundamental doubt as to whether a civilization can afford to 
surrender itself entirely to the malestrom of the driving force of just 
one of its subsystems-namely the pull of a dynamic, or, as we would 
say today, recursively closed, economic system which can only 
function and remain stable by taking all relevant information, 
translating it into, and processing it in, the language of economic value. 
Marx believed that any civilization that subjects itself to the imperatives 
of the accumulation of capital bears the seeds of its own destruction, 
because it thereby blinds itself to anything, however important, that 
cannot be expressed as a price (Habermas 1990b, 9).
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This recasts Habermas’s consistent position that labor and interaction or system 
and lifeworid were quasi-ontologicaily separate societal dimensions, which 
Marx (despite his wishes) was never successful in theoretically unifying.
Next, Habermas then rapidly undermines the relevance for today of what 
he has designated to had been, at bottom, Marx's concern. Marx, in his time, 
"put so squarely on the map...the agent (my emphais, RR) of expansion...the 
bourgeoisie of 1848" (Habermas 1990b, 9). But, Habermas writes, today the 
agent is, "an anonymous, internationally operating economic system that has 
ostensibly severed any ties it might once have had with an identifiable class 
structure" (Habermas 1990b, 9).
The implication is that Marx's (now generally outmoded) critique 
assumed the centrality of class; Marx's critique, then, was of a moment (now 
passed) of “civilization” and, strictly immanent, appealed to a potential intrinsic 
to it. In this interpretation, Marx's critical intention was to reverse the places of 
the universal (morality) and particular (the economy) by unmasking the tatter's 
appearance as the former. Moreover, according to Habermas's interpretation, 
Marx's solution required the assumption of a clearly identifiable historical 
"agency" (or subject). Marx, when Habermas mistakenly attributes to his 
economic theory a transhistorical view of labor, could be interpreted to have 
believed, quite simply, that the bourgeoisie's opposite, the proletariat, could 
assume the former's role, and “complete" the historical Enlightenment project. 
Much of my analysis of Habermas's approach to Marx has been concerned with 
demonstrating that Marx's critique of capitalism penetrated structures at a 
deeper level than an analysis of social classes alone would permit.
Keeping in mind the range of texts (both Habermas's and Marx's), and 
their periodicity, I have already taken up in this respect, it is clearly not the case 
that in this 1990 article I am considering now Habermas is restricting his
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characterization of Marx's argument to a specific phase (1848) in his (Marx's) 
theoretical development. Moreover, I shall show, while Habermas on occasion 
granted (in fact, even insisted) that Marx did historically restrict his own theory, 
Habermas usually follows this with criticism of how it was appropriated 
transhistorically, not without reasons for which Marx could, or should, himself be 
held responsible. Before I take up that argument in the article's section on 
Marx's and Marxism's "errors and defects", it is necessary to note Habermas's 
second observation directed at demonstrating that the critical element in Marx's 
description of modernity has lost its relevance.
Habermas, after pointing out that today's international economy seems to 
have uncoupled from class structure, argues that not only have western 
societies, in terms of distribution of material wealth, made Engels's description 
of "Manchester misery" obsolete (Habermas 1990b, 9), but that it is precisely 
Marx's critical "piece" of description of modernity which is constitutive of the 
"welfare state compromise" characteristic of those "western" societies. The 
"welfare state compromise" is the "answer" to the "stark words of the Communist 
Manifesto..." (Habermas 1990b, 10).
Even so, Habermas next observes, in the collapse of Communism, there
arises,
the ironic circumstance that Marx should still offer us the quotation [in 
the Communist Manifesto] that most aptly describes the situation in 
which captial scrambles into markets corroded by state socialism, in 
search of investment opportunities...(Habermas 1990b, 10).
(Contemporary "state socialism” has "paved the way" for capitalism—or 
least its revitalization).
...just as thought-provoking as the fact that Marx's doubts have 
themselves been incorporated in the structures of the most advanced
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capitalist societies...Does this mean that "Marxism as critique"...is as 
exhausted as “actually existing socialism?“(Habermas 1990b, 10).
Here Habermas refers to his own "Between Philosophy and Science: Marxism 
as Critique", first published in the German in 1960, and writes in a footnote, 
"This is the title of an essay in which I dealt with Marxism systematically for the 
first time" (Habermas 1990b, 10).
Recall that a central feature of that essay was consideration of a “law of 
value", which was not a refutation but a proposal for revision. It argued that the 
extension of state intervention to spheres previously guarded and thought to be 
justly “self-regulating” (and immune to social deliberation) had, ironically, 
preserved captialism, despite its own self-destructive tendencies. Habermas 
attributed this, despite the orthodox Marxist denial of its possibility due to an 
assumption of the crisis tendencies following from a fall in the rate of profit, to a 
defect in Marx's analysis of a labor theory of value. Essentially, Habermas 
argued that Marx ignored as "unproductive” that type of labor (technical, 
scientific) which, while not productive in terms of material objects, allowed for 
the modem explosion of the productivity of the labor which was so productive.
Moreover, in referring to passages in the Grundrisse, Habermas 
suggested that Marx had recognized the decreasing role of direct labor in the 
production of wealth, as well as the increasing role of the application of science 
in increasing economic productivity, suggesting a need to revise the orthodox 
law wherein value depended on direct labor alone. Marx is said to have 
retained the latter position in his final theory (contrary to theoretical advances in 
his prior Grundrisse).
The development of social democracy-which Habermas advocates 
politically in what is otherwise a highly technical presentation--is said to permit
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a rational distribution of a sufficiently growing mass of surplus value which, 
under the presuppositions of Marx's original labor theory of value, would have 
plunged the economy into crisis. Marx's central mistake, in not appreciating the 
real potential of social democracy, was to give up the practical side of critique; 
Marx succumbs to a "scientistic" tendency when he understands his economic 
theory as the discovery of "laws" which underly its (self-destructive) dynamic. 
Marx's theory represents a replacement of the potential of philosophy with 
science, instead of their mediation, which Habermas at this point (beginning of 
the 1960s) assigns to a revised Marxism, one which picks up a path Marx 
himself unfortunately abandoned. Habermas, then, through a proposed 
revision of the law of value, intends to restore to critical theory its "practical" 
potential. This, he makes clear, is only possible through the consolidation and 
strengthening of the social-democratic welfare state. Against this background 
the question Habermas now asks is whether the resurgence of an “unbridled 
capitalism" in the wake of Communism's dissolution, and the fact that Marx's 
Communist Manifesto, ironically, seems best to explain it, makes obsolete his 
much earlier analysis in “Marxism as Critique". Perhaps Marx's "law of value” in 
what Habermas understands in its unrevised form, anticipates and best 
explains, contemporary developments, at least from the perspective of the 
potential consequences for the masses in the formerly Communist countries.
The section which follows in Habermas's article, "Errors and Defects", is 
a strong warning against any prospective utility in a return to Marx's theory. The 
critical substance of Marx's theory has already been "incorporated in the 
structure" of those countries which have reached the "economic summit" of the 
system. The revolutionary masses (in central and east Europe, perhaps 
including Russia) want to catch up. In addition, certain other features of 
modernity preclude the application of Marx's theory, despite other contemporary
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empirical features which might suggest the return of its relevance in the wake of 
Communism's collapse.
In Part II of the article Habermas prefaces his section on the "Errors and 
Defects" of Marx and Marxism by positing a quandary in which the "non­
communist Left in West Germany" finds itself in the wake of the mass overthrow 
of Communism. On the one side, there is the tendency of some to have 
preferred “the bird in the hand"; on the other, there stand the "idealists" who 
treat socialism as an "idea abstractly confronting reality". The latter are rightly 
"convicted of the impotence of the moral 'ought' (not to mention the total 
contempt for humanity evident in any attempt at its realization)" (Habermas 
1990b, 10). None the less, according to Habermas, neither tendency need let 
"guilt by association be foisted on it for the bankruptcy of state socialism it has 
always criticized". They must, however, ask, "how long an idea can hold out 
against reality" (Habermas 1990b, 10). Among these tendencies (implied to be 
exhaustive) Habermas seems to find the "idealists" more salvagable. A section 
of the "non-communist Left" has connected to its "abstract idea confronting 
reality" the,
normative intuition of a peaceful coexistence that does not provide for 
self-realization and autonomy only at the expense of solidarity and 
justice, but rather along with them (Habermas 1990b, 10).
It is clear that Habermas's approach here recapitulates his critical 
response to Thomas McCarthy in the Praxis International symposium I 
discussed in detail earlier (see Chapter 5). There Habermas decisively 
reduced to a "shared intuition" any affinity with Marx's theory his Critical Theory 
might retain (after TCA). More importantly, now he repeats his admonition of
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McCarthy (thus confirming that his original remarks were anticipatory and 
directed at a broader theoretical tendency, rather than an individual), that,
the socialist tradition ought not to explain this intuition by the direct 
approach of a normative theory, in order to set it up as an ideal 
opposing an opaque reality (Habermas 1990b, 10).
In addition, Habermas uses the occasion to add the following recommendation, 
not present (or at least far more implicit in his comment four years earlier):
It [a normative theory] should instead be the basis of a perspective 
from which reality can be critically observed and analyzed. During 
the course of the analysis, the normative intuition should be both 
developed and corrected, and thus at least indirectly tested against the 
power of theoretical description to disclose reality and convey 
empirical content (Habermas 1990b, 11).
While it would be difficult to object to such an injunction, and other 
aspects are in need of elaboration in these prefatory remarks to the section, 
"Errors and Defects”, one particularly glaring question already arises: why does 
Habermas choose the descriptive term, "non-communist Left", instead of "non- 
Marxist Left"? I have already indicated part of the answer. Habermas believes 
that even those on the Left who are not, in a theoretical sense, Marxists 
nonetheless share, even if unwittingly, “Marxist" assumptions. Hence, 
Habermas is suggesting that these assumptions be uncovered, examined, and 
discarded. "Errors and Defects", then, opens with an introduction to a 
theoretical tradition which, Habermas indicates, provides something of a model 
for this task. He writes,
Western Marxism has used this criterion since the twenties to 
subject itself to an unflinching critque that has left little of the 
theory's original form remaining (Habermas 1990b, 11).
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Here, in a second indication of a recapitulation and development of his 
analysis in the Praxis International symposium, Habermas refers to Martin Jay's 
Marxism and Totality (1984). In the introductory remarks to his symposium 
comments, Habermas had noted his regret that he had not had available to him 
Jay's just-published work. As it turned out, Jay's contribution (on Habermas's 
aesthetic theory) was the one among several which did not draw out serious 
critical reservations in Habermas's response to the symposium participants.
In addition to Habermas's notification that he will only "go over a few of 
the ways" it has become apparent the Marxist tradition, "remained rooted in the 
original context and limited scale of early industrialism", the major point to hold 
in mind in assessing the six "errors and defects" is the specification that here his 
critique is directed not at generations which followed Marx's, but at, "Marx and 
his immediate successors" (Habermas 1990b, 11). In many of Habermas's 
previous analyses it has not always been clear what, if any, distinctions should 
be drawn between Marx and Marxism. In some contexts, aspects of Marx's 
original theory were vital, eg; in the sense all classical theory might serve as a 
source for re-thinking contemporary problems, while much, or all, of the Marxist 
tradition which followed failed to keep up with either "reality" or developments in 
other areas, or disciplines, concerned with social theory. In different contexts, 
the neo-Marxist tradition, eg; some moments of Critical Theory itself, where 
Habermas sometimes places his own work, was especially qualified to 
adjudicate among all theories-including a judgement of Marx's own as 
specially (and objectionably) materialist (Rockmore 1989). The confidence with 
which Habermas assumed this role was primarily on the basis of a modem 
concept of rationality, which he had brought into its own. Since, in the several 
chapters preceding this one, I have treated in detail the substance of the six 
"errors and defects" Habermas proposes to "go over" here, I will merely indicate
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the central theme of each point, and briefly issue reminders about the problems 
I find with his positions.
The first three “errors and defects" are identified as a result of 
Habermas's critique of the notions (attributed to Marx) that, a) industrial labor, 
and its social organization, provides the model for a future (socialist) society, 
superior to the existing one, which has superimposed on it an exploiting class; 
b) Hegel's basic concepts can be reformulated in a “scientific spirit”, and with 
their application constituting a critique of political economy, the process of 
capital accumulation, thus exposed as an illusion, can be dispelled, opening 
the way for society's rational re-organization; and, c) conflict rooted in opposing 
social classes, in a concrete sense, are usable for analysis upon which theory 
bases its calculations. Habermas holds that the latter notion is no longer viable, 
since in increasingly complex societies there are, "no straightforward 
connections between the social, subcultural, and regional surface structures, on 
the one hand, and the abstract deep structures of a differentiated economic 
system (intertwined with complementary state intevention) on the other..." 
(Habermas 1990b, 12).
In respect to a): I have argued that intrinsic to Marx's theory was the 
notion that "industrial labor" belonged to, was specific to, capitalist society. 
Marx's capital aimed to demonstrate that "proletarian" labor could, and should, 
be abolished, opposite in conception to Habermas's attribution to Marx of an 
idea of industrial labor serving as a "model" for the kind of society which might 
follow the capitalist; b) After Moishe Postone, I have recognized a perspective 
which finds in Marx a sociohistorical epistemology. Hegel's dialectic 
philosophy, explained such that while society per se is not grasped as a totality, 
capitalist society alone is so structured, on the basis of social relations mediated 
by labor; c) More specifically, the relation between abstract and concrete labor
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constitutes the deep, abstract structure of the capitalist social formation, 
compared to the concrete expression of social classes, property ownership and 
the market.
Habermas draws a sharp distinction between, on the one hand, the three 
criticisms listed above, and the three which follow. The fourth (e) in particular 
holds that Marx's,
restricted and functionalist analysis of constitutional democracy has had 
far more serious practical consequences than the defects discussed so 
far...he retained a purely instrumental attitude to its institutions. The 
Critique of the Gotha Program tells us in no uncertain terms that Marx 
understood a communist society to be the only possible realization of 
democracy (Habermas 1990b, 12).
In the context of Habermas’s article, an analysis of the collapse of 
Communism with attention alternately focused on the practical and theoretical 
dimensions characterizing it, there is little room for any other interpretation of 
the statement just quoted than that Habermas believes that the Communist 
governments just overthrown not only represented a practice that legitimated 
itself with reference to Marx's theory, but did so on the basis of a substantially 
correct interpretation of that theory. This seems due to Habermas's consistent 
position that the efficacy for social revolution of the abolition of private property 
in the means of production represented the core of Mane's theory.
Recall that in his Critique of the Gotha Programme Marx severiy criticized 
two competing tendencies whom proposed to unite in an histortically first 
German Social Democratic party. His critique of the proposed unity program of 
the Lasalleans (after Ferdinand Lasalle) and Eisenachers (the ostensible 
Marxists) was written in the form of marginal notes to the draft party programme. 
Much of the severity of Marx's criticism of the program was directed at Lasalle's 
not-so-subtle attempt to re-write Marx's theories such that they appeared
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relatively innocuous, not only for the powers that be, but to party activists with 
varying theoretical orientations. Lasalle's apparent goal was to insinuate the 
incipient revolutionary organization into a niche in Bismark's 'social state".
In this, Marx, far from "instrumentalizing" constitutional democracy, 
recommended that the two tendencies, rather than compromise O’ust to achieve 
"unity") on the conceptual breakthroughs represented in his recently completed 
Capital, simply agree upon a common strategy for practical reforms. Among the 
principles Marx did not want compromised for immediate political expediency 
was the concept of labor I have discussed at length in the preceding chapters, 
as well as the very concept of revolutionary organization itself.
In a word, Marx was willing to dispense with socialist "unity", if it meant 
the institutionalization of an organization uncoupled from the conceptual 
achievement Capital represented. Compared to Habermas's strong criticism of 
Marx for instrumentalizing constitutional democracy, it seems more accurate to 
say that the thrust of Marx's marginal notes to a proposed instrumentalization of 
constitutional democracy was to warn of the lack of utility in such a course, and 
to resist the "instrumentalization" of theory (his own).
Habermas's fifth point (e), similar to Albrecht Wellmeris approach I 
described in Chapter Five, proposes to critique Marx's theory by, in addition to 
pointing out specific defects in its content, attempting to demonstrate basic 
"errors" in theoretical strategy as well.
These "errors" are meant to be understood as theoretical 
"presuppositions" unconsciously held, or insufficiently examined, by the 
theoretical founders and compounded in their impact by his or her followers 
whose stake becomes a matter of faith in and/or commitment to dogma. In this 
case, Habermas holds, Hegel's teleology of "Being" is replaced with that of 
"History": "The secretly normative presuppositions of theories of history are
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naturalized in the form of evolutionary concepts of progress". The "secretly 
normative presuppositions" result in a concealment of the "margin of 
contingency within which any theoretically guided practice is bound to move" 
(Habermas 1990b, 12). Habermas explains this point by concluding:
By abolishing any sense of risk in those who will have to bear the 
consequences of action, it also encourages a questionable type of 
vanguardism. On the other hand, a totalizing knowledge of this sort 
feels in a position to make clinical evaluations of the degree of 
alienation, or success, of particular forms of life in their entirety. This 
explains the tendency to see socialism as a historically priviliged 
concrete ethical practice, even though the most a theory can do is 
describe the conditions necessary for emancipated forms of life. What 
concrete shape these take is something for those eventually 
involved to decide amongst themselves (Habermas 1990b, 12).
As is clear from the conclusion to this point, Habermas understands 
Hegel's dialectic, Marx’s critical social theory, and the development of Marxism 
such that, at a sufficient level of abstraction, they can all be grasped in their 
limitations with a single concept: with the maturation of Habermas's critical 
social theory, the negative implications of a "monological" theory can be fully 
appreciated such that a "dialogical" theory of communicative action and reason 
would be thought to be irresistible.
The final point (f) makes virtually irrelevant any remaining question of 
whether further examination of Habermas's previous research might yield 
productive insight into any positive relevance of Marx's theory for 
contemporaneity. In another reconnection to 1960 of the present article's 
theoretical summation of the status of Marx's theory, Habermas argues for a 
credible conceptual continuity from "Marx and Engels" (apparently a single 
perspective) to "codification by Stalin" (Habermas 1990b, 12). Recall that in the 
article, 'some Difficulties in the Attempt to Link Theory and Practice" (Habermas 
1973, 1-40)-which served as the introduction to the English version of Theory
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and Practice (the collection where "Marxism as Critique" first appeared in book 
form)—Habermas linked Marx to Stalin through a concept of organization, said 
to have been "introduced" by Lenin politically, then later justified philosophically 
by Lukacs. Here, in respect to this issue, Habermas refers to Marcuse's Soviet 
Marxism (1961). This reference is designed to both ameliorate the implications 
of the continuity he has just proposed to establish, and to tie together the 
threads of this part of his analysis. Recall that he had introduced this section 
with the comment that Western Marxism (since the twenties) had subjected itself 
to an, "unflinching critique that has left little of the theory's original form 
remaining" (Habermas 1990b, 11).
Soviet Marxism, while certainly distinguishing between Marx's theory 
and Stalin's, nonetheless does not account for Stalin's theory as a 
transformation of Marx's theory into its opposite (Dunayevskaya 1992, 109). 
Thus, Habermas is able to reference Soviet Marxism as documentation of his 
claim that, at least with the passage of time, and the development of practice, 
nearly as much affinity as difference can be found in the theories of Marx, on the 
one hand and post-Stalin Soviet Marxism on the other. In view of the foregoing, 
and in return to the question I posed at the beginning, on what grounds can 
Habermas justify his conceptualization of a salvagable "non-communist" Left, 
relevant and appropriate to his intention, instead of a "non-Marxist" Left?
It is clear Habermas considers it crucial that at least one major neo- 
Marxist theoretical tradition-Critical Theory-the one, in fact, with which he has 
himself identified, has since the twenties, "left little of the theory's original form 
remaining" (Habermas 1990b, 11). As I have already noted, Habermas 
believes that the relevant critical element still traceable to Marx, has already 
been incorporated in the structure of Western capitalism. (For now I will put 
aside a major contention of my analyis preceding this chapter, that it has been
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far from decided whether, even as late as the present decade, Western 
Marxism, or Critical Theory in particular has, in the first place, ever-prior to 
Moishe Postone (1993)--satisfactorily grasped and presented Marx’s “mature 
critical theory").
In order to refine a view of Habermas's estimation of the status of Marx in 
the 1990s, it is necessary to consider in greater detail why Habermas-even 
after the implications of his theoretical critique of Marx and Marxism, which goes 
so far as to ask, in so many words, how fundamental a theoretical difference 
there is between Marx and Stalin—does not focus on the existence, possibility or 
prospects of a non-Marxist Left, which he might hope his theory would infuse 
with a new vitality, instead of a non-communist Left.
In "The Price of Social Democracy", the section which follows "Errors and 
Defects", Habermas notes that though Marxists achieved "indisputably their 
main success" in their contribution to instituting a "welfare state compromise" 
(Habermas 1990b, 13), and, it was not the welfare state that proved to be an 
illusion, a problem arose in the, “expectation that one could use administrative 
means to arrive at an emancipated form of life". Phenomenon such as the 
absorption of political parties by the state has, "kept a non-communist Left to the 
Left of the social democrats" (Habermas 1990b, 13).
The "non-communist Left", in reaction to this problem, clings to a concept 
of a "self-managing socialism". It has a difficulty in, "distancing itself from a 
holistic conception of society, and giving up the notion of a switch from a 
market-led to a democratically controlled production process" (Habermas 
1990b, 14). Habermas concludes,
This was the best way of keeping the classical link between theory 
and practice intact, but also the best way of ensuring that theory 
became orthodox, and practice sectarian.
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The same fact of institutional differentiation-besides that of the economy and 
state—makes its presence felt theoretically as well.
Marxism has become one other, more or less marginal, method of 
research among the many that make up academic life. This 
process of academicization has brought about long overdue 
revisions, and cross-fertilization with other theoretical approaches.
The fertile combination of Marx and Max Weber shaped the field of 
sociological discourse as early as the Weimar period. Since then, the 
self-criticism of Western Marxism has been completed largely in 
universities, producing a pluralism mediated by academic 
discussion...As a tradition [Marxism's] perspective benefits from being 
stereoscopic; it does not concentrate on purely superficial aspects of 
the process of modernization, and, equally, is not confined to the near 
side of the mirror of instrumental reason, but is sensitive to the 
ambiguities in the process of rationalization that plough through 
society...Many have learnt from Marx, each in his or her own way, how 
Hegel's dialectic of enlightenment can be translated into a research 
programme. However, the reservations I enumerated in sections (a) to 
(e) form the sole basis on which impulses from the Marxist tradition can 
be taken up today (Habermas 1990b, 14).
The increasing complexity of modem society—in addition to differentiation 
of the economic and political systems—makes itself felt as well in the form in 
which Marxism appears today. Political/practical impulses are distinguishable 
from Marxism's academic mediation, the former apparently in urgent need of 
infusion from the latter, which is fully explained in TCA. Recall that in that work 
Habermas explained his approach to social theory, characterizing it as the 
second attempt from within Western Marxism to appropriate Max Weber. 
Consequently, the vitality of the "Marxist tradition" is highly abstract, its limited 
potential recognizable only with a certain type of theoretical mediation of its 
differentiated social instantiations. At this point, Habermas counts his preceding 
analysis as an effective historical summation of, "the position in which the non­
communist Left found itself when Gorbachev ushered in the beginning of the
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end of state socialism" (Habermas 1990b, 14). Given the events of 1989, he 
asks, "Must people on the Left now retreat to a purely moral standpoint", is 
socialism still a goal? (Habermas 1990b, 14). Habermas's answer to the latter 
question is certainly not,
if understood in the romantic, speculative sense given it in the “Paris 
Manuscripts", where the dissolution of private ownership of the means 
of production signifies "the solution to the riddle of 
history..."(Habermas 1990b, 15).
What follows in Habermas's text is an abrupt characterization of Marx's 
1844 Economic-Philosophic Manuscripts, proposing once again that, "the 
dissolution of private property" represented the core of early Marx's philosophy. 
Moreover, Habermas links Marx's "romantic socialism" to Stalin's forced labor 
camps, holding that Marxism's ostensible belief in the controlling effects of an 
end to private property had already been theoretically discredited before, 
"recent critiques of the false totalizations of the philosophy of reconciliation 
...or...Solzhenitsyn..." (Habermas 1990b, 15). Again, re-stating theses in TCA, 
Habermas holds that what is relevant in 1844 Marx is evidence of a "romantic 
socialism" which harks back to by-passed forms of social integration-"the 
family, the neighborhood and the guild", and "Janus-faced...looks forward to a 
future dominated by industrial labor" (Habermas 1990b, 15). I have already 
commented extensively on Habemas's interpretation of Marx's 1844 Economic- 
Philosophic Manuscripts. What needs to be asked here is what utility 
Habermas might see in linking the early Marx, in particular, to the Stalinist 
regimes just overthrown, the object of his present article.
After discrediting what he believes to be Marx's "concretist" interpretation 
of socialism, Habermas proposes an alternative, an idea of "radical abstraction".
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In the section, "The Presupposition of Rationality", Habermas argues that 
solidarity
in the framework of a society with a large-scale political 
integration...is only available in the form of an abstract idea...a 
legitimate, intersubjectively shared expectation.
Everyone should be justified in expecting that the institutionalization of 
the process for the non-exclusive formation of public opinion and 
democratic political will can ratify their assumption that the processes of 
public communication are being conducted rationally and effectively 
(Habermas 1990b, 15).
Much of the remainder of Habermas's article argues for the vitalization of public 
spheres as a counter to, and as vehicles for pressure upon, the other 
differentiated spheres, the economy and state.
Structural Transformation of the Public Sphere--Revisited 
Hence, I will begin to conclude this study with a look at Habermas's 
contribution to a symposium organized for the occasion of the publication of 
Structural Transformation of the Public Sphere (Habermas 1993), the English 
translation. There he reflects on the development of his theory generally, and 
that of the public sphere, including their relationship to Marx and Marxism.
A first thing to notice is Habermas's contrasting characterizations of his 
relationship to Marx and Marxism evident, on the one hand, in his lengthy 
formal contribution to the conference (thirty-six pages, excluding notes) 
(Habermas 1992a, 421-461) and, on the other hand, in his participation in the 
summation of the conference entitled "Concluding Remarks" (Habermas 1992b, 
462-479) in the published volume. In “Further Reflections on the Public 
Sphere" (his formal contribution) Habermas centers self-critical remarks 
(directed at STPS) on what he claims was a mistaken "ideology-critical
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approach" (Habermas 1992a, 430) and, "...the weaknesses of a Hegelian- 
Marxist style of thought, all wrapped up in notions of totality...” (Habermas 
1992a, 435). In the section titled, "A Modified Theoretical Framework", 
Habermas writes,
From that time on [since TCA] I have considered state apparatus and 
economy to be systematically integrated action fields that can no longer 
be transformed democratically from within, that is, be switched over 
to a political mode of integration, without damage to their proper systemic 
logic and therewith their ability to function. The abysmal collapse of 
state socialism has only confirmed this. Instead, radical 
democratization now aims for a shifting of forces within a “separation of 
powers" that is itself to be maintained in principle. The new equilibrium 
to be attained is not one between state powers but between different 
resources for societal integration. The goal is no longer to supersede an 
economic system having a capitalist life of its own and a system of 
domination having a bureaucratic life of its own but to erect a dam 
against the colonizing encroachment of system imperatives on areas of 
the lifeworld. Therewith we have bid a farewell to the notion of 
alienation and appropriation of objectified essentialist powers, whose 
place is in a philosophy of praxis. A radical democratic change in the 
process of legitimation aims at a new balance between the forces of 
societal integration so that the the social-integrative power of 
solidarity-the "communicative force of production“--can prevail over the 
powers of the other two control resources, ie; money and administrative 
power, and therewith successfully assert the practically oriented 
demands of the lifeworld (Habermas 1992a, 444).
In contrast, in his informal remarks, Habermas states, that in revising the 
"frame of ideology critique" in the years since STPS, he sees a challenge to,
especially social theory in the Marxist tradition, which I've quite fiercely 
decided to defend as a still meaningful enterprise...! mostly feel that I am 
the last Marxist. I think, in fact, that there is a definite need to counter 
those imperatives that are still reproduced according to the capitalist 
mode of accumulation and come from a highly bureaucratized capitalist 
nation, to cope with and reverse them, at least to modify these 
imperatives. These should grow from what I would like to call 
autonomous publics of an Offentlichkeit type, so that we can have a 
lifeworld-system interaction that redirects the imperatives in such a way 
that we can contain, from the system's perspective, those side effects that 
not only make us suffer but almost destroy core areas of class and 
racially specific subcultures. Now let me lay out how it should work
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(why I think that it could work is even less believable). I don't think that 
there can be any type of revolution in societies that have such a degree 
of complexity; we cant go back anyway, in spite of all the romanticist 
antimovements. For academics, revolution is a notion of the nineteenth 
century (Habermas 1992b, 464, 469).
Moishe Postone correctly restated the original intention of the book, 
which I now see more clearly than at the time. Structural 
Transformation moved totally within the circle of a classical Marxian 
critique of ideology, at least as it was understood in the Frankfurt 
environment (Habermas 1992b, 463).
In consideration of these remarks there is a sense of having returned (in 
the 1990s) to what I pointed out was already evident in the relationship of 
"Between Philosophy and Science: Marxism as Critique" and Structural 
Transformation of the Public Sphere (in the early 1960s). The "ideological- 
critical approach", what Habermas apparently considers to be most 
characteristic of Marx's theory, he claims for STPS as well. Recall that in 
Chapter Three I had noted that after utilizing a concept of radical democracy in 
criticizing Marx's and Marxism's labor theory of value in “Between Philosophy 
and Science: Marxism as Critique", in Structural Transformation Habermas, in 
the reverse, posed Marx's analysis of bourgeois political economy such that it 
impinged on questions of authentic democracy. In this sense, the two works 
seemed to aim at a synthesis of two traditions which appeared at the time (the 
height of the cold war) to be mutually exclusive and, in fact, locked in a battle 
which could lead to mutual destruction. Here Habermas implies that Marx's 
“ideology-critical approach" led Habermas to an idea of,
a society that administers itself, that by means of legal enactment of 
plans writes the program controlling all spheres of life, including its 
economic reproduction...integrated through the political will of the 
sovereign people (Habermas 1992a, 443).
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However, recall (as I showed In Chapter Two) that this theory was 
presented as an alternative to what Habermas held was Marx’s notion of the 
idea of a public sphere left with only the task of an "administration of things”. 
Consequently, Habermas now is not criticizing what he regarded to be the 
specific content of Marx's theory, but rather its "presupposition", primarily the, 
"holistic notion of a societal totality in which the associated individuals 
participate like members of an encompassing organization..." (Habermas 
1993a, 443).
Conversely, in his informal remarks, where he views himself as the “last 
Marxist", Habermas focuses upon, "imperatives of a capitalist mode of 
accumulation" (recognition of which is implied to be characteristic of Marx's 
theory). While the “imperatives" arising out of a capitalist mode of accumulation 
might be "countered", "redirected", "coped with", "modified", or even "reversed", 
Habermas does not admit that they might be eliminated, because he has never 
fully grasped the deep structures of labor which are intrinsic to (value) 
production, and define capitalism's specificity. Marx's theoretical perspective 
on capitalist accumulation cannot be understood without reference to the 
specific nature of capitalist labor and production. According to Habermas, the 
task of revitalized public spheres is the alleviation of suffering due to the side 
effects of systematically integrated action fields (state and economy). In 
addition, these public spheres are charged with defending against destruction 
of, "core areas of class and racially specific subcultures".
From the 1960s-1990s, Habermas is generally consistent in an approach 
to Marx which views the latteris standpoint to be that of accumulation (or 
distribution), instead of through Marx's concept of labor, the contradictory form it 
assumes in mediating capitalism's social relations. Moreover, in connection 
with this, he holds fast to the one-dimensionality thesis of the older Critical
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Theory. In the example just shown, this seems to construct an insuperable 
barrier between social theory and freedom as when he projects a principal goal 
of the former to be the defense of "core areas of class".
Conclusion
A close reading of his major works brought to view Habermas's 
consistent concern with a proper understanding of the status of Marx's theory. 
From the 1960s through the 1970s his own theory did not develop so much in 
addition to his attention to a description of Marx's theory in the context of social 
theory generally. Rather, I have characterized Habermas's critique of Marx's 
theory as constitutive of his own theory. Moreover, while Habermas's earlier 
theory formation in the 1960s and 1970s remained importantly motivated by his 
search for the meaning and potential of a public sphere, a search informed by 
his understanding that Marx's critique of capitalism was essentially of the limited 
bourgeois idea of the public sphere, there was a marked shift in the period of 
TCA and its aftermath. From that point, Habermas, with remarkable persistence, 
attempted to articulate the public sphere as a vital concept, rather than as an 
historical artifact, or even as a recoverable ideal which was still, in its most 
important significances, extrinsic to his own theory. The fundamental break 
effected from the inception of the 1980s decade concerned the question of a 
constellation of the lifeworld, economy, state, and of Habermas's crystalized 
theory, itself now viewed as internal to the meaning and potential of the public 
sphere. In this, Habermas attempted to move his theory into the center of a 
public sphere, or in fact to realize his theory as constitutive of such a public 
sphere. Although understood as only one of a plurality of (existing or potential) 
public spheres, Habermas clearly viewed this, the one he participated in 
shaping as a fruitful critique of Marx's theory, as the most crucial of all. This has
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wide-ranging implications. In respect to Marx's theory in particular, Habermas's 
critique, while maintaining a substantial continuity, became more precise and 
explicit. For example, already in STPS Habermas had indicated that Marx's 
theory was, at least in one major respect, inferior to (or left behind by) the 
"bourgeois ideology” Marx criticized. According to Habermas, while Marx still 
held open the potential of the public sphere to replace power with reason, 
bourgeois theory became "realistic”. Instead of continuing to burden the public 
sphere with the task of such an absolute social transformation (the replacement 
of power with reason), thinkers such as John Stuart Mill began to view the 
public sphere as one of several formative social forces, specifically assuming 
the function of a "check" on state power, instead of as it potential replacement.
In 1990, Habermas retains an idea of the regressive character of Marx's theory. 
But in 1990, compared to 1962, Habermas now has his own theory, one which 
had not been available to Marx or Mill nor, for that matter, to himself. In 1962 
Habermas weighed the idea that Marx simply brought an idea of the public 
sphere to its logical conclusion. In this sense, according to Habermas, Marx's 
critique was superior to the mere ideology of the property-owning citizen. By 
the inception of the 1990s and the availability of an alternative critical social 
theory adequate to modem society's complexities Habermas, while offering 
more nuanced arguments in support of a view of the backwardness of Marx's 
theory, essentially argued that Marx, in "instrumentalizing constitutional 
democracy", disqualified his theory as where political or social action might 
today be grounded.
On a deeper level, the above involves a subtle, largely undiscussed, 
major shift in Habermas's understanding (and presentation) of the coherence of 
Marx’s theory. For example, within STPS, the early Marx (when he was most 
explicit about his relationship to Hegel and German Idealism generally) is
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represented by Habermas’s analyses of his pre-1844 writings, while leaving out 
entirely the 1844 Economic-Philosophic Manuscripts. With this approach, the 
young Marx's work could be presented as the purest expression of the potential 
of the principle of modem society, authentic democracy and social 
inclusiveness, adequate however only to early, not "late", capitalism.
The beginning of the 1960s' STPS's inadequate analysis of Marx's 
theory was already implied in Habermas's own radically different approach to 
the same theory at the end of the 1960s in KHI. Crucially, analysis of Mane's 
theory in STPS was bound by Habermas's central theme (which he was none 
the less to retain all the way in to the 1990s). That is, Marx 1844 Economic- 
Philosophic Manuscripts, with their detailed discussion of philosophic concepts, 
labor and social alienation, were not, of course, entered into the public sphere 
during Marx's lifetime-which covered an important time-span of the period to 
which Habermas’s theoretic concept of the public sphere corresponds 
historically. The situation changed radically in the 1960s, when it became 
increasingly evident that Marx’s 1844 manuscripts were achieving a major 
influence on an understanding of Marx's theory, including comprehension of his 
"mature theory". Even in themselves they represented an important contribution 
to an explanation of many of modem society’s (both Communist and capitalist) 
pathologies. Furthermore, this turn of theoretic events appeared to be gaining 
some practical, even political, significance, particularly in Hungary, Poland, 
Czechoslovakia, and Yugoslavia. In the face of this, and in view of his lack of 
focus in STPS on Marx's concept of labor, Habermas (in KHI) developed the 
novel argument (which, however was ambiguous) that the "non-public sphere" 
character of the 1844 manuscripts (especially their fulfillment in the 
contradictory “unoffical" and "official" versions of Marx's theory of labor in the 
Grundrisse) represented the inception of a failed strategic, "narrow
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appropriation" of Hegel's dialectic. Here "strategic" is used in the sense of the 
application of a monological theory (characteristic of instrumental reason) to 
intrinsically dialogical social relations (interaction).
Within TCA, and in its aftermath, Habermas (with an approach opposite 
to his ignoring them in STPS) categorically denounces the young Marx of the 
1844 Economic-Philosophic Manuscripts. However, new interpretations of 
Marx's Capital still figure in the constitutive process of Habermas's theory. The 
significant difference is not that he had viewed Marx's 1844 writings favorably 
in, for example, the KHI chapters, the key point there being that he took them up 
in some detail. Rather, now he takes the offensive in rejecting wholesale the 
philosophical basis of these writings in themselves, as well as what he saw as 
the philosophy embedded in them slipping through the back door into Marx's 
later writings. What made these 1844 writings vital was their continuing 
practical, political potential-first discovered by Marcuse in the 1930s, and 
extended in the Marxist humanist tradition in East Europe as a critique of 
Communism, as well as in a different way, and with considerably more 
consistency, though with less apparent impact, even in the U.S., primarily in the 
writings of Raya Dunayevskaya.
Habermas's bi-level social theory of modernity salvages as 
"contemporary" only Marx’s Capital, in so far as the latter attempts to link what 
Habermas terms the system and lifeworld levels of modem society. He casts 
Marx's 1844 manuscripts as at best naive and, at worst, wholly backward and 
regressive. Habermas conceives Marx's theory of society, which I have argued 
is rooted in these 1844 writings in a different way, as clandestinely based on an 
"expressive" model of labor, that of a social subject, which in producing objects, 
“realizes" itself—in the way any artist's self-expression comes about through the
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creation of his or her art. To this unity of objective and subjective, transferred to 
a notion of society as a whole, Habermas of course objects whole-heartedly.
Habermas's specific interpretation notwithstanding, the implication of the 
analysis in the preceding chapters is that Habermas understood more clearly 
than others the following: that even if it is granted that the theory of society 
Habermas developed over several decades constitutes a successful (and 
progressive) critique of Marx's theory, and communicative action an adequate 
alternative to Marx's expressivist conception of labor, that is far from sufficient. 
Habermas, beginning in the late 1970s, and especially in the 1980s, seeked to 
find avenues for communicative action which supported the thesis that unless a 
critical social theory which retains universalist claims is grasped socially, that 
theory is as effectively inadequate as the one it criticizes. It is at this level of 
abstraction where the most is to be learned from Habermas. The old bi-polar 
world of competing state powers has dissolved along with the little credibility 
which remained that events could be satisfactorily explained, on a one-to-one 
basis, solely in terms of any existing critical social theory. Even more difficult is 
the identification of the underlying deep structures of social domination, which 
seem to remain in place even after immense, epocal political transformations on 
a global scale, which have been witnessed in the last couple of decades. This 
is reason enough to take with the utmost seriousness the changed 
constellation, implied in the preceding chapters of this study, in which the public 
sphere and theory are aligned (and re-aligned).
While it is suprisingly undetailed and abbreviated, Habermas's analysis 
of "new social movements" in TCA is a crucial element in his justification of the 
theory of communicative action as a "progressive" critical social theory, 
compared to Marx's. There he refers to the women's, youth, Black, and 
ecological movements. These have come about in tandem with the process of
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the "colonization of the lifeworld". The state as well as the economy have 
attained a level of systematization, grounded in a logic which no longer admits 
any prospects of social or political integration. Parallel to what he believes 
Marx had already perceived in respect to labor, what Habermas characterized 
as the “monetarization of labor power", the concrete content of social integration 
and co-ordination was eroding in the face of the strategic logic of political power 
and capital accumulation.
Along with this diagnosis in the TCA, Habermas proferred advice in the 
direction of the "new social movements". These movements were symptoms of, 
reactions to, the "mediatization" of the lifeworid, the role of money and power, 
constitutive of the differentiated subsystems of economy and state. The latter 
were separated out from the lifeworid (itself structurally differentiated), and 
integrated society in a functional sense. In contrast, the other type of societal 
integration, from the perspective of the lifeworid, was social; that is, it was 
communicatively achieved. These differentiation processes had their 
counterpart in a fragmentation of consciousness, suggesting the limits of 
philosophy which corresponded to it, what Habermas, linking it to labor, terms 
the "philosophy of consciousness". The "new social movements", which existed 
at the boundaries of system and lifeworld, were unlike the older, directly political 
party-forms, exemplified in the social democratic labor movements. The former 
are intrinsically "defensive" against the encroachment of the system on the 
autonomy, identity and aspirations of self-realization. These "new social 
movements" were more about particular "forms of life", which defended against 
a colonizing system. While explaining the defensive inclinations of these 
movements as following from the logic of his anaiyis of modernity generally, 
Habermas warned against their assuming a "strategic" stance in the face of the 
political system. These movements should remain "defensive" and "self-
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limiting". The danger of attempting to act otherwise was a pull into the very form 
of strategic integration against which their own movement arose in the first 
place.
While Habermas analyzes these new social movements as intrinsic to 
late capitalism, and how they seem to confirm his diagnosis of the times, what 
became clearer by the 1990s was the implication that Habermas believed his 
theory was, in important ways, intrinsic to these movements. When he 
suggested that these “new social movements", though acting defensively, and 
in a "self-limiting" way, publicly articulate the validity of their existence, despite 
countervailing systemic imperatives, Habermas implied that his own theory (in 
so far as it represented a more or less fully worked out communicative reason) 
was ultimately constitutive of the potential success of this public sphere.
What is most valuable in Habermas’s approach to critical theory is his 
development of, and commitment to, the idea that the theoretical success of a 
social critique does not necessarily lead to an end to social domination, and 
can even lead to its intensification. Although such a notion can already be 
found in the older Critical Theory, Habermas made publicly available a detailed 
analysis of Marx’s theory, and suggested precisely where in that theory these 
consequential defects might be found. He also implied that a grasp of his own 
theory, while leaving open the question of the current (practical or theoretical) 
relevance of at least some of Marx's ideas, led beyond them. In any case, close 
attention to Habermas's own consistent return, over a long period of time, to 
Marx’s theory, even where he is most critical or in his major works focused on 
elaborating his own theory, yields a view of the full array of issues of social 
domination in contemporary society.
Even though the view of Marx's theory I have developed (with a large 
debt to Postone's arguments from within a Critical Theory tradition which has
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absorbed Habermas’s theory) in a discussion of Habermas’s various 
approaches to it is not compatible with Habermas's assessment, this does not 
imply a turn to "action'' which could supposedly directly abolish labor (as it has 
shaped capital and, in turn, been shaped by it). I have argued that labor is not 
exemplary of just one of modem society’s modes of societal integration; labor is 
central to the capitalist formation-both its early and late stages-because, 
unique to that social formation, it functions as its social mediation. In accord 
with Habermas's concern with the unique potential of a social grasp of an 
emancipatory critical theory, the need is for the development and enhancement 
of even newer social movements, which include and deepen those identified by 
Habermas. Habermas's critique of Marx, in so far as it has contributed, however 
ironically, to the re-emergence of an idea of the current potential of Marx's 
theory, needs to be made available to, and infuse, these movements from the 
start. Recent recognition of the relevance of Marx's "mature critical theory" 
(especially since it appears after many decades of relative neglect within the 
Critical Theory tradition itself) might imply the potential for this type of mature 
social movement.
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